Sandinistas hold first congress
T HE CONGRESS was prepared
through 1,374 assemblies which more than 47,000 members and affiliates participated, representing 43% of the total membership. According to the official report made to the congress, the FSLN has 110,000 members, out of a total Nicaraguan population of about 3.5 million.
This is an impressive figure if compared to the 600,000 members of the Brazilian PT, the principal anticapitalist party in Latin America (Brazil has a population of
It seems that following the electoral defeat there has been a wave of people joining the Front. While this is partly due to an easing of the conditions for joining the FSLN, it is nonetheless true that this wave of adhesions is also evidence of the vitality of the FSLN in a socio-political context where it is more useful to have a UNO (the governing right wing coalition) card to keep a job in the public service, or to obtain a loan or a license as a small trad-
The loss of governmental power has moreover obliged the FSLN apparatus to slim itself down drastically; the number of fulltimers has fallen from 3,400 to 200.
Experience of opposition beneficial
Despite these difficulties, the experience of opposition, implying as it does a divide — a "de-fusion" — between the Front and the state apparatus has been rather beneficial for the Sandinistas, leading to a revitalization of the structures at different levels, and a greater freedom of action for the Sandinista mass organizations.
On the other hand, in the light of the statistics on the composition of the congress, it appears that the Front lacks "young blood"; less than 6% of the delegates were aged less than 26 years whereas the majority of the Nicaraguan population is less than 18 years old, only 17.5% of the delegates were women and agricultural and industrial workers were under-represented.
The congress, at which more than 500 delegates participated, was a forum for lively discussion but its main function from the point of view of the leadership was less to hold a true debate than as a bade ogic exercise with regard to the
There were some hundreds of interventions, but these related only indirectly to the challenges confronting the Front and the masses. The preparatory debate was couched in sometimes violent terms, notably in the Sandinista press and in the other
THE first Congress of the
Nicaraguan Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) took place in mid-July. Present at the congress was Eric
Toussaint, a member of the
Belgian Socialist Workers
Party (POS/SAP - Belgian section of the Fourth
International), who sent us this report.
### ERIC TOUSSAINT media (see IV 206). In the course of these pre-Congress debates, the "moderates" defended the thesis of the "social pause", the entente with the Chamorro-Lacayo government and support for its economic and so on). They criticized the untimely strikes led by the Sandinista trade unions and claimed to be thus preparing ground for a Sandinista electoral victory in 1996.
The concessions that they envisage would permit the maintenance of Sandinista control over the army, which would guarantee the legal return of the Front to power in 5 years. Amongst the "moderates" can be found Humberto Ortega, head of the army, Sergio Ramirez, head of the Sandinista group in the National Assembly and new member of the national leadership, Victor Tirado Lopez, one of the 9 comandantes, Edmundo Jarquin, vice-president of the Sandinista parliamentary group, Herty Lewittes, exminister of tourism and Martinez Cuenca, formerly responsible for economic policy.
### Danger of electoralism
The opponents of this so-called line of "co-government" argue for the need to intransigently defend the living standards of the masses, jobs and the revolutionary conquests. They argued that there was a danger of the FLN's becoming an elec-
This debate was not central to the congress, only being reintroduced in a roundabout way at the end for example in a speech by Humberto Ortega. The principal protagonists of the debate which preceded the congress remained silent.
NICARAGUA Why? Between April and July 1991, there was a clear radicalization in the speeches of Daniel Ortega (see /V 209) in response to the incessant attacks of the bourgeoisie which accelerated the process of dismantling of the revolutionary state. From this verbal radicalization, the FSLN then passed to action; it constituted a Front of Popular Struggle in which the community movement in defence of the urban property reform played a new role
Nonetheless, the mobilization was insuf ficient to stop the parliamentary UNO group from passing decrees on the ownership of housing. The parliamentary Sandinista group withdrew from the national assembly in mid-June.
This withdrawal, for an undetermined period, united the Sandinista ranks. It allowed the FSLN congress to reaffirm its unity, which constitutes an element of
But to the extent that the congress participants have not debated and defined a clear and coherent orientation in opposition to the attacks of the bourgeoisie and attempted to reconstitute a hegemonic revolutionary bloc, the contradictions which have run through the Front in the precongress period are going to deepen. The more so in that the withdrawal of the Sandinista parliamentary group from the national assembly has not put an end to the policy of dialogue with the counterrevolutionary ruling coalition.
A conflictual alliance
Indeed, the leadership of the FLN maintains a conflictual alliance with the head of government, President Chamorro, and her eminence grise Lacayo. Chamorro and Lacayo disagree with the aggressive anti-Sandinista attitude of the UNO parliamentary group, where a majority alliance is emerging between Alfredo Cesar, UNO president of the national assembly, and the partisans of Vigilio Godoy, vice-president of the republic. The fact that the Sandinista parliamentary group has withdrawn form the national assembly diminishes the legitimacy of the latter and reinforces the executive, which favours a progressive dismantling of the revolutionary conquests.
For its part, the FLN leadership wishes to make concessions to the executive to undermine the unity of the UNO and thus to scale down the attacks of the latter. The Chamorro-Lacayo duo seek for their part to mollify the FSLN while putting the finishing touches to the counter revolution. What we are currently witnessing is then a ment. Nonetheless the elements of inva: 1 5 ment. Nonetheless the elements of insta-
International Viewpoint #213 • September 30, 1991
NICARAGUA bility are such that the situation could change after the congress.
Introducing the congress, the national leadership of the FSLN presented a written balance sheet of the revolutionary struggle in Nicaragua in general, and the last few years in particular.
This document merits being studied in depth. It constitutes a genuine aid to the comprehension of the Front's strategy, despite evident gaps. Correctly, the balance sheet says that "with this report one will have an instrument for better understanding and evaluating the efforts of the FSLN and its action in the struggle to open a new horizon to the people of Nicaragua".
Ebb of revolution explained
The text puts forward a pertinent explanation of the ebb of the revolution: "the policy of aggression against Nicaragua, practiced by successive US governments... led to a militarization of the economy and of society. The FSLN fell into practices foreign to the democratic tradition of Sandinism, accentuating the vertical character of the Front.
"On the other hand, the profound economic and social crisis which the socialist countries have entered diminished the capacity of the Sandinistas to face up to the diverse effects of the war".
The document forcibly insists on the justice of the self criticism made at the Sandinista assembly meeting at El Crucero in June 1990, under the pressure of important social struggles: "Independently of the fact that certain of our internal problems have objective roots, we must submit ourselves to criticism as a necessary condition for the elimination of these problems, and, moreover, because, in very many cases, they have been reinforced by attitudes and personal or collective styles. The national leadership assumes the principal responsibility of not having corrected in an adequate manner these practices and, in certain cases, of having reinforced
Practices mentioned by the leadership include authoritarianism, the absence of sensitivity in the face of the positions and concerns of the rank and file, the stifling of criticism, the bureaucratic styles of the leadership, sectarianism in the mass organizations, the excessive professionalism of the party structures, the preference given to those with administrative responsibilities, and so on.
The part devoted to the errors of the Sandinistas in relation to the peasantry is particularly interesting. It allows the FSLN to begin to understand why a part of the peasantry, notably at the level of the poor peasants and small proprietors, passed to the side of the Contras.
Since the election defeat, the insistence on the need for dialogue and common action with the peasant base of the Con16 tras is a positive factor.
The principal weaknesses of the text reside in what is not said. There is a total absence of reference to the generalized arming of the civilians as a means utilized by the revolution to defend itself and consolidate its conquests. And this is not by accident, because in its new programme, the FSLN advocates the total disarmament of the civilian population.
This constitutes the abandonment of a vital part of the revolutionary conquests. Nothing is said either on the balance sheet of the Sandinista Defence Committees which, if they have finally disappeared played an essential role in the popular mobilization up until 1984-85.
Nothing is said on the absence of a policy of workers' control in the factories, the service enterprises or in agriculture.
In fact the balance sheet of the Front, like its new programme, limits the democratic horizon to the bourgeois democratic institutions which, if they constitute a formidable advance in relation to a century of oligarchic dictatorship, constitute also a limit to social and political democ-
One of the errors of the FSLN in the last few years has consisted in refusing to further develop democracy.? Moreover, the balance sheet of the FSLN contains no of the IMF-type measures of economic and monetary adjustment introduced by the Sandinista government, above all from June 1988, and pursued by the UNO government.
This has allowed a number of Sandinista leaders to support the economic policy of Lacayo and congratulate themselves on its success in terms of stabilization of inflation at the price of economic reces-
Leadership elected as team
One of the most hotly debated subjects during the congress concerned the leadership. The outgoing national leadership (Direccion Nacional - DN) succeeded in convincing the congress participants to proceed to the election of the new national leadership as a team.
The old leadership has thus been reelected, without really changing because the two new members, Rene Nunez and Sergio Ramirez, functioned part of the leadership, the first as secretary of the DN and the second as head of the parliamentary fraction.
The outgoing DN wished to thus reaffirm its unity and avoid the non-election of certain of its members who had been heavily criticized by the rank and file.
vote, Daniel Ortega, who became general secretary of the party, promised that at the next congress the members of the DN would be elected
The continuation of this verticalist behaviour was underlined when, during a break in the congress, Daniel Ortega addressed the mass meeting in Revolution
Square to commemorate the12th anniversary of the revolution and proposed that it ratify the composition of the new leadership, at a time when the congress had not yet begun to vote on the question.
On the other hand, in a new sign of the FSLN's vitality, the latter attributed genuine powers to the Sandinista assembly, powers comparable to those of a central committee.
The composition of the new Sandinista assembly is particularly interesting, with the leaders of the popular organizations winning the most votes. Several moderate Sandinista leaders and/or close advisors of the Comandantes were not re-elected.
### Internationalist thread expressed
The internationalist thread in Sandinism was enthusiastically expressed at different moments of the congress, in particular during the speeches of Osmani Cienfuegos, member of the political bureau of the Cuban Communist Party, of Lula, president of the PT, and of Joaquin Villalobos, member of the general command of the Salvadoran FMLN.3
This internationalist orientation was also present in the balance sheet of the leadership and in the positions taken by Daniel Ortega.
The congress decided to call a rally of international solidarity in Managua October 1991. This initiative should, we hope, permit the revitalization of solidarity with the Nicaraguan, Central American and Caribbean revolutions. * 1. The writings of the Sandinistas in favour of workers' control are very rare. See in particular "Workers' Control in the Private Enterprises" in "Participatory Democracy in Nicaragua", CIERA editions, Managua, 2. See the resolution of the 13th world congress of the Fourth International in International Marxist Review 3. Numerous international delegations from more than democratic parties from France, the Spanish state (the latter left the congress to protest against the presence of a delegation from Herri Batasuna), Sweden, Germany, and the Dominican Republic were present. The French delegate argued for a much closer relationship between the FSLN and the Socialist Intemational but did not convince the congress. The Communist Parties of Cuba, the Soviet Union (a member of the CPSU's Political Bureau), China, Vietnam, North Korea, France, the Spanish state and several Latin American countries were represented. Also present were representatives of the Brazilian PT, the Tupamaros of Uniguay, the PUM, UNIR and Communist Party of Peru, the Mexican PRD and PT, the FMIN of El Salvador, the UNRG, BS and PTD from the Dominican Republic, AD-M19 and UCELN from Colombia, and the Lavalas organization from Haiti. Three sections of the Fourth International were represented, the Mexican PRT, the French LCR and the BelThe far left from the imperialist countries was virtually absent; apart form the aforementioned sections of the Fourth International, there was only the Mao-Stalinist PTB from Belgium and the MK-LKI from the Basque country. Also present at the congress were Verigio Cerezo, the former Christian Democratic president of Guatemala, and representatives of the Mexican PRI, the Bolivian MIR which is currently in power, the Libyan regime, and the Palestine Liberation Organization.