HAITI Namphy decided to dissolve the electoral council, independent of the government, which was charged with organizing the elections. Strikes and demonstrations followed. The objective was the ousting of the military government. Faced with this danger, the Duvalierists mobilized their forces. In the towns, the army remained in control. In the countryside, section chiefs, soldiers, and gangs of old or new tontonsmacoutes retook the offensive and imposed their will, sometimes at the price of massacres, as in the Jean-Rabel district. Therein lies one of the contradictions of the American plan - the system of the section chiefs and the tontons-macoutes is still indispensable for the maintenance of order in the countryside.
1987 elections drowned in blood
Finally, the elections of November 29, 1987, were drowned in blood. On that day, hired thugs and soldiers attacked the polling stations and sowed terror in the capital and in certain regions. The organizations of the "democratic sector", more or less linked to the Socialist International, subsequently declared that they had not thought that the Duvalierists would dare to behave in such a fashion. In the preceding weeks they had preferred to close their eyes to the exactions of the Duvalierists and the soldiers, and had in no way encouraged the population to organize its defence. This was a grave setback for these organizations. A great part of the population had followed them in what was a true electoral adventure.
After this the population is no longer ready to place its confidence in these bankrupt politicians, nor to participate in elections, which could end up once more in a massacre. It knows full well that it is illusory to struggle for free elections as long as the sectors which are opposed to them are so powerful and have armed force. It is not disposed to pay the price of battles between politicians and knows well that it is not through elections that change will come - even if an honest man could be elected, he would be a prisoner of the military.
After the army had made Leslie Manigat president of the republic, a reversal of alliances took place. The "liberal" bourgeoisie had until then supported the attempts of the "democratic sector" and the so-called "civil society" (bringing together fractions of the petit and middle bourgeoisie) to oust the Duvalierists from the state apparatus. These sectors drew their prestige from their ability to channel the popular mobilizations, strongly helped in this by the use of radios.
During the first half of 1988, noting the evolution of the relation of forces, the "liberal" bourgeoisie turned towards the rest of the dominant classes. And after the 10 ment for the Institution of Democracy in overthrow of Manigat, the MIDH (Move-
DEMOCRACY
1 IN
HASTI
urcadio Haiti) of Marc Bazin, protégé of U.S. imperialism, advocated "a realistic appreciation of the forces opposing each other socio-political chessboard" and accepted General Namphy's offer of dialogue. It was followed down this road by the PANPRA (Haitian Revolutionary Progressive Nationalist Party), today a member of the Socialist International.
After the coming to power of General Avril, in September 1988, the two parties tightened still further their alliance and accorded de facto critical support to the military regime. They presented themselves as representatives of the financial backers represented by the United States and France, hoping thus to influence Avril's policy, and persuade him to resign after the elections.
Avril plays several games at
General Avril has been trying to play several games at the same time. He is conscious of the grave social crisis that Haiti is experiencing, and of the necessity for a strong state power. "The Presidential seat is too hot for a civilian", he explained with lucidity. Besides, he is not going to do anything that does not have the support of the thousand men who constitute the Presidential Guard. It is the latter which saved him from an attempted coup in April 1988. It is today a coalition of gangs that breaks into houses and sows terror when night falls, without sparing the bourgeoisie. Foreign aid has been strong ly reduced since November 1987, and now that Avril has had to put a brake on the cocaine traffic, the soldiers help themselves to the state coffers and take what they need from the civilian population.
Acting under the pressure of these new "Tontons-Macoutes", Prosper Avril has become an uncontrollable element in the
HAMAN MILITARY eyes of a good part of the bourgeoisie, as was the case with Namphy when he was overthrown in September 1988. This is also the opinion of the imperialist powers who had thought they could rely on their men inside the army. Prosper Avril must at the same time maintain his support in the Presidential Guard and the Duvalierist sectors, and remain within the limits acceptable to the United States. From this dilemma stems an apparently incoherent policy — he announces the holding of elections, but does everything to remain in power, he nominates an electoral council but goes out of his way to block its functioning. For their part, the United States have despatched to Haiti an ambassador experienced in difficult missions. In the 1970-72 period, Al Adams was one of the functionaries of the U.S. embassy in Saigon, and worked towards the "Vietnamization" of the war. In 1983-85, he was assistant in the struggle against terrorism. If he does not succeed in organizing elections and erecting a democratic facade, at least he will be in a position to help Avril to break the popular movements. And is that not the essential thing?
Certainly the situation today is hardly favourable to the popular organizations. After the mobilizations that followed the overthrow of Namphy in 1988, the population is once more enclosed in silence and fear, as it had been a year before. However the fire continues to burn under the cinders. The massive success of a number of general strikes testifies to this. And, while their base is certainly narrower than in 1986 and 1987, the popular organizations have succeeded in structuring themselves and have maintained their activity, often more thought out than in the preceding years. Al Adams knows well that it is in this deep going activity, axised around a long term perspective, that the real danger for the established order resides. *
East Germany: the new Anschluss
EAST GERMANY lation to abandon all hope that the regime could reform itself. For many, above all the young, who did not feel tied to the country by decades of constructive work, the only possibility to "realize a better life" was to leave the GDR.
The possibility of mass flight appeared when Hungary announced the opening of its borders with Austria in May 1989. For
IN THE LAST MONTHS of 1989, the regime in East Germany was overthrown by a mass movement. The fall of the Stalinist regime in Czechoslovakia soon followed and a few weeks later the Causescu dictatorship in Romania toppled. These events meant the end of Stalinist rule in Eastern Europe, and at the same time the disintegration of the organizations intended to integrate the Soviet bloc economies, COMECON, and the
Warsaw Pact military alliance. The postwar order in Europe, its division into an imperialist bloc and a bloc of bureaucratized post-capitalist states is dissolving. This signifies a profound change in the situation in Europe and a reinforcement of imperialism.
ANGELA KLEIN
U
NLIKE in the Soviet Union or
Hungary, the overthrow of the
East German regime was carried out by a popular mobilization: this was a revolutionary overturn in the sense that "those on top could no longer rule in the old way, and those below could no longer live in the old way". From the beginning, the motor force of the revolution was democratic demands: the right to free and public expression, an independent judiciary, pluralism, free elections, rule of law, and popular participation in the running of society and state.
Opposition called on people not to leave GDR
The slogan that summed up this mood
"we are the people". In midhave left the GDR since its foundation. After 1961, only a few people took the risk of flight; some tried to test out whatever field of action was open to them inside the existing structures, but most took the road to "inner emigration". Periods of reform were always the result of similar moves in the USSR.
The authorities, however, did not want to get involved with perestroika. It correctly feared that the process would get out of control and would mean the end of the SED regime. As the leadership of a "rump state" constantly compared with the other, capitalist, half, the SED feared political and economic liberalization more than any other East European regime, more even than the Soviet leadership.
the East German citizens who traditionally spend their holidays in Hungary, a direct route to mass emigration was in front of them. The mass exodus began in August and continues to this day. This situation where it is possible for people to emigrate en masse from a country whose government they reject without being able to change, is unique in Europe. External circumstances, language, culture and common traditions facilitate the move to a country that they do not consider to be foreign.
GDR migrants get special treatment in West
On the other side, the West Germany government, pretending to speak in the name of "all Germans", offers them, from the first day of their arrival, every possibility for immediate integration into society (money, housing, work and so on). The citizens of East Germany enjoy, because they are Germans, privileges compared to other foreigners and even to West Germans from the poorer classes.
It was the daily flight of thousands of people, then the process of organization of the previously illegal opposition, and finally the development of an ever growing mass movement, that led to the fall of the regime. These elements, added to the sudden opening of the wall, that has presented the GDR with extraordinary economic problems, have determined the rhythm and direction of political develop ment in the following weeks. These general conditions have also influenced the formation of new political forces:
best was
September, the opposition forces organized to exploit the paralysis and passivity gripping the ruling SED's Politburo. They
I'VE FOUND A SUPPLY called on public opinion not to seek the solution for their problems by fleeing to
OF IMMIGRANT WORKERS
West Germany, but to attempt a revolu-
WHO SPEAK GERMAN AND tionary renewal of the GDR. These forces included the United Left (VL), the New
DON'T LIKE TRADE UNIONS!
Forum (NF), "Democracy Now", and later on the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
The process of political revolution in
East Germany has been marked by special characteristics that distinguish it from the other East European countries.
First of all the reform process was much delayed in East Germany. As a result it erupted with all the more violence. Since
1953 there has been no mass movement in the GDR. Before the building of the wall the masses found a way out for their discontent through leaving for the West. A total of 3.5 million people, mostly young,
This attitude led the East German popu-
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• The revolution took place in the PESSiN 11
International Viewpoint #181 • March 26, 1990
EAST GERMANY street, whether on the road out or in the demonstrations. There was no political leadership. The opposition groups tried to have an influence, but they did not organize this.
• At the start, there was no process of self-organization by workers in the factories. Later, a number of groups, notably the United Left (VL) tried to stimulate it, but it has been difficult to get off the ground. Workers made up the majority of demonstrators. They wanted to put pressure on the regime to undertake reforms. Insofar as they were disappointed many of them packed their bags and went West. This remains a simpler alternative than that of building structures and alternative forms of rule. After the fall of the wall, another possible solution appeared, the simplest of all: reunification with West Germany.
At the start the dominant tendency was towards a "renewal of Socialism". In mid-November, the Sociological Institute at the Academy of Sciences stated that 87% of East German citizens believed in the possibility of constructing democratic socialism. On November 24, 83% were still for keeping the GDR as an independent and Socialist state. Only 10% were for reunification.
Mood changes suddenly in
Leipzig
A few days later, on November 27, at the regular "Monday demo" in Leipzig, the mood changed: 200,000 demanded not only free elections, free functionaries of the regime, but also "Germany, one fatherland". The climate also changed to the right. The demonstrators began to be more and more aggressive towards anything that seemed left-wing. Nationalist, xenophobic and even antisemitic slogans multiplied. Today, it is risky for the left to take part in the Leipzig demonstration. Only small groups dare to do it, distributing leaflets saying: throw away the GDR". They are abused and physically attacked by the demonstrators. New Forum orators are interrupted
"Reds, get off the demo" and "put the left in concentration camps". The Republicans, an right-wing force in West Germany, who agitate openly and provoke violent confrontations, are tolerated. According to recent opinion polls, 76% of the GDR population are now in favour of reunifica-
How to explain this turnabout?
• In the first place, despite rapid advances, the process of self-reform and self-renewal has been too slow and has appeared too hesitant to be really credible and arouse new hopes. The SED faces an impossible job, that of simultaneously dismantling its own regime while creating 12 the backbone of a new political leadership, that is to say, it is supposed to both dissolve its power and keep it.
• At first, all the attempts of the SED reformers to get the party to regain the initiative, while reforming it, were successfully thwarted. In September/October, changes only took place under popular pressure and always "too late" masses to have confidence in the SED Ten weeks of mass flight passed before Honecker's resignation (October 18); two months passed between October 9, when the regime renounced a "Chinese" repression and December 1, when it renounced the leading role of the party. The conflicts around the dissolution of the Stasi (political police) reinforced the widespread fear that the SED was organizing the reform only as a way of safeguarding its power
• During the Extraordinary SED Congress, that opened on December 8 against the will of the old leadership, the reformers took the leadership of the party. But they too proved unable to give a clear lead for renewal. The delegates settled their accounts with the Stalinist past and clearly came out for political pluralism. But the Congress imagined that, by purging the conservative wing from the party and the old guard from the state structures, renewal was achieved. It did not throw down the existing structures of domination and made no effort to push forward autonomous citizens' initiatives, which could have formed the basis of a new political order. At the same time, it has been getting ready for the electoral con"Strengthen the SED" remains their slogan. A lot of oppositionists were disappointed by the outcome of the Congress.
During January, the disbelief of the population in the possibility of the state and party reforming itself were further reinforced. At a leadership meeting, the new party boss, Gregor Gysi, claimed that the party had the right to keep the fortune that accumulated during the period when it held monolithic power (and therefore the right for the party to take from the state). The new Prime Minister, Hans Modrow, brushed aside the Round Table that was set up in mid-December, declaring that he could not accept that it should put any pressure on him. Everybody, he said, must respect the existing rule of law (that is to say the rule of bureaucratic
Finally, the government antagonized many with its purely formal dissolution of the Stasi. In reality, it proposed to keep it by creating a new "Service for Protection of the Constitution". Only when the other coalition parties threatened to leave the government did Modrow give in to the demand of the Round Table and promise to delay the formation of a successor to the Stasi until after the parliamentary
• During the extraordinary SED Congress at the end of January, it became clear to everybody that the reformers have
Well at least I've shown you the countryside (from Polityka) failed to establish the party (now called the Party of Democratic Socialism PDS) as a leading force in political life. The entire leadership of the Dresden district left the party the same weekend. They have been followed by a whole series of tendencies constructed around diverse platforms. The party has begun to break up. Its membership has dropped from 2.3 million in October to 800,000, and the bottom has not yet been reached. The opinion polls give the SED/PDS some 5% of the votes for the March elections. Opposition groups fail to find alternative
• In this short time, the opposition groups could not find a way to set up a credible alternative. The only exception has been the social democrats. These weaknesses are due to the circumstances under which they had to work during the SED regime. They had no possibility to take root in society (which applies above all to the left and its aspirations to acquire a working class base) or to organize their
Their political preoccupations were democracy, peace, human rights and antifascism. Only a small part of them had asked the question of how an alternative non-capitalist economic order was supposed to work.
The intelligentsia, which was previously almost entirely connected with the SED, has been profoundly marked by the work of building a post-capitalist state for 40 years, a state that they have often had to defend against the systematic attempts of the FRG to call into question the existence of the GDR. Its most well-known representatives are on the left. It is characterized by a serious attitude to theory and by a thoroughgoing assimilation of socialist ideas, including from the West. Many of
the "thinkers" of the West German left (Bloch, Dutschke, Rabehl) came from the
Their first analyses of the explosive situation were made in 1988. Even so, the opposition was surprised by the strength of the eruption and the direction that it took. Above all, the political revolution found itself faced by a problem that it (as well as the West German left) was not ready for: the sudden opening of the wall, and, connected with this, a sudden confrontation with the social and political reality of West German capitalism. Apart from the VL, almost nobody had any concepts capable of dealing with this situa-
The opposition, that had been united in the fight against the Stalinist regime, began very quickly to divide over the question: private or collective property? Market economy or preservation of elements of socialist planning? Along with reunification, these themes are the dividing lines between the left and the right. For the left-wing of the opposition, this division began to become more important than that with the SED.
• The collapse of the SED regime has gone along with the exposure of its bad management of the economy. Until now, the fact that this country, even if it did not offer the same standard of living as the COMECON country at an international level, in 13th place, alongside Britain, was of some comfort to the population. The revelations have been a shock.
Previously secret information has come to light revealing:
•The internal debt has risen to 130 bil-
• The external debt is $20 billion, that is $1,250 for each inhabitant. The director of the Commercial Coordination Service, Golodkowski, responsible for managing currency exchange, had banked enormous sums abroad, notably in Switzerland and Luxemburg. In order to get currency, Golodkowski had organized arms deals with, among others, Iran and Iraq. •
• Six million marks were put annually at the disposal of the families of Politburo members to supply the luxurious ghetto at Wandlitz.
• The colossal corruption and quasifeudal privileges of the nomenklatura pavilions, private parks for hunting, constructing and repair teams for their private use and so on).
• The industrial installations in the GDR are, with a few exceptions, so out of date that, from the point of view of competition on the world market, there is no point in modernizing them. Productivity in the GDR is 40% of that in West Ger-
• Terrible environmental destruction has taken place, causing an annual loss of some 30 billion GDR marks and requiring in some cases the closure of factories.
Cities of South of GDR in
And, as has been known for a long time, the buildings of the cities, especially in the South, are in ruins; the supply of high quality goods is very poor; waste in the production process is enormous and
With the opening of the wall, millions of people were able to see with their own eyes that the difference in living standards with the FRG is even greater than they had imagined. On both of the first two weekends, four million East Germans visited the West. This represented a sort of culture shock. The SED symbol became synonymous with a worthless economy, stealing, egotism and so on. People's anger was immense. It has not ceased to grow and the population no longer wants to hear any more about the "renewal of Socialism". "I have supported Socialism for 40 years, and I don't want any more varieties of it. No more experiments! We do not want to be used as guinea-pigs!"
After the fall of the wall, the decisive question in the GDR was: is the population going to find the strength and self-confidence to rebuild a non-capitalist society on the ruins of Stalinism? Only
EAST GERMANY such confidence would give the GDR a reason to exist as a separate state. The price that would have to be paid for this would be a markedly lower standard of living for a prolonged period - and this with open frontiers. People would have had to believe that the possibility of creating a socialist democracy was more advantageous than the increase in consumption for a part of society.
The opposition spelled this out quite clearly. In her November 8 appeal to those preparing to leave the country, Christa Wolf declared: "What can we you? Not an easy, but a useful life. Not immediate prosperity, but a part in great changes." A few days later New Forum went further: "We will stay poor for a prolonged period, but we do not want a society run by profiteers and where people push themselves to the front with their elbows."
This strength and self-confidence do not exist. The exodus of thousands of people continues. From the end of August 1989 to mid February 1990, 400,000 people have left the GDR. As many, if not more, are waiting for the elections to decide whether to leave or not. The governments of East and West Germany estimate that between a million and a million and a half will leave in 1990. The GDR's economy risks collapse through lack of capital and labour
However, people's ideas are rather contradictory: on the one side they are scared of capitalism, and scared of the GDR being bought by the FRG. On the other, the GDR, has in fact, been dependent on the FRG in many respects. The FRG has always been its principal economic partner in the West; its living standards have always been taken as the model; the regime's ambition has always been to "catch up with and overtake" the FRG in
At the SED congress in December, Rudolf Bahro described this dependence in the following terms: "Here we put our finger on a decisive link in the vicious circle, that, over decades, has led to the demolition of our economy. Its regulation has in fact been determined by the obtaining
13
International Viewpoint #181 • March 26, 1990
EAST GERMANY of hard currency, in economic competition with the "class enemy", that was always stronger in every way. The running of our economy determined by the needs of the population. The conclusion is evident: the West German mark has dominated: this is the inevitable outcome of this choice... Hans Modrow finished his report by concluding that our economic development must become socially and ecologically sustainable. But this aim is in total contradiction with the very nature of the economic fores that are now coming to bear on us....
"A joint venture costing 5 billion, as seems to be envisaged with IFA (the East German enterprise that builds the Trabant motorcar) means, in the present situation, a loss of political and cultural decisiontaking power by the society, Whatever form this joint venture might take. This is the result of a strategic renunciation, of a failure to take into account the economic potential of the country...Such a joint venture means a straightforward acceptance of a piece of capitalist society....In this way our society loses its sovereignty, in one sphere after another."
Bureaucracy tried to create
East German patriotism
The questioning of the "united German fatherland" by the Honecker regime starting in the early 1970s always lacked credibility, since it was based on arguments similar to those used by the bourgeoisie in the West, who, however, defended the idea of a "fatherland for all Germans". It is hardly surprising that a population that had been educated for decades in the values of the "Socialist fatherland" today, as "Socialism" collapses, advantages in a larger and more efficient, albeit capitalist, "Fatherland".
The Modrow government has not been able to escape from this dependence. It declares that it can do nothing about the economy without West German capital and addresses its attention almost exclusively towards the FRG government and its industrial and financial circles.
The population is disarmed. It is convinced that the leading economic principle must be competitiveness on the world market and the achievement of living standards equal to those in the West, objectives that cannot be obtained without the
DM. Of course, the process has to be cushioned socially. This analysis is shared by many opposition groups, including on
The opportunities that exist in a perspective of an economy orientated eastwards, towards the semi-industrialized countries and towards the small capitalist countries that do not have the same powers of blackmail, are only discussed in restricted intellectual circles. The great majority of the 14 way forward.
Very quickly, all eyes have turned towards Bonn. Modrow first proposed a pact between the two German states for a confederation. He hoped in this way to get the necessary "fraternal aid". But the Kohl government has tied all financial aid to precise conditions, which get constantly more demanding: free elections, an end to the leading role of the SED; introduction of market mechanisms; abolition of obligatory currency exchanges. Later, points have been added on. An agreement on the protection of investments; no limitation on foreign participation; liberty of setting up firms and choice of work; and later the adoption of the social and legal order of the FRG; and monetary union. Besides the establishment of a hard currency fund that allows the GDR's citizens 200DM per year for journeys to the West (and which they spend in the West), the federal government has not until now come up with a single penny of financial aid to the GDR. Kohl's argument: he does not want to invest in a "black hole".
Modrow offers to renounce executive functions
When, at the January Congress, Modrow found out that he could no longer rely on the party, he made a U-turn and announced his capitulation. He offered to hand over central executive functions to the Round Table and several days after declared: "Germany must become a united country for all the citizens of the German nation." The plan that he presented envisaged first a confederation, after that the progressive transfer of the sovereign rights of the two states to common confederal organs, finishing up with a common federation of Länder. This plan meant the final abandonment of an independent road for the GDR. But even this plan has not been realized. In Bonn they no longer want unity via confederation; the aim is for Anschluss, a pure and simple integration into the FRG. In the GDR itself, the economy has spoiled all plans: the central bank is calling for the immediate introduction of the DM as a second currency, and, in exchange, the transfer of a part of its powers to the FRG's Federal
Bank. Modrow is left fighting rearguard actions and lamenting the arrogance of
The U-turn in East Berlin has considerably accelerated the efforts of Bonn to utilize the collapse of Stalinism to get its hands on the RDA. Kohl's ten-point plan of November 28 (see /V 176) still envisaged a stage by stage approach, realizing a common federal state via a confederation. There was to be a ten year period to carry through the equalization of the economies of the two socially different systems, political union being considered as the culmination of this process.
Modrow's declaration in favour of reunification has rendered all these plans nulland-void. Since then, the federal government has been frantically cobbling together a new plan: first of all monetary union (to be carried out by July 1) then political union - this being planned for two years hence - prepared by the formation of common parliamentary commissions at various levels and by a process of "transplantation" of the FRG's civil law, penal and social systems and finally the rapid establishment of the federal system, with the GDR Länder being able to declare their adhesion to the FRG separately (something that is envisaged in the West German constitution).
Once the West German bourgeoisie has got its hands on state power, it will be in a much better position to offload the costs of the painful process of "adaptation" (more precisely, the costs of reunification), since it will have political and legal power over the workers of what is still
The essential measures in this direction will be prepared before the federal elections in the FRG, putting the future government before a fait accompli. It is not out of the question, in fact, that the federal government will postpone the elections (set for December 1990) in favour of panGerman elections a few months later.
The West German political parties have begun to organize various regroupments of different East German opposition groups to create "fraternal parties" for the elections to the GDR Chamber of Deputies on March 18. Without direct intervention by the West German Democrats (CDU and CSU) and the Liberal Party (FDP), neither the conservative for Germany (Allianz für Deutschland), nor the German Liberal Party (LDP) would have seen the light of day in East Germany. The SPD got to work a lot earlier, but it did not have to fear any resistance, given the still living social democratic traditions in the GDR.
Bonn politicians stand as candidates in GDR
Bonn politicians have played the preponderant role in the electoral campaign in the GDR. In the election rallies, they behave already as if they run the country, and some have even allowed themselves to be put forward as candidates. For example, Elmar Pieroth, President of the Association of Liberal Professions of the
Western CDU is standing for the Allianz in the East declaring that he wants to become the economics minister, since the natives understand nothing about the mar-
The second step has been to get round the obstacles to immediate reunification posed by the victorious powers of the Sec ond World War, above all the Soviet
Union. With the Genscher plan, the Bonn government has found a formula whereby a united Germany would remain a member of NATO with a special military status for the territory of the ex-GDR. The main
March 26, 1990• #181 International Viewpoint pillar of this would be the construction of a new European security system in which every state would participate except the USSR. The United States and Soviet Union would be the guarantors of this order. This concept would permit the integration both of the neutral states in Europe and the Warsaw Pact countries. This plan, of course, involves the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time this entire security system would be, in one way or another, associated with
Soviet troops could remain in the GDR and US troops in the FRG. The eventual presence of West German troops in the East is an object of controversy. Another is the question of a guarantee of the western border of Poland. These two problems are not insoluble for the bourgeoisie. The German bourgeoisie is an expert in devising special military statuses for particular regions. After the First World War, the two sides of the Rhine were demilitarized
Modrow did not insist on his original concept of neutrality. After the Ottawa summit, the Soviet Union seems ready to accept the notion of a new European security system, even if this has nothing to do with Gorbachev's "common European home", but means an imperialist alliance in Europe under German leadership. The internal situation in the USSR and COMECON does not permit the Kremlin to press hard for conditions.
The third step by the federal government on the road to rapid reunification is the swift carrying through of monetary union. A bilateral commission has already been established to consider ways and means. This has led to controversy in West German bourgeois circles. the majority of economic including the Bundesbank (federal bank), warning about the risks of a rapid monetary union, all the political forces have come out in favour of it, and have in fact imposed it. The Bundesbank president's opposition only lasted about 24
Nonetheless, the risks are clearly visible. The important economic gap between the FRG and the GDR cannot be quickly overcome, even in the framework of a united Germany. It would first be necessary to raise the level of prices and wages in the GDR as it exists now. Otherwise the migration will continue inside the new
On the other hand, the employers are openly in favour of keeping the level of wages in the GDR low, for this is the only way in which the East would be attractive for investments. This means that East Germany is going to be the poor region of the new Germany. At the same time, there will be a massive downward pressure on West German wage levels. Unemployment will grow fast. The estimates of the number of potential unemployed in the GDR this year range from 800,000 to 2.5 million. These figures are based above all on projected closures of enterprises (Gysi talks of a half of them) that are unable to stand up to West German competition. The assimilation of the social security system will demand enormous sums. The massive privatization of enterprises, land and housing will lead to speculation and inflation. No one can control the effects of this process or its impact on international financial markets.
Representatives of the West German employers have given figures regarding the cost of total economic reunification. It will need some 800 billion DM (which corresponds to the sum of floating capitals seeking an outlet) for the infrastructure, energy provision, construction of housing and cleaning of towns and the appropriation and cleaning of factories. But nobody, either in East or West, has come up with figures for the social costs.
The federal government is claiming that the costs of non-reunification will be equally high, since, in this case, the wave of migration, which is already causing a certain amount of social disturbance in the West, could not be stopped. But this
EAST GERMANY migration could be stemmed if GDR citizens were treated like normal immigrants, and if Bonn was ready to come up with the immediate financial aid (between 10 and 15 billion DM) asked for by the GDR government and Round Table. Only under these conditions would the reconstruction of the GDR have any credibility for East
Bonn is refusing to do this because it wants to force the GDR into rapid and unconditional reunification. It answers the employers' reservations with an alternative calculation: past experience of investment in countries with "state trade" shows limited profitability, insofar as there continues to exist a political system that imposes precise conditions, where workers cannot be freely disposed of, and where the global economic conditions are dictated by political rather than purely market criteria.
According to Bonn, if private investment in the GDR is to be really profitable, it is necessary to impose the FRG's political and judicial system. "Only when we have political power will we be able to control conditions for investment; only then will we be able to remove negative factors for the market."
This is a very dangerous operation for the bourgeoisie. But it believes that it has sufficient financial as well as repressive means (police and special para-military units) and political ability to carry it
Threat to take back property from East Germans
The question is: who will pay the costs of reunification? Certainly not capital. In the first place it is the GDR that will have to take it on. A colossal process of expropriation threatens to begin immediately after the March elections. Some 500,000 previous landowners and at least the same number of homeowners are demanding what once belonged to them.
The traditional firms in the FRG have already set up in the GDR to find out
What there is that could serve as branches there. The FRG trusts are negotiating with the GDR's industrial complexes. Siemens has pounced on Robotron, Volkswagen on IFA, Zeiss Ikon on Zeiss Jena, the three chemical industry giants on the Leuna workshops and so on. A list of 3,000 firms that want to buy GDR factories at a very low price or who want to create new private enterprises has been made public. West German capital unashamed brutality and aggression. The second group who will pay are West German workers. The Association of Engineering Employers has already categorically rejected any further reduction in the working week as wellest, remaing a the GDR. The 15
International Viewpoint #181 • March 26, 1990
EAST GERMANY / USSR president of the Association of Savings Banks has gone so far as to assert that reunification requires limitations on trade union rights and social negotiations. The social claims of the metalworkers and printers this year are going to be tests of strength.
There are also other costs that threaten West German wage earners: there is talk of setting up, after the federal elections, "emergency sacrifices" for the GDR, for example, special taxes. Political pressure to keep down wage rises is already apparent. Under the pressure of competition from the GDR the level of pensions, services and health care are going to drop, but the cost is going to rise.
A grand coalition, ranging from the Christian Democrats to the social democracy are promising that the "period of adjustment" will be brief and will be followed by a new economic miracle. God alone knows! It cannot be ruled out. But it is a fact that the new Greater Germany will come out of the reunification process profoundly destabilized. In any case, promises about the future are not the main concern of the wage earners; they are worried about what is going to happen next.
Seizure of power by West
German bourgeoisie
Properly speaking, we should talk about the "incorporation" of the GDR into the FRG rather than reunification. What is happening is the conquest of the GDR as a new market by West German capital and the seizure of social and political power by the West German bourgeoisie on the territory and over the population of
In the GDR resistance to the mechanisms of the Anschluss is beginning to take shape. At the end of January, the Free
Confederation (FDGB) held its congress, at which it it adopted a trade union law demanding a right of veto for the unions on matters of working conditions and decisions that affect the enterprises (changes in forms of property, the structure of the enterprise, functioning, investment and so on), as well as measures of defence against lock outs and the right to strike. The FDGB wants this law passed even before the elections, if not it is threatening a general strike. One can have one's doubts about what strength a renewed FDGB can have, however. The same motivation: "we must be in the factories before capital" is also behind the movement for the reconstruction of workers councils, which, also, remains weak for the moment.
Tenants, haunted by the fear of being dispossessed and thrown in the street, have formed an association. Capitalist plans are thus, for the first time in a bureaucratically dominated state, inspir16 Thus parass happositis to capital. ing a large-scale anti-capitalist reaction.
may produce what the opposition to the bureaucracy only stimulated in embryo: an anti-capitalist awareness and a process of self-organization of the working class and large layers of the population.
The East German SPD, which seems likely to win the election was the first to raise national slogans. The West German SPD candidate for the Chancellorship, Oskar Lafontaine, has been attacking the "costs of reunification". It may be that it is the social democracy that succeeds in becoming the most skilful architects of reunification. At best, such a line can prolong the reunification process somewhat. But this will change nothing regarding the character of the Anchluss and its social consequences for a large part of the popu-
At the present time, the process of integration of the GDR by capital seems inevitable. Even a strike movement for specific demands might become a strike for unification and win the demands only in this framework.
Collapse of bureaucratic
Time is a decisive factor in this revolubureaucratic economy is faced by a capitalist economy that has been growing for seven years; the political revolution is exposed to massive pressure from West German imperialism; no alternative way out exists at a mass level; and, finally, when the criticism of the old regime overwhelms for ever all discussion of another anti-capitalist road, the time available for developing an alternative is decisive. This time does not exist in the GDR. There is not a sufficient field of action to win a large part of the population to another form of planned economy.
This does not mean that people are passing bag and baggage over to the side of capitalism. In the FRG, the project of a rapid integration of the GDR has awakened great anxiety. The wage earners do not want to pay the costs of reunification. Greater anxieties are felt in the East. The population fears that reunification will create a "second-class zone" Germany. Ina Merkel, president of the Independent Women's Association (see IV 180) can count on considerable support when she says that capitalism also has a "great need" of reforms.
The population of the two German states is looking for a third way between the evils of capitalism and bureaucratic rule. This explains the popularity of the social democracy which is perceived as the only force capable of realizing such a perspective. The "when" and the "how" of reunification will be the object of strong social conflicts in the two German states. Their outcome will determine the circumstances and the relation of forces under which reunification will be real-