FSLN debates future of revolution
NICARAGUA against it; productivity has fallen by 5%. Public service workers, for example, have lost 50% of their purchasing power. This has obviously led to a spectacular lowering of the living conditions of the masses, aggravated by the reduction of social services (growth of infant mortality, reappearance of a series of diseases banished
THE first congress of the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FLN) will take place July 19-21, 1991. The congress was initially scheduled for February 1990, but the FSLN leadership decided to postpone it, on the grounds that the social situation in the country demanded all the energies of
Sandinista militants. Meanwhile, a frequently violent public debate is continuing in the press, with members of the national leadership and well known cadres of the FLN putting forward a wide variety of positions, whilst the former middle cadres (now often unemployed and left to fend for themselves) and the rank and file grumble (see the letter of G.
Lopez p. 11).
CECILIA GARMENDIA
S
INCE the electoral defeat of the FSLN in February 1990, the discussion has centered on the causes (economic and military choices, alliances, the policy of the
FSLN in relation to the mass movement and the population in general); on the
"social partnership" with certain sectors of the bourgeoisie and the attitude to take towards the measures undertaken by the government (confrontation or negotiations); on the current role of the Sandinista People's Army (EPS); and on the kind of party to build (internal functioning, elected or nominated leadership, and so on).
Social mobilization attenuated
The signing of the social partnership accords in October 1990 has attenuated the social mobilization which reached its high point during the general strike of
July 1990; but these agreements have not checked, far from it, the persistent degradation of the standard of living of Nicaraand the deterioration of the guans economic situation. Dismissals continue,
(24,000 public employees will be sacked between now and April - 33% of current employees in administration, health and education — as well as 10,000 workers in the nationalized sector); a new privatization plan, worked out with the International Development Association (IDA, controlled by the United States) will be implemented and will affect 350 enterprises.
New privatization laws will soon be proposed to Parliament; these attacks are currently creating a renewal of social ten-
10
I sion (a strike of health personnel para-
International Viewpoint #203 • April 1, 1991 lyzed the hospitals in February 1991), but the mass movement seems disoriented by the zig-zags of the Sandinista leadership. Nicaragua's debt will be settled in the "Latin American" manner; half will be paid over 40 years and the rest converted into shares in the productive nationalized sector, the target of different measures taken by the government of the National Union of the Opposition (UNO) since February 1990.
Under the social partnership accords, the government succeeded in imposing an eventual privatization of banks; the state monopoly of foreign trade also seems threatened (it was one of the first measures taken by the revolutionary government in July 1979). Agrarian reform is frozen (despite the supplementary pressure exercised by the demobilized former Contras of peasant origin); the raising of interest rates has tightened the noose around peasants who had received land during the revolution. Whereas the accords envisaged the freezing of redundancies, the growing autonomy of local governments and administrations (a sign also of the divergences inside the UNO which reached their apogee in the so-called "revolt of the mayors"2) has meant that this measure has not been observed in many areas.
Incessant decline in purchasing power
Purchasing power declines incessantly; inflation has reached 10,000% for 1990; the cordoba-oro - the new currency which should be in parity with the US dollaralready exchanges at a rate of 7 to 1 since 1979 — fatal epidemics of measles, chickenpox and so on).
The EPS has fallen in size from 90,000 at the beginning of 1990 to 28,000 (the smallest army in Central America); it has also been shaken by a series of debates and incidents which have been terminated in a more than authoritarian fashion. Colonel Picardo, chief of the air force, was dismissed with his closest collaborators in August 1990, accused of indiscipline for having defied, indeed criticized, the authority of the commander of the EPS (general Humberto Ortega); these events concealed a more profound debate on the current role of this institution, the "rebels" being suspected of interfering in politics, whereas some now want the EPS to be no more than the guarantor of the Constitution.
At the end of 1990, four Sandinista (as well as Salvadoran) officers were imprisoned, accused of having sent missiles to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. Commandante Luis Carrion, a member of the national leadership of the FSLN, spoke, with regard to the FMLN, of a "disloyal attitude which does not correspond to the quality of the political relations and the solidarity of the FSLN*4.
FMLN forced to return missiles
The leadership of the FMLN, under the threat of the expulsion of the Salvadoran refugees based in Nicaragua, was forced to send back 8 Sam-7 missiles and 14 Sam-14 missiles to the EPS. The Sandinista Youth, qualifying the act of the accused officers as "heroic", indeed as a sign of a "revolutionary morality", rebelled; "the FLN is not the party in power and it cannot then feel itself offend-
Going to the root of things ed, or betrayed". The National Workers' Front (FNT, which brings together the whole of the Sandinista trade unions) has also criticized the attitude of the EPS leadership.
The 4 officers launched a hunger strike, supported by the association of dismissed former soldiers, after their condemnation to three and a half years imprisonment on
NICARAGUA
February 14 — they finally stopped on the
IN THE context of the preparation of the FSLN congress, a announcement of an eventual pardon. The debate has opened in the columns of the Nicaraguan press. As response of certain top Sandinista leaders part of this discussion, a farmer in region IV (the departments to this act has been shocking (see the interview with Dora Maria Tellez, p. 12). If of Masaya and Carazo, to the south of Managua) sent an open prudence is understandable in such an letter, in the name of a group of peasants, to the daily affair, the FSLN, as a party which is no
Barricada, which we reproduce virtually in its entirety.
longer in government, and no longer officially leading the EPS (a minister of state is responsible for it) had plenty of room to
GUADALUPE LOPEZ take an independent position.
To qualify the efforts of the FMLN to protect a civilian population faced with the bombardment of the Salvadoran army as a
"disloyal" act reveals a double morality and a certain historic amnesia (the attitude of the Sandinista government in December 1989, in the San Isidro accords, condemning "the armed actions and terrorist acts" hardly a month after the offensive launched by the FMLN, had already shaken the Sandinista ranks and shown the impasse into which the FSLN was drawn through its instinct for self-preservation).
Unjustified excess of zeal
Thus the attempts of the government to
"depoliticize and professionalize" the EPS are fully underway, with the active aid of an important part of the Sandinista leadership.
It is true that the transition accords, signed during the handover of government°, limited the Sandinista leadership's margin of manoeuvre, if it wished to keep control of the army — but this does not justify such excesses of zeal.
The measures taken since April 1990 by the UNO government have been made against the principal gains of the revolution (nationalized sector, Sandinista army and police, social gains — free health and education, right to work, agrarian reform, and so on).
If it hopes to regain the majority and continue to represent the interests of the effectively the
FSLN masses, must advance in its definition as a party. This is what is at stake in its congress. *
1. See /V 187.
2. UNO mayors close to vice-president Virgilio Godoy stirred up some confrontations at the end of 1990 between supposedly demobilized Contras and the Sandinista army and police. They demanded in particular the resignation of Humberto Ortega.
3. Rumours accuse him of having had contacts with the right and its joumal, La Prensa, of wishing to make the air force an "autonomous" institution, and of wanting to repress the July strikers. Officially, he has been accused only of having a "particular conception"
of the army.
4. El Nuevo Diario, January 30, 1991.
5. See /V 176 and 178.
6. See /V 184.
HE peasants of region IV have had a good deal of discussion on what the revolution has bought them, and what they have gained during all these years of sacrifice.
In that which concerns us, if we think about it, we see that the rain still falls on us (our cabins fall down); the more fortunate have learned to read and write, even if they hardly remember it; we have neither horse, nor beef meat; at best, we possess three manzanas' in a cooperative.
But all this is not very important for we are agreed that the revolution has given us something better; consciousness. This, we will never sell on any market.
A comrade said to us "there is something which is better than being a Sandinista, that is to be a revolutionary". We begin to understand what he meant.
We have travelled, and travel broadens the mind. We have seen many peasants in Nicaragua and also very Good land for agriculture and for livestock, but the cake is unfairly divided; on the one hand, there is an enormous share for some and on the other, there are the
Some say that there has already been an agrarian reform and longer be distributed. Others claim even that there have been very many injustices and it is necessary to go backwards; but so long as there remain so many empty bellies and such a big share of the cake for some, the agrarian reform must con-
There are peasants without land who live close to a big estate; for our part, we would already have occupied it. In time, if this was done, the expert from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MIDINRA) would come along with his great speeches: "You should not be extremist, the big landowner has said that he has no more land, wait, I will find you some elsewhere". And the people stay there on the road. Obviously, you will often see the expert coming out of the estate, with his jeep full of milk and cheese.
It is true that it was necessary to take account of the war and be patient. It was necessary in the first place to put an end to this savage aggression, the sovereignty of Nicaragua was at stake. But now we are going to concentrate our attention on the second priority; the agrarian question.
We are going to give those who have more than 100 manzanas of cultivable or cultivated land what they deserve; it is necessary to expropriate it, confiscate the land and give it back to the peasants, to the agricultural workers, to those without land and to the unemployed who are ready to work. And to pay no attention to his livestock or his beautiful speeches. Big landowners waste money
1. There exist numerous farms, of 4 to 5 thousand manzanas, with 300 beasts, and 7 or 8 families which work there for the proprietor or for the state. The proprietor fills his pockets; he sends his money to the United States or wastes it, buying imported products which are no good to him. To increase production, it is necessary to redistribute this property to 500 peasant
2. These families will no longer live in a situation of "hidden" unemployment and will no longer sell grain or milk or cheese or meat. The price of alimentary products will fall, which will suit the workers in the towns who, immediately, will modify their demand for wage increases.
3. The peasant needs a Sunday suit, schoolbooks for his kids, nails and tools, zinc to repair his roof, rum or refreshments; he will have his pennies. You will see; the industrial middle class and the traders will be happy; they will do good business with the peasants - for the middle class, good business is the best poli1. A manzana is an agricultural unit of measure 0.7 heyed in Nicaragua. One manzana is quivalent to 1 1 0.7 hectare. April 1, 1991• #203 International Viewpoint
NICARAGUA tics.
4. The land owner has only to change his trade and become bourgeois, to devote himself to industry or to commerce. The land is for those who work it.
5. The technicians, the functionaries and the secretaries will also come out winners, it will be necessary that they work hard and live as the middle class of the underdeveloped countries must; but they will eat more, and for less cost.
6. The state must change its policy in relation to the peasantry. The loans for sowing and the MIDINRA experts who come to see what we have sown and that there is no disease, are not enough. What are we going to do with our tractors, given the price of fuel and spare parts? The intellectuals and the technicians must rather find us better techniques, midway between the wooden plough and the Belarus 80 tractor; the government could install some schools so that the young peasants can learn a little of accounting and administration.
7. The intelligent and wealthy governments which, some say, exist in Europe, can help us.
8. It is evident that a true agrarian reform is the best way to improve the economy and that the modern bourgeois will obtain thus a good part of the cake; now we are going to deal with the political questions. As long as there are peasants who dream of their little piece of land, what you call social and political stability will not exist in this country.
Land reform brings peace
This way of settling the problems of the countryside, with machetes, and those of the nation, with rifles, is the fruit of the backwardness of these big landowners and of those governments who transform the workers into soldiers. The agricultural worker and the poor peasant will become soldiers if their boss orders them to; but if they possess their ten manzanas, there will no longer be wars, for lack of soldiers, and the people will learn to no longer put their lives in danger for nothing. See then how agrarian reform can lead to peace and social stability.
9. You have perhaps noticed that we are a little Sandinista and a little revolutionary. Sometimes, pressed to resolve our problems, we function by ourselves, and before receiving an order from above, we occupy a farm.
As the laws change every day, we no longer ask questions, we steer towards that which is just and we fight. In order for the revolutionary forces to triumph, it is necessary to win the big battle of the countryside.
10. It is obviously not a matter of taking up Kalishnikovs and attacking the big estates. This struggle takes place in the plain and it is an affair of cunning (this is 12 what they call "politics"). What is necessary is; a peasant organization which is International Viewpoint #203 • April 1, 1991 disposed to mobilize itself and to fight; the constitution and a handful of laws; a lawyer who knows his paperwork and does not sell himself for a piece of bread; the radio, and everything that can serve propaganda; and a lot of imagination.
Consciousness is needed; you will see how much the struggle will grow and how much it will reinforce itself. If someone tells you that it is illegal or unjust, it is necessary to tell him that nobody knows how the big landowners have succeeded in dispossessing us of our lands and throwing us on the roadside.
11. If property belongs to the state, don't pay attention to that. Respect only the farms which are conducting advanced research (new seeds, inseminations, and so on). The rest, privatize it. What is necessary is that the workers be conscious and disposed to steer the plough; to milk a cow or sow coffee, it is not necessary to have studied in Michigan. Moreover, who has milked the cows for all these years?
Advance by other roads
It is necessary to say that sometimes we have received orders seeking to stop us from occupying this or that farm. If somebody says to us that it is so that cooperatives can be installed there, we follow the orders; but if it is for the state, we turn a deaf ear and look elsewhere. We have never seen the advantages of that [the nationalized sector]. It is undoubtedly an improvement, but, in the countryside, we want to advance by other roads.
12. The big landowners come to us with their stories. They tell us that we are loafers, that we don't know how to work, that we are backward and that we have no "civilization". But who looks after their lands while they party and run after women?
There was never enough space to build schools or cemeteries on their land, they said; there could be 500 literacy campaigns, that will be no use as long as we don't have enough to eat. From where can we get the money to buy a newspaper or a book? If they wish to modernize this country, and introduce what they call "civilization", they can begin by having their feet on the land.
13. We don't like to mince words; if they [the readers] are intelligent, they will see that we are speaking about the very root of popular power in the countryside. If it is necessary to discuss [in the FLN] how to hasten the end of the regime currently in government [the UNO] or how to be a party, it is necessary to go to the root of things. Afterwards, according to the task, we will see at what time we work and with what.
First, we must know where we are, what we want and what we can do.
Then, we can speak of strategy and tactics, of forms of organization and of who can help us. But this will be for another time, if we have the chance. *
"The Front is going through a crisis"
DORA MARIA TELLEZ
Joined the Sandinista
National Liberation Front
(FSLN) in 1974; she led, with
Eden Pastora, the commando unit which occupied the national palace, where the Somozaist deputies met, on August 22,
1978, obtaining the liberation of numerous political prisoners, among them Tomas Borge. After having participated in the liberation of the second biggest town in the country,
Leon, Dora Maria Tellez was named "commandante guerillera"; she is a member of the Sandinista assembly and a deputy in parliament.
During the Sandinista government, she was minister of health. In an
Interview in the new
Independent Nicaraguan weekly El Semanario, from which we reproduce large extracts, Dora Maria Tellez spoke in particular of the coming FSLN congress.
H
OW do you analyze the contradiction which persists between those Sandinistas who advocate a substantial modification of the political propositions or tactics of the FSLN and others who criticize this attitude?
All this is natural. The Front is going through a crisis. A party which loses an election and does not enter into crisis is a dead party, it is obvious.
This crisis stems from first the fact of the electoral defeat, and then the exhaustion of the political programme of Sandin-
ism (I am referring to Sandinism since the epoch of Sandino).
This, for example, spoke of agrarian reform; but in Nicaragua there is a historic lag such that it is only 60 years later that we have succeeded in doing it.
Today, we experience a crisis of programme because reality has changed and the country has changed.
The question of knowing what the political programme of the FSLN is is still not
And you do not overcome it through desires — it is necessary to reconcile what we want with what is possible, the rest is just demagogy.
To do this, a minimal consensus is needed between all Sandinistas, and today we are faced with a diversity of positions and propositions...
For me, consensus is built starting from an analysis of reality.
It is necessary that the FLN discuss the which the Nicaraguan revolution must take, starting from today.
It is necessary to look to the year 2000 and not to return to 1979, 1984 or 1989.
There are different interpretations of national reality amongst FSLN militants. Some think that the current government is a dictatorship which must be overthrown by force; they start from the fact that the people owe us something and that it is necessary that they repay us, and so on.
I am trying to understand current Nicaraguan reality, which is nuanced.
The government of the National Union of the Opposition (UNO) does not seem to
Then, I do not consider that the revolutionary process is finished; I conceive it as a staircase, it has continuity, reverses, throwbacks, a process of new accumulation of forces, but this happens in a contin-
Facing us, we have a government of the bourgeoisie; it makes no attempt to con-
But we must determine where Nicaragua is going; what is possible and desirable to do, and what is to be the role of the FSLN - which moreover must build its identity, learn to be a political opposition, establish a framework of alliances like any organization (it has moreover always done this), obviously, as a function of popular interests.
It is necessary, beyond this, to work in the direction of national stability which depends on social and political stability.
I think that the Front must change, adapt itself and modify some of its ideas. • For this re-adaptation, do you think that the current internal democratic mechanisms are sufficient?
No. Democracy does not consist solely in elections, it must stimulate a political debate without phoney procedures, or polarizations, without disqualifying this or that position and with everybody accepting the nature of the Front.
Democracy in the FSLN is closely linked to the relations we have with the people. If, even inside the Front, we are not capable of learning to listen, to conceive that different appreciations exist, while continuously seeking a political drawing closer again to the people.
If we are not capable of tolerating a different position, when it comes from a Sandinista militant, how are we going to approach the population which is not San-
We are not obliged to all have the same opinion on this or that question; that is
It is not an end in itself, nor an enjoyable game, nor in the style of perestroika; it is a political necessity that the FLN rebuilds its links with the population.
If Sandinista militants are capable of learning to listen, to discuss, to persuade, to search for consensus inside the FSLN, they will be capable of doing it as much outside our ranks, with the people. • The positions expressed publicly by some leaders of the FSLN seem sometimes to contradict the actions of the organization, for example, in relation to alliances inside ParliaThere, it seems that there have been numerous convergences between the Sandinista deputies and those linked to Alfredo Cesar', whereas the speeches of some FSLN leaders seem to indicate the contrary....
We had approved this strategy in the document of El Crucero?; it is very clearly indicated there that, in this way, the FLN seeks to neutralize the most reactionary
If the Front developed simply a policy of negotiations, it would be liquidated, for this is only a part of a political project. The schema of alliances is part of this project, of which the essential goal is to win back the lost majority.
One way of doing this is the policy of country needs peace and economic improvements. Then comes our work, with the peasants, the workers, the producers, the inhabitants of the popular neighbourhoods, youth, and so on, so as to win back the social base of Sandinism.
If the Front limits itself to negotiating at the summit, that would be the end of it as a party, in any case in its current form.
If it limited itself to reestablishing its social base, without building alliances with other political forces, which are close to it, and this with very precise goals, it would make another error.
The revolution passes by different roads and necessitates diverse means. • In relation to the missiles affair?, two sectors close to Sandinism (the National Workers' Front — the FNT - and the Sandinista Youth) have
NICARAGUA come out in favour of the accused EPS (Sandinista People's Army) soldiers. Have there been debates inside the Front on the decision taken by the EPS to punish these soldiers?
In this affair there are two problems. First, that of the the state of law, of legislation and of judicial order. If somebody steals a missile or a packet of cigarettes it is an offence, full stop.
Intentions are another affair, whether good or bad, one cannot introduce them into a trial.
The law does does not ask what was the intention of the authors of an offence, it condemns, that is all.
But the evaluation of the acts of the EPS or its head is the affair of the government. It seems to me that the army has an important role to play in national stability and that, from a professional point of view, it adapts itself to the necessities of the coun-
But it has obviously had to pay a certain political price because of the reduction of its numbers. * 1. Alfredo Cesar, who had participated in the Contra leadership, is close to president Violeta Chamorro. He was party to the so-called appeal of "the Los Palmas group". During the renewal of the presidency of the national assembly, the FLN deputies voted for his candidature, on the grounds of barring the road to "the reactionary extreme right". 2. After the electoral defeat, the FLN held an assembly of cadres at El Crucero, from which emerged a balance sheet document, which also drew the outlines of
13
work in the current phase. 3.See introduction, p.10, for details of this affair. April 1, 1991 • #203 International Viewpoint
In government - and
BRAZIL against it
THE FOLLOWING Interview with Jose Dirceu, general secretary of the Brazilian
Workers' party (PT) and a deputy in the Brazilian national assembly, was conducted on February 12,
1991 by Cecilia Garmendia.
HE government of Fernando
T
Collor is now onto the second phase of its economic
Brazil is in its worst recession since
1981-83, with a decline in Gross Domestic Product of 4.1% and a fall of 12% in industrial production. The main problems
- inflation and the state debt — have not been resolved, and there is no short term perspective for development.
The government's main aim is to control inflation — which is running at more than 20% per month - and reduce the public debt. The foreign debt — a prob lem both serious and insoluble — is on ice. Brazil is no longer paying its creditors, while the funding countries are preoccupied with the Gulf crisis. Since
Collor cannot permit the budget deficit to increase, he has launched a new plan — involving a price and wages freeze with the aim of blocking inflation. Collective agreements were renewed in January
1991, with implications for wages and the workers' economic
1991 the issues of participation by workers in the income of enterprises as well as union representation are to be dealt with.
time the governfund, which, in order to counter the left, it claims is
"progressive"
and "democratic".
In the speculative field - which is very important in
Brazil — private capitalists have been obliged to pay into a fund which to some is extent to finance social services (freeing the
14 state from some
International Viewpoint #203 • April 1, 1991 of its obligations), investments and the market.
Collor is trying to make us believe that both big capitalists and small shareholders share the same interests. But most of the big bosses have opposed this project. They have no confidence in the president's economic team, and they do not believe in the price freeze, seeing in these measures state intervention in the financial market. • How has the workers' movement reacted to the government's measures?
The union confederations, including the one close to the government, have opposed them. There have been several demonstrations against the recession, unemployment and now against the war, organized by the United Workers Confederation (CUT) and other confederations, including the General Labour Confederation (CGT). Opposition political parties and some sections of Brizola's Brazilian Democratic Party (PMDB), which is fighting for ground with the left, have taken part in these actions in the name of the populist slogan of "development/redistribution of revenues"
Furthermore they are not supporting the government in parliament - with the exception of some social democrats and the Communist Party, who claim to be living in hope.
The right has also criticized the measures. But there has not yet been a massive popular and working class reaction. The population is in general convinced that the recession and unemployment are going to grow, but this is not expressing itself as yet through strong mobilizations or political opposition. There have been strikes in industrial sectors; on March 15, 1991 (the Collor government's first anniversary), a day of action has been called, with demonstrations and perhaps national strikes. • This movement is far from mas-
It should be understood that the government's propaganda about "democratization" of the financial market, against speculation, and the creation of the so-called anti-recession funds, and Collor's stated will to control prices, have had an effect on public opinion.
Collor has already found it necessary to decree a rise in public tariffs (tarifazo), independently of the rise in the oil price (Which, in any case has not gone above $21 a barrel) to struggle against the public deficit, instead of carrying through a real
The government talks a lot about privatization, economic deregulation and opening the country to the outside world, without there being the real international space for this. Who today is going to buy Brazilian enterprises? Foreign investors are not going to buy if the issue of the foreign debt remains unresolved; national capital is in the grip of recession and high interest rates. Collor's economic policies have thus run their course — despite the audacity and political will shown by the government — but no alternative seems likely to appear before the new elections in 1994.
In the absence of support from the majority in parliament for his proposals, Collor rules by "provisional measures" that is, decrees, which are sometimes unconstitutional. He is becoming used to authoritarianism. He is playing for time, before applying another economic policy. • Why has the popular discontent not found its way into mobilizations, even after the electoral breakthrough of the PT?
PANLAO
I think that the PT bears a great responsibility in this. For months we were practically immobilized and were unable to develop significant political campaigns. This is the result of the repeated electoral campaigning over two years - from Lula's defeat in the presidential election in 1989 to the 1990 legislatives. The elections have presented us with new political, organizational and even ideological problems. The PT is also suffering the effects of the present crisis of the socialist project, as well as the experience of its administration of some big cities. These include Sao Paolo, with 12 million inhabitants one of the country's most important industrial and urban centres, and Porto Alegre.
The PT leadership also suffers from organizational weaknesses: our structures are not adapted to our political tasks. Our systems of leadership, debate and political elaboration, and of internal communication are not suitable for this historical period. We need a radical change. • How do you deal between your parparliamentary inter- union and popular struggles?
Until the start of 1991 at least we have not found a way of dealing with this. We experienced a crisis in the roles of our politiadministration taken up thousands of militants, hundreds of national leaders, involved in leading peasants, workers, students, women's movements and so on. Many of our cadres are today deputies in the parliament, others are municipal coun cillors — we have 82 deputies, in 21 provinces, 35 in the National Congress and one
Our work in the institutions — the parliament, municipal administration or the provincial governments — seems fundamental to us. We cannot convince people that the left, the socialists, represent an alternative if they are incapable of putting into practise the political activity that they talk about in the assembly or provincial
In order to resolve its crisis of credibility, the left must not only defend people's living standards, wages and civil and union rights, but must also be capable of governing.
The PT has not been able at one and the same time to set in motion a plan for mobilization against Collor's measures, to put forward an emergency economic programme in reply to that of the government, and a set of immediate demands for the wage-earners. And this has created a vacuum which Brizola's PDMB and even Collor himself are occupying.
At its last leadership meeting, the PT drew a balance sheet of all this, and decided on a tour by Lula, the appearance of a newspaper, an emergency plan and set dates for meetings and actions to assist in the emergence of a movement of opposition to the government's projects. • Recently, the CUT took part in negotiations with the Collor government. Does it accept the idea of a pact in the framework of the "national consensus" that the president is trying to launch?
There is no pact. The CUT put forward its demands to the government in the form of a radical platform, which denounces Collor's policies. In my opinion, it would be necessary to combine negotiations with social mobilizations. The governPresident Collor and two of his ministers ment, for its part, is trying to get a national consensus policy off the ground, relying on the coming into office of the governors elected at the end of 1990.
There are no elections in Brazil this year, and we can devote ourselves to four main tasks: the PT congress discuss the socialism that we want, our reorganization, the current historic period in the world and in this country, and a balance sheet of our municipal administration; the problem of running town halls; the reorganization of the party; and its work in the institutions. • And in fact, what would you say about your experience in local gov-
Firstly, it must be said that we have suffered due to our lack of experience in practical administration and our limited knowledge of the state apparatus; and we have paid for our weaknesses domain. We have made mistakes in our alliances — in Sao Paolo we wanted to govern alone.
BRAZIL
Next, neither the union movement nor the popular organizations have a clear conception of the tasks of a democratic and popular government. The unions and associations do not see our elected representatives as theirs and the latter do not live as if they are the representatives of those sectors; there is thus a problem of liaison and a serious contradiction. Without activity articulated with the social movements, our comrades do not have the strength to make their presence felt in the municipal councils, when we are in the minority, as we are in the twenty odd towns where we are the largest party.
Very often the PT's militants and local leaders (those who are not on the council) do not have a clear understanding of the fact that it is their party that is running the local institutions; they criticize the city authorities without establishing any relation between the social movements and local government. We have also made administrative mistakes: we have inherited many cities which are bankrupt, with cratic apparatus of low paid workers, whose wages we have tried to improve. We have had to confront sabotage from the state governments and the existence these problems overresponsible positions annoyed by the PT's know how to deal with such problems. All this has led to a divide in the PT; on the one side are the elected officials, who feel isolated, on the other the PT which criti-
In my opinion we need an organism which can evaluate and regularly discuss our intervention in the institutions and town halls, which can map out the lines to follow, work out a municipal policy and concrete proposals in the fields of health, transport and so on. We already know something about such problems via the unions and social movements. The Brazilian left began to consider these issues ten or 15 years ago. Our concrete political propositions have nothing in common reformism. To compete with the bourgeoisie and aspire to rule, it is necessary to give concrete answers to the demands of the youth, workers, shanty-
We must have competent governments, which, at one and the same time, respond to the demands of Brazilians and explain 15 the limits to their action, and expose the April 1, 1991• #203 International Viewpoint
BRAZIL reality of the state. We must create spaces for popular participation and create social and political movements.
The PT, as a party, must not be confused with the administration: this is also an error that we have frequently made.
In some places, the local PT leadership took part in meetings of the local council, mixing up party and administration; in other towns, on the other hand, the divide between the PT and the elected officials was total.
One day the PT will govern the big states of Brazil. To get there we have to resolve these present problems. We must govern, while developing the class struggle. This is something that the revolution-