With the Mudjahedin in the Panchir Valley
The death of several hundred Soviet soldiers in the Salang tunnel explosion at the beginning of November highlighted the cost of the Kremlin's intervention in Afghani-
Two years after the start of a massive military intervention, the Soviet forces have not yet succeeded in smashing the guerrillas fighting foreign domination. They do not any serious headway. And they are paying a heavy and
Of course, the U.S. imperialists, as well as various conservative regimes in the region have an interest in seeing the Soviet forces bled and humiliated in Afghanistan.
also have an interest in developing their own local agents. And so, there is no question seem even to have made increasing material and political price.
that they are sending in some financial and military aid
On the other hand, it is equally clear that the outside military aid to the guerrillas is not a decisive factor. The type of material aid necessary to change the nature of the resistance to the Soviet forces could not be concealed. And its political effects would be even more obvious. Such aid would inevitably involve a major war with Soviet forces on the Soviet borders.
The conflict in Afghanistan does not have that kind of dimensions. And there is no indication that the imperialists or any of the local conservative regimes are prepared to risk such a confrontation.
In these conditions, only the determined support of the overwhelming majority of the population could enable the various forces fighting foreign domination to survive. This political reality is already well established, and it makes the perspective for the Soviets grim, at least unless they are prepared to make a qualitatively greater commit-
The Kremlin's own press has begun to recognize that the Afghan operation has been a costly one. On November 8, the Soviet army's journal "Krasnaya Zvezda," published an article saying that the conflict was doing "enormous damage" to the economy of Afghanistan, and that the Soviet forces had had to "pay a heavy price" to "win the confidence of the Afghan people."
As the struggle continues and deepens, the forces fighting in defense of the Afghan people's right to self-determination tend increasingly to differentiate. This typically happens in national struggles as they mobilize the masses of working people, even in the most conservative ideological climates. The following interview points to some clear changes the struggles are producing in the leadership of the resistance, though, in the case he cites, this has not taken the form of a conscious political difference. Along with this, there are already consciously socialist oriented currents in the
Against the background of this massive and deepening struggle, it is not surprising that the fact that Yuri Andropov held some of his first discussions as head of the Soviet bureaucracy with the Pakistani chief Zia El-Haq, Afghan president Babrak Karmal, and Mrs Ghandi of India encouraged speculation that the USSR might now be prepared to make big concessions to achieve some sort of compromise settlement in
In its editorial November 17, "Le Monde" wrote: "Of course, it would be hasty to conclude from the discussions Monday that the Soviet position on Afghanistan is going to evolve. But that cannot be excluded, since it is reported that Andropov was opposed to invading the country.
"This question should be followed very closely because it will be important in any normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. Along with a settlement of its border conflict with Moscow and of the Cambodian question, Peking is demanding a gesture of good will from the Kremlin in Afghanistan in order to continue the rapprochement that started in the last weeks of Brezhnev's reign.
"One might suppose that Andropov is dreaming of playing the Chinese card to get Washington to take a more amenable attitude."
In any case, it is likely that in the uncertain situation that can be expected to accompany a change of leadership of the totalitarian bureaucracy in the USSR, problems as acute as those caused by the Kremlin's Afghan war will play an important role and increase the instability of the bureaucracy's rule at a critical moment.
Not the least important of these problems, moreover, is the encouragement the Afghan resistance has given to the peoples subjected to national oppression by the Soviet bureaucracy, such as the Poles in particular.
Neither they, nor the Kremlin chiefs can have forgotten that the last major change of leadership in the Soviet Union, Stalin's death, opened up the way for the explosion of resentments against the regimes imposed and maintained by the power of the Soviet Dr Jean-Philippe Tabard, a member of the International Medical Aid Association has just returned from Afghanistan. He was based in the Panchir region, north east of Kabul. It is a strategically important valley since it finishes up on the KabulUSSR road.
An AMI medical team, which was looking after Afghan Mudjahedin fighters was there during several military offensives carried out by Soviet occupation forces and Afghan government troops. Dr in late October.
developments in Poland, and in the solidarity movement with the Polish workers, and an eye-witness report of the resistance in Afghanistan today.
In addition there are substantial background articles. on the economic situation in the Spanish state - which is an impor tant factor in watching the new political developments, and on Uruguay.
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We publish this interview as information material on the development of the situation in Afghanistan. We refer readers who want to know the Fourth International's position on Afghanistan to read the resolution adopted by the May 1981 International Executive Committee (IEC) of the Fourth International meeting, entitled "For an independent, federal and socialist Afghanistan" (publicly available in English from Intercontinental Press, 410 West Street, New York, 10014 New York, USA). -+ able situation in all left - just like understand very
Q: Did these tr
A: Massud's tactic is to not stand and fight - which is understandable - since his fighting forces are only a tenth of those who are attacking him and they are much less well equipped. At strategic positions he has units which try and resist but he withdraws as soon as that becomes bad and opts for commando-style operations. Before they only did this at night since the Soviets did not move at night, but now the Soviets also move at night so Massud changed tactics and attacks both day and night but always with small groups capable of withdrawing
Q: It is more or less Mao Zedong's strategy of revolutionary war?
A: In fact they do talk about it and people say Massud has read Mao Zedong and Vo Nguyen Giap.
Q: So you have to mainly look after civilian wounded? 12
A: Yes, people injured by bombs, especially those notorious fragmentation bombs whose shrapnel cut people to shreds. If a fragment hits your foot it is torn apart, if it gets your arm, as a minimum you have an open fracture with large chunks of flesh torn away. I saw a ki ripped away. th va ei va fo ing, Sc bu de ci ar ar th ev a house. inhabitants already left?
A: Almost all of them. During this second offensive - which I observed - I estimate there were at least 60,000 people who found refuge in the mountains and adjacent valleys out of a population of some 100,000 people. Only the old people - thinking they would not be harmed - stayed behind in the villages. In general they were right. I've heard contradictory the Logar region, but in the Panchir region the Soviets were content to lock them in.
Q: And we don't know why they with-
A: There are various explanations. A British journalist I met out there, who had already been eleven times in Afghanistan, thinks that all the Soviet offensives are very precisely programmed down to the exact days required. Therefore once the day comes for ending the mission the troops go back to base whatever the success or failure of the offensive . haps he's right. But in this case it seems very bizarre that the withdrawal was so quick. The Dara valley takes a minimum six hours to cross at a good walking pace but the withdrawal was made in one night. This was particularly rapid since a military withdrawal takes another four hours on top of this, and it is a region where neither tanks nor lorries can pass and one goes only on foot.
Q: Do the Soviets suffer losses?
A: The figures Massud gives are pretty high. I am naturally wary of figures given only by one side but I've observed that up to the May 1982 offensive all the figures given by Massud have been confirmed by diplomatic sources in Kabul - confidence in him. For the May/June offensive he says 3,000 Soviet troops were killed, 180 tanks destroyed and 20 helicopters and Migs. I can assure you that there were certainly significant material losses. I've seen wrecks of all sorts. In May the Mudjahedin attacked Bagram airport (60 km north of Kabul) the main Soviet airbase and destroyed 24 grounded aircraft. This figure has been confirmed in Kabul.
Q: What arms do they have?
A: They have the classic Kalashnikov assault rifle. Nearly all the Mudjahedin are now equipped with them. One no longer sees the old English Lee Enfield Mk III which is still used in other regions. They have 13 anti-aircraft weapons, including big tripod mounted automatic machine guns which can be transported over several kilometres in two hours and artillery cannon mounted on wheels.
Q: Where do these weapons come fro
A: From Pakistan and are all marked with the Chinese triangle which does not me supplied by Chinese. There are also heavy weapons which come from Egypt, the only coun try which officially recognises its aid Everything goes through Pakistan. relations between Pakistan and the resistance movement established within its borders at Peshawar are rather good at the
Q: What about the relationship be tween the internal resistance and the Afghan political parties based in Peshawar?
A: It is difficult to judge. The three 'fundamentalist' parties based in Peshawar seem to me to have eighty percent of the Afghan resistance behind them. The numerically biggest is the Harakat-e Enquelabe-e Islami (Movement of the Islamic Revolution); the second, the Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society) is the most important military force, and the third, the Hezb-e Islami (Islamic party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) is now rejected by all the other parties. The alliance between nationalists, fundamentalists, indeed some progressive forces in my opinion seems to work quite well in Peshawar in terms of dividing out financial aid and arms. The Hezb-e Islami is not only rejected by everyone else but it excludes itself from unity with the others. Massud himself went so far as to tell me that Hezb-e Islami was: "a worse enemy than the Russians!"(1) In the interior the resistance needs the Peshawar parties since arms can only pass through there. Some resistance leaders have good links -like Massud who is a member of Jamiat-e (1). The Le Monde of 4th November 1982 reported fighting between the different movements in the Koh-e Safi mountains near to the Panchir valley. The Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddir Hekmatyar, a fundamentalist party, is carrying out an offensive to regain its influence over villages in this region which have fallen into the hands of rival factions. Hezb-e Islamic suppor ters are therefore in an armed opposition to the coalition regrouping Jamiat-e Islami, Harakat-e Enquelab-e Islami and a dissident grouping from Hezb-e Islami led by Yunus Khales. The Le Monde journalist quotes a local Jamiat-e Islami chief who stated that the Hezb-e Islami "had gone as far as striking the village women, even the Soviets did not go as far as that.' The journalist further notes that in this region such fighting has become more important than actions against Soviet and Afghan government troops.
Islami. Others only use the parties for arms supplies.
Q: Is the resistance unified in the Pan-
A: Yes it is. It is entirely controlled by Jamiat-e Islami. Only one village is supposed to be favourable to Hezb-e Islami. north of Afghanistan, whose Rabani, are all politically controlled by Jamiat e Islami. But in this country differences are sometimes much more related to ethnic divisions than ideology.
Q: Is it true that other resistance centres have sent aid to those in the Panchir region?
A: Figures are a bit contradictory, but it is certain that other resistance groups have sent reinforcements, particularly the Hazaras. I've heard reports of 1,000 fighters. In my opinion such a figure is difficult to accept - moving 1,000 Mudjahedin about is not an easy matter. But there is certainly support from Shamali, Nuristan and Hazarajat ... And without doubt Massud's biggest victory is to have brought together these forces to support his front. He has thus
Q: During your stay in Panchir did you get to know about military actions in other areas of the country? offensive in the Logar region which turned out very badly for the resistance because there all the parties are fighting one another. More than 2,000 Mudjahedins were supposed to have been killed. I found out about this in Peshawar because when you are in a region like Panchir, one knows practically nothing about what is happening elsewhere - except through the BBC which is listened to to get news from other regions of Afghanistan. News also reaches Kabul about the operations carried out by other forces on the Shamali plateau which are more or less controlled by Massud. Reports mention that
Afghans follow.
government tary morale?
Wor
Literacy class in Afghanistan (DR)
A: It is difficult to say. They are very worried, especially the adults. However they are all very much in solidarity with the Mudjahedin. At the end of the offensive the people expressed themselves with one voice: 'We've kicked them out!' It was really their victory as much as the fighters. But at the same time they suffer from big psychosomatic problems, difficulties in sleeping, headaches, etc, is understandable given the intensity of the bombing in the region. But they are
Q: Has there been a political evolution in the resistance?
A: We spoke a lot with Massud. His objective is the Islamic revolution. what does that mean? When we asked him 'like Khomeini's in Iran?' he replied *No, Khomeini has not put forward anything for the people in his Islamic revolution' and he added "The Koran is not a political ideology'. He understands this very well and even compares the Koran to the Gospels, saying In your countries you can draw out two hundred political ideologies from the Gospels, from Pinochet on the far right to the left. It's the same thing with the Koran. We hope that the Jamiate Islami in Peshawar develops a policy from the Koran for us. Here on the front we have other things to do?
We asked him precisely which policies he would like to come out of that but his answers were much more vague.
We took him up specifically on the question of women and he replied that the present condition of women in Afghanistan did not conform to the Koran. For example he said that women should not have to give dowry and should have the right to choose their husbands. According to him this problem has to be looked at when the war finished.
He even pointed out that all the problems which had caused the 1978 Noor Mohammad Taraki coup d'etat such as the problem of sharing out water, land reform, education, women, were going to