The refusal of the Lithuanian deputies to vote for Gorbachev, even though it was done in the name of Lithuanian independence, was a blow to the legitimacy of the bonapartist presidency, and as such benefited all the anti-bureaucratic forces in the USSR. Similarly, if the Latvian Supreme Soviet majority sticks to its proclaimed principles and denies Moscow on Lithuanian territory, that would be a strong slap to Gorbachev's claim to rule the whole USSR on the basis of continuity with the Stalinist regime; and, if it mobilized the Lithuanian people to assert real independence, that would be a material blow to the Stalinist state
The declaration of independence is a direct challenge to the political power of the Soviet state. Moscow has tried to meet it with various legalistic arguments that involve vague promises of "sovereignty" after a "referendum" whose conditions Soviet bodies and after a "waiting period" dropped from Soviet army helicopters over Vilnius shortly after the declaration of independence said: "Citizens of Lithuania — civil rights. The fate of the peoples of Lithuania must be decided by the peoples of Lithuania. TOWARD A SOVEREIGN LITHUANIA NATIONAL REFERENDUM."
Trying to borrow the weapons of Westem parliamentarism, the chiefs of the Soviet bureaucracy have also turned to politicians and capitalist media in the 4 In the Lithuanian crisis, Pravda of March West for arguments against "separatism." International Viewpoint #182 • April 9, 1990
23 turned to the Scottish Labour MP G. Robertson, for his expertise in fighting "separatism" at home. The interview was done by special correspondent A. Liutyi, who introduced it as follows:
"In the British Isles, where they know about separatism first hand, they are following attentively the events in Lithuania. That was what I was told by a well-known Labour parliamentarian, the deputy minister of foreign affairs in the 'shadow' cabinet, G. Robertson."
Liutyi then went on to quote Robertson as saying: "I represent Scotland in the House of Commons.... But we in the Labour Party have opposed and continue to oppose the separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, since we consider that today Scotland is an inseparable part of this country economically, socially and culturally. Breaking up Britain is an unrealistic policy. Indeed, in that case, land would be in a very position...In the 1970s, when separatist moods reached their peak in Scotland, I fought with special energy against the extremes of separatism.
"That is why today, I would hope that peaceful dialogue between Moscow and Vilnius will take place aimed at working out constitutional frameworks that will make it possible to satisfy the interests of both countries. Although we in the Labour Party hold a definite position with regard to the constitutional bases of the incorporation of Lithuanian into the USSR, we do reform is needed that would maximize the possibilities for realizing the principle of self-determination in the framework of the existing realities."
Moscow seeks support from right and left
Pravda apparently did not want just to cite the support of politicians of the "left." In its March 27 issue, it offered the opinions of British and American diplomats stationed in the Baltic in the interwar period. George Kennan's memoirs were tapped for a description of the desolation of the port of Libava. "The city was the product of the mighty economic develop ment of Russia in the nineteenth century."
The Soviet journal concluded its argument by citing the opinions of Roosevelt and Churchill. "At the Teheran conference, Roosevelt said, jokingly, according to the American translator Ch. Bolen: I know that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were part of the Soviet Union in the past and not long ago. And when the Russian armies again enter these republics, I am not going to fight with the Soviet Union about that." Churchill was also said to have agreed to the incorporation of these countries into the USSR during the war.
Hard experience may convince the Baltic national democratic leaders that the Stalinist regime is at least right about the attitudes of the Western powers. But their reluctance to accept that is understandable, not only because of allergic reactions to the arguments of the regime's press. The question of "legalism," that is the call for asserting formal independence on the basis of the illegality of the Soviet annexation, has in fact been much debated in the Baltic national democratic movements.
For example, the electoral program of the Estonian People's Front, as summarized in the November 1989 issue of Side, the journal of the Estonian social democratic party in exile, published in Sweden, criticized the Estonian Congress severely for unrealistic "legalism." It might be added that such legalistic arguments depend in the last analysis on the support of the big Western powers, as the guarantors of international law and conventions. In the March 7 issue of Reede, the Estonian literary weekly, Tunne Keelam, chair of the Estonian Congress replied to such criticisms with the argument "what other alter-
Labour bureaucracy not interested in national rights
The Baltic republics are very countries. The Russian "democrats" seem lukewarm allies at best. The workers movement in the West, dominated by social democratic bureaucracies and in a few cases by Communist Party-dominated ones and in the case of the US by bureaucrats totally subordinate to Washington, is not interested in their national rights. And the more radical movements have not shown great sympathy either.
The Lithuanians have had some solidarity from other national democratic movements in the USSR. But the leaders of the Azer movement, which could be key in the present confrontation (since most of the troops sent into Lithuania are apparently Azeris) have tended until now to take an attitude hostile to all Europeans.
There has been considerable contacts and cross-fertilization among the national democratic groups, which have for the most part followed the example of the Baltic fronts, but no general theory of the place of these movements in the world and in history, no international democratic program. They have not explained clearly them, regardless (although the program of the Latvian front made some important steps in that direc-
However, ultimately their only hope of achieving their objectives is to base themselves on an international current of opinion that supports the aspirations of all "¡egalistic, Peoples. In that respect, the returning to the pre-1940 constitutions, hardly models of real democracy, is no help. In fact, oppressed peoples and thoroughgoing democrats in general have a vital stake in the advance and victory of the national democratic movements in the
Gorbachev: what lies behind the new presidential powers?
ON MARCH 14, a specially convened Congress of People's Deputies, by a vote of 1,817 against 133 (61 abstentions), amended the Soviet constitution to create a new strong presidency. The president will have the power to declare martial law, to veto Supreme Soviet decisions (subject to overriding by a two thirds vote), and to propose laws and quickly pilot them through parliament. The congress then proceeded to elect Mikhail Gorbachev to that post by a vote of 1542 against 368 (76 abstentions). Vitalii Korotich, liberal editor of the mass circulation magazine Ogonyok, declared, only partly in jest, that now Gorbachev is "dictator officially"! DAVID SEPPO
T FIRST GLANCE, these developments are perplexing. S. Sergeev, Chairman of the Revision Committee justified the changes in terms of a "paralysis of power"2. But for all practical purposes, Gorbachev already had these powers. While the Soviet Union's nationality problems are often cited to explain the need for exceptional powers, the fact is that Gorbachev waited so long to intervene against the Azerbaijani blockade of Armenia, not because he lacked the power to do so, but by his own decision, or
No opposition in parliament to Azerbaijani intervention
Once he decided to intervene, he did so with speed and force and encountered no opposition from the Soviet parliament. As for the Baltic republics, the Soviet leaders themselves have ruled out the use of force there, since it would resolve nothing and would have little support in the rest of the population.
Another oft-mentioned reason for the exceptional powers is the Soviet economy. Of course, it is true that, much to the ordinary people's dismay and anger, it is increasingly taking on a wild west, freebooting flavor. The scandal involving the joint state-cooperative venture ANT that came to light at the end of 1989 is typical of the Soviet economic scene today.
This firm, with over 5,000 employees in 150 branches across the Soviet Union, was originally set up to help the defence industry in converting to civilian production. But, as a profit-oriented enterprise, ANT found that it was much easier and more lucrative to purchase Soviet military goods and materials cheap and sell them abroad, often as "scrap", for hard currency. ANT was caught trying to ship 12 T-72 tanks and 200 tonnes of strategic titanium parts across the border. In the this scandal, several highranking government officials were fired or given severe reprimands. Accusations are now being hurled at the Prime MinisANT case only tip of iceberg
The ANT case is only the tip of the iceberg of the intensifying social process of the fusion of the shadow economy with the monopolistic producers of the state sector. But the problem is not a lack of governmental power. For it is the government itself that has given increased autonomy to enterprises in their pursuit of "cost-accounting income". It is also the government that has largely legalized the shadow economy.
This is primitive accumulation in every sense of the term. One can argue to what degree this is conscious policy or stupidity, but it has little to do with a lack of power. There is no will in the government to recreate strong central economic planning and regulation. On the contrary, Gorbachev has formalized and accelerated their dismantling, which was already well under way under Brezhnev.
So why this wish to establish a new presidential system with extraordinary powers? A key to the mystery lies in the fact that at least a very significant part of the liberal deputies, like Vitalii Korotich, support a strong presidential power. Indeed, Nikolai Shmelev, probably the best-known liberal economist, not only endorsed the measures, but expressed fear that Gorbachev would not be "bold enough" to use his powers to "drastically
USSR increase the role of private enterprise in the economy"4.
These people, many of whom are united around the Interregional Group of the Congress, have been posing as superdemocrats. It was they who called for a generCongress of People's Deputies in November to demand the abolition of article 6 of the constitution, consecrating the party's "leading role". The declaration of their "Democratic Action" lished in Ogonyok, calls on all opponents of totalitarianism to join them.
But already towards the middle of 1989, some of the bolder liberal intellectuals began saying in public what many of their colleagues had so far dared to say only in
- their market reform, which they claim is the only economic basis for political democracy, cannot be introduced through democratic means.
"Let's say our Icader proposes to introduce the markel" asks liberal historian and publicist I. Kliamkin. "Can he do it with the support of the masses? Certainly
Our population would be 80% opposed. The market means the differentiation of revenues and interests. You have to work hard to earn your living". (Note the implicit judgement, very widespread among the liberal intelligentsia, that the workers are opposed to the market because they are lazy and envious). The problem, continued Kliamkin, is the working class — it is socialist, and socialworkers see economic reform as a means to attain social justice. Miners strike seen as support for reform
The coalminers strike was unanimously interpreted by official spokespcople and by journalists as a movement in support of the economic reform. But even without any special knowledge of the workers' attitudes, the very monotony with which this claim was repeated was enough to raise doubts about its validity.
Kliamkin did not participate in this charade. Yes, the workers want to modernize economic management, he admitted. But they also want social justice. For Kliamkin, these two demands are incompatible. 1. New York Times, March 14, 1990, section A, p. 18. 2. Ibid., March 13, 1990, section A, p. 17. 3. G Lomonosov, "Vse na prodazhy?", Pravitelsivennyi vestnik, no. 6, 1990, p. 4; New York Times, March 15, 1990, section A, p. 10. 4. Ibid., March 13, 1990, section A, p. 17. 5. Ogonek, no. 8, 1990. April 9, 1990 • #182 International Viewpoint
----- photo credits and running heads -----
5
USSR And so, he concludes, the dismantling of the old political structures that are holding back the needed changes is necessary, "not for developing democracy, but to reinforce the power of the leaderreformer".
At the Second Congress of People's Deputies, Yeltsin, one of the cleverest of the liberal politicians, attacked the timidity of the government's program, calling it a compromise between the interests of the apparatus and the people. And of course, there is a conservative opposition in the apparatus. But it is fragmented and in disarray.
The relative ease with which Gorbachev abolished Article 6 attests to this. In the past nine months, the conservatives have begun playing with populism, but they do not have much hope of winning a significant mass base, since they are discredited by their past and lack a positive program. And besides, they fear that a populist movement might turn against them.
What is really holding up the reform is the fear of "social explosion", which the presidential powers are designed to avert. This fear is not new. It has arcady caused the repcated postponement of the price reform, which is surely the key element of the government's market reform. A freeing of prices would lead to galloping inflation and a drastic decline in living standards, hitting hardest those who can least afford it. Now this reform has been announced for 1991.
Popular opposition to large-scale private sector
Popular opposition is also the major obstacle to the establishment of a large-scale private sector. Hostility to the coopcratives, which are really private enterprises that often use hired labour, is very demanded the closure of intermediary workers' committees proceded to shut opinion survey on private property, a liberal sociologist concluded that "private property in the form most widespread in
La market economy has
"The majority, although not opposed to private property, want to keep it on a strictly limited scale, in strictly limited forms and spheres of activity". He suggested the introduction first of group forms of property, based upon worker leasing, buyouts, stockholding, as a way of getting the people used to private property, because "more radical transformations are pregnant with social explosion.
consciousness might simply be unable to withstand such an overload"8
As Kliamkin indicated, the major ideological obstacle to the introduction of the market relations is the workers concept of social justice. A particular problem is the International Viewpoint #182 • April 9, 1990 popular concept of "unearned income", labour income". Income that comes from the employment of hired labour or from "speculation", that is from buying and selling without any significant labour input to justify the price difference, is thus considered unearned.
In numerous conversations with workeven the most market-oriented among them who say they support the liberals, firmly reject the deregulation of
"unearned income", unemployment, poverty, and the privatization of basic services.
The miners' strike of July significantly intensified the fears of "social explosion" amongst the government and liberal intelligentsia. Almost immediately, articles began appearing that raised the specter of anarchy, bloodshed and civil war. The campaign succeeded in no small measure in creating a mood of anxiety and fear, especially among the non-worker population. The aim was to prepare the ground psychologically for the "firm hand". The miners' strike was, in fact, an extremely peaceful, organized and conscious affair, that gave the lie to the widespread prejudices of the workers being a benighted, declassé, and fascistic mass.
But this only made them more frightening, because such a class could not be disarmed by manipulation and divisive manocuvres. Most of all the strike showed, as Kliamkin admitted, that the unremitting liberal ideological barrage directed at the working class over the past three years had only been superficially effective in "freeing the workers of their outdated stereotypes", or in other words dislodging their socialist values and atti-
Gorbachev seeks new base of legitimacy
If the new presidential powers are not in themselves really new, they should be seen as part of an operation to give Gorbachev a new basis of legitimacy. It is not a coincidence that the same session that voted for a presidential system also abolished article 6 of the constitution. The presidential system is designed to legitimize the use of state power to push through the government's economic
Gorbachev wants to shift the basis of his legitimacy away from the party. For not only has the party's legitimacy been severely eroded, but it is based upon socialist ideology that is foreign to Gorbachev's reform. As president, Gorbachev can claim a "democratic mandate" although the Congress that created the presidency is far from being a democratic body. Only two thirds of its members were elected by universal suffrage and this in a one-party context).
Of course, Gorbachev also wants to free himself from the conservatives in the party apparatus. The state's rehabilitation and embracing of the Russian church -priests are now teaching religion in some schools — is part of the same operation. Lately Yeltsin, who always has his nose to the political wind, has even been toying with Russian nationalism, which so far has been the domain of the conserva-
Temporary ban on strikes
The presidential powers should be seen in the context of Gorbachev's attempt in October 1989 to ban strikes for 15 months. The Supreme Soviet agreed to do this in the basic extractive sectors, in energy, transport, chemicals and metallurgy. This came right after the Supreme Soviet effectively froze wages in all branches of heavy industry.
At the same time, it enacted a law on "resolving labour conflicts" which workers see as a law on "how not to strike". The government will soon present a new draft law on the state enterprise that will rescind most of the broad democratic powers given by the 1987 law to the worker collectives, including their right to elect managers (although, it should be added, these self-management rights have been realized in very few cases).
This is in sharp contrast to Gorbachev's original position three years ago, when he stated that "the well-being of the worker will depend on the abilities of the managers. The workers, should, therefore, have real means of influencing the choice of director and controlling his activity'"0 This reflects the government's realization management are incompatible. Worker power, even limited to the enterprise level, would be a major obstacle to factory closures, layoffs and the attempt to tie wages to enterprise profits. intends to use his presidential powers to move swiftly ahead with the economic reform. This should help Soviet workers in deciding whether their declining social situation - the inflation, scarcities, and the spreading corruption — is the result of not enough reform, as the government and liberals have been arguing, or the result of the reform itself. The moment of political truth is fast approaching in the Soviet Union. Whatever its final outcome, it will at last clearly draw the political lines and dispel any illusions that remain among Soviet workers about who their real friends are and what perestroika from above is really about. * 6. Cited in E. Berard-Zarzicka, "Pour une perestroika autoritaire", Les temps modernes, February 1990, p. 7. See IV 170, October 2, 1989. 8. Nedelya, no. 52, 1989 9. See recent editions of New York Times, week of March 14. 10. Pravda, January 28, 1987.