The undoing of own right: the Yugoslav army and the Federal government headed by Ante Markovic. The Federal ministers of defence and the interior, the army chief of staff and several other active and retired generals have recently formed a new party, the League of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia, whose backbone is the
ONE year after the breakup of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia (LCY), the federal Yugoslav state itself seems set for dissolution. Despite its federalist rhetoric, Serbia, under nationalist demagogue Slobodan Milosevic, began the process last November when it adopted a new constitution. It was followed this February by Slovenia and Croatia.
Macedonia is expected to do the same soon. Montenegro has vowed to stick with Serbia come what may.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Moslem and Croat nationalities would like this republic also to declare itself a sovereign state, but this option has so far been rejected by the Bosnian Serbs.
The two remaining federal units, Vojvodina and Kosovo, have meanwhile been swallowed up by Serbia (many Montenegrins fear that their republic will suffer the same fate).
At the same time the demonstrations over the weekend of
March 9/10 in Belgrade raising democratic demands offers a hope for the de-stabilization of Milosevic on his home ground.
Given the fact that Milosevic's Greater Serbia plan is doomed to failure simply by weight of numbers (Serbs make up only
40% of the Yugoslav population) nothing more than short term solutions to the crisis are in sight.
The following article was written on March 7, 1991, before the student demonstrations in Belgrade.
MICHELE LEE
S
ERBIA's iron-fisted policy in in the majority, has led province to secede from Serbia and declare itself a fully sovereign repub-
Yugoslavia.
Yugoslav option is being denied to it. Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and to an extent also Bosnia-Herzegovina take the position that the subjects of current negotiations must be the six existing republics, provinces, excluding the two thereby
Kosovo and Vojvodina, from the discussion regarding Yugoslavia's future and encouraging the feeling among Kosovo
Albanians that they would do best to seek unification with Albania.
Serbia, meanwhile, has revised the Federal constitution not just by annexing the two provinces, but also by adopting the position that the proper subjects of any new political settlement are not the republics/provinces at all, but the South Slav nations. In its view, Yugoslavia's internal borders are administrative, not political;
hence Serbia has the right to represent all
Serbs, irrespective of where they live.
Official Serbia has publicly committed itself to annexing parts of Croatia and
26
Bosnia-Herzegovina — and eventually
International Viewpoint #203 • April 1, 1991 also of Macedonia - in the event of the federation being replaced by a looser state structure.!
Arguing that all Serbs wish to live in a single state, it has been encouraging secessionist movements among Serbs living in these republics. In Croatia, this has taken the form of armed struggle: attacking local police stations, blockading roads and railways, forming armed guards, disseminating strident anti-Croat propaganda and so on.
Rights for Serbs but not for others
Thus civil war is no longer merely a distant prospect: already initiated in Kosovo, it is now spreading into Croatia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, too, Serb nationalists have set up institutions of power parallel to the republican assembly and government. motto "One nation, one Serb state" runs counter, of course, to similar rights for the other nationalities, which is why Serbia's policy is pushing the country in the direction of civil war.
Apart from the six republics, two other agents have emerged as subjects in their
"Yugoslav army and its commanding officers, as an institution and as citizens."
This party is intended "within the next five or six months to become the strongest political force." The army top brass has experienced the Communist loss of power in parts of the country as a betrayal: "In some of the Yugoslav republics, antiCommunist "democracies" won their elections, in part because of the traitors within their local Communist leaderships. It is especially important to liquidate such people from our party, the party that is led by our commanding officers. We should not repeat the errors made in the recent past; we should liquidate the fifth column among us.." Army fears cuts in financing and prestige
At home, the army has formed an alliance with Serbia while in the longer run it counts on conservative forces in the Soviet Union (and the Soviet army in particular) to save "Communism and socialist society" and thus solve that other paramount issue — "the continued financing of the Yugoslav army, [which] the hostile forces have discontinued or threatened to discontinue." Serbia's current intransigence is a direct result of the Yugoslav military's support.
Prime Minister Markovic, on the other hand, enjoys the support of the West, which is awed by the prospect of Yugoslavia's complete break-up. The West's strong card is the International Monetary Fund, without whose good will Yugoslavia faces an imminent economic collapse. Markovic's position is that the country must choose between him and the generals. But his plan of uniting Yugoslavia around a common economic reform has foundered as much on the stubbornness of the republics as on the rapidly growing incoherence of the Yugoslav economic space.
He has thus been left with the ungrateful role of Yugoslavia's undertaker — a task which, nevertheless, he has performed with some honour. It was above all Markovic, who, on the night of January 25-26, helped to avert a military intervention in Croatia which, had it been successful, would have led to the introduction of military rule in the rest of Yugoslavia, setting off in all probability a generalized civil 1. Serbia's eventual encroachment into Macedonia will be contested by Bulgaria. The Bulgarian govemment has recently published a statement in which it commits itself to recognizing a sovereign Macedonia, if and when this is adopted by the Macedonian parliament, and abandon all claims on its territory.
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The pre-eminence of national politics in Yugoslav internal life is nothing new. The recently published stenographic account of a February 1991 meeting of republican and federal leaders called to discuss Yugoslavia's future shows an uncanny resemblance to the last congress of the class had enjoyed after 1945.
Nevertheless this protection becoming little more than one by-product of an inert tive system - which moreo-
YUGOSLAVIA
1990 bound volume
LCY in February 1990.
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(Collection of IV, issues no. 177 to an impotent Montenegro), hoping to decide by sheer force of Serb numbers the fate of the Federation, ready to start civil
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(For further payment details see subscriptions looser association, which they also perindispensable protection against Serbian aggression.
Bosnia-Herzegovina| occupy a middle position, torn between the twin fears of a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia's dissolution. The
February meeting of the country's state leaders ended exactly like the 14th Congress of the LCY: Croatia and Slovenia walked out, Serbia pushed for the meeting to continue without them, Macedonia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina voted to postpone the meeting to a more opportune moment.
Reluctance to take the plunge subsequent meetings of the presidency were also sabotaged
Serbian side. However, it is easier to dissolve a party than a state. The republican assemblies may vote themselves full sovereignty, but nobody wants to be the first to leave. The crafty Slovenes have invented a new term - dissociation - to describe what they wish to see happen. The existing Yugoslav association should be dissolved and replaced by a new one.
Two dates are seen as crucial: May 15 and June 30, 1991. On the first, Croatia's representative on the Federal presidency is due to replace Serbia's as the country's head of state for a year. If the Army and
Serbia allow this to happen, that is, if they agree to respect the Federal constitution, then the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav conflict will be much enhanced. June 30, on the other hand, is the final date set by Slovenia for a negotiated inter-Yugoslav agreement. If no agreement is reached, then Slovenia, followed by Croatia, will secede unilaterally.
Contemporary Yugoslav politics contains novel features, but bears also the marks of the old. The disappearance of the
LCY has undoubtedly removed the minimal protection from the ravages of international capitalism which the working positive morbidity by the early 1980s. The introduction of martial rule in Kosovo in 1981 was followed, in succession by: an attempt to reintroduce strict censorship; the failure of an initiative to open up debate among party members; the trial of six Beltrumped-up charges; the legitimation of an aggressive Serb nationalism in Serbia; official tolerance (again in Serbia) of crude attacks on the LCY's nationality policy; the trial of four Slovene intellectuals in military courts; putsches in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro; and the bloodshed in Kosovo.
The industrial working class and public-sector workers responded to the leadership's impotence in the face of the growing economic crisis with strikes:
1980 and 1985 their number doubled (from 235 to 696); it then rose to 851 in 1986 and to 1,685 in 1987. In that year, Milosevic came to power in Serbia and the army became restless. Meanwhile, a democratic alternative was offered by the western republics: in 1988, Slovenia quietly legalized opposition; in
Slovenian and Leagues of Communists opted for multi-party elections. The military party has described this as an act of betrayal. Yet, in the words of Ivica Racan, leader of the League of Communists of Croatia (now the Party of Democratic Change) all the party did was to return its mandate to the
The multiparty elections of 1990 did not lead to a sharp break with the past. In Serbia and Montenegro, the ruling Communist parties won overwhelming major-
In Slovenia, a non-Communist coalition, DEMOS, won the elections, but the leader of the Slovenian Communists (now party of Democratic Change) Milan Kucan, became the republic's president. In Macedonia, no party gained an absolute majority; despite the strong showing of the nationalist VMRO, the assembly elected Kliro Gligorov, an old Communist, as its presi-
In Croatia, the main Croatian nationalist party — the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) - won almost two-thirds of the seats, but key positions — including that of the president — went to ex-Communists. Croatia's president Franjo Tudjman was thus able to say recently that there are more people sitting in the
197) now available.
160FF. box on page 2) Croatian parliament with partisan war documents dating back to 1941 than in any other such body in the country. Only in Bosnia-Herzegovina did the nationalist parties win outright: the joke goes that the elections were in effect a census, since Croats voted for the Croat national party, the Serbs for the Serb one (Serb Democratic Party) and Moslems for the SDA. In Kosovo, Albanians refused to take part in the elections, having declared themselves independent from Serbia last November; their demand was for democratic elections
Despite elements of continuity, the sense of political dislocation is great, due to the combined effects of the change of administration, the dismantling of the previous socio-economic system and the depth of the economic recession. Whatever happens to Yugoslavia, there is little doubt that its heirs will continue to be unstable for some time to come. This is primarily because a power vacuum has been created at the very base of Yugoslav society, with the near-complete absence of parties representing the working class.
Steep rise in industrial unemployment
The dismantling of the system based on social property and the vertiginous rise in industrial unemployment has dramatically weakened this class, which is only beginning to organize itself at the trade-union level. Its resistance is at presence obfuscated by the siren calls of the various national flags, just when the state of permanent tension is aiding authoritarian tendencies which will sooner or later be targeted against it. This is why a speedy and democratic political settlement at the all-Yugoslav level is of the greatest interest to the country's working population. 27
The greatest obstacle to such a settleApril 1, 1991 • #203 International Viewpoint
YUGOSLAVIA / USSR ment has been Slobodan Milosevic's regime. This is how a Belgrade independent weekly Vreme (March 4, 1991) describes its tactics. "Slobodan Milosevic is undoubtedly the central figure in Yugoslav negotiations, not because of his contribution or initiatives, but because of his hostile stance to all dialogue — his evident desire to make any agreement seem
"Thus, for example, he used the [antiCroat] demonstration of women [held in Belgrade at the end of February] to make it difficult for Tudjman and Mesic come [to a scheduled meeting of the Federal presidency]; then, when they did not come, he pressed for negotiations to take
"Milosevic agreed to join the [interYugoslav] talks unwillingly and only under pressure from domestic and foreign public opinion, but he clearly believes that his aims cannot be achieved that way. Recent events have strengthened the sovereignty of the republics as well as the legitimacy of their borders, while republican presidents are increasingly behaving as his equals.
### Least desirable partner
"Milosevic, who lacks all diplomatic and negotiating skills, is also harvesting the bitter fruits of a politics which, over three years, has made Serbia the least desirable partner in Yugoslavia. Apart from [Montenegrin president] Momir Bulatovic, he cannot convince anybody that he does not wish to dominate. He is also burdened by the dead weight of the Communist ideology, rejected in four of
"The link between the two parties [the Socialist Party of Serbia and the League of Communists — Movement for Yugoslavia] is evident. The LC-MY relies on the army whose help Milosevic is increasingly seeking - despite the fact that this is undermining his position as Serb national leader. The LC-MY, on the other hand, cannot count on winning elections anywhere in Yugoslavia, not even in Serbia. This party and its leaders probably harbour no illusions in this regard, but this does not prevent them from acting ever more aggressively and with open ambi-
"Their only chance lies in the army taking power, following which the LC-MY would take the place once occupied by the LCY. This project of renewal of Communist power is, of course, hopeless. Yet Serbia's conduct in the negotiations suggests that it is counting on this option. The fact that it is not taking them seriously argues that it is relying on the power of the army. In its attempt to renew socialist Yugoslavia, the army would ensure that all Serbs live within the same state, which is what Milosevic says he wants. Yet a military coup d'etat would spell the end 28 Serb state i* of Milosevic and of the dream of an allInternational Viewpoint #203 • April 1, 1991
Referendum resolves nothing
THE March 17 referendum on the maintenance of the Soviet Union saw a vote of 75%, on an 80% turnout, in support of Gorbachev's proposition in favour of a "renewed union". According to Gorbachev's spokesperson, Grigory Revenko, this vote opens the way for "concrete steps towards privatization of small enterprises, acceleration of land reform and a search for a solution to the problem of property." COLIN MEADE
ONCRETE steps are indeed on the way, with steep price rises scheduled for the start of April including an estimated 250% increase in the price of meat, 200% for bread, 100% for sugar and increases also on items such as post and telephone charges and children's goods. The rises are to be offset by compensatory pay-
Before Gorbachev's referendum the three Baltic States held their own referenda on independence, in each case winning overwhelming support in their own republics for that goal. In Lithuania, on turnout, some 90% were in favour of independence. The figures in Estonia and Latvia were, respectively, 83% and 88% turnout and 77.8% and 73.6% in favour. Constitutionally, since a vote of two thirds is all that is required for separation to be permitted, should settle the issue as far as Lithuania is concerned. However Gorbachev decided to exercise his special powers and ruled the poll out of order.
Furthermore, in the weeks before the thousands took place in Russian cities in support of Russian president and leading opponent of Gorbachev Boris Yeltsin, while the voters in the Russian federation supported the proposal that there should be a directly elected Russian president (assumed to be Yeltsin).
In the face of these impressive displays of opposition strength, the Soviet leadership's "success" in the referendum has been to underline the degree to which the Communist Party apparatus continues to control most of the Soviet Union, and give its opponents a sobering glimpse of the real balance of forces.