THE BRUTAL violence which swept through major black townships of the Transvaal Reef within days of the second round of talks between the de Klerk government and the ANC has shattered the atmosphere of the "new South Africa". In weeks of intense, bitter carnage and counter carnage, many hundreds of people have died and thousands more have been injured and left homeless with most of their belongings destroyed.
Finally, after much prevarication, and with the tacit agreement of the ANC, the state sent troops into the townships to "restore order". A thinly disguised new state of emergency has been declared. This is barely three months after the much heralded partial lifting of the previous state of emergency, which had been in force since 1986. The sheer scale and brutality of the "Reef War" has etched a question mark on the reform process and the prospects for a peaceful transition period. The following analysis of the underlying causes of the reef war was written at the start of September.
SOPHIE HAWES
HE DAY following the signing of
T the "Pretoria Minute",
, which included the ANC's announcement of a cease-fire, vigilantes from the East Rand hostels of Thokoza,
Katlehong and Vosloorus launched a series of murderous attacks using "traditional" weapons on former hostel dwellers and squatters. Police did nothing to prevent the bloodshed.
Township residents counter attacked and within three days, 44 people in the area had been killed and hundreds wounded. Within a week, the war had escalated to most areas of the Reef, the country's industrial heartland.
Although there had been similar attacks throughout the previous months, the scale, intensity and brutally personalized form of the violence — beatings, and stabbings with knives, knobkerries, sharpened sticks and spears, use of the "necklace"
and the burning of people with petrol as individuals and well as shootings by police — as well as graphic coverage in the media has had a major impact.
Media hacks as well as right wing academics have been quick to raise the specters of ethnic/tribal conflict between
Zulus and Xhosas", "internecine squabbles between black organizations" as well as "tribal warrior traditions, weaponry and initiation rites."
More perceptive observers pointed to the exclusion of Inkatha from the two recent "talks about talks" as a cause of the frustration of Inkatha members which spilled over into violence, and urged ANC leader Nelson Mandela to sit down and discuss with Inkatha leader Gatsha Buthelezi.
Beyond the bare facts of Inkathainspired and far right vigilante attacks on anyone regarded as a supporter of the libmovement or Inkatha, both the immediate and underlying causes of the violence are extremely
This is hardly surprising in a society which is experiencing a simultaneous process of disintegration and renewal, requiring whirlwind shifts in the alignment of forces. Violence rooted in apartheid
In a fundamental way, the roots of the violence reach to the core of the apartheid capitalist system — the way in which the black labour force is still rigidalong "ethnic" lines; the reinforcement of this through the phoney "homelands"/ bantustan system; consequent patterns of male migrancy from homelands to work "temporarily" in "white" South Africa; as well as the generally appalling housing conditions and shortage of amenities in genercompounds and squatter camps.
Despite the abolition of influx control accommodation as a "single" man.
Migrants enjoy few rights and benefits. Forced to live in a mine compound, a single sex hostel, squatter camp or overcrowded township house, they face the insecurity of only temporary residence and employment.
Conditions in the hostels are notoriously bad with usually 20-50 men sharing a room, each with only a single bunk demarcating "home" . All washing, toilet and cooking facilities are shared and public. No privacy is possible. A visiting spouse or girlfriend or children must be accommodated in the only space available - the single bunk.
The economic crisis has only aggravated the situation. It is estimated that 1.1 million jobs were lost through production stagnation in the 1980s and many migrants are unemployed.
In addition, a worsening housing and amenities crisis has meant increased competition for all resources including water, electricity, sanitation and so on. In many cases, township residents "look down" on hostel dwellers and squatters, who have been traditionally prey to the maneuvering of various right wing, gangster and vigilante elements.
Ethnic solutions to material problems
Just as in Natal, Inkatha has exploited this situation by posing "ethnic" solutions to material problems. If you join Inkatha or the Inkatha trade union, they say, we will find you housing, protect your job, provide you with land at home and so on. The price paid is "warrior" service to Inkatha.
When the call is made there is little choice but to fight or be killed. Many who resist forced recruitment can never again return to kwaZulu for risk of assassination.
But why has the tinderbox exploded now? At one level. Buthelezi feels he has been publicly humiliated by being excluded from the ANC/government talks. He is also anxious about the proposed reforms, especially those related to the homelands and the migrant labour system.
At another level, Buthelezi desperately needs to move beyond his base in kwaZu1. It is still in force in Natal province. 2. Even before the Reef War, over 500 people died in violent "politically-related" incidents between January and June, bringing the death toll in 1990 already dangerously close to the violent years of 1984-1986. In March, riot police killed 11 people and injured scores of others at Sebokeng, an incident leading to a govem-
Mam Cothe posice for beniry which has just reported, 7
blaming the police for being "trigger happy".
International Viewpoint #190 • September 17, 1990
SOUTH AFRICA lu and the Zulu speaking areas of Natal if his claim to a national political profile is to have the slightest credibility?. But is not the only force who would like to derail the reform process. In fact there are three main elements that have been instrumental in provoking the
• Inkatha as an organization and the security forces of the kwaZulu "home-
• Right wing elements within the South African Police as well as "askaris" - black former members of liberation organizations who have turned informer and now work for and are protected by
• Organized far right vigilantes and extremist elements, both black and white, acting in various degrees of coordination with the abovet. Buthelezi makes call to arms
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's disquiet at the special relationship between Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk developing since February, and Inkatha's exclusion from the process of "talks about talks" has been growing increasingly rancorous. Since July especially, Buthelezi has made several "calls to arms to defend the national pride and forward the aims of the 'Zulu nation"'. Indeed there had been several warnings — for example from the COSATU trade unions and in the New Nation newspaper — that Inkatha was planning to spread the Natal violence to
Recf.
the
For
COSAexample,
TU warned that
Inkatha was bussing armed vigilantes to attack
Sebokeng on July
22. The police did
22 nothing and people were killed
Again, on August
12, just before the talks, Inkatha held a rally for all hostel dwellers the on
Reef at which it warned that Xhosas and their organizations were preparing an attack on Inkatha Zulus in the townships. Yet, despite the potential threat this posed to the talks, de Klerk made no attempt to instruct the police to disarm
Inkatha nor protect vulnerable communities.
Inkatha has concion to force hostel dwellers to join Inkatha and resign from other organizations and to participate in Inkatha attacks. This at both Zulu and dwellers. Inkatha warlords have spread the idea that war is coming and that their members must arm themselves. Hostels have been used as launching pads for attacks and fortresses for defence. The police have colluded in this and have consistently refused to raid "Inkatha hosor disarm them. Inkatha as an organization has supported the attacks with weapons and transport. Several hostel dwellers have been assassinated for not joining raiding parties.
There are also incidents where police have engaged directly in the violence, as evidenced by medical reports that some of the wounded have been shot with observers have alleged that the police had "fronted" for Inkatha by undertaking killings, then leaving bodies stabbed by sharpened sticks and pongas to lay the blame on Inkatha. Several reports told of police being called in to "quell the violence" and then firing tear gas into comallowing in raiding parties of vigilantes
In addition police consistently refuse to disarm the vigilantes and/or Inkatha.
There is widespread sympathy among the police for Inkatha, many of whom favour Buthelezi as a black leader over
Mandela. This is true throughout the
"white" community which is attracted by
Buthelezi's espousal of the free enterprise system and the perpetuation of ethnic structures. Buthelezi has also managed to avoid actively engaging in or propagating violence directly. He constantly presents a mask of "peace, freedom, and democracy" which cuts little ice with the vast majority of blacks but which corresponds to the expectations for "moderate" black leadership of a large layer of whites.
The police have also provoked the situation by their regular raids on squatter camps and hostels. Shacks have been bulldozed, and people sent back to homelands throughout the last few months. In addition even journalists have reported that they watched police standing by while vig ilantes and gangs have openly attacked and murdered people. It is also highly sus picious that very few arrests were made during the two week period at the height of the killings and none of these were of known killers, warlords or vigilante lead-
Vigilantes exploit chaos
The chaos caused by the violence has also been exploited by "unorganized" vig ilantes and gangs. It is known that many off-duty policemen and members of far right groups and "askaris" often form vigilante groups to carry out armed attacks on anyone considered radical, or simply on black people in general.4 In addition, the situation has been used to settle old scores among rival gangs and carry out robberies and looting. Of particular concern is the provocation by means of rumours and smear pamphlets. Malicious rumours have been consistently spread in the fertile climate of fear in the townships. Leaflets purporting to come from the ANC, UDF or COSATU attacking Inkatha and "Zulu ethnicity" and calling for "Xhosas to fight Zulus" have been widely circulated to fan sectarianism'.
But Inkatha does not have a monopoly on political intolerance. Indeed, in the months since the release of Mandela, many township youth, wearing the colors or invoking the name of the ANC, have also engaged in acts of provocation and 3. Two recent opinion polls carried out by commercial companies confirmed the lack of support for Buthelezi among blacks. The first showed that Buthelezi would get the votes of only 1% of blacks in a presidential election (Mandela received 58% and de Klerk 22%); the second showed that Inkatha as an organization enjoyed support from only 2% of blacks, the ANC receiving 38% support. 4. Armed attacks by the far right are steadily increasing. A recent spate of bomb and grenade attacks in black shopping centres, taxi queues and outside more enlightened Afrikaans newspapers have been traced to far right groups. Various police investigations also point to the existence of very well-organized networks of "spare-time" vigilantes inside the police force and anny. 5. Smear leaflets are beginning to feature more and more in the arsenal of the far right. Practically every struggle and organization within the liberation/ workers/left movement now has to deal with a regular flow of leaflets cleverly worded to sow discord among fellow organizations.
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8
Who is behind the violence?
THE MASSACRE continues. The armed groups, usually in minibuses, attack once or twice a day, in the centre of Johannesburg where the majority of the city's black workforce is concentrated. According to witnesses, these people
SOUTH AFRICA tive or reactionary forces. This sectarianism is undermining working class unity and the will to participate in strategic alliances with the forces of the working class and liberation movements. Indeed the leadership of both the ANC and the Comare both black and white, but the whites have blackened faces. On Thursday
September 13 there was an attack on a Johannesburg commuter train in which
26 persons were killed and 100 injured. The next day another attack on another train led to 15 deaths, whilst an attack on a taxi line led to 5 deaths. Since August 8 there have been 764 people killed in the Transvaal.
In South Africa, the public debate centers on the possible existence of a "third force", in addition to Inkatha and the ANC. In fact, it is clear that the police apparatus is involved in the violence. Furthermore, in addition to the participation in these attacks of Inkatha and groups from the white far right, there is also talk of the possible utilisation of mercenaries from UNITA or Renamo (armed groups sponsored by the South African state in Angola and Mozambique), regrouped in camps to the north of Transvaal. De Klerk now recognizes that an unknown "third force" could very well exist.
But he has not explained why the emphasis of the violence has shifted from the township conflicts to organized attacks in the centre of town without discrimination between ethnic groups.
There can be no doubt that there is a strategy of low-intensity war, although it is debatable whether the government as a whole is involved or only a part of the state apparatus with the silent complicity of de Klerk. A large part of the black population sincerely believes that this is a conflict between Inkatha and the ANC. The conditions have been created under which the army sent by de Klerk can appear as a peacemaking force. This disinformation favours also the idea among the Zulu population that Mandela is more a
Xhosa chief than a national figure. Buthelezi is trying to capitalize on this reactionary radicalization. He is making an increasing number of attacks on Mandela, accusing him of pursuing an anti-Zulu and communist project.
The government has set up a meeting between the Xhosa president of Transkei and the Zulu king under the patronage of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik
Botha. All this is intended to highlight the inter-ethnic dimension of the conflict.
A meeting of Zulu traditional chiefs finished with a communiqué which says, among other things, "We call on the ANC to apologize to the King of the Zulus for its call for the disbanding of kwaZulu and for the disbanding of the kwaZulu poilice force."(The Citizen, September 15)
The ANC is experiencing severe problems. Having called for the army to step in, Mandela has'now made a self-criticism. In fact, the first act of this force was to look for arms in the pro-ANC hostels. The ANC is not responsible for this violence —the only violence that can be attributed to it is that of the groups of youth in Natal who have defended themselves from Inkatha independently of
Mandela has said that this war is being organized by a force other than Inkatha, but he has not pointed the finger at the state apparatus, and he does not seem to have any means of threatening the government and the process of negotiation. In this situation, it is urgent to build a united front of all progressive forces —
ANG, PAC, AZAPO, WOSA and the unions. The very minimum that is required is that the ANC should withdraw at once from the negotiations with the government. The ANC has decided to suspend its "armed struggle", which had become a formality for several months. But many ask now whether it is capable of physically protecting the people in the townships. * From our correspondent in South Africa. 17/9/90 intimidation against non-members, members of other political tendencies and hostel dwellers (especially Zulu speakers). There have been many complaints from township, hostel and squatter residents of this growing "culture of political intolerance". This has often taken the form of members of street committees, civics or residents committees — not to mention youth groups and trade unions - being forced to declare allegiance to the ANC, sometimes with the use of physical intimidation.
This degree of factionalism has often had the outcome of pushing working from organizing around important material issues, not to mention from other political organizations. Worse still, it sometimes results in pushing them into the arms of conservamunist Party has shown itself to be particularly deaf to the problems being created by the unruly and extremely undemocratic practices of certain "young lions" on the ground and in the unions. This negligence can be ill-afforded during this crucial period which demands unity in action, especially by the mass organizations.
The violence against the Reef communities is an assault on the working class and all the forces struggling for a democratic end to apartheid capitalism. It serves the interests of the sectarian nationalists, both black and white, and the far right. (At this stage, it is not really in the interests of the
: which would much rather go through a process of peaceful transition, which would offer it more legitimacy than putting troops back into the townships.)
The backdrop is the whole edifice of apartheid capitalism. Add to this the fact that Inkatha's social base - "ethnically" divided homelands, communities, job reservations and so on — is gradually erod-
The ever-growing urban working class has turned to a range of other organizations to fight for their interests. Orgaimproving conditions, especially once ties longer materially important. Workers join trade unions, residents join civic associations, tenants' assoparent-teacher-student associations, school students join student organizations and so on. Through this people are exposed to organized political
Conflict not ethnic but ideological
As these differences become expressed in more organized and political ways, the tensions between them spill into violent confrontation. Oskar Dhlomo, former Inkatha ideologue who recently resigned from the organization, has stressed that the conflict is not ethnic but ideological. He is right, but this ideological difference goes beyond differences between Inkatha and the ANC.
At the end of the day, it is a clash of different strategies for solving the deep socio-economic problems created by apartheid capitalism — the bantustans; the migrant labour system; the housing/hostel/ squatter problems; the lack or inadequacy of services and amenities in the townships; and massive unemployment.
Unless the organizations of the liberation and working class movements unite on a clear class strategy for tackling these issues, as well as supporting the capacity of communities to defend themselves from attack, the prospects for a peaceful transition process are remote indeed. *
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9
The slide towards civil war
THE federal organization of the Yugoslav
International Viewpoint #191 • October 1, 1990
YUGOSLAVIA
HE unknown factor in the as peacefully, as was the case in
T current power struggle is the Yugoslav People's
Army. Its birth and develpost-Communist rule particularly chaotic.
opment took place firstly as a
Some republics have already had multiparty part of the revolution and antielections, others not. Over the past three fascist national liberation war, and then as a part of the emeryears, a muffled conflict within the gence and consolidation of the
Communist Party leadership over the
Communist system. The relative desirability and terms of a radical change has autonomy of the armed forces, and their role in policing internal been transformed into an open conflict dissent increased substantially as between the federal units — or rather, a result of extensive party purges between Serbia and all the others. Most in the early 1970s, at precisely the time when a major devolution worrying for the future of the country is the of state power to the Republics burgeoning violence in the ethnically mixed and provinces was initiated. The areas of Yugoslavia's central regions.
collapse of Communist Party rule has left the armed forces without a political master.
The representatives of the chief republics — Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia - have become in their different ways the spokespersons for a new post-Communist order. The effects of this turn, combined with professional self-interest, political conservatism and
Serb preponderance in the officer ranks, have produced an unstable and potentially dangerous force. As the army seeks a new role, it is possible that sections could emerge as a serious threat to the new parliamentary-democratic system, using as a pretext the need to defend Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.
Army's diminishing qualms about intervening
In 1981 the army could still be found grumbling over the politicians' incompetence which had required it to intervene in the majority-Albanian Kosovo province of Serbia. Such qualms seem to have diminished with the crumbling of unity within the party-state leadership. Two years ago the army was involved in trying to inhibit political democratization in Slovenia. Last year it participated in dismantling the political and cultural autonomy of Kosovo - a move both violent and unconstitutional.
This summer it staged military manoeuvres in Bosnia in which Slovenia and
Croatia were designated as the "enemy"
(coloured blue). Within weeks of this exercise, it intervened in the internal affairs of Croatia by sending two of its
MIGs to turn back police helicopters despatched by the Croatian authorities to recapture the town of Knin from a group of armed Serb insurgents, who had cut off
10 road and rail links between Zagreb and state has made the transition to
MICHELLE LEE Split.
These actions amount to little more than occasional harassment — as yet. Indeed it is difficult to ascertain whether they commanded the full support of the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff. If some generals harbour political ambitions, they are at present kept in check by the multinational character of the conscript army, by the legitimacy of the new governments in Slovenia and Croatia and - last but not least - by fear of possible Western reaction. Yet a military putsch cannot be altogether excluded. Much will depend on the outcome of forthcoming elections in the republic of Serbia.
In the spring of 1990, the Communist Parties of Slovenia and Croatia, bowing before the inevitable, organized free and fair elections, in which they lost power, but gained around 20% of the popular vote (less in Slovenia and more in Croatia). Despite the fact the CPs emerged as a respectable parliamentary opposition — with no single party winning the absolute majority of the popular vote - they are faced today with a drastically declining membership and severe political disorientation. What is more, the constant pressure from Serbia is forcing them into a coalition with domestic parties to their right in defence of national and republican state sovereignty. This autumn, it will be the turn of the other republics to go through the electoral process, in which ethnically-based parties are likely to win the lion's share of the vote in individual national constituencies.
It is unlikely that the Serbian elections will be as equitably organized, or proceed