Miners fight to
Save industry
BOLIVIA, today presented as the "good pupil" of the international creditors, is paying very dearly for their goodwill. A spectacular decline in the rate of inflation and the return of foreign capital has been achieved at the price of a savage economic adjustment, which has led to a drastic slimming of the workforce (particularly in the mines) and a spectacular impoverishment of the population (purchasing power has fallen by 75% in ten years, and the rate of infant mortality is 169 per thousand - comparable to that of the countries of Black Africa). To succeed in the "restructuring" of the country, the Bolivian government must break the resistance of the Bolivian trade union federation, the COB, the most organized in Latin America. Felipe Vazquez is a miner and a leader of the Bolivian Mineworkers' Trade Union Federation (FSTMB) in the Huanuni mine. He spoke to Cecilia Garmendia and Gonzalo Molina about the resistance of the Bolivian miners.
The Bolivian model
BOLIVIA
CONOMIC neo-liberalism
E seems to have implanted itself without too much trouble in Latin America, in
THE neo-liberal policy applied in Bolivia may have brought about a slowing up in certain countries at least. Bolivia the rate of inflation (20% in 1990, as against 25,000% under the Siles Suazo govhas been a veritable experimental ernment between 1982 and 1985), but it has also brought recession and unemlaboratory for adjustment measployment. The rate of growth has been less than 3% and 80,000 redundancies have already taken place — affecting 25% of the active population.
Indeed, it is in Bolivia that the imperialist offensive has been at its sharpest,
Wages have been frozen since 1985 despite strong protest movements; in and the neo-liberal policy most violently
1989, 80,000 teachers went on strike (the government responded by declaring a applied, since 1985, when the governstate of emergency, arresting and deporting 858 trade unionists).
ment of the Revolutionary Nationalist
Since 1988, Bolivia has also been a "model" in dealing with its foreign debt prob-
Movement (MNR)' came to power. The lem. Its borrowings, which had gone as high as $5.6bn, fell to $3.5bn in 1990 government of Paz Zamora has,
(which represents nonetheless 183% of Bolivia's gross national product in 1990 example, adopted a decree legalizing the and 63% of its export earnings). Bolivia had already redeemed $470mn of its comapplication of this line, drawn up by the mercial debt in 1990 through the "transfer" of national wealth by means of large-
US economist Jeffrey Sachs — today the scale privatizations.
adviser to the Polish government, and
The government has also embarked on a further vast privatization plan (100 somebody who before that had assisted"
state enterprises out of 157 are to be privatized in the coming five years, which
Menem in Argentina and Fujimori in should bring $500mn into the state coffers). Despite this, Bolivia needs $600mn
Peru. This plan basically sought to liquifor the year 1991 — as much as the annual product from exports of cocaine, cultidate the vanguard of the Bolivian workvated over 140,000 hectares.
ers' movement, that is the mining sector.
Seven of the biggest tin mines were put up for sale in December 1990; they are
It has already led to 23,000 redundancies to be co-managed by the state (the COMIBOL) and the private sector purchaser amongst the miners,
(in what is called the system of "joint risk").
employed by the nationalized sector of
Thus, the COMIBOL will become a holding company, which will entrust to the
Mining Corporation private entrepreneurs, according to the "joint risk" agreements, the administration
(COMIBOL)'.
of the sectors which the state is no longer capable of financing.
The MR has been able to profit from the situation created by the defeat of the
The rest of the nationalized enterprises will be directly sold to private investors so-called government of the left - the
(including milk, rubber processing, the sugar refineries, the cement enterprises, bourgeoisie considered it as such — of the agro-industrial plants, steel, and so on).
the Popular Democratic Union (UDP),
Other national enterprises will come under the regime of "performance conled by Hernan Siles Suazo?, composed of tracts" (the state keeps control of these companies, which have a greater autonothe Bolivian Communist Party (PCB)
my to define their programmes). This affects the COMBOL, but also the oil and the Movement of the Revolutionary company (YPFB), posts and telecommunications, electricity, water, airports and railroads.
The UDP's incompetence opened the way to the MNR, which was then able to attack the workers' movement. Since the beginning, the miners have opposed the economic policy of the MNR. In August
1987, the government decentralized the
COMIBOL (see box); the miners immediately responded and organized what was called the March for Life, starting from Oruro with 5,000 people and finishing at Cajamarca.
On August 28, the demonstrators were encircled by the army. The leadership of the Bolivian Workers' Trade Union Federation (the COB), led particularly by the
PCB, gave in to the soldiers, despite the determination of the miners who wished to break the blockade; this discouraged
At the same time, the MNR has tried to atomize the movement by offering a series of supplementary social services, which do not figure in the labour law. It has, for example, proposed bonus, to be added to the unemployment benefit; it said that it would pay the moving expenses of all those agree to give up their jobs; it would give them an unemployment benefit of 80 currency] a bolivianos [the national month (the wage of the miners is 60 bolivianos), and so on. These proposihave obviously attacks on the workers.
• Has the numerical reduction of the active working class led to a weakening of its political influence within society?
Without doubt, the dismissal of 23,000 miners has weakened the Bolivian workers' movement, but the government wishes to go much further; it seeks to annihilate the combativity of this layer of workers and, obviously, its influence inside the COB. It wishes, in fact, to liquidate the Bolivian Mineworkers' Trade Union Federation (FSTMB).
But, up to now, it has not succeeded, to the extent that the 7,000 miners who have remained in their jobs have continued to resist, which has prevented the application of other measures — the privatiza1. In 1952, a mass insurrection carried the MNR, led at the time by Victor Paz Estensorro, to power. The first MR goverment nationalized the tin mines and carried out an agrarian reform. In 1971, general Hugo Banzer came to power in a coup d'etat. In 1985, after fraudulent elections, the MR retumed to power and immediately decreed a string of austerity under the aegis of the International MoneIn 1989, in the course of new elections, the MIR leader, Jaime Paz Zamora was elected president. He allied himself with the MR and with the rightist formation oí General Banzer (the Nationalist Democratic Alli-
ADN) and established a govemment of "convergence and national unity".
tion of education and health, and, obviously, the closure of the mines.
After the first dismissals, the workers decided that nobody would any longer transferred to another enterprise; the miners should stay at their mines and defend their jobs. We are all convinced that, once distanced from their mining centre and their trade union, the miners will have no chance of remaining organized, or of participating in the political strug • The economic policy of the Paz Lamora government also envisages the so-called "cooperativization" of the enterprises, which would 2. During the nationalization of the tin mines, a nationalized company, COMIBOL, was set up. 3. The UDP government was formed by the Communist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left. This coalition, led by Heman Siles Suazo, won the 1980 elections. Before it came to power, General Garcia Meza led a coup d'etat and installed a military junta (one of the first "narco-govemments" of Latin America). The UDP came back to power in 1982. Over three years, it applied an economic policy mid-way between its populist ideals and the Latin American "new reality". Neo-liberalism won the day, whereas the price of tin — the principal product of the country fal. in 1985, the LP at replaced by the MR 19 govemment, led by Victor Paz Estensorro. April 29, 1991 • #205 International Viewpoint
BOLIVIA appear to imply reorganization under the control of the workers. What do they think of that?
The miners are opposed to this "cooperativization" of the enterprises. does not mean that we are against cooperativization in its socialist sense; but, in Bolivia, these "cooperatives" resemble very much more private enterprises, with exploiters and exploited. They have a capitalist character — that is why we don't want them. • What alternative do you put forward to the government's economic
The COMIBOL and the government have declared that they can no longer finance the functioning of the mining enterprises and that it was necessary to carry out important investments in this sector. Thus they have paralyzed production over a period of two years. But, basically, they wanted the miners to grow tired and let themselves be thrown out of
But this has not been the case, much the contrary. The workers have developed their own alternative plans, enterprise by enterprise, while proposing a plan of recovery. The government has been forced to accept this because, from an economic, technical and administrative point of view, we have shown that it was not necessary to carry out these dismissals, but on the contrary there was a need for more miners, that it was neces-
The government has been forced to our programme of whilst proposing that it would take two or three years. We have taken up this challenge and we have proved that it was possible to put an enterprise back on its Ieet within the space of three to six months, with wages of 60 bolivianos a month, working the hours it was necessary, without claiming overtime payments and without claiming the level of qualification that we merited.
The government had to accept, but it was convinced that it was not going to work. For our part, we got to work; we did not get the enterprises back on their feet in three months, but in four, and not in two and a half years as the authorities said. The centres have begun to produce again. We had calculated that, starting from a certain level of production, the enterprises would not only break even, but make a profit. We then proposed that the surplus was distributed among the workers. It is then that COMIBOL began to sabotage our efforts — we no longer had money to buy spare parts or necessary equipment. COMIBOL wanted to stop the miners' objectives from being
We were beaten. Then, the management took advantage of the fall in interInternational Viewpoint #205 • April 29, 1991 we started implementing plan in the mining centres, a pound of tin was $4 (this rate allowed us to envisage making a profit); today the price has fallen to $2.5. In these conditions, with bad management and over-evaluated costs, the majority of the mines seem doomed
But we have not backed down; we have another economic more technical and more solid. We have thus proved that the miners are not only capable of working, but that they can make incursions into the administrative domain. We have obtained results, but the government continues its
Because of the fall in production and the lowering of prices, the COMIBOL has declared the Iloco mine bankrupt. It claimed that it would turn it into a cooperative, but in reality, it turned it into a private enterprise. The workers demanded that it be turned over to their control, the management and the government ended up by accepting and the workers have hired the mine, with a contract. Production has restarted and it has even increased threefold - this enterprise has obviously made some profits.
Seeing this, COMIBOL has said; "We have leased you this enterprise and you have made it productive; but it will be for us to manage it; that is, we are going to administer the resources and the production and commercialize the minerals. We will decide the cost of them, we will set and so on". The workers "This is out of the question. It will be for us to hire the managers and the technicians. We have our own administrative team". COMIBOL replied "No, the constitution does not allow us to sell off the nationalized enterprises. So, we must occupy ourselves with the financial
But COMIBOL has gone still further and has begun to organize a provocation. It engaged mercenaries, under the name of "co-operators", in the mines of Catavi and of Siglio XX and transferred them to Iloco. At Iloco, there are 200 miners; the management sent 600 unemployed to expel them and there were three confron-
Today, the workers of Iloco demand that the contract signed with COMIBOL • Apart from this concrete case, have the miners worked out a more general economic proposition?
We have discussed in several general assemblies the imminent dangers of seeing the mining centres returned to private enterprise or "joint risk" — as the government calls them. We have adopted a counterplan to respond to that of the United States.
COMIBOL claims that it needs $35mn to put all the enterprises back on their feet. The Miners' Federation obtained a financing of $70mn; unfortunately, this which are now at war. Despite everything, we remain confident and we think that through work we can save the enterprises. We are asking that the mines be handed over to us in their present conditions, despite the low price of tin. We mistrust the administrative management of COMIBOL, for it is obedient to the government and it is implicitly seeking to liquidate the enterprises.
It is pointless to try and change their minds! We can surely not expect the government to act in good faith, in the sense
Moreover, the relations between bosses and workers no longer exist. Very often, the workers no longer even want to see the technicians, and vice versa. It is impossible to come to an agreement with such an administration. That is why we returned to us in a letter we have given to the government. • What has been the reaction of the government?
First, it has decided to put into technical unemployment the 70,000 miners still in work, as well as 30% of the employees of the civil service who are not unionized. Nearly 70,000 workers are thus going to be thrown onto the street. Faced with this, we have to fight with all our strength; we can no longer seek an agreement with the
When we sign collective agreements, the administration applies whatever suits it and the parts concerning the rights of workers are violated. In November 1990, we signed an agreement which should have lasted 30 days; it led to a lowering in the incomes of workers, because it envisaged that overtime would no longer be paid. Inflation, moreover, according to the government itself, is at 15% and petrol has gone up by around 35%. All this has had a negative impact on the wages of the workers; in one year, between August 1989 and August 1990, we have lost 80% of our purchasing pow-
Moreover, the government has used the mobilizations as an excuse to annul the right to strike, whereas the constitution guarantees it. It claims that strike days are unjustified absences. Because of that, women have begun to mobilize and to organize marches — in place of their companions, threatened with dismissal if they don't go to work to support our
The coming months will be decisive. Either the government will wield the iron fist and crush the resistance of the workers, by privatizing the enterprises, and carrying through its neo-liberal project, or the Bolivian miners will succeed in their projects, taking control of the enterprises and turning the relationship of forces in their favour. *