The US ruling class and the war
On the brink
AT THE MOMENT of writing, the world is awaiting a decision from George Bush: will he launch the all-out ground offensive that his troops have been preparing actively for more than one month, or will he try Mikhail Gorbachev's "peace plan"
that the Iraqi government has
GULF WAR months, there was broadcast testimony before committees of Congress and debates on the editorial class of the United States could
A combination of international, regional, Iraqi, military and political factors are involved in the US president's decision making : the international factor relates to the kind of
"New World Order" Bush is looking opinion pages of major newspapers by people who are high-level government and ruling class advisors. It was narrow, of course, in the sense that the basic justice and rightness of the imperialist objectives in the was universally for, that is, one falling under the powerful Third World nation had exclusive and unchallenged hegebeen accomplished by the use of mony of the US world cop. The Kremlin's move, from that angle, is most embarrassing for the White
House, whatever the latter's final
This is not only because the peace plan jeopardizes the ground offensive which had been already planned, but also and above all because it represents a political comeback by Moscow on the Middle
Eastern stage. This move by the
Soviet bureaucracy will restore its prestige among the Arab masses and governments and, if successful, may leave in power a Saddam
Hussein who will be more popular than ever in the Arab and Muslim countries (including the Soviet Asian Republics) while more dependent than ever on the USSR.
On the other hand, the possibility of finishing the job without taking great risks involving heavy casualties, is certainly welcome to the US administration. However, they need to be sure that the job of crushing Iraq is really finished and that Saddam, if he remains in power, may be a hero but a clearly vanquished one, prevented from rebuilding his military might by all sorts of provisos,
Hence the conditions that they are putting on the Iraqi retreat envisaged in the Soviet plan; insisting that the withdrawal must very rapid, so as to prevent the Iraqi army from taking back a large part of its material, and refusing to give any guarantees to Baghdad in exchange for the withdrawal of its troops. The problem for Washington is that they have no ready-made and satisfactory alternative to Saddam Hussein, unlike in Grenada and Panama.
Had they, their unhesitating decision would have been to carry on their aggression. * - Salah Jaber 22/2/91 overwhelming American alr Power, with very little human cost to the attacking force.
DAVID FINKEL
B UT BEFORE the war actually
began, there had been a serious crisis in the US ruling class about whether such a war with Iraq was too risky, or even whether it made any sense at all. Why did capital decide, ultimately, in favor of war? What interests were compelling enough to justify the risks of war, when - as critics of the establishment repeatedly pointed out - the United States faced no threat of a cutoff of oil or any other strategic dan-
An analysis of the debate and its outcome may provide some insight into the way the US ruling class thinks. It also demonstrates the way in which, under certain conditions — particularly when the bourgeoisie itself is uncertain and undivided over policy — the "executive committee of the ruling class", particularly the presidency as opposed to the Congress, plays an extraordinarily powerful
A fraudulent debate- and a
There were, in fact, two debates, which simultaneously. The first, although it occupied most of the Congressional attention, was essentially a fraudulent debate working well enough to force Saddam Hussein to capitulate without war? The second, more substantive, debate was essentially over whether the war itself was a good idea for "America's national interest" and the "New World Order".
The second debate was surprisingly open, though ideologically narrow. It was open in the sense that for nearly three granted; the question was whether they were worth having a war over. This substantive debate did not, in general, pit liberals on the one side against conservatives on the other. The pro-war versus no-war debate cut across the categories of liberal and conservative; but most of the interesting and important arguments on both sides of the issue came mainly from sectors of the right-
There were a few exceptions. Some African-American political figures and a few whites, notably one Democratic Senator Paul Wellstone (Minnesota), and the independent Socialist Congressman Bernie Sanders (Vermont), argued strongly against the war on moral and left-populist grounds. One Republican Senator, Mark Hatfield (Oregon,) also broke ground with the administration and opposed the war on grounds of principle, not merely
For the most part, however, liberals did not intervene in the substantive debate, but relied instead on the argu-
"giving sanctions against Iraq time to work." This argument was also unfortunately echoed by a wing of the mass movement protesting the war mobilization. It was self-defeating, because it misunderstood what the sanctions were
Whether the sanctions would weaken Iraq if given another nine or 12 months, to the point of forcing Iraq to concede, was basically a technical question. And it is, in fact, almost certainly true that they would have done so, simply because the powers that usually undercut and sabotage sanctions against aggression - the United States and Britain above all — were supporting sanctions in this case. Sanctions used as cover for mobilization
However, for the Bush administration, the sanctions' purpose was not to force Iraq to concede or even primarily to hurt desirable side effect. The sanction were 3 desirable side effect. The sanctions were March 4, 1991 • #201 International Viewpoint
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BY THE TIME the Persian Gulf war was month old, the ruling take great satisfaction in the performance of its military technology: the virtual destruction of a relatively
GULF WAR the vehicle through which to mobilize for It was under the banner of sanctions that UN support was mobilized, that the huge strike force was assembled in the Arabian desert and that the pro-war coalition was put together. Between the November 29 UN Security Council resolution 678 and the January 15 deadline, the pro-war coalition reached its strongest and most uni-
To continue relying on sanctions after January 15, in terms of their stated purpose of weakening Iraq, would have been sound technical strategy. But from the standpoint of their real purpose - to assemble the pro-war coalition - the sanctions had already completed their
So much for the artificial debate over sanctions. What about the more substantial debate as to whether a war in the Gulf would be in the real interests of US impe-
The pro-war argument, roughly speaking, was carried by forces who can be called military-statist Keynesians, who have dominated state policy for time and were particularly prominent in 1980s. Indeed, these elements have been dominant in US administrations of both parties since the beginning of the perma-
Military-state Keynesian
Especially in the Reagan years, under the ideologically convenient cover of promoting conservative and "free market" values, these military-statist Keynesians have in fact organized and implemented an extraordinary state subsidy of military and high-tech industry, at the expense of the working class and the poor. The so-called collapse of Communism represented a victory for their policy but also a problem: if there was no longer a global enemy, what would justify vast subsidies
Further, these forces have also run up against a big disadvantage, which surfaced in the debate over the Gulf: in carrying out their massive military buildup, which contributed to THE bankruptcy and virtual collapse of the Soviet Union, they have also helped to accelerate the destruction of US capitalism's competitive capacity in relation to Japan and Germa-
These partisans of the military-statist economy, however, have one big advantage: they control the United States gov-
They therefore controlled the pace of events and the terms of debate. Given the lack of unanimity inside the ruling class about whether this war should be carried out, the fact that Bush, Baker, 4 power and organizinge an on checieo on Cheney, Sununu were at the center or International Viewpoint #201 • March 4, 1991 terms was a decisive factor.
Once they had put 400,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, they were able to advance a strong "use it or lose it" argument. Such an army could not remain there indefinitely in face of growing opposition in the Muslim world, not to mention the effects on the reservists pulled away from their jobs and families.
This point was made almost explicitly in the January Senate debate on authorizing war by two Senators — Bennett Johnson (Dem) of Louisiana and Arlan Spector, a Republican from Pennsylvania. They both said, in effect: I think the sanctions policy was working and it would have been better to continue it. But the choice the president made is to go for war now. And I am going to vote for that.
They were, in short, politically trapped by the administration's ability to create facts and set the terms of the debate. Senator Bennett Johnston said most explicitly of all that the decision for war had been made in November by Bush, not on November 29, the day of the UN resolution, but on November 9, when Bush announced the offensive military capabil-
What are the basic assumptions around which this pro-war party was organized? Assumption number one: Arab nationalism must be confronted and crushed. Number two: US force must be used to maintain military and political superiority vis-a-vis all enemies and indeed vis-a-vis our friends. And third: the strategic alliance with Israel remains vital for US domination of the Middle East, even though the Cold War is over, even though the Soviet Union as a military threat no longer exists, and even though Israel was a political liability in this war.
Confrontation with Arab nationalism
Once these premises are accepted — as they are across a wide spectrum of American political discourse — then the reasoning for war was strong. Especially with respect to a confrontation with Arab nationalism. It's a lot easier to confront that nationalism in the brutally military and bureaucratic form of a Saddam Hussein than when it takes the form of the grassroots and democratic Palestinian
With regard to the second premise, if you accept that US forces must be used to maintain political and military superiority - over not only enemies but also over allies - then the argument follows fairly directly that the US must fight now or later and now is better. If the United States its force effectively now against Saddam, it wouldn't be credible in a future crisis. The power of that argument depended on the way in which the agenda had been set. Having put 400,000 troops out there, the administration could say to their loyal imperialist opposition:
there will be times in the future when you want to have a military option, and if you don't use it now you'll never be able to make it credible.
The argument against the war was voiced by several groups who had much the better of the intellectual argument, but not the political strength of the pro-war faction. First of all, there are genuine conservatives: the vanishing breed who actually believe in the power of the free power. For authentic conservatives, war is justified only to defend "vital national interests" — that is, when the very existence of the ruling class is at stake.
Such people were ideologically committed to the struggle against Communism and the Soviet Union, but not the permanent massive state subsidy of the military. They found the latter to be a necessary measure when fighting Communism, but don't feel that it is very vital when what is involved is the price of oil, which is going to be set by the free market. They also understand that the US economy absolutely cannot afford the cost of this war, even if Japan and Germany and the Saudi royal house can be blackmailed to finance part of it (which real conservatives regard as humiliating).
Secondly there are some among the liberals — a minority - who don't place the US alliance with Israel above every other consideration. They recognize that the fundamental problems of include some kind of Israeli-Palestinian settlement and at least a partial redistribution of oil wealth in the Middle East, neither of which would be advanced by the war undertaken by the Bush team.
Competitors laughing all the way to the bank
Third, and most important, were some pragmatic strategists who have been looking with horror at the economic realities of the US. One such expert, Edward Luttwak, who testified before the Senate, openly ridiculed the pro-war ravings of Henry Kissinger. Luttwak in essence said: The Japanese and the Germans and the Dutch and the Belgians are watching us carry out this adventure in the Gulf and laughing, because they are making money. They are re-tooling their economies, and we're out there in the desert.
A second antiwar expert was Zbigniew Brzezinski, who pointed out that the costs of winning the war might be even greater than the costs of fighting it. Brzezinski argued that the destruction in the Middle East, from which various forms of Islamic fundamentalism as well as Syria might benefit, would force the US to maintain a massive occupation army for many years.
Brzezinski, a former National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, also pointed out the cost of keeping the Soviet Union as part of the anti-Iraq coalition. He predicted that Bush's Gulf War meant giving the
result of the Iran-Iraq war, which reached
Soviet Union freedom to repress the Baltic Republics, and possibly the end of the economic "reforms" in the Soviet Union in which the US ruling class has placed such high hopes.
As events showed, Brzezinski was right. Indeed, the predictions of those who argued that American capitalism may lose more than it gains from a victorious Gulf War may prove to be devastatingly accurate. The federal budget deficit for fiscal 1991 alone will exceed $300 bn; state and local governments are in financial shambles all over the country.
War party creates a fait accompli
Nonetheless the party of war won the debate, not on the merits of their case, but for several reasons that can be briefly
1. A fairly narrow clique at the center of organizing for war from the very first day of the crisis and controlled the pace of the build-up. The antiwar elements within the elite had to argue on the administration's
2. Secondly, though not the decisive factor, the drive for war was supported from the beginning by the Israel lobby in the US and by at least a substantial fraction of the neo-conservatives who place an extremely high value both on militarism and on Israeli interests.
3. The pro-war argument was backed up
SAUDIARABIA In the camp of democracy ACCORDING to Amnesty International, thousands of Yemeni immigrants in Saudi Arabia have, since August 1990, been subject to arbitrary arrest, persecutions and torture, for no other reason than their nationality, and their assumed hostility to the Saudi government's position on the
Thousands of them have been arrested in the street or in school, at home or at their place of work, notably in Jeddah, Where there is a large Yemeni communi-
Some of them, according to the Amnesty report, have been subjected to torture by electricity, beatings on the head and body, being forced to stand for long periods of time, sleep deprivation, total immersion in water and the falaqa - blows on the soles of the feet, a favourite with the Saudi regime. These tortures take place in provisional deten-
Oil slicks - who is responsible? WHILST warnings from opponents of the Gulf war about its potentially catastrophic environmental effects were scorned by western governments before
January 15, Iraq's alleged pumping into the Gulf of enormous amounts of oil has now become yet another justification for the frenzied assault against the country.
GULF WAR tion centres, from which the victims are returned to their country, without any legal proceedings.