Youth rebel
against
Milosevic MOUNTING gloom about the ability of Yugoslavia to survive as an integral state was suddenly pierced by a ray of light in March 1991, with massive demonstrations against the hardline regime in Serbia, Yugoslavia's largest republic. Called originally by opposition parties to protest against the ruling party's iron control over the local mass media, the first demonstration on March 9 was met with the full array of instruments of riot control: water cannon, tear gas, mounted police, dogs, rubber bullets and finally live ammunition. MICHELE LEE
B Y the end of the day, two people
had been killed and army tanks made their appearance on Belday, tens of thousands of young people demonstrated in Serbia's key towns, leading to a four-day occupation of the main square in Belgrade. The target of their anger was the government and republican president, Slobodan Milosevic, whom the crowd likened to Saddam Hussein. One hundred days after its overwhelming victory in the first multiparty elections since the war, the legitimacy of the ruling party — the Socialist Party (formerly League of Communists) of Serbia (SPS) - was thus dramatically brought into question.
Involving a multitude of young people and several university centres, the demonstrations expressed the clear repudiation by Serbia's younger generation of the policies of national hatred pursued by Milo. sevic over the past four years. The spontaneous eruption of Serbia's youth into national politics has put paid to Milosevic's claim to speak for Serbia far more effectively than all the combined efforts of the opposition parties. The appearance of the army on Belgrade streets said it all: Milosevic is the first republican leader in Yugoslavia's postwar history requested military intervention in defence of domestic "law and order". The ground wor thered sense end sap 5 prepared by a widespread sense of disapApril 15, 1991 • #204 International Viewpoint
YUGOSLAVIA
In the Yugoslav federation unrealistic national programme, thereby contributing to their own this historic responsibility. Much will depend also on whether the political parthere are: Six republics
Serbia: 86,361 km?; 9.9 million inhabitants, of which 66.4% Serbs, 19.4% Albanians and
2.3% Croats. Capital: Belgrade (also the fed-
Feral capital). Slovenia: 20, 251 km?; 1.9 million inhabitants, of which 90.5% Slovenes, 2.2% Serbs and 2.9% Croats. Capital: Ljubljana. Croatia: 55, 538 km2; 4.6 million inhabitants, of which 75.1% Croats, 11.5% Serbs.
Capital: Zagreb.
Bosnia-Herzegovina: 51,129 km2; 4.4 million inhabitants, of which 39.2% Muslims,
32.2% Serbs and 18.4% Croats. Capital: Sar-
Macedonia: 25,713 km?; 1.9 Million inhabitants, of which 67% Macedonians, 19.6%
Albanians and 2.3% Serbs. Capital: Skopje.
Montenegro: 13,812 km2; 632,000 inhabitants, of which 68.5% Montenegrins, 13.4%
Muslims, 6.5% Albanians and 3.3% Serbs.
Capital: Titograd.
Two autonomous provinces (within Ser-
Kosovo: 10, 887 km2; 2 million inhabitants of which 90% Albanians. Capital: Pristina.
Vojvodina: 21, 506 km2; more than 2 million inhabitants, of which 55.8% Serbs and
21.7% Hungarians. Capital: Novi Sad. * pointment with Milosevic's betrayal of his electoral promises, chief among them a commitment to protect the population's living standards and work for a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. Three months after the elections, half of Serbia's workforce remains unpaid; old-age pensioners and workplace invalids have not received their pensions; and Milosevic's hardline stance in negotiations with the other republics has brought the country to the brink of civil war. As a student delegate told Milosevic: "Never before has Serbia been so isolated, so much hated, its international prestige so low."
demonstrations mark a watershed in Yugoslav politics, giving rise to fresh hope that differences regarding the country's future will be resolved by negotiations rather than force. For this to happen, though, Milosevic must go. This can only be achieved by the citizens
A petition demanding his resignation has been circulated in Serbia, and it is highly significant that the Serbian intelligentsia, which contributed so much to Milosevic's rise to power and only months, indeed wecks, ago was still hailing him as the saviour of the Serb nation, should now have sided overwhelmingly with the young demonstrators and trodden the path to its Canossa in Belgrade's Republic Square.
The parties of the opposition have hith6 sevic's erto shied away from challenging Miloaggressive and ultimately International Viewpoint #204 • April 15, 1991 political (and electoral) marginalization. Now, however, in the words of a Serbia human rights proved that it is not freedom (slowhich are mutually exclusive, but rather freedom and Slobodan."
On hearing the students declare the Serbian emperor naked, the rest of Yugoslavia heaved a sigh of relief. It will be difficult for the
Belgrade media to argue henceforth that Milosevic's opponents are automatically enemies of Serbia. By rejecting the identification between Milosevic and the
Serb nation, the students have raised the hope in other parts of
Yugoslavia that their representatives can negotiate with Serbia without being constantly subjected to ultimata, demands unconditional threats of civil war or military
The immediate condemnation by most of the other republics of the use of violence against demonstrators, and especially of the army's involvement, gave the lie to Milosevic's favourite demagogic device: the claim that all
Yugoslavs - and much of the world besides - are joined in an anti-
Serb plot. The chief plotter against the nation's freedom turned out to be none other than the republic's own president!
Serbia's young people have thus emerged as a key protagonist of Yugoslavia's uni-
Fresh elections needed
The way forward must lie in fresh elections in Serbia. Milosevic's charisma as an undisputed national leader, created and maintained by his control over the mass media, has been a key instrument of his party's electoral victory. Thanks to the students' action, this control is now weakening. Nor will Milosevic be able in future to rely on the federal army, for the army has vowed to remain henceforth outside the political fracas. This does not mean that Milosevic's regime will give up without a fight. It will create its own military forces and continue to play the nationalist card. It will also seek to dismantle the remaining federal institutions
— the collective presidency, the government and the army — threatening to bring
Yugoslavia down with itself.
The young demonstrators, on the other hand, have given a mandate to the Serbian opposition parties to articulate a programme based not on confrontation, but on cooperation with Yugoslavia's other nationalities. It remains to be seen whether the opposition is capable of assuming ties in the rest of Yugoslavia will be able to grasp the importance of what happened
Serbia during the March days, and make an adequate response.
"Civil war? We leave that to the older generation" one Belgrade student told a German television crew. He was speaking at that moment for all the young people of Yugoslavia — politically marginalized, largely unemployed and overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the options on offer from their elders. His words hold a particular poignancy for the Albanians of Kosovo, who, thanks to Milosevic, have for two years now been having a taste of something very close to civil war.
In the mass media of western Europe, the potential for civil war in Yugoslavia is ascribed variously to its multi-ethnic makeup; to the differing cultural traditions
"Mitteleuropa" Empire; to memories of the atrocities committed by local Nazi collaborators during World War Two; to a struggle between the remnants of Communism and a new anti-Communist majority. All these factors are present, but they do not play more than a marginal role.
Creation of Greater Serbia
If civil war does come to Yugoslavia, it will be through attempts to alter existing borders by force. Milosevic has made it absolutely clear (as recently as March 28, at a meeting of republican heads of state) that if the other republics persist in their plans for a confederal Yugoslavia, he will seck the creation of a greater Serbia — that is, a state embracing all Serbs living in Yugoslavia.
This implies the disappearance of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the amputation of a substantial part of Croatia. It is likely that Macedonia also would be a victim. From the national point of view, such a state would be an absurdity, since within it Serbs would not even command a numerical majority.
This has not prevented Milosevic from encouraging militant Serb nationalists in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to form National Councils with the aim of annexing these territories to Serbia. At the end of March, such a Council in Croatia announced the secession of a self-proclaimed "Autonomous Province of Krajina" (an area embracing only a minority of Serbs in Croatia, along with a connumber of Croats)
It is worth spelling out why such acts can only lead to war. During the Second World War, Yugoslav Communists were able to organize a mass anti-Nazi resistance, and also win the civil war, primarily because they understood that the aspirations of the country's diverse nationalities could only be satisfied by their acquiring their own states within the new Yugosla-
(This public appeal is dated March 17, 1991. It was published in the Independent Belgrade weekly, via. This was the basis for the federal organization of the postwar state: republics and two provinces (see box).
The formula ensured national peace for almost half a century. The borders of these federal units are thus not administrative, but deeply national and political. They do not coincide with ethnic borders, nor do so; they separate many Croats, Serbs, Muslims and Albanians from their mother republic/province. But international borders too in many parts of Europe do not follow ethnic boundaries. The key point is that these frontiers - and this holds equally for Yugoslavia — cannot be changed except by agreement, or
The first attempt to alter Yugoslavia's internal frontiers came in 1988-89, when Serbia incorporated by force two federal imposed a puppet administration upon a third, Montenegro. Yugoslavia has not yet recovered from the shock of this aggression, nor will it be able to regain any stability until it has been rolled back.
The secession of the so-called Krajina - only one day after the conference of republican presidents in the Croatian town of Split - is a fresh attempt to use this method to destroy Yugoslavia from within. Milosevic, by supporting the Krajina leaders, has in effect, declared war on
Milosevic has never been interested in a collective agreement. In the past, he has managed to torpedo all efforts to resolve the political crisis by peaceful means, each time upping the stakes in this deadly
Yugoslavia's future. Now, with time running against him, he is becoming even more dangerous. The adventurist character of his policy was illustrated clearly by the farce - a farce that could easily have turned into tragedy - surrounding the resignation, on March 15, of Borisav Jovic, chairman of the presidency, from that President resigns
YUGOSLAVIA foreign governments.
In a dramatic address to the nation folannounced that Serbia would no longer obey the Federal Presidency; that he himself, as president of Serbia, would have nothing to do with it; and that he was organizing police reservists to prevent alleged rebellions in Kosovo and the Musliminhabited south-west of Serbia. He concluded his speech by calling upon the "imperilled Serb nation" to unite behind him. The Serbian prime minister brought up the rear by informing the Serbian Assembly of an impending attack by the Croatian and Bosnian authorities on Serbinhabited towns — a piece of misinformation which he subsequently had to retract.
Milosevic's attempt to undermine collective federal bodies, did not, however, succeed. Five days later, on March 21, Jovic simply rescinded his resignation and returned to his presidential post without any explanation; the vassal provinces and Montenegro trailed behind. Nevertheless, the eruption of this unforeseen constitu-
The Serbian intellectuals' appeal
ONLY three months after his election to the post of President of the republic, Slobodan Milosevic has lost the confidence of the people.
The whole world, all the Yugoslav republics and peoples (with the exception of the puppet regime in Montenegro) and finally now also Serbia and its youth have come out against Milosevic's Serbia. His skill in acquiring enemies has brought Serbia to the very brink of civil war.
The crude and violent manipulation of Serbian public opinion could no longer cover up these facts. The arrogance and scorn with which Slobodan Milosevic has treated everyone, including his own people, reached their peak on March 9 when he ordered an attack on Serb people, when human lives were lost, and when torture was used against imprisoned Serb youth.
Having failed to persuade the army to introduce a state of emergency in Yugoslavia, the purpose of which could only be the preservation of his personal rule, Milosevic went on to destroy the Presidency of Yugoslavia, thus foreclosing the last possibility of a peaceful resolution to the crisis.
The President of Serbia has chosen the politics of war. The bringing of tanks into the streets and the undermining of any agreement about the future of Yugoslavia testify to an adventurism and selfish egotism which the Serb people can no
Milosevic cannot implicate the whole of the Serb nation in the creation of enemies for which his despotism has been responsible.
The Serb people is no longer willing to allow Slobodan Milosevic to keep it in isolation, to feed it with lies, to beat it and burden it with historic mort-
Speaking in the interest of all citizens of Serbia, we demand of Slobodan Milosevic that he immediately resign his post. /reme on March 25, 1991) * demonstrators' shouts still ringing in his ears, Milosevic tried to push the presidency into allowing the introduction of a state of Yugoslavia. When he failed to win a majority for this, he engineered Jovic's resignation as well as that of the representatives of Vojvodina and Montenegro. The Kososided with the majority, was unconstituSerbian Assembly. The elimination of four out of eight members of the Federal Presidency not only made the collective head of state impotent, it also left the army without a functioning commander-in-chief.
Jovic's act was unprecedented in Yugoslavia's moder history, causing a severe constitutional crisis. Neither the Federal Presidency, nor the Serbian Assembly, nor the relevant bodies in other were informed of this decision before it was made public. He subsequently justified grounds that the current rela-
"supports break up of the country", taking the opportunity also to launch a violent attack on Ante Markovic, the federal prime minister, accused of being an agent of tional crisis had been sufficient to shift public attention away from the demonstrations that had taken place in Serbia, and to the even more urgent issue of who - if anybody — rules Yugoslavia.
The secession of the so-called Krajina from Croatia is intended to serve the same purpose; to provide Milosevic with extra time — even at the price of civil war. It already cost three lives; between the coast and the interior has again been interrupted; tourism - on which Yugoslavia vitally depends for its foreign currency — has been dealt a mor-
By deploying its tanks in a part of the disputed area — Plitvice National Park — the army is back on the streets again. Given Milosevic's warlike stance, Croats determination to prevent the breakup of their republic, it is difficult to see how it will be able to return to barracks in
These events prove once again that Yugoslavia has no future unless democracy wins in Serbia. This is why the demonstrating Serb youth gave rise to such hopes that peace would prevail. In the last two weeks of March thousands of Serbian citizens signed the petition demanding Milosevic's resignation (see box).
The main message of the March demonstrations was: give peace a chance. The Serb youth, however, in its majority, owes loyalty to no particular party in Serbia. The vast majority of the opposition parties have been so complicit with Milosevic's nationalist programme that is difficult to see how they can offer the youth the positive alternative it sceks. Until such an remain a menace to the rest of the country. Yugoslavia as a political, economic and cultural space will continue to crumble, tottering between hope and the threat of civil war. * April 15, 1991 • #204 International Viewpoint
The bubble bursts
GERMANY ing, getting 90% of their old that time. They are mostly made up of supporters of the bourgeois parties. Thus the actions have an essentially demonstrative character, even if they reflect a more radical mood.
The trade unions, which are now almost exclusively in the hands of the West German machines, have jumped on the bandwagon, organizing a series of protests. In
NOBODY will be worse off, and most will be better off: this was the claim of Federal German Chancellor Helmut Kohl when East Germany was annexed by West Germany. And almost everybody believed him.
income, even though they often have nothing 700,000 public employees have been laid off, on 70% of their income. Thus open and force. But most saw this as a
35,000 shipyard workers demonstrated in the Baltic Coast towns. At the start of March 10,000 public employees took part in a protest as part of a wage campaign (transport for 50,000 had been provided). In the Leuna works 20,000 chemical workers demanded the
Kohl's election campaign tour on behalf of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) at the start of March 1990 was a triumphal procession. Over half a million people came out to welcome him at half a dozen rallies, brandishing placards with the temporary problem of transi-
Some were positively thankful. The lower income could be supplemented by savings, and the free time used for travel.
However many are now beginning to realize that the road is leading not to ecomaintenance of their jobs.
At this point an element of spontaneity came into play. On March 11, some 25,000 people, mostly unemployed, demonstrated in Leipzig. It was not by chance that this is the city where the anti-Stalinist demonstrations, which were to spread throughout East Germany, began in autumn 1989. Here the "Alliance '90" (an electoral coalition of the old opposition message "Helmut, take us by the hand, and lead us to economic nomic miracle land but to poverty. The first closures of enterprises are now taking and the Greens), the churches and the engineering workers' union had issued a miracle land".
This took place in the old strongholds of the workers' movement — Leipzig,