There is then obviously a general change. Despite the poverty and misery that exists on the African continent, despite the application of the austerity plans dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank over the past ten years, we have not until now seen popular revolts on the scale of those which have taken place in countries like Morocco, Argentina, Brazil or Venezuela. There has been a political delay in the revolt of the masses. Today it is clear that in these countries there is a kind of power vacuum, a decomposition of the state apparatus, for example in the Ivory Coast where the soldiers are on strike, the customs workers are on strike, the taxi drivers are on strike, the firemen are on strike, and so on. In the face of this these unsophisticated and very personalized state apparatuses — the apparatus of the state is identified with the presidency of the republic - are extremely fragile. This is a turning point, but it does not mean we are witnessing a revolutionary upsurge in Africa.
The big problem is whether political and social forces exist which can represent an alternative. The twenty years old strategic debate on whether the social conditions exist to establish a bourgeois democratic order in Africa, the debate we had with the Maoist and nationalist currents, is again on the order of the day. For the danger is that there could be, under the effects of the crisis, an implosion, a collapse of the state apparatus, in the context of a popular revolt, hunger riots, strikes even - but in the absence of, not simply a political, but a social alternative Which 1s capable ol proposing an alternative project of society, a new state apparatus, a new form of economic development, and so on.
And there is a very great risk that these social forces do not exist, precisely because of the depth of the crisis and the weight of imperialist domination which has limited and hindered the development of these forces. Obviously this posers movement exists, if a class consciousness exists, even in the reformist sense — I do not necessarily mean the revolutionary sense - which can transform these riots into a class confrontation. There the debate remains open between optimism and pessimism. It is necessary to be perceptive and pragmatic, it is necessary to try to develop such a force but at the same time not to be over-optimistic on this question. • Apart from the political fragility of the regimes, what are the economic and social factors underlying the current explosions? Why have so many black African countries experienced mass upheavals almost simultaneously?
Firstly, there are those elements which are the consequence of the global capitalist crisis of the world market in raw materials. This market has been thrown into turmoil not simply by the conjunctural crisis of the price of raw materials, but by drastic changes in the world economy and its needs - crises of sugar, cocoa, coffee, and petrol production which are due not only to conjunctural modifications of world demand but also to a modification of structural demand. That is, there is a problem of product substitution, a problem of competition between countries of the third world - there is a tendency today to buy Central American rather then African coffee — and there is obviously the problem of overproduction and the profitability of production. I think that we 15 are witnessing in Africa today something June 18, 1990 • #187 International Viewpoint
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A turning Africa colonies.
AFRICA "revolutionary" — the transformation of the international division of labour which issued from colonization. These countries became independent at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, but until now they have had a place in the world economy which was an extension of their role in the traditional colonial economy, based on the production of primary products for export. These products no longer have the same place in the world economy. Consequently, thirty years after independence, Africa's objective place in the world market is in the process of being transformed, and no provision has been made for this.
Add to this the classic features of "third world" countries which apply in particular in Africa. You have mass illiteracy, a demographic acceleration — Africa is the only continent where the demographic curve continues to rise — there are huge ecological problems, there is, connected with the demographic problem obviously, the situation of women where the problem of illiteracy is worse. In some countries the rate of illiteracy amongst women reaches 85% and this affects the access women have to birth control and control over their lives. Africa is the only continent where there has been in the past ten years a fall in agricultural productivity; this is linked to demographic pressure, debt, urban drift, and so on, as well as to the collapse of the system of exportation of raw materials. To this must be added the problem of AIDS in a number of countries. The African continent is affected to a greater degree than any other by the generalized crisis today. These are the factors which explain the simultaneous nature of all these current explosions. • What have been the specificities of French imperialist domination in Africa, and why is it that the crisis of the neo-colonial regimes seems to be especially sharp in the former French colonies?
There is a particularity in the form of domination of French imperialism, and thus a particularity also in the crisis of this domination. First it is necessary to understand that the African continent is very fragile from the institutional and state point of view, a factor which all the European countries must take account of in their relations with black Africa.
France has maintained a very close, very constrictive monetary, institutional and military relationship with its former colonies in Africa over 20 to 30 years. In a certain sense these countries have profited from this. For example the "Franc Zone", to which 14 African countries belong, is supposed to be a means of stabilizing these economies, of protecting them against monetary risk. The French military presence was supposed to protect these countries against the great instabili16 Tyhich did n other African countries, which did not have this kind of access t International Viewpoint #187 • June 18, 1990 external military aid. I think from one point of view it was true, from the point of view of the bourgeoisie, the imperialists, there has been a relative, a very relative, stability in a certain number of Francophone African countries, compared with the other countries on the continent. What is very interesting is that today, despite this, these countries have gone into crisis in a specific and violent manner.
Very many of these countries have very large French communities, larger than was the case during the colonial era. For example in the Ivory Coast, there are 45,000 French, very much more than in colonial times. In Gabon there are 20,000, again very much more than in colonial times. There are then factors which have retarded the crisis, but at the same time when the crisis comes it takes a very explosive form. • How would you characterize the evolution of Soviet strategy in Africa under Gorbachev, and how is the crisis being reflected in those countries which have been allied in some form with the Soviet Union? The western press has made much of abandonment "Marxism-Leninism" by a number of regimes. In Ethiopia, the regime seems on the verge of collapse, whilst the Eritrean and Tigrayan resistance movements also seem to be reevaluating their ideological commitments.
On the Soviet presence, it is necessary to be extremely prudent, because the international media have made a lot of froth about this over the past 20 years. The Soviets have attempted to stabilize political, military and diplomatic relationships with a certain number of African regimes which have claimed to be pro-
Marxist-Leninist or socialist. You have to study the situation case by
In Ethiopia there was a specific situation. There was a revolution, not a socialor proletarian revolution, revolution nonetheless. The regime needed political, economic and military support. Most important, it was incapable of resolving the national question in the country. So it had to rely on a Stalinist model of centralization, and the denial of national rights. For all these reasons, it was not for us a revolutionary regime.
Fidel Castro said in the 1970s, when the Cuban troops were in Ethiopia, that in Ethiopia there were aspects of the French revolution and aspects of the Bolshevik revolution. I think he was right.
However we are not at the end of the 18th century but at the end of the 20th. This means that the place of Ethiopia in the world economy is posed. How to tackle the problem of under-development in this context? The second problem is that the Ethiopian leadership has the attitude to the national question of the Jacobins. They have tried to construct a centralized nation by force, starting from an abstraction of the Ethiopian nation that didn't in fact exist. If Castro had followed through his thoughts he might have arrived at Lenin's conclusions. Unable to answer either of these two questions, the Ethiopian situation has degenerated. The regime is more isolated than ever. The Eritreans may be close to victory. The empire is exploding everywhere, with the resistance in Tigray and in the South, and I think the regime's days are numbered.
Despite what the Soviet Union used to claim, the Derg did not result from a socialist revolution. Now what is on the cards is a pro-imperialist counterrevolution. The nature of the regime is highlighted by the way Israeli military advisers have replaced Soviet ones.
The main Tigrayan organization is of pro-Albanian origin. It seems that it is very rapidly moving towards ideological "new realism" insofar as the possibility of power and the international situation pose the problem of a real balance-sheet of Stalinism. The Eritrean leadership considered itself socialist. It has shown great political astuteness over a long period of time. It denounced the Soviet role in Ethiopia, and criticized the Cuban attitude without ruling out the possibility of dialogue and Soviet or Cuban mediation. Eritrea is a case where it is necessary to demand and win national independence. The leadership there has evolved to a sort of radical nationalism, more realistic than the professions of faith of the past.
Angola is also a specific case. The Angolan regime originated in an armed struggle for national liberation. It was a very fragile regime, confronting not simply a South African military intervention, but also a regional ethnic problem, which it did not have the capacity to resolve in social, economic or political terms. Consequently it searched for a military response. This is what happened with the Cuban intervention.
Now, in the context of the South African intervention, we have never demanded the
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, but the Cuban leadership did not understand that it had engaged in this struggle on behalf of an Angolan government that had no revolutionary response on the social and economic level to the Angolan crisis, only a military response - and which consequently was unable to resolve this crisis.
Obviously, it is a completely different affair if one turns to the "pro-Soviet" nature Brazzaville, Benin or Madagascar. There one is dealing with a farce, these are regimes which remain absolutely neocolonial, linked to French imperialism. Congo-Brazzaville and Benin are members of the Franc Zone, and there have always been French soldiers in Congo. The diplomatic and political game over 15-20 years with the Soviet Union did not mean integration into COMECON or economic or military integration with the Soviet Union, it was very much more contradictory than that. Moreover with the beginning of the fall in the price of petrol a certain political realism became necessary, and the Brazzaville regime, for example, has retreated from its "Marxism-Leninism". There is very much noise about this, for reasons of imperialist propaganda, obviously, but in reality there has never really been a Soviet capacity in these countries. There has been a Soviet political intervention, yes, if completely derisory, and Gorbachev has really put things back in place from a certain point of view, he has said that it is necessary to finish with this kind of artificial and costly framework in Africa. • On a related point, what has been the impact in black Africa of the events of the past year in Eastern
I am a bit cautious about this. I think that the events in Eastern Europe have had an effect at two levels. Firstly the imperialist powers, particularly the French Socialist government, have understood that there are problems posed at the moment in supporting single party governments, whilst celebrating the events in Eastern Europe It is noticeable that the French secret service, for example, has begun to work in a certain number of countries, within the regime but also within the clandestine opposition, to begin to resolve the problem of multi-partyism. Secondly, the little opposition parties, essentially composed of intellectuals, liberal professionals, students, teachers, and so on, are with good reason using the events in Eastern Europe in their propaganda. However I do not think that it has much influence with the broad masses who do not have access to very much information about what has happened in Eastern Europe. From the point of view of political propaganda and anti-imperialist propaganda in Europe, it is a completely valid argument. In a coun try like France it is very interesting to show the contradiction between the demagogy of the French Socialist Party on the struggle against all dictatorship and tyranny and the manner in which it bails out and supports the African dictatorships.
I would like to add an important point. Today the debate in Paris and London or in the African capitals is a debate on multi-partyism. Obviously we must support every struggle for the satisfaction of elementary democratic rights, the right to form parties or trade unions, the right to strike, for a free press, and so on. But it is necessary to pay attention to two things. Multi-partyism in itself does not have the same revolutionary dynamic in Africa that it could have elsewhere. For several reasons. First, because we already have an experience of multi-partyism in Africa. In Senegal, there is a formal multi-partyism, where there are some 15 legal organizations, but all strikes and demonstrations are repressed and you can't have a meeting in Dakar without the police intervening. The state apparatus remains under the control of one all-powerful party. Secondmulti-partyism presents another problem: what type of party and what social force is capable of establishing real parties of opposition to imperial-
You can say that elementary democracy is needed in these countries. But if you look at the Ivory Coast for example, small opposition parties exist, but they have not supported any of the strikes that have been multiplying. There is a vast gulf between the potential for the development of social movements and the opposition parties who have a very narrow world view. They aim for elementary democracy but without a grasp of strategic problems or the question of social base. At the same time the workers' movement is too weak to exert any pressure on the formation of political organizations. In Senegal, where real revolutionary organizations exist, it has taken 10 or 15 years to reach a point where a convergence between these organizations and the first stirrings of an
AFRICA PLANTu independent workers' movement is possible. The process is only in its initial stages. • The existence of single party systems in black Africa has often been justified as the sole means of controlling in some way the problem of tribalism. Do you think that there is any validity in that argument?
The term tribalism is pejorative and shouldn't be used; in any case it doesn't correspond to the situation. In all these countries there are a large number of ethnic groups, that can vary in size from thousands to hundreds of thousands to millions of individuals that have a language, often economic and social specificities, cultural forms, property laws and village organizations and so on. It is a question of ethnicity. The imperialists and their client regimes have spent 30 years attempting to stabilize themselves by seeking a social base through clientilism and corruption, using family and ethnic networks. One result of this is that opposition movements take the form of revolts regional or ethnic oppression because the regime appears to be the monopoly of a particular region or ethnic group. Imperialism has manipulated this phenomenon. It would be wrong for us to see in every ethnic group a nation in the process of formation. This is never the case. There is a real theoretical problem in Africa concerning the relations between the ethnic and national questions.
These countries do not have a national consciousness; the regime has tried to impose one. We have viewed the ethnic issues from a democratic point of view, involving the right to linguistic selfexpression and self-determination, peasant self-organization, local and regional self-government. All these things also raise questions of mass democracy and direct democracy. We have talked of such things as bilingualism and literacy in the official and local languages, of equality 17 between regions and their populations. June 18, 1990 • #187 International Viewpoint
No honeymoon for
AFRICA / NICARAGUA
The only way to overcome these problems is a revolution that would be capable of really giving opportunities for the selforganization of both the urban and rural masses. This is something more than a strictly bourgeois democratic revolution. • So you would have in mind some kind of autonomy on the lines of
THIRTY days have been enough for the government of the what has been attempted in Nicaragua with the Miskito people, rather