The smoldering miniwar in Somalia
The miniwar that began on Somali territory the Democratic Front for Somali Salvation, and the smolder. In its November 13 issue, Somali National Movement have recently formed a common carried a report from a correspondent saying:
"The Ethiopians remain about 20 miles inside Somali terri- hastening the fall of President Barre.
four months ago continues
"Economist"
tory, on two fronts around a couple of border villages.
This accord was announced by Radio Kulmis, a Somali oppomake almost daily air reconnaissance flights, but there appears sition station located in the suburbs of the Ethiopian capital.
to be a stalemate in the fighting. The Somalis, have had 500 men killed and 1,200 wounded, claim that Ethio-
Halgan (Struggle), the United Voice of the Somali Opposition pian reinforcements have arrived and that a further onslaught is
The Somali government has used the threat of an Ethiopian opposition groups have claimed, invasion to pressure its Western allies to cough up more aid. The
"Afrique-Defense," that they
"Economist" noted that the Western diplomats were skeptical
Somali territory and are now engaged in a "struggle to the death" with the government forces.
about the Siad Barre regime's new cries of alarm.
On the other hand, the November issue of "Afrique-Defense,"
The following article, written in late September, shortly after a magazine published in Paris for businessmen interested in the scope of the confrontation became clear, analyzes the backinvesting in Africa, reports that the two main Somali opposition ground and terms of the armed conflict underway in Somalia.
The development of an armed conflict involving Ethiopia on the territory of the
Somali state might seem surprising, since it represents a reversal of the terms of the
1977 confliet, when the fighting developed on Ethiopian territory.
In 1977, on July 23, the Somali army took the initiative, using as a cover the
West Somali Liberation Front, an organization that claimed to be fighting for the right of self-determination of the Somalis living in the Ethiopian Ogaden.
After the defeat of the Somalis, the region has again been thrown into moil, in the name of a totally different cause. Now the people of this region are supposed to be in opposition to the
Somali regime and to support a liberation struggle against the military dictatorship of President Siad Barre.
A few years ago, the Somali regime claimed that the fight was over liberating the Somali people of the Ogaden. Today, a section of the Somali opposition claims that it is basing itself on the same people to overthrow Siad Barre, with the aid of their Ethopian friends.
In fact, there are two distinct aspects in these repeated clashes between Ethiopia and Somalia, and neither one should be forgotten.
First there is the background to these conflicts, the Somali national and ethnic question. Because the Somali nationality is extremely clearly defined, the problem of the border between Somalia and Ethiopia cutting off a part of the Somalis is a permanent source of instability.
The idea of reuniting "Greater Somalia" has always been part of the propaganda of the Somali governments. After being dealt a defeat in 1978 at the hands of the Ethiopian, Cuban, and forces, Siad Barre publicly renounced this
"ideal" on March 9, 1978, announcing front "with who say they This radio station Forces." unilateral withdrawal of Somali THE OGADEN QUESTION
The Ogaden has always been a bone of contention between the two countries. The area was ceded to Ethiopia by the British after the second world war, in a period in which the policy of the imperialists was to reinforce the empire of the negus, Haile Selasse. This gift had an effect similar to the Western powers winking at the annexation of Eritrea in 1952 by the regime in Addis Abeba. This sort of conflict, therefore is directly linked to the legacy of colonialism and to imperialist policy in the region.
The Ogaden question led to an initial conflict in 1968, a second in 1966, and a third in 1977-78. Each time, the Somali state was able to base itself on a strong national feeling among the Somali communities, all of which have a common language, the same religion, and the same sort of social organization, regardless of
However, the Somali national question does not always produce the same politically clear and unanimous response in all the Somali communities, which exist not only in Ethiopia but also in Djibouti and
CLANS AND POLITICS
The objective reason for this complexity has to be with formation itself. Some 60% of the population is considered totally nomad and part of the remaining 40% are only semi-
Among the effects of this situation is that the social, economic, and political life of the country is chronically dominated by clans. It is still being debated whether there is even a stable full-fledged of accelerating the armed struggle and has reportedly changed its name to Radio have occupied large parts ruling class in Somalia. In the past, this situation has led to a generalized fragmentation of political life, with a myriad of groups mainly representing different clan interests. Thus, in the March 1969 elections, there were 88 parties running
So, in this context, it becomes clear how important the military coup staged by Siad Barre in 1969 was. It was aimed at achieving the coercive power to build a centralized state and ruling class through military junta. After 13 years, the military regime has only partially achieved its objectives, and the power of the clans remains unbroken.
This fragmentation of the Somali people into clans greatly complicates the Somali national question in the frontier and disputed areas. The ups and downs of Somali irredentism in Ethiopia, as well as in Djibouti or Kenya, are often conditioned by the relations between the local clan notables and the groups in power in the Somali capital of Mogadiscio. Thus, the Somali state's conflicts with Ethiopia are usually accompanied by maneuvers, purges, and splits. This was also the case with the fronts operating in the Ogaden.
These problems are further complicated by the way in which the various governments in the region use and manipulate the national question - Ethiopia and Somalia in the first instance, to say nothing of the imperialists. Real self-determination of the communities involved is the last concern of all these governments. This goes for the Somali nomads, as well as for the peoples of Eritrea and Tigre in the northern part of Ethiopia.
In the name of defending the frontiers left by colonialism, wars have persisted in this part of Africa for thirty years. Indeed they may have been primarily means of settling the internal political crises of the existing regimes.
The successive renewals of the Ethiopian offensive against the Eritreans or the wars between Somalia and Ethiopia have come at good times for defusing serious crises facing the regimes
At times, it has been the vicissitudes in the relations between these regimes and the imperialists that have directly encouraged them to undertake such military adventures. The 1977 Ogaden war was so motivated. Mogadiscio hoped to get massive aid, including economic aid, from the imperialists at a time when the Ethiopian revolution still had a strong element of mass self-organization, both in the capital and in the countryside.
DERG TRIES TO HOLD ON TO
The Derg (the Amharic word means "the Council of Equals") was determined to keep the empire of the negus intact. But this state was being torn by great convulsions. Centrifugal forces were at work not only in Eritrea but also in Tigre and in the Ogaden.
In the Ogaden, the central government in Addis Abeba had always represented oppression and poverty. After the fall of Emperor Haile Selasse on September 12, 1974, the people gradually discovered that the "revolutionary" military officers intended to maintain a centralized repressive rule over the restive regions.
At the same time, a crisis broke out between Somalia and the Soviets, leading Moscow to break with Mogadiscio. This opened up the way for a rapprochement
Somalia and the imperialist powers. In fact, the imperialists had probably been maneuvering for a very long time to reduce the Soviet foothold in the country and to find ways to rebuild their network of positions in the Horn of Africa, after the breakup caused by the fall of Haile Selasse.
One of the consequences of these new relations between Somalia and the U.S was granting of the Berbera military base near Djibouti to the American navy.(1)
THE REASONS FOR THE 1977 WAR
But the Ogaden war between Somali and Ethiopian regimes was not caused by the national demands of the Somali communities in Ethiopia or the American maneuvers against the Ethiorevolution. In the case of both regimes, the war was intended to solve certain internal political problems.
On the Somali side, the war was used to restore order in the satellite fronts that the regime maintained on Ethiopian territory, to get a firmer hand on leaderships that had shown a tendency to presume to speak in their own name.(2)
On the Ethiopian side, the war offered an opportunity for an intense campaign to integrate the still uncontrolled peasant militias into the state forces. Far from being a simple and necessary measure of bringing these forces into the revolutionary army, this action was a step in rein24 forcing the bourgeois army controlled by the Derg. It preceded the housebreaking of the neighborhood committees in Addis Abeba and the repression against the Meison (the Pan-Ethiopian Socialist Move-
From the broader standpoint, the war enabled the Derg to make it clear that in the case of the Ogaden, as well as in it had no intention of granting any right whatever of self-determination.
Finally, the Ethiopian officers succeeded in getting the Soviets and Cubans to intervene massively on their side, without their making the least criticism of the Ethiopian government's policy. A common general staff was even set up, including the generals of the three con-
After the war, the guerrilla movement continued to operate in the Ogaden. Cuban forces remain stationed in the area, about 9,000 troops guarding the border. In 1981, several thousand refugees in Somalia reportedly came from that area of the Ogaden. According to the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees, there are between 500,000 and 900,000 refugees from the Ogaden in Somalia.
CHANGES IN THE WAKE OF THE
In the present conflict, like that in 1977, it is important to identify all the various elements involved so as not to overemphasize any one of them.
Since 1977, several changes have taken place in both Ethiopia and Somalia. First of all, the Somalis have not gotten the financial and military commitment they expected from the United States.
Washington did not want to alienate the Ethiopian regime definitively, and so it preferred to drag its feet, awaiting like. ly changes in the relations between the Soviets and the Derg officers. As in many other conflicts in Africa, the U.S. knows how to keep several irons in the fire at
THE U.S. INTEREST
The so-called contradictions the bourgeois press points up by comparing quotations from various American officials and politicians often reflect the complexity of American interests, since the general line adopted at a given moment by the White House caff be deflected by the industrial
Ethiopia ranks nineteenth in Africa as a trading partner for the U.S., selling 89.5 (1). Before Ethiopia, Somalia was characterized Le Moscow saten it peat itse, take Sind Barre regime got large amounts of military aid and was considered the backbone of the Soviet military establishment in the region.
After the fall of Haile Selasse in Ethiopia, everything was suddenly thrown into the melt-
The Soviets probably tried to foster a rapprochement between the two countries. But at the very least they did not want to let the Ethiopian situation evolve without their taking
Several small crises had already to consider the million dollars worth of goods to the U.S. and buying 62.2 million worth in 1981. Somalia comes far behind.
This is why, despite the American promises, Siad Barre has made no bones about his criticisms of the West:
"The West's indifference is more surprising than it is disappointing. How can the Westerners keep letting the Soviets pull the wool over their eyes? The Soviets make promises they have no intention of keeping, and here, as in Iran or Afghanistan, they are getting ready to confront the West with accomplished facts."(4)
In fact, after making a belated deal with the Somalis for using the Berbera naval base, the Americans have not yet taken the decision to make it into an important part of their military network in the region. A considerable part of the old Soviet installations are awaiting the overhaul needed to make them usable by the American forces. After its military defeat in the Ogaden, this cautious attitude on the part of the Americans was a second heavy blow for Siad Barre inside
THE SOMALI OPPOSITION
There have been other internal political developments in Somalia since 1977. A group of officers, some of whom are known to have continued to harbor pro-Soviet attitudes, tried to overthrow Siad Barre. The attempt failed and two of the plotters were shot
This episode illustrates, once again, the complexity of the problems. cers were far from being simply soldiers embittered by a military defeat. were also involved in an old conflict between their clan, the Mijerteins, and the Darods, to which Siad Barre belongs.
This first test of strength was to give rise to the Somali Salvation Front, which thus is partially an outgrowth of an interclan struggle. At the beginning of 1981, this group gained attention by starting up terrorism. Its activities led and they revealed that the group enjoyed a certain complicity in the administration and the army, as well as ties with personalities described at the time as pro-Soviet.(5)
It seems, in fact, that the break with Moscow divided the leading group. The Ogaden war made it possible to maintain a facade of unity by appeals to the old nationalist ideals of "Greater Somalia."
The war against the hereditary enemy, Ethiopia, may well have obliged officers government never ceased to be a repressive mili-
For his part, Fidel Castro had visited Mogadiscio during an African tour. At the time, he endorsed the characterization of the
"socialist and revolutionary." After he also denounced the regime as pro(2). Le Monde, September 5, 1982. (3). The Meison was a populist group of Maoist unlike the Revolutionary People's Party of Ethiopia, supported the Derg for
Revolutionary People's Party, which had been isolated by its totally irresponsible ultraleftist actions. In turn. the Meison had to break with the military and its leadership became the target of repression.
August 5, 1980. (5). Le Monde, November 25, 26, 1981.
SAUDI ARABIA marked by ten years of "scientific socialism" and suddenly left political orphans to restrain their feelings. It is not excluded either that Moscow was able to keep certain military circles under its influence, waiting for a more propitious moment to touch off a political crisis in Mogadiscio.
In any case, the defeat in the Ogaden precipitated things. It exposed the Siad Barre group to blows from the most varied collection of opponents - clans, friends of the Soviet Union, disappointed
RED
SEA
Massawa
¡ERITREA
SUDAN
SOUTH
YEMEN
NORTH
YEMEN
GULF OF
Aden
ADEN
• Djibouti
-•Berbera military officers, and so forth. At no time, however, was there any indication of mass support for this opposition.
Diredawa A PRO-IMPERIALIST ALTERNATIVE
TO SIAD BARRE ETHIOPIA Ogaden
In 1981, twelve ministers formed a tendency inside the official party, which is the only one allowed to exist, demanding more democracy, a turn toward more free enterprise in the economy (today it is based mainly on state enterprises) and a genuine peace with Ethiopia. They also for creating a post of premier in order to reduce what they regarded as a concentration of power in the hands of the president, Siad Barre.
Shortly after this, it was announced in London that a Somali National Movement had been formed, which, in the words of one of its leaders, Hassan Adan Wadadi, a former ambassador, "neither hostile to the West nor favorable to Moscow." (6)
Finally, in October 1981, three other groups, including the Somali Salvation Front, fused to form the Democratic Front for Somali Salvation, whose ties with the Ethiopians are obvious. It has a radio transmitter in the suburbs of Addis Abeba, Radio Kulmis. And in the present military conflict, the Democratic Front forces apparently have modern arms, even supposing that the troops inforces and not simply
In February 1982, mutinies broke out in military bases in the northern part of the country, along with mass demonstrations, which were harshly suppressed. This was the first time since 1977 the regime faced anything more than small opposition groups. But it remains imposto tell what, if any connection, existed between these demonstrators and the organized opposition.
Finally, in June 1982, the crisis was at its height in the ruling party. Siad Barre was in danger of losing his majority, but he extricated himself by successfully carrying out the arrest of seven top figures.(7) The first charge lodged against was complicity with DIVISIONS IN THE DERG
The Ethiopians, for their part, had hardly any less problems. First of all there was the chronic and still unresolved question of building a "Marxist-Leninist party." This project divides the Ethiopian ruling strata. The Soviets are supposed to
### Addis
Ababa.
KENYA have brought heavy pressure to bear to assure that such a party is finally formed, since it is unquestionably the only way to create the conditions for stabilizing the ruling layer. The Soviets have intervened in the same way in Angola.
Such official parties, which copy all the mechanisms of Stalinist parties and use Marxist phraseology for the purpose, can in fact play a decisive role in such
They can be the means of achieving homogeneity within the petty-bourgeois layers, military or civilian, that make up the apparatus of a fragile and unstable state that remains in the framework of economic dependence on imperialism. Such parties can use repression within the ruling strata themselves to accomplish this objective.(8)
According to le Monde of March 16, this affair strained relations between Addis Abeba and Moscow. The French daily reported that an article in Pravda stressed the slowness of changes in Ethiopia, noting, for example, that the organized political vanguard." The Soviet
Le Matin, July 15, 1982. minister of defense med; former minister of information Mohamed former minister of foreign affairs Omar Arten Galib. (8). See Quatrieme Internationale, No. 5, July a-t-il des partis marxistes-leninistes en Afrique?" (9). Le Monde, 1982; June 1, and November 14, 1981. In 1978, offensive against the Eritreans was supported by the Soviet navy and air force. An Ethiopian landing on the coast was carried out from Soviet ships. In this period, the Cubans were present in Eritrea, but it is impossible to tell what their role was. Afterward, they made the decision limit themselves to giving logistic aid to the Ethiopian army, to training soldiers, ete. From Eritrean sources, it seems that they are still stationed in Asmara, the capital of
SOMALIA
INDIAN Mogadishu OCEAN
0 Miles 300 CP organ said that it was necessary to make up for lost time.
It was in this climate that the military junta decided to launch a new offensive against the Eritrean fronts. It committed considerable forces to this operation, and for the first time since 1978, carried it out without massive support from Soviets. The offensive failed to achieve its to take the city of Nafka from the People's Liberation Front of Eritrea. This setback was compounded by a worsening of the military situation in Tigre, where another liberation front is fighting the central government.(9)
SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION IN
Finally, Ethiopia is experiencing a grave economic crisis. The Ethiopian revolution has released social forces long suppressed by the monarchy. Today, despite the state enterprises, despite the committees and the cooperatives, social differentiation is developing in the coun tryside. In the cities, corruption and the Eritrea, but are still not involved in the military actions. It should be noted that the 1978 Ethiopian offensive against the Eritreans was launched just after the victory in the Ogaden. It seems that the integration of the peasant militias into the army that was carried out at that time helpwhip up chauvinist feeling against the Eritreans.
At the same time, the military integration in Soviets, and the Cubans probably extended to some extent to the Eritrean front, with the Cubans being brought under the combined pressure of the other forces. So, it was after some time that the Cubans decided not to supthe Ethiopian army on the ground in POIL operations in Eritrea. It was at this time that Fidel Castro talked about the need for a "political settlement" to the war. Nonetheless, overall, he continued to support the Derg.
25
state bureaucracy are promoting the rise of a privileged layer. The shortage of necessities such as wheat, cooking oil, sugar, textiles, shoes, and soap is hitting the urban population hard. The head of state, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam recently launched an attack on "backward farmers," who are selling their produce at prohibitive prices.(10)
But the basic problem lies elsewhere. The Ethiopian economy depends basically on financial aid from the European
Community see Marches tropicaux et Mediterraneens of January 22, 1982). Between 1976 and 1978, the government made the maximum exertion to break the self-organization of the masses. The state apparatus remains in the hands of the military officers, petty bourgeoisie, and a few other profi-
The peasant and worker masses have found themselves denied access to the central decision-making power, same time as the local power of their neighborhood committees has been rolled back. Thus, the laws of capitalism continue to operate in the country. The state apparatus functions along bourgeois-state lines. And the official "Marxist" ideology serves in fact as a veneer for military bonapartism.
THE NEW WAR
So, this was the context in which the news came of the outbreak of the conflict on Somali territory between Siad Barre's army and opposition forces. No one can seriously believe the version offered by the Ethiopians and their supporters, who claim that this is a very simple question: the Somali masses are unhappy, a democratic and anti-imperialist opposition has developed, and it has gotten some fraternal but modest aid from the Ethiopian regime.(11)
Despite the Ethiopian denials, there is no doubt that the authorities in Addis Abeba have given the green light to the Somali opposition, that they have furnished heavy arms, and that they have at the very least provided logistic support. The present anti-Siad Barre Democratic Front is no more independent of the Ethiopian state than the Western Somali Liberation Front was independent of Mogadiscio. (12) A PRO-IMPERIALIST ALTERNATIVE
TO SIAD BARRE
The Somali government has raised a hue and cry about foreign invasion to try to force Washington to step up its support. But the Americans know how fragile and isolated the Siad Barre regime is. The American policy is torn between the fear of seeing a new pro-Soviet regime established in Somalia and a desire to find an alternative to the group presently in power in Mogadiscio. The Somali National Movement has tried to step into this opening. It has taken a position against 26
"foreign intervention" in Somalia, thereby offering itself as an alternative for the
On July 24, 1982, Washington announced its first shipment of emergency aid to Somalia but made it clear that it consisted of defensive weapons (radar, anti-aircraft batteries, and ammunition).
published indicating the still modest character of this aid. On August 16, after Siad Barre declared a state of siege, ments. (13) Although it is not possible to determine exactly how extensive this new is, there is no doubt that for the moment the White House has decided to diplomatic maneuvers to defuse the conflict. But the U.S. administration preferred to take a step closer to the Mogadiscio regime, undoubtedly because of the recent military revolt in Kenya. The new political situation prevailing in Kenya suddenly forced the imperialists to make some clearer choices in East Africa. A prolonged destabilization in Kenya would constitute a longer term danger to imperialist interests and investments in the region and to the hope of restabilizing Uganda after Idi Amin.
The Democratic Front's statements calling for a "democratic socialist governand an end to the military facilities accorded to the U.S. shows clearly the risks that the Americans will run if they persist in the wait-and-see they have followed in recent years.
See Marches tropicaux et mediterraneens, (11), It is too often forgotten that in the conflict between the Derg and the Eritrean People's victory of the government because they know that the People's Front is a nationalist movement based on the Eritrean masses and won that would constitute a victory of "prolonged people's war." The present ideology of the People's Front is permeated by progres-
The People's Front was also able to differentiate its criticisms of the Derg, of the Soviets, and finally of the Cubans, whom it handled victory for Eritrea would be a blow for imperialist policy in Africa, since the imperialists claim to uphold the principle of maintaining the borders inherited from colonialism, a principle contained in the charter of the Organization of African Unity.
The overthrow of the Derg, if it made possible self-determination of the victory of the People's Front would be a new of problems for imperialism. In DecemMinister of Foreign Affairs with Ethiopia reaffirming respect for the established borders of the states in the (Marches tropicaux et mediterraneens,
It would also be simplistic to reduce the situation in this region to a conflict between Moscow and Washington. Quite the contrary, the clashes going on there may force the Soviets to maneuver to cool things down. Rene Lefort, who was le Monde's correspondent in in this period, described an incident at the end of the Ogaden war in this way: "But this Soviet commitment (not to go into Somali territory) Addis Abeba and the USSR. The Derg dreamed of nothing but revenging the affront it suffered and of settling the Ogaden for all by giving Somalia a lesson it would not forget. This meant carrying out fourteen years later the plan of Aman Andom, which had been
But not only did Moscow rule this out but it also twice opposed a battle plan that would
Nonetheless, for the immediate future, there are no prospects for a change in the situation for the masses of the region. The Democratic Front is a pawn in a contlict that is far from being a simple clash between Moscow and Washington. This region of Africa is one of the poorest in the world. The Ethiopian revolution had excellent possibilities for arousing the enthusiasm of the masses in this part of
MASS MOVEMENTS DIVERTED the absence of a revolution ary vanguard has enabled the Ethiopian and Somali military to divert the mass liberation movement. The Ethiopians did this through repression, the Somalis by using the national question. If the Ethiopian revolution can regain momentum, it would turn against the policy of the Derg It would, then, have to put an end to the bloody repression being waged against the Eritrean people. In Eritrea, in Tigre, or in the Ogaden, the revolution would recog nize the right of self-determination of the populations.
Such a development would make it possible to pose the question of power in Somalia in a different way than through military conflict between groups of officers with confused programs and with immediate objectives that take very little account of the fate of the populations involved. Indeed the various national questions are an underlying and basic fact of political and social developments in the region.
Reluctantly, the Ethiopian army stopped on the frontier. Only the pilots, the hard core of the anti-Soviet elements in the armed forces, went beyond their orders and bombed Somali cities, including Hargheisa and Berbera." (Rene Lefort, Ethiopie, la revolution heretique. Maspero, Paris, 1981, P. 357.) National Assembly, Siad Barre declared once negotiations with Ethiopia at any time and in achieve a political settlement. Mogadiscio now says that it no longer claims
Ogaden territory but demands only self-determination for its population. recognition of the border and of the principles of the OAU charter, as well as reparations for negotiations. Moreover, for the time being, they to play their cards very close to chest, presenting the present conflict as a pureforces in the Ogaden, have no doubt maintained the political position on this question that they held in 1978. In its March 26, 1978, Granma the daily paper of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, said:
"Those who know Africa are aware that in straddle the frontiers with other African coun
Many African states have not yet passed the stage of tribal organization.
would constitute a precedent that would lead to a real catastrophe for all of
This is why the African states have said: and must not be any redrawing of borders, and the use of force to redraw borders is out of the question." (Retranslated from
Cuban CP journal thus made quite a clear defense of this point in the charter of the OAU. But rather than take up the fundamental problem of the national and ethnic questions and the tragic heritage of colonialism, it takes refuge in a strange view of tribalism as a sort of original sin.