the Soviet
left
SHORTLY after Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Poul Funder Larsen spoke to Vadim Damye, a Moscow left-wing activist, co-founder of the Green Party and leader of the eco-socialist group Green Alternative.
HE attempted coup by the "Committee for the State of Emergency" turned out to be a total failure. In most major cities in Russia, for example in Leningrad, there were no troops at all, and the local — mostly liberal -soviets were firmly in control. This rather unusual for a coup supported by the leaderships of the
There are many rounding the coup, which indicate that it was not a real coup d'état, but rather some kind of "provocation". It is indeed a strange coup which does not include the air forces and the navy; which is not actively supported by the commanders of the military districts; where there are no clear orders given to the there is no substantial support from the social forces which would benefit from the coup and so on. Even the military units loyal to the junta did not take any decisive steps — they didn't try to conquer the positions of power, and the military forces, for example in Moscow, were
Besides it is still quite unclear who gave the orders to halt the military units marching towards the great cities. Even if one assumes that the coup leaders were absolute fools, all this sounds improbable.
In this connection the declaration by former KGB chief, Kryuchkov, in yesterday's Izvestiya (August 24) was interest-
He said that he had mistakes, and that there are many indications that he will soon be set free. • Could you give some additional information about the scale and political character of the resistance against the coup in Moscow? During the days of the coup the mobili: 11
Social forces in the
Soviet crisis
International Viewpoint #212 • September 16, 1991
SOVIET UNION zations were not very large, and people's opinions varied a great deal. However, the majority seemed rather indifferent. There were no factories on strike in Moscow. Of course there were strikes among the miners in the provinces, but not in a really massive fashion. There were few workers around the "White House" of the Russian parliament, for example building barri-
WE publish below an extract (point 4) from the document on the cades. The great majority there were crisis in the Soviet Union adopted by the 13th World Congress of young people, political activists from
"Democratic Russia" and so on, but also the Fourth International, which took place in February this year.
some left-wing activists took part.
The complete text of this resolution and others passed or discussed at the Congress can be found in no.11/12 of
• What positions did the left wing
International Marxist Review, which can be obtained from the put forward during the coup? Were any of the left groups able to intersame address as IV. The issue costs $10 or £5 per copy.
Unfortunately this situation demonstrated that the left forces are scattered and not in a position to take substantial initiatives within a few hours or even days. Many of the leaders of the left wing were out of Moscow.There were a lot of meetings among the different left-wing groups, but they were mostly confused
Our group produced a leaflet, but it had only a small circulation, because it was impossible to get it printed. At that time we still thought that the coup was dangerous, and we stated as the main point that we were against the plotters, against fasrights. We also stated that in principle neither of the two sides were right - that both were undemocratic towards private capitalism.
the outset the junta declared that it would limit democratic rights, ban strikes and so on, and we clearly wanted to fight this. We therefore sup ported the call for a general strike, but we emphasized that this should not be seen as a sign of support for Yeltsin. The strikes should be based on self-organization at all
Unfortunately we only had small possibilities, because of the lack of time and our lack of resources - with no access to a copy machine or a print shop. We distributed and stuck our leaflets on the barricades, but in general the reception was rather negative, as most of the activists were pro-Yeltsin.
• After the coup the situation has developed extremely rapidly. t seems that the Yeltsinites are taking control of most of the state apparatus even at the Union level. Yeltsin is governing by decree and has taken a series of "emergency measures" some of which are far from democratic. How do you view the
"temporary suspension of the Russian Communist Party", the closing of several CPSU newspapers and the immediate confiscation of all the property,
12 endorsed by Gorbachev?
Well, this is an ambiguous question.
DOCUMENT
T HE CPSU is no longer the sole
framework where various strategies confront each other: it has broken up on the one hand on the basis of national fractures into as many parties as republics, more or less looking for a base in the nationalist movements. On the other hand, the conservative and liberal currents have made efforts to find a mass hearing outside the party (for the Obviously a big part of the Russian Communist Party (RCP) is Stalinist, and a weakening of the Stalinists should be welcomed by the left. So one could even be a bit malicious about this. But the strengthening of Yeltsin creates anxiety, and a feeling that hard times are ahead for the Soviet left.
It seems that Yeltsin is going to curtail democratic rights just like the junta. The attacks on the Communist Party gives rise to a feeling not only of anti-Stalinism Bolshevism. Now the banner of the Tsar floats over the whole of Moscow and the red flags are gone; while graffiti like "CPSU=SS" and "down with communism" are written on the walls. So the mood is not only anti-Stalinist but anti-
But even if we are talking only about the CPSU and its CC — the building of which has been confiscated - one should not forget that the CPSU and its CC were not involved in organizing the so-called coup. These methods could in tum be used against other parties and
Yeltsin and his organization "Democratic Russia" are now the heroes of the day. They have the confidence of the people and a green light for their pro-capitalist market reforms. This means privatizations, attacks on workers' rights, unemployment and price rises. For a long period people will endure this — no one knows for how long; but certainly for the
In our leaflet during the coup we stated conservatives, the United Front of Toilers, Inter-Fronts in the Baltic Republics; for the liberals the Russian Democratic Front). Finally, a multitude of parties have begun to spring up without any of them being in a position to challenge the CPSU for the moment. In this context, the abandonment of article 6 introduced by Brezhnev to consolidate the "leading role of the party", almost imposed itself on its own. that "the dictatorship of the military and the nomenklatura should not be transformed into the dictatorship of the Yeltsinites." Unfortunately such a dictatorship is not out of the question. Yeltsin could use the present situation to oust Gorbachev from power. Clearly the atmosphere in Moscow is not in favour of Gorbachev.
Yeltsin's increased powers and his present popular support could form the basis for some kind of authoritarian regime. However, it is not yet clear how this could come about. Right now, he is exercising strong pressure against the CPSU, but when the unemployment and price rises of the market reforms create social protests, he could use his new authoritarian powers to crush these. • What tasks face the Soviet left following last week's events?
I think the left-wing should make it clear right now that Yeltsin and his movement are the main danger. Stalinism has perished in its old form. Influential forces of this type may still exist in the army and the KGB - and one could even imagine that they played a key role in the recent events and may also do so in the future. But Stalinism as the dictatorship of the party has gone. The main danger now is a new form of authoritarianism, that is a right-wing, populist and authoritarian regime.
We should also draw some conclusions from our problems during the coup and try to develop links between the left groups to create the ability to react more quickly and flexibly in a crisis such as this. *
September 16, 1991 • #212 International Viewpoint federal and republican between powers that has been radically overthrown by the republics.
They are increasingly confronted at the same time economic by close interdependence linking them together and the problems they will face in relation the to world market, and finally with proclamations of soveof their reignty minorities own possibly seeking
SOVIET UNION between conservatives and radical liberals still derives from the weaknesses of their projects, but such manoeuvres are more attempts to manage the disorder than reforms. His recourse to the party apparatus within the KGB and the army to maintain the power of the centre against the chaotic breaking-up of the Union is on a far from firm basis, so deep is the crisis of the whole system. Repression could be used by different forces present, from neo-Stalinists to supporters of capitalism. The liberal pseudo-democrats would only oppose the use of repression in cases where it would aim to maintain the former regimes. Only mass resistance could prevent a recourse to force to stamp out the
COVET But more and more conflicts if not a sort of dual power are developing between the party machinery and that of the soviets, many of which are falling to the control of the liberals. There is a general crisis of the regime through its fragmentation.
b) The liberals have speeded up their restorationist course. They are joined by Yeltsin enjoying a temporary popularity thanks to three factors. First, his conflicts with the apparatus and his past speeches against privileges; second the proclamation of sovereignty for a Russian Federation that up until then did not exist, thus scoring points both with Russian nationalists who correctly denounced the nonexistence of institutions representing the Russian people and with non-Russian liberals and nationalists who saw in it a radical weakening of the powers of the "Centre" with the possibility of direct negotiations between republics around reciprocal terms and relationships. Thirdradical free-market speeches appeared to be a response to maintenance of the status quo. The liberals, like the conservatives, will pay for the experience of power with the loss of popular illusions.
c) The national and social movements now go beyond all the limits fixed at the centre. The "full powers" that Gorbachev gave himself are going to come into open confrontation with the sovereignty proclaimed by the republics and the tendency to increased independence for regions, towns and even enterprises, with a growth of social and national exasperation both against the centre and against its paralysis (the demand for a strong hand to restore "order" and the reproach made that Gorbachev is too hesitant illustrates a certain popular ambiguity...).
• Whether a question of independence or sovereignty, it is the articulation protection from the Soviet Federation against oppressive governments in the republics. d) Generally, the change in the enterprise law in June 1990 represented an abandonment of the initial characteristics of perestroika and its diversion in a liberal, free-market direction: its logic became privatization and management rights dependent on share holdings, to the detriment of the initial (although limited) powers given to workers' collectives. The wish for Western credits has not been negligible in this evolution, which also reflects the growing support from a section of the intelligentsia and the apparatus for restorationist projects. But this will inevitably give control of the market to mafia-type forces who are using cooperatives to launder and extend the funds previously accumulated. In addition, the growing chaos rather calls makes the recourse to automatic market functioning increasingly difficult and the source of uncontrollable explosions.
• Initially, the "radicals" - including in the presentation of their "500 Day" programme of "transition to a market econo-
- kept a demagogic language (Yeltsin, like Walesa, promised wellbeing for everyone straight away with the market and privatization). But the identification between liberal-market reform and democracy is being increasingly challenged by supporters of a strong-arm solution for imposing the market. They now have some decisive institutional support at the level of the soviets in several towns and republics. The population seems very torn between fear of change for the worse exasperation with
• This unstable situation is reflected in the different variants of the and the ultimate recourse to methods of direct control beyond formally proclaiming financial autonomy. Overall, the project of bureaucratic reform with a "human face" has failed, the centrist base of support for Gorbachev has developing social and national conflicts.
e) With the miners' working class has had its first experience of self-organization that will mark future struggles. Independent regroupments of on a socio-political union level that have multiplied on various levels, sporadic local actions against the bureaucratic regimes and the massive participation in the elections and national fronts - these are all manifestations of a major political awakening. But there are no independent organizations putting forward coherent programmatic responses that can allow them to avoid the false counterposition that is continually presented: neo-conservatism adopting class-struggle language or free-market radicalism with its radical anti-bureaucratic dis-
Our central task in the USS is to help break this false counter-position. It is to support all the experiences and steps towards self-organization of the workers, however fragile, confused and embryonic they may be, as much on the trade union level as on that necessary for forms of self-management as a response to the crisis. *
13
Behind the BCCI scandal: