Guatemala; elections under military eyes
GUATEMALA round. In fact the key developments in Guatemala have not been the elections, but the progress of the National Dialogue.
The National Dialogue was to have got underway after the Esquipulas Accords signed by the five Central American presidents in August 1987. The application of the Accords in Guatemala ran up against
WITH the strong support of the Christian Democracy, Jorge
Serrano Elias, candidate for the Solidarity Action Movement
(MAS), won the January 1991 presidential election with a massive 68% of the vote, defeating Jorge Carpio of the
National Union of the Centre (UCN). The elections were marked by a high abstention rate (44% in the first round and 50% in the second) and violence; nonetheless Serrano is a charismatic figure with widespread support, including that of the United
States. Even so, his ability to resolve Guatemala's crisis is minimal. It will be continue to be the military who decide, even if they decide on change.
RENALDO TUCCI
T
HIS was the second election for a civilian president in Guatemala, the first being that of the Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo in
1985. As before, these elections, which took place between November 11, 1990 and January 6, 1991, were the occasion for a rise in violence and the settling of accounts by the different political formations.
Before the first round, attention was focussed on the candidacy of the former dictator Rios Montt'. The latter, a member of the Church of the Word (one of the numerous fundamentalist sects in Guatemala, which propagates a resigned fatalism), put himself forward as the man of law and order. According to some analysts, this was attractive to many Guatemalans who consider that a strongman is needed to get the country out of its dead-
Since the constitution forbids former heads of state from becoming president,
Rios Montt took on a galaxy of lawyers to use every possible legal trick to get on the ballot. At the same time he struck populist notes. And, even if attendance at his meetings was less impressive than he had predicted, there is no doubt that he drew on a sentiment that really existed.
However, after months of prevarication, the Constitutional Court ruled his candidacy out of order at the last moment - after allowing Rios Montt to dominate the electoral process for all this time.
After the first round, there were three candidates remaining.
The first was Jorge Carpio of the National Union of the Centre (UCN), a rightwing rival to the Christian Democrats, who came second in the 1985 elections.
He was supported by the diplomats, some top army officers and bosses.
The second was Jorge Serrano, representing the Solidarity Action Movement (MAS), another rightwing outfit, supported by Thatcher's International Democratic Union and the US Republicans. His success was no surprise. A charismatic figure, he was able to draw on the credit accruing from his role in the National Dialogue (see below). He was, furthermore, marked out from the other candidates by his calm demeanor during the campaign and his good showing during a television debate. Also working in his favour was his membership in a fundamentalist sect, given that Montt was out of the race.
Ruling party comes last
Finally there was Alfonso Cabrera, the Christian Democrat candidate, who, despite the disastrous balance sheet of Cerezo's reign, and his hospitalization during the voting, came in third. It seems that the ruling party benefited from the impact of its municipal achievements in the interior of the country, above all in the west.
During the first round, there was a 44% abstention rate. The organized popular movement - the associations of parents of the disappeared, workers and peasants' unions, humanitarian and human rights organizations and remained hesitant about the poll. While some observers emphasize the positive fact that, for the second time, democratic elections have taken place in Guatemala, there is another side of the coin. Since 1988 violence has been on the increase and prevents the opposition from playing any part in the country's political life. Thus, the president of the moderate left Revolutionary Democratic (URD), Humberto Gonzalez Gamarra, was assassinated a month before the first enormous problems. The government dragged its feet, while the "technical" coups of May 1988 and May 1989 were not inducements to peaceful and open dialogue. However, 1990 saw a series of meetings between the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG — bringing together the political and military opposition organizations) and various negotiators from the institutions.
The first meeting between the National Reconciliation Commission — the institution charged with supervising the National dialogue — and the URNG took place in Oslo from March 27 to 29, 1990. It set out the time-table of meetings between this latter and all representative sectors. It was to culminate in high level negotiations between the army and the guerillas. The final statement in Oslo underlines the need to achieve a lasting peace by negotiation, as envisaged in the Esquipulas accords, and the establishment of an inclusive democracy. Far right participates in talks
The second meeting in El Escorial in Spain from May 28 to 30, 1990, brought together the URNG and the political parties. Even the far right National Liberation Movement (MLN), which is radically opposed to any discussions with the URNG and has links with the death squads, took part.
According to some sources, the far right agreed to meet the guerillas in order to divide them. In any case this process, aimed at reaching a minimum consensus for the peaceful resolution of internal problems by political means, has provoked intense debate on all sides. There are probably also differing shades of opinion inside the URNG. Some are in favour of this development, others have reservations and others, finally, consider that the main thing remains to build up their military strength.
The other reason for the parties' participation in these discussions was, of course, the approach of the presidential election. At such a moment it was not politic to appear too bellicose and hostile to any political dialogue. At El Escorial, the political parties restated the need for the disarmament of the guerillas and a real 1. Rios Montt took power in a coup in March 1982. He bears the main responsibility for the genocide of the Indian populations in 1982/83. 2. So-called because it appears as if the objective of these coup attempts was not to take power, but to cause desablization and reduce the spice for democratic 19
International Viewpoint #200 • February 18, 1991
GUATEMALA amnesty for the militants. For its part, the
URNG announced its decision to suspend strategic and economic sabotage during campaign, while repeating that it would only lay down its arms after a series of constitutional reforms.
The main reform would be the election of a National Constituent which would redefine the economic role of the state, the place of the army in society and so on.
A constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage would proconstitutional reforms, which would then be submitted to referendum.
According to the URNG, it is impossible to make substantive changes in Guatewhich lie at the root of the perspective repression; bringing those responsible for human rights' violations to justice; demilamnestying decrees enacted by the Mejia
Victores government; abolition of the
(PACs - paramilitary militia used by the army), villages" and "poles of devel-
Third meeting held in Canada
The third meeting, in the
Canadian capital
Ottawa, from August 30 to September 1, 1990, brought together the URNG and the Coordinating Committee of the agriindustrial and financial associations (CACIF) and other bosses' organizations. While the URNG recognized the
CACIF as a full negotiating employed and those with marginal jobs, you have 45% of the Guatemalan popula-
Then in Quito (Ecuador) between September 24 and 26, 1990, the URNG met the religious organizations — Catholics, Anglicans, Protestants and Evangelicals. Their support for future constitutional and institutional reforms is an important factor, since their weight will be essential for any solution to the crisis. And in fact, the Catholic church was instrumental in getting the application of the Esquipulas Accords off the ground in Guatemala.
The final meeting took place October 23/25, 1990 in Ometepec in Mexico. Here, the URNG discussed with the popular organizations. These latter insisted on the resolution of the internal conflict and the establishment of a lasting peace by peaceful, political means. Underlining the importance of the existence of democratic parties and the holding of free elections, they nonetheless noted the need to consider a line of social development that would permit the population to express itself.
SE454TL simply the armed force of the Guatemalan state, and, thus, it does not belong at such meetings, it being up to the government to deal with such matters.
The National Dialogue is developing slowly since the government continues to drag its feet and representatives of popular and social organizations continue to go in fear of assassination.
The stage manager of the transition from the program of "national security" to
"national stability", defence minister general Hector Gramajo, has retired. The appointment of Juan Leonel Bolaños as his successor shows that the high command's aim remains that of institutionaliz ing the army. What this means was explained at a conference of the Guatemalan army chiefs in August 1987, that is, that one cannot conceive of a resolution of the Guatemalan crisis without having the means to resolve the problem of underdevelopment. This means that the regime has to pay attention to social, economic, ethnic and political factors in the conflict.
In reality, however, the army has continued to enforce its coercive role, militarizing the countryside, and repressing the rural population.
The so-called hard line is the work of the officers on ground, who criticize the incompetence and corruption of the generals in the capital. For these ultras, the only possible solution is a military solution and they are opposed to any dialogue. It is they who have been behind the various coup attempts. After developments
National Dialogue these "dirty war" forces are more than ever convinced that a coup is the only
But do they have the means for it? Where would they get their support? Would the majorthe representatives of the interests of the Through this series of meetings, the ity of landowners and enterprise heads be bosses and of the big landowners, and the politico-military organizations, was difficult. While coming out in favour of the social and political integration of the URNG, the CACIF called for it first to be legalized — with the hope that once legalized and integrated into the traditional political panorama, the guerilla movement would become a political party like
The URNG reiterated its belief that the economic structures were out of date and declared that any development or democsocial justice, including improvements in wages, a redefinition of land holding, development of non-traditional exports and agricultural production, the importance of an educated and trained workforce. It also appealed to the CACIF to look at the problem of production from O together the unemployed, the semi- the point of view of jobs; if one adds idea of a consensus between the different sectors of society for a political solution to the crisis took on form. After nearly thirty years of a war from which everyone has suffered, the conflict is felt by the majority to be a dead-end.
The political and social polarization is expressed in daily life by the official repression and human rights' violations. Today, some sectors that had previously resisted the Esquipulas accords, such as the bosses, want them to be implemented. Beyond the impact of its economic sabotage, the URNG remains a political force that cannot be ignored, whether owing to its military actions, which the army cannot stop, or as a force that puts forward proposals for a definitive settlement.
According to the Oslo accords, the next meeting is to bring together the government, the army and the URNG. For some time, the army has been multiplying declarations that it is not a political actor but in favour of such a move? This is not at all evident, since a coup would only increase the political chaos, which in its turn implies capital flight and less investment.
Social mobilizations face numerous obstacles at present. This is shown by the course of the two most important conflicts in recent times.
The teachers' strike in summer 1989 lasted two months and involved 40,000 people. Organized outside the main teaching union, the struggle was very militant - besides demonstrations and school occupations, the strikers also occupied embassies, official Guatemalan and international buildings, and the border posts on the Mexican frontier and so on. Limits to repression removed
Very violent repression followed, but was resisted, while the leaders went on hunger strike outside the presidential pal-
February 18, 1991• #200 International Viewpoint ace. Finally the government declared the strike illegal. Thus every striker could be sacked and exposed to the attentions of the death squads — all limits to the repression were removed. Assassinations of teacher militants continue.
This movement came up against both the official repression and difficulties in finding support in other sections of society. On the one hand the strike put forward demands that went beyond what many strikers wanted; on the other the strike was perceived as a narrow corporatist movement, without significance for the rest of society.
The second example is the strikes organized by the Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC) in the banana, cotton, coffee and sugar cane plantations on the south coast. The agricultural workers are Indians who come down for the harvest with their families from the Altiplano. Their working conditions are appalling. They are housed in barracks without sanitation, and some — mostly children, who start work at five years of age — die owing to the change in climate and the working conditions. Finally, overseers supervise the work, as well as the weighing (usually fraudulent) of what has been picked and the payment of wages (often less than promised).
The CUC launched strikes in 1989 and 1990 at harvest time (September to March with a high point in December, January and February). On each occasion they brought out at least 50,000 workers. In the negotiations forced on the National Union of Agro-exporters (UNAGRO) the main demands concerned working conditions and a minimum wage. UNAGRO played for time, postponing the meetings, whilst the bosses' thugs and the army intervened against the strikers. These latter found themselves in an impossible economic situation, without resources. These examples are eloquent for two reasons. Firstly, despite the repression, there have been changes afoot in the Guatemalan social movement over the past ten years. Confidence in the civilian regime has been shaken by the growing repression. All the recent conflicts turn around false promises and then intransigence on the part of the government and bosses, before confronting the forces of law and order.
The second thing to note is that the popular movements lack means. Take for example the National Coordination of Guatemalan Widows. Its militants have lost their husbands during the period of massive repression; they sometimes have eight or so children - some gathered in discreetly after the disappearance or murder of both their parents. In these conditions daily survival absorbs much of people's energies. Mobilization is most difficult in the towns. The formation of the Trade Union and Popular Action Union (UASP) in 1988 allowed the united expression of the majority of popular associations and organizations.
However, rather than putting forward unifying demands, it tends to simply promote the sum total of sectoral demands, putting one or another up front at a given moment.
Oddly, it is in the country areas patrolled by the army that the most developed popular organizations can be found. This is the with the for (CUC), a clandestine peasant and tion created by member of the UASP.
The special aim of this organization of agricultural workers is to promote unity between the disadvantaged Indians and the poor ladinos (mixed race). In a country where some 60% of the population are Indians, the CUC has little by little overcome the effects of the genocide of 1978-83. It now has a significant capacity for mobilization and propaganda and can hope to make further steps forward with the Latin American campaign to celebrate "500 years of Indian and popular resistance."
There are signs of increased activity elsewhere including: The National Council of Displaced Guatemalans (CONDEG), which brings together families and communities who fled the repression (some one million of the country's nine million inhabitants are internal refugees); the Runujel Junam Council of Ethnic Communities (CERJ), which resists enrolment in the PAC militia in the Santa Cruz de Quiché region; or the CONAVIGUA, organized by peasant Indian widows. Violence growing continually
Since 1988 violence and human rights violations have been growing continually, in particular the violence of the state in the countryside. Apart from the day to day violence, the army regularly bombs the north of the Quiché, where the Communities of Resisting Populations (CPR) have taken refuge. Eight years ago these communities fled their villages to seek refuge in the mountains, mainly in the Ixcan, near to the Mexican border.
These 25,000 civilians, who have suffered the army's attacks — as well as hunger and disease - for eight years have always refused to arm themselves. These are clandestine communities, orga-
GUATEMALA nized in a very unusual way — a village can disappear in ten minutes, while maize fields are sown in the forests. Supported by the Church, on September 13, 1990 the CPR officially requested to be recognized and reinserted in civil society.
Meanwhile the army continues its bombardments. Then there are the death squads — a non-institutional form of violence. These far-right paramilitary groups target miltants or leaders of such groups as the parents of the disappeared, peasant organizations and trade unions.
Someone is lifted by "unknown armed persons", disappears and then their body is found on the roadside. Several people can disappear at once, while offices of popular destroyed by grenades or dynamite.
The scope of the ensemble of official and para-official violence has been widening. Now specialists studying aspects of Guatemalan society can be victims, such as the Guatemalan anthropologist, Mirna Mac, an official with an organization concerned with the fate of internal refugees. She was assassinated in September 1990. Foreigners have been killed. In January 1990, on a mission for the Socialist International, the Salvadoran social democrat, Hector Oqueli Colindres, was lifted in the capital in broad daylight.
In August the US citizen Michael Vernon Devin was killed. The US has demanded an inquiry into these three cases and voiced its doubts on the capacity of the Guatemalan government to put a stop to human rights violations.
As Nineth Garcia de Montenegro, president of the Group of Parents of the Disappeared remarked: when a US citizen falls victim to a death squad, the Guatemalan government holds an inquiry, but this is not the case for the two or three Guatemal 21 lans assassinated each day. *