The invasion of Panama and its consequences
PANAMA THE FOLLOWING Is the balance sheet of the US invasion made on January 8 by the Revolutionary Workers' Party, a revolutionary Marxist organization in Panama. The text has been somewhat shortened for space reasons.
HE United States' most recent and
T
most brutal aggression against Panama began at 1:00 am, December 20, 1990. The empire sent in
24,000 soldiers, in what is regarded as its biggest military operation since the Vietnam war. More than 14,000 of these troops were already on the bases in the canal area recognized by the 1977 Carter-
Torrijos treaty. The others were brought in, starting on December 18, mainly from
Fort Ord in California; Fort Beenin in
Georgia; and Fort Bragg in North Carolina.
Heavy artillery and aerial bombardment was concentrated on the main barracks of the Defense Forces in Panama City and
Colón, as well as in the town of Río Hato in Coclé province. A large number of them were razed to their foundations.
The assault met with strong resistance in most of these places, which was sufficient to cover their evacuation, massive distribution of arms to the civilian population and the destruction of important documents. The main defensive operation was the withdrawal of the military from the bases and their melting into the population in order to prepare for hand-to-hand fighting in struggles that took on the aspects of guerrilla warfare.
Surprise attacks on U.S. forces
This was reflected by the virtual disappearance of the Panamanian forces from the cities at both ends of the canal and subsequent sustained surprise attacks on major US military targets around the canal itself, such as Quary Heights, the central headquarters of the Southern
Command and the Clayton base, as well as the thwarted attempt to assassinate the vice president installed by the Americans,
Ricardo Arias Calderón of the Christian
Democracy, and the constant harassment of the invasion forces in the first days. International Viewpoint #180 • March 12, 1990
At the naval base in Coco-Solo, on the Atlantic coast, isolation of the site by a body of water made retreat difficult. Here the garrison waged a heroic resistance, forcing the invading forces to retreat at various times. After that, the Americans decided to bomb the base, an action that many consider a cowardly slaughter of dozens of young Panamanians.
In San Miguelito, a densely populated neighborhood in the capital city, where one of the Defense Forces units had its headquarters, fierce and prolonged fighting took place, in which elements of the population participated. The resistance was broken only after several days of aer-
Despite the invaders' numbers and their superior military technology, less than 3 thousand trained soldiers, along with hundreds of civilians, both men and women, who had been given arms, kept the gringos out of Panama City and Colón for three days. Owing to the determined resistance in the first days, on December 23 the US government sent in another 2,00 soldiers, bringing its force up to 26
The immediate result of the US aggression, the retreat of the Defense Force and the inability of the invading forces to control the situation, was the notorious absence of law and order in Panama City and Colón. The Dignity Battalions commanded popular expropriations of bourgeois businesses of all sizes and types, causing losses of more than 4 billion dollars, according to the employers' organizations first estimates. The Panamanian economy, hard hit by the US government's sanctions in February, was brought to its knees.
The dignity battalions played a leading role in the patriotic resistance, one that was later distorted by the invaders' press and their local acolytes. The formation was encouraged of defense committees against them in the outlying neighborhoods of the capital and the areas where the middle class live. This situation limited the mobility of the militia and Defense
Force units, whose members had disguised themselves. They were informed on by civilians who saw them as defenders of Noriega.
army to consolidate its hold. On December 24, they began the second phase of their intervention, establishing order.
Except at the Río Hato base and the
Tomás Herrera Military Academy, there were no battles in the interior of the coun try. When the resistance seemed to decline in the capital and Colón, various military units in the interior announced their intention not to fight, to wait for the American army and recognize the government established by the invasion.
On December 23, the new government decided to abolish the Defense Forces and establish the "Public Force." To head this institution, it appointed Colónel Roberto Armijo, a former member of the general staff of the Defense Forces, who had gone into exile some months ago because of an accusation that he was involved in one of the attempted coups against Noriega.
Subsequently, lieutenant Colónels Daniel Delgado and Carlos Arosemena King, who are said to have commanded the stiff resistance in San Miguelito, joined the Public Force. Gradually almost all the officers of the Panamanian army did the same. Most of them were pensioned off or definitely retired on January 2
More than 3,00 Panamanian, men, women, children, heroic patriots, lost their lives as a result of the invasion. The US government had to admit that Operation Just Cause was not the three-day excursion they expected.
U.S. conceals number of casualties
The US forces have concealed the number of their casualties and losses of military equipment. The violent clashes and the constant harassment of the patriotic forces, which forced the US to send in more troops, must have caused greater losses than 24 dead and 300 wounded.
President Bush claimed that the mission had four objectives: (1) To protect the more than 35,000 Americans in the country; (2) to protect the canal; (3) to reestablish democracy in Panama; (4) to capture
General Noriega. But it is well known that their real objective was to get rid of a regime that they had not been able to control since 1970 and which, justifiably or not, inspired national feelings and publicly defied the US government.
The intervention was the culmination of a destabilization plan that included a prolonged and devastating low-intensity conflict. For many months the US government had mounting interventionist operations in the republic, starting with the open and shameless participation of US embassy officials in organizing and financing the opposition parties. Then there was the imposition of economic sanctions — the illegal seizure of Panamanian money and property deposited in the United States; suspension of the annual payments for the canal; preventing US companies in Panama from paying their tax obligations.
Then when the economic sanctions failed to achieve the desired results, the US
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4
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PANAMA However, the means created new dilemmas, such as deciding the character of the new armed force, its role in internal and external security, its subordination and oversight by the US and the role of this force in what is supposed to be the joint defense of the canal. For later on, the problem arises of what sort of armed force there will be in the country after December 31, 1999. Or, will the US use the disarmament and reduction of the national armed force as an excuse for not withdrawing its troops in accordance with the agreement.
LONDON: INVADING US. TROOPS SEIZE THE NOTORIOUS MAGGIE THATCHER, WHO FOR
YEARS HAS ALLOWED THE BRITISH TO UNLAWFULY DRIVE ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE ROAD. started military provocations, staging military exercises outside the canal These acts of intimidation cost the life of a US soldier on December 16. He was shot by a Panamanian soldier. The decision to invade was taken after the latest economic sanctions rebounded directly against the imperialists' allies in Panamanian society. All this happened as January 1 was approaching, when a Panamanian was supposed to take over administering the canal, and the US had rejected the functionary proposed by the regime. Moreover, it was well known that since the failed coup d'etat of October 3, the government was preparing the militia for irregular combat, reinforcing and expanding the Dignity Battalions and forming Committees to Defend the Fatherland and Dignity (CODEPADI) in the public institutions.
The government installed by the invaders is made up of people who have advocated capitulation to the US for a long time, and who in the difficult conditions created by the invasion cannot even offer an appearance of independence in the relations with the empire.
The invasion has installed a government, which besides being a puppet, changes the political configuration in Central America.
Another effect of the invasion, the one most desired, is that a goverment as abject as the present one will authorize maintaining US bases after December 31,
1999, when US forces were supposed to leave the country. While the present situation represents a turn in favor of the US and the continuation of its presence in Panama, it does not definitely resolve the conflict between the nation and the empire, which dates from the middle of the last century. After a time, the length of which cannot be predicted, the Panamanian people will resume their struggle to build an independent, sovereign and democratic nation, when the promises it accepts today prove as hollow as all those in the past.
The new government is ushering in different times, reminiscent of those before the 1968 coup d'état, as regards oligarchic government, ties with the US and relations with the "blocs" in the world. However, the conditions it inherits, including the consciousness of mass organization, and the difficulties it will have to face as a result of the economic disaster engendered by the sanctions and the invasion, demands for payment of the interest on the foreign debt that the imperialists are making, unemployment, the massive layoffs underway and expected in both the public and private sectors, as well as the impossibility of meeting all needs in a short time, do not point to times of peace or prosperity.
Moreover, it is likely that such problems will soon bring out the differences in the ruling group, which is an alliance of various economic forces unable to reconcile their interests in the past and who caused the crisis that led to a military takeover in 1968. It also includes sections with different perceptions as regards the national struggle.
### Joy greets Invasion
The Panamanian population responded to the invasion with a disconcerting joy, to an extent that offered a basis for the claim that the invading army were liberators. This depressing reality reflects the growing frustration of the masses at the inconsistencies of the former regime, its failure to meet their needs when they were facing falling living standards, while the functionaries of the regime were displaying their privileges and corruption was accepted as a way of life.
The military defeat of the patriotic forces was not only a result of the overwhelming military and technological superiority of the aggressor but also of the political disarray inflicted by the Noriega regime, which resisted any democratization of the state in the direction of people's power.
As a method of governing, it maintained the manipulation of sections of the population and the imposition of orders from the top down without discussion. It had been obvious for a long time that this method of governing reflected the bourgeois limitations of the nationalist consciousness of the power centers of the former regime and a lack of confidence in the masses and their organizations.
The destruction of the Defense Forces seems to have solved the immediate and medium-term problems of the United
States and the Panamanian oligarchy. It got rid of an institution that functioned autonomously, with uncontrolled powers, and which was publicly hostile to them.
Bý resorting to force the US has stressed its self-proclaimed manifest destiny to control the world and impose its democratic values, especially on those countries that it considers in its backyard. The violence of the US invasion has forcibly altered the history of Panama, imposing a course that was programmed a decade ago but which could not carried out because of the opposition of objective forces within
Today a direct and open alliance has been established between the Panamanian oligarchy and US imperialism, which has sufficient initiative and power to try to turn back the calendar of nationality and
The political reality since the invasion points to hard times for the masses, their movement and their organizations. The economy is prostrate, and the needs of the masses will certainly not be a priority for the new regime. The patriotic organizations are suffering, if not the direct effects at least the indirect ones of the defeat, in which the joy produced by Noriega's ouster has thrown them on the defensive and left them struggling to survive.
military victory over the
Defense Forces and their subsequent abolition involve the breaking of an institution that was being forged into part of the Panamanian nation and of its struggle for full sovereignty. This tragic transition in the history of the fatherland will leave permanent scars, despite the efforts of imperialism and the ruling oligarchy.
thousands of armed men recently downgraded to policemen have certainly suffered a loss of dignity and identity, and this is undoubtedly going to represent serious problems for the future in Panamanian
Guns were distributed massively and many of them have been recovered by the army. That is going to be another complication in the medium term.
Panamanian under 40 years of age, who would have been 20 at the time of the coup d'état, do not known from their own experience the style or consequences of an oligarchic government. They only know reformism, which they came to hate. This situation, among others, will give the new regime time to take form, and this in turn will require determination and patience from the patriots in carrying out the tasks 5 that accrue to them. * March 12, 1990 • #180 International Viewpoint
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HHH
Elections strengthen
Baltic push for
USSR
In the February 23 issue of Reede, Mark Tarmak cited the Sajudis leader Landsbergis as saying that the Lithuanian election was a contest between the independent CP and Sajudis. If that was so, it was a tricky sort of competition, since Sajudis backed most of the members of the independent independence
CP elected in the first round. Tarmak also cited Rumualdas Ozolas, a member of the bureau of the independent Lithuanian CP, who was on the list backed by Sajudis, as saying that the independent Lithuanian