Lithuania: front line of the fight for
USSR/ LITHUANIA laboration in the political and economic spheres will be much more successful now than it was in the first half of this century. Then, our countries were, in the full sense, isolated from each other, each concerning itself only with its own problems. That made it possible for us to be treated the way we were in 1939 and 1940." The solidarity of the Baltic states today is a dramatic contrast with their division in 1939-1940, and there is a key lesson in that. It is the socialization of their econo-
FOR ENTERPRISE LEADERSHIPS of Solidarnosc in two
Polish cities —Wroclaw and Lodz- that I visited In April, the question of Lithuania was the "test" of Gorbachev's democratic credentials and in particular of his claims that
Moscow no longer wanted to dominate East Europe by force.
They expressed a complete identification with the Lithuanian
Independence movement and thought that the rest of
Solidarnosc felt the same way. In Prague, I found the city center thoroughly postered for a rally in defense of Lithuania at the Soviet embassy.
The Lithuanian challenge is becoming an important experience for the democratic and workers' movement in
Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union Itself, It seems to have begun to polarize the democratic movements, not only in the other Baltic republics or oppressed nationalities but in the
Russian republic itself.
GERRY FOLEY
A
S THE Lithuanian crisis deepens and as the Western governments increasingly make clear their lack of support for the national democratic cause, the democratic movements among the other oppressed nationalities of the Soviet Union and in
Russia itself are coming more strongly to its defense. In his report of the special Sajudis congress in the April 23 Libération,
Bernard Cohen noted the appearance of
Edgar Savisaar, leader of the Estonian
People's Front and now premier of the
Estonian SSR, who embraced the Lithuanian leader Vytautas Landsbergis.
The
French reporter went on to point out:
"The mass pro-independence rally led in Riga [Latvia] on Saturday [April 21] supported what several Baltic politicians only yesterday were still calling the Lithuanian hastiness.' Those attending the
Sajudis conference...also heard a message of solidarity read by a representative of the Ukrainian Rukh [the Ukrainian equivalent of the Baltic people's fronts],...
[which] has clearly reinforced its positions in recent weeks, especially in the western Ukraine."
On April 15, the Estonian People's
Front issued a strong statement in support of Lithuania: "The People's Front of Estonia calls on all enterprises, institutions, organizations, movements, unions and especially individuals in Estonia to be morally and materially prepared to support the Lithuanian people.
"The fate of Estonia and all the Baltic countries now hangs in the balance in Lithuania. Our struggle for freedom is a common struggle.
"A decisive moment has arrived testing our determination and faithfulness."
Agreement between Baltic national movements
On April 12, representatives of the governments of the three Baltic republics signed an agreement for economic cooperation, which also expressed political solidarity. Commenting on the document, Vilnis Bresis, the chair of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR, said: "The Baltic republics have a common history, a common life and a common future. Our aims are common. Our road is one, the Baltic road. I think that no force can divide us....Although our government has not officially spoken on the status of the Lithuanian state, the signing of this document itself attests to recognition of it."
The Estonian leader Savisaar said: "I have always been convinced that it was necessary to build a strong economic union of the Baltic states. I think that colmies that has made that possible. When they were at the mercy of the capitalist world market, they fell under the domination of various great powers, Germany in the case of the Estonians, England in the case of the Latvians. The Lithuanians, ironically, were allied with the USSR, because of their conflict with Poland over the Vilnius area.
The economic cooperation document put the Baltic common market in the context of the decentralization of social enterprises: "The contracting parties consider that there is a real possibility for creating genuine market relations in the framework of direct relations between independent enterprises, organizations and other legal persons."
Deals with local authorities and enterprises
Moscow's economic blockade of Lithuania not only represents a refuation of its democratic pretensions but also of its claims to be establishing a decentralized economic system ruled by the objective criteria of the market. The Lithuanian leadership is seeking to exploit this contradiction by offering deals directly to local authorities and enterprises. Economically, this tactic is unlikely to solve the problems created by Moscow's pressures. But it can become a very important political weapon.
Kremlin representatives in Lithuania have begun to complain about the Russian democrats giving aid and comfort to the "separatists," and their complaints are being giving some play in the official Soviet press. For example, Pravda of April 6 carried a TASS dispatch reporting a statement by the Committee of Citizens of the USSR in Lithuania. This neo-Stalinist unionist organization condemned the Russian opposition organizations for supporting a government using undemocratic and even Stalinist methods — no, not Moscow, the Lithuanian government. TASS summarized:
"The irresponsible arbitrary actions of the Supreme Soviet of the [Lithuanian] Republic, it says in the statement, have put the fate of millions of people under threat, as well as the integrity of the USSR. Is this realized by "democratic' and 'radical' emissaries of all-Union and Russian members of parliament, by the deputies of the [opposition controlled] May 7, 1990 • #184 International Viewpoint
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democracy
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USSR / LITHUANIA
Leningrad and Moscow soviets who have rushed to support the decisions of the new government in Lithuania? Do their voters know about that?"
In an interview in the April 14 issue of
Wilenski, the Polish language organ of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, Vladislav Shved, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Moscow loyalist split-off from the Lithuanian CP declared that while it could not be said that the Interregional Group of Deputies in the Congress of People's Deputies was unconditionally for Lithuanian indepen-
"it considers that it is possible to break up the union and then put it back together again.
"I say that we can break up the union and end up with such problems that afterwards we won't have anything to unite
Of course a breakup of the union would be a breakup of then from Shed's point of view, there really would be nothing to put back together.
The confrontation in Lithuania is also a test of Gorbachev's ability to use his new demand for the imposition of presidential rule is one of the cow. The Baltic fronts recognized what was at stake in the Soviet intervention in Azerbaijan, and took the lead in the defense of the Azeri front.
Whatever their weaknesses, the Baltic fronts are very politically aware organizations. And it is notable that despite the threats of military force and economic ruin being applied against it, the line of attack of the Soviet press against the Lith uanian leadership is far more political and subtle than that employed against the other national democratic movements. This applies both to the line of Moscow and the unionist Lithuanian Communist Party-CPSU (formerly, "on the platform of the CPSU").
According to Pravda's report on the first stage of the congress of the CPLCPSU, which began on April 22, the
Oil refinery
Mazeikiai • Siauliai Nuclear • Klaipeda Military power plant air bases Kedainiai
CPSU Central Committee Secretary A.
N. Girenko spoke at the congress, saying, according to the Pravda summary, that
"he understood under what conditions the
Communists of Lithuania had to act in persevering with the ideals and principles of the CPSU.
He gave special stress to the question of the sovereignty and independence of Lithuania. Today, this was the fundamental question... Firmly opposing any attempt
Union, to divide the
CPSU into national compartments, he expressed his support for the right of nations to self-determination."
In the press conference after the first stage of the congress, Girenko said:
"Lithuania has the right to leave the
USSR, but this has to be by the legal road." In the congress, itself, it seems, he prefaced his remarks about devotion to the principle of self-determination of nations by saying the priority was to meet the daily needs of the republic's inhabitants and the first thing necessary for that
"to and preserve was strengthen Soviet power in socialist the republic, the statehood of Lithuania and of
Ignalina the entire Soviet Union as a federal state."
A Dotenting main demands of the unionist
• potential organizations in the republic.
In April, moreover, two key laws have been proclaimed.
One is a law on emergency rule. The second is on "Great-
Kaunas
Vilnius
LITHUANIA
• Lazdijai
The April 10 Pravda carried an interview with CPLCPSU leader Shved, in which he said that in claiming the right to dispose of institutions belonging to the Communist er Responsibility Before the Only road out of Lithuania not under Soviet control Courts for Violations of the National Equality of Citizens and Forceful Violation of the Territorial Unity of the USSR."
The latter law provides for draconian penalities for "public calls for the violent overthrow or change of the Soviet government and social system or the forceful violation of the unity of the territory of the constitutionally guaranteed unity of the territory of the USSR, the republics and autonomous republics, autonomous regions and districts and also the dissemination of materials carrying such a message."
This law indicates that far more is at stake in the Lithuanian confrontation than the fate of one small people. The future of the democratic and national democratic movements depends on a victory for the Lithuanians. Moreover, the Baltic republics have from the outset been the cockpit of the movements of oppressed nationalities.
Even the Azeri People's Front program is modeled on the Baltic ones, despite the fact that some of its leaders have expressed hosility to all Europeans. It was the Baltic fronts that managed to get the Armenian and Azeri fronts to engage in 4 common interest in opposition to Mos negouauons, in which they declared a International Viewpoint #184 • May 7, 1990
Kremlin's favorite sons combined calls for removal of the elected government with complaints about violations of their democratic rights: "From the platform calls were raised for the resignation of the president of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian republic, V. Landsbergis and the chair of the Council of Ministers, K Prunskiene. Speaking of the way out of the crisis, many deputies called for the introduction of presidential rule." The report continued: "The Congress protested against the witch-hunt of Communists, the organization of moral and physical terror, the intentions to outlaw the Communist Party." Pro-Moscow CP claims party property
The Lithuanian government has threatened legal action against the rump CP, Which has offered the pretext for some of the worst military provocations against the Lithuanian people, claiming that research institutions, libraries and printing facilities belong to it as the programmatic continuation of the Lithuanian CP and as the local representative of the CPSU, that supposedly paid for them.
Party, the "Supreme Soviet of Lithuania is toward a neo-Stalinist society, utter lawlessness." The interviewer said: "The leadership of the republic declares that your party, with the help of military forces, is seizing control of these buildings." Shed replied: "Nothing of the sort. We are not seizing but defending party buildings and property. In principle, this should be defended by the laws, by the prosecutor's office, the internal affairs bodies. But when they do not carry out their functions, you have to appeal for
Shved claimed that his party was being threatened because of its program: "It is not surprising that a law is being prepared penalizing anti-government appeals, in accordance with which our party will be outlawed. This is because it supports such wild ideas, in the view of parliament, as a Lithuania in a renewed federation."
This bitter sweet complaint came at the very time when the Soviet parliament was passing a law that made national appeals a political crime with equally draconian penalties, without of course any complaints from the likes of Shed. Clearly, this interview was part of the provocative role being played by Moscow's Lithuanian fifth column.
Shved claimed not even to be against
independence, if it were done in the "right way." "I have said that the Communists want to see Lithuania in a union of equals. But nonetheless, I consider that every people has the right of self-determination; it is stupid even to dispute about that. But the problem should not be resolved with such
USSR / LITHUANIA will fail. The fact that democracy is still weak in Russia was shown by the recent elections."
The following article tried to back up this argument by citing che Western press, including the Voice of America: "Other administration spokespersons have indicated methods. The process by nature is a painful and longdrawn-out one, and here you have one blow of the axe." 1953
In the April 14 Kurier Wilenski, courtesy of the "neo-Stalinist" Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian republic, Shved expanded on his attitude PLANTe to the question of indepen-
"As regards the independence of Lithuania, we are in favor of it being free from dictates, oppression, bureaucratic unity, of it being in the framework of a
"You can't pose the question whether we are for Lithuania leaving the USSR or not. The situation in the world is such that no one can be independent. Independence can be understood as freedom to determine the form of dependence. Some propose that it would be better to dependent on the EEC. I say, on the other hand, that we maybe can rebuild our federation to meet democratic norms.
"Lithuania has the right to leave the Soviet Union, but in the present situation, wouldn't this be a precedent that could lead to perestroika ending in a fiasco in the Soviet Union? I think that if Lithuania expresses a wish to leave through a referendum, it should leave. But our comrades think that it is necessary to explain to people that steps leading out of the Soviet Union are disastrous."
Western governments find pretexts
Gorbachev has put forward more or less the same line, and it has been bought by a lot of Western commentators, who are ready to believe that he is ready to let Lithuania go, only not now, only when he has the situation in the country better in hand. On the part of the press, this may be confusion. On the part of the Western governments, it is a pretext to cover the fact that they have no interest in the rights of nations and considerable interest in deals with Moscow.
It is essential in order to build support for the Lithuanian national democratic movement to fight any such confusion. Democracy is not something that can be postponed for the sake of political expediency, and the oppressor power has no right to determine the conditions in which national self-determination is expressed, in particular to change the rules of the game as it chooses. The Soviet constitution says that the republics have the right
1990 to leave the USSR, period! That is an essential legacy of Leninism. It is revolting to see Soviet government spokespeople argue that no one in the West would allow "part of their countries to get up and walk away."
There is no indication that Gorbachev is moving toward a greater democratization. In fact, all the signs are the opposite - the new laws mentioned earlier, the calls for presidential rule, the use of military and economic threats, even the use of KGB forces to try to stop black mar-
Independence and mobilization of support
In the present conditions, if the Lithuanians relaxed their claim dence to any degree, allowed this claim to become in any way confused, to that extent they would lose control of the situation and weaken their ability to mobilize support. There are of course various degrees of independence in a dog-eatdog world, but there is a qualitative difference between political independence and the lack of it.
Moreover, the question ot momentum is decisive for the Lithuanian movement. Sajudis is a broad coalition of different forces. It depends also on an alliance with the independent Communist Party, whose attachment to the national cause is ambiguous, if not consciously two-faced. A good example of this is the editorial page of the independent CP organ Tiesa
The headline is "Two opinions". But in fact only two angles of the same argument are presented. The first article, entitled "Independence and Beyond" starts with a lot of drum beating Soviet "occupation" and the wickedness of "collaborators," obviously the CPL
But it goes on to present a plethora of defeatist arguments: " Mr. Gorbachev is also trying to win the conservative layers. The president of the USSR knows that if he cannot reach these layers, he that they in no way want to encourage...Landsbergis to widen his challenge to Moscow." It went on to say: "From the statements of the foreign press, the conclusion can be drawn that no one disputes Moscow's right to 'deal with the Lithuanian prob-
Any faltering of the drive for independence will give the independent Communist Party a chance to begin to sabotage and divide the movement.
The Lithuanian push is also the locomotive for the other Baltic republics, where there is a large non-native population. In independence" CP has managed to get a pivotal position. In this context, in particular, the call on the Lithuanian leaders by Kohl and Mitterrand represents a de facto alliance with Gorbachev.
The Lithuanians can betrayal. But they can get effective political support from democrats and fighters for national freedom everywhere. The slogan of the Polish independence fighters of the nineteenth century, "For Our Freedom and Yours," has already begun to appear in the Lithuanian demonstrations.
Significance of Lithuania in
Western Europe
In an editorial in its April 5 issue, Zutik, the organ of the section of the Fourth International in the southern Basque country, pointed out the importance of the Lithuanian example for Western Europe
"The independence of Lithuania is an event of surpassing importance. For the first time in more than four decades in the immovable Europe, the product of Yalta and the blocs, there may be a change in frontiers opening the way for the entry of a nation that wants to form its own state. This is the first occasion in all this time that a national awakening has swept up the great majority of the population...
"In fact, the so-called neutrality and real lack of support for Lithuanian independence by the West European states is not motivated so much by the desire not to complicate things for Gorbachev....as by a realization of what a change in frontiers means and because in their own houses there are also national movements example and victory of Lithuania." * May 7, 1990 • #184 International Viewpoint
Votes against Stalinism
ON MAY 2,1990, the newly elected Hungarian parilament assembles for the first time.
of the "party-list", favours
S
INCE the mid-70s
Hungary has fallen into an ever deeper
Almost half of the seats will be occupied by economic crisis, representatives of the two and a half year old including massive foreign indebtedness, forcing Hungar-
Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), ian people to work much more described as of the centre-right, which won and much harder. In the 1980s an unexpectedly convincing victory in the growing the crisis undermined the legitimacy - albeit second round. Lászlo Anders, a member of weak - that the post-Stalinist the Hungarlan Left Alternative, gives his view system had gained through of the background to the elections.
the rising living standards of the 60s and 70s. The position of the tiny internal opposition became stronger as a result.
Through illegal publications and traditional demonstrations on March 15, the Democratic Opposition, bringing together liberals and intellectuals associated with the 1956 revolution, many of them with leftist or explicitly Marxist origins, gained increasing popularity in the capital Budapest.
New democratic groups begin to appear
In September 1987, a few weeks after the new prime minister Károly Grosz spoke our openly tor the first time about the country's enormous economic problems, another group of intellectuals, this time with powerful nationalist inclinations, founded the Hungarian Democratic
Forum. The HDF was given protection and publicity by the reform Communist leader Imre Pozsgay, who was trying to put Gorbachev's glasnost into practise and play the role of a new Imre Nagy and shift the country towards pluralist democracy. In March 1988 another group appeared: two dozen Law and Economics students founded the Alliance of Young
Democrats (AYD), which openly proclaimed itself as a political organization whose goal was the creation of a new democratic Hungary.
By May 1988 the membership of the
Hungarian
Socialist
Party
Workers
(HSWP - the Communist party) had reached the conclusion that the old, paralyzed leadership must be replaced.
The party conference accepted the concept of a "socialist market economy" (the market mechanism across the board, but with state-owned property predominant)
and "socialist pluralism" (a broad national coordination between the mushrooming social organizations but without other parties). But Hungary's Western friends
6 West European style multiparty democraproposed more radical steps towards
International Viewpoint #184 • May 7, 1990
### LASZLO ANDERS cy and a full market economy. In his speech of November 1988, HSWP general secretary Grosz rejected the legalization of parties, but by February 1989, the HSWP leadership realized that they had no choice but to accept pluralism. In March, with the aid of the United States ambassador, Mark Palmer, the new parties established the Opposition Round Table (ORT) which, in May, started negotiating with the HSWP.
Luckily nobody asked who the ORT members represented. At the same time, because of the unclear situation, the so-called social organizations (trade unions, Womens Council, youth movement and so on) took part in the National Round Table (NRT) as a third force. The ORT members used the reburial of Imre Nagy in June 1989 and were encouraged further by a visit from George Bush in July. In September the participants in the NRT signed the agreement on a "peaceful transition" meaning an end to the one-party state and the establishment of a democratically elected parliament. On October 23, on the anniversary of the 1956 demonstrations, Hungary was declared a republic. The majority of the NRT agreed to the election of the leader of the HSP (as the HSWP is now), Pozsgay, as President. But a group led by the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) collected 200,000 signatures and prevented this. A national referendum then decided to delay the presidential election until after the elections to parliament, which were fixed for March 25, 1990.
The electoral system that has been worked out is a rather unsatisfactory mixture of two methods resulting from a political compromise. One method, that small parties, while "first past the post" (referred to henceforth as voting for individuals) favours big parties. Last September no party was sure if it would turn out to be big or small, and the NRT thus decided that 176 of the 384 MPs should be elected individually, 128 on regional lists and 90 on a national list, this latter being made up of votes left over. List sytem works agalnst small parties But they also included a limitation on the list system that worked against small parties. Any party getting less than 4% would not get into parliament and their votes would be redistributed among the parties with more than 4%. It was also stipulated that a candidate had to get the signatures of 750 sponsors in a district to be able to stand there, a ruling that seemed to many people to throw into question the secret character of the electoral process. Even so in many districts parties could find eight or ten willing candidates.
According to the electoral rules in the first round, candidates could only become MPs from individual districts if they got more than half of the votes cast. In the second round the strongest three from the first round can stand and the decision is by a simple majority, providing that more than a quarter of the citizens take part in the voting. All this is very complicated and many of the population could hardly understand it!
The party campaign managers soon grasped that the key to popularity and high votes is the mass media, and a bloody fight ensued for influence and time on TV and radio. In January and February more than 50 parties had two spots of five minutes each on prime time TV and radio. Many of their efforts were really dreadful and alienated many people both from a lot of small and not very serious parties, but also from the whole electoral process.