While nobody proposed that the EPS should be used for a short term taking of power, that wing of the Sandinistas that was most critical of H. Ortega's political line - that is militants coming from the former Prolonged People's War tendency, the GPP, who put out the bulletin Nicaragua Desde Adentro (see document below) - declared: "one cannot deny that the fact that the army chiefs and some of the troops belong to the Sandinistas is advantage for the FLN - beyond the fact that formally soldiers cannot be militants of the Front, for in the last analysis this means that, if it comes to it, the FLN will have under its orders an organized military force that could support an eventual popular uprising against the government". This perspective was totally ruled out by Humberto Ortega and other Sandi-
Nicaragua Desde Adentro explained: "Nonetheless, it is equally clear that the subordination of the army to the executive power involves its implicit support to the hegemonic sector of the bourgeoisie [the Chamorro-Lacayo-Cesar wing], privileg1. See International Viewpoint, no. 184, May 7, 1990. 2. El Semanario, February 28, 1991. 3. Behind the scenes, Javier Pichardo was accused of having relations with the right and its joumal La Prensa; of wanting to make the airforce autonomous and of having wanted to repress the strikers in June. Officially he was accused of having a "particular conception" of the army. 4. See IV, 187. 5. Nicaragua Desde Adentro, July 15, 1990.
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NICARAGUA
ing thus its professional and constitutional character against its original Sandinista
This text insisted on the fact that the EPS was going to be the object of a strug the bourgeois government and the FSLN, with attempting to "seduce" key army person-
This thinly veiled attack on H. Ortega's line was broadened by a very strong critique of EPS military and political strategy in the 1980s, and the economic line followed since 1988 on the initiative of the circle around the Ortega brothers. This attack, expressed by those close to Tomas Borge, certainly had something to do with the hard line taken by H. Ortega in his meeting with the interior minister.
But it is not so clear that this alternative to the economic and political choices of the 1980s was defended by Borge in a systematic fashion inside the national leadership of the FSLN.
The fact that, on April 25, 1990, Humberto Ortega decided to stay at the head of the army, at the same time giving up his functions in the leadership of the Front, was criticized by the supporters of the former GPP tendency. According to them, Ortega should have been replaced as army chief by his deputy, comandante Cuadra. He was reproached for preferring his role as a statesman and military chief to that of a member of a collective leadership. Apart from this point of criticism, there is no evidence of the left wing putting for-
The EPS faced its most serious test during the July 1990 general strike, when hundreds of barricades were put up in Managua on the appeal of the National Workers Front (FNT), which brings together the Sandinista trade union organizations. The army daily cleared the main arteries of the capital with bulldozers, but did not clash with the workers, while the latter allowed the army to get on with the work as instructed by the government.
After the army finished the Sandinista militants rebuilt the barricades, times with the help of soldiers in civilian dress. The government knew what was going on, but the mobilization was too powerful and the army too reluctant for UNO to try and order it to attack the strikers. The FSLN had to exert all its strength on the UNO government on the one side and the FNT on the other to get a (rickety) compromise which ended the
Disarmament of civilian population
When the agreements were signed, H. Ortega pledged to the government that the army would follow its orders and those of the president, that it would go ahead with the disarmament of the civilian population (the barricades defended at night by people with arms), but he also made it clear that the EPS would not shoot down workers.
The disarmament of civilians has been going ahead, but it is by no means com-
Tens of thousands of weapons remain in the hands of the population, including in those of many Sandinista
A few months later, the EPS had to confront a second challenge, this time coming from the right.
In November 1990, there was an uprising by local authorities in region V of the departments of Boaco and Chontales — in the centre of the country, a poor region of crop farming, and an old fief of the
Contras where the UNO won especially convincingly in 1990 — supported by armed former Contras.
The strategic route which links Managua and the Atlantic Coast, via the town of Rama, was cut and three hundred kilometers of road were blocked.
This action was orchestrated by the far right of UNO, led by the former vice- president of the republic, Virgilio Godoy.
The mayors demanded the removal of
Antonio Lacayo from his ministry —
Lacayo being Chamorro's eminence grise and a defender of compromise with the
Sandinistas; of the defence minster Carlos Hurtado and of General Humberto
Ortega; the departure of the police and the EPS from region V; the reduction of the defence budget; the formation of a rural police integrating former Contras;
the disarmament of civilians; the distribution of land to former Contras to the detriment of the APP and former EPS soldiers; the granting of real powers to
Virgilio Godoy, who, owing to his differences with the Chamorro-Lacayo-Cesar clan, has no specific tasks inside the exec-
The military officer responsible for this uprising was Aristides Sanchez, a CIA
NICARAGUA agent and former Contra adviser who was finally arrested and expelled to the US without trial.?
The aim of the action was to destabilize the Chamorro government and force it to crack down on the EPS, and the EPS was indeed compelled to accept a bigger cut in its budget than previously envisaged.®
"The mayor's rebellion" had an impact on the debates and votes in the National Assembly. At first only the 33 Sandinista deputies voted for the defence budget presented by the president; all the UNO deputies voted against. Chamorro then had to use her right of veto to get round this vote. This gave her time to negotiate a deal with the leaders of the UNO parliainvolving an additional reduction of 8.5 cordobas-oros in the military budget. This was thus the price for getting the budget passed.
Chamorro also told the UNO leaders that "the removal of General Ortega is among my objectives, but it is not possible to set a date
After these discussions with the presi dent, one of the leaders of the UNO right wing, A. Ubilla, explained to La Prensa (January 7, 1991), "We must be aware that the advantages today enjoyed by the Sandinistas are not solely due to Doña Violeta Chamorro. Her government came into being without arms, police or money, confronting a party that has everything that it lacked. Guiding the interests of the nation requires a lot of subtlety and
All the evidence suggests that this leader had put his finger on the situation. He understood that the revolutionary has not yet been completely dismantled and that this will need time; but he clearly also believes that the dismantling is well underway and that the Chamorro-Lacayo clan is not doing badly in this respect.
Missiles supplied to Salvadoran rebels
In December 1990, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, the Bush administration was able to prove that SAM 7 and
SAM 14 missiles supplied to the EPS by
6. According to Humberto Ortega:
divided into three tendencies, and the differences were more than tactical. There were strategic differences with the thesis of the Prolonged People's War tendency led by Tomas Borge and the Proletarian tendency
[led by, among others, Jaime Wheelock and Luis Carron]. If one of these two tendencies had won the debate, we would never have taken power in Nicaragua. It was the "third way", "insurrectionary" tendency led by us which predominated. The same pattern is present now." From an interview in Brecha, Uruguay,
August 17, 1990, quoted by La Prensa on September
8. At first, the EPS asked for a budget of 131 million cordobas-oros, The Chamorro-EPS discussions produced a figure of 78.6 millions. After the new reduction the budget is 78.1 million. This is a cut of 56% in the EPS budget between 1990 and 1991. See Envio, 13
9. Envío, February 1991. April 29, 1991 • #205 International Viewpoint