International Viewpoint #214 • October 14, 1991
HUNGARY / CUBA councils and socialism. For them, socialism and Stalinism are the same thing. I had a conversation with an SzDSz (Alliance of Free Democrats) parliamentary deputy who said that all this talk about the workers' councils in 1956 is just an illusion. And this is the official conception; the social content of 1956 is an illusion and its real content was national independence.
The workers are not impressed by this symbol. Every day they hear "56", "45" and so on. The majority are not listening because they understand that they are being lied to. • What is the Left Alternative's policy at the moment?
Most of the poorest workers are becoming still poorer. They have little possibility of defending themselves.
There are two possible alternatives: to get involved in some kind of modernized fascism, or to become nostalgic for the old regime, since their present situation is worse than under Kadar. The radical left does not exist in the mass movement. This could change but that is how things are now.
Many workers who were not Communists — I don't know the exact percentage — say that the new politicians are even worse than the Communists. They know that they have lost a lot in terms of living standards.
The government and the parties say: "you have gained much freedom", but what is this freedom for? Sure, workers have rights, but, as Marxists have explained for a long time, freedom has its economic and material aspects. People feel outside parliamentarism and the new parties. They don't have faith in all this. They can see that the parliament is essentially composed of old and new representatives of the economic elite.
I do not think that the workers are going to organize themselves. I think that in this first phase we must assist the organizations fighting the government and in favour of the unions. The workers will not follow anyone who wants to organize them under an ideological hat. National sentiment is strong among workers and is currently under the control of government propaganda. We can say nothing on this question. For example, if you say that we should struggle for rights and not against Romanians, you will be treated as a traitor to the nation. I am an internationalist and I speak of nationalism with much caution. Marxist intellectuals are likely to be considered as internationalist enemies of the people. It is a very complex situation which the majority of Marxists in the
West cannot understand.
The left now needs to start from the trade unions. We have had a tendency to forget the old union. This is a mistake 14 obtain real help from it. They also want because many workers expect and can trade union unity. We must find new union leaders. I may hate the leaders, but it would be a disaster if these unions were destroyed, since the new unions will not replace them.
In my view, by October or November the situation in Hungary will be explosive, because it is then that people will have to pay the new energy prices. • Does Left Alternative want to form a new party?
Left Alternative will create a new party when there are real mass social movements in Hungary. People loathe the new parties and to create another in such a situation would be understood as just another group of intellectuals trying to get parliamentary money for themselves. For this reason we want above all to help development of organization. We want to bring together the various parties that want to change the system, for example the Workers League, which considers itself Trotskyist. We have met with the Democratic Party of Hungarian Workers which represents some thousands of workers. We aim to promote these contacts.
Our second intervention is in the unions. We organize meetings and meet union leaders.
There also exist neighbourhood associations, which we hope to bring together on the national level. These associations could defend people unable to pay their
We have registered some successes in these actions, but we are unable to go further owing to financial constraints. We have, for example, no independent publication and without that we cannot explain our positions on the television. • Is there a feminist movement in Hungary and what is the real position of women in Hungarian socie-
Marxists and the western left need to understand that we do not have real democratic traditions. Feminism is not a real
Hungary. Some small groups without social weight exist, and I believe that it will take a few years for feminism to become a real movement.
The new style propaganda promotes a new image of women. Under the Kadar regime, the model was the woman workwho worked like a man. Now we have the American model - the woman as sexual object.
There is now significant unemployment in Hungary, something unknown before. There is an increasing amount of propaganda putting forward the idea that women's work is not necessary for society. Thus, there is a conservative evolution towards the modern American way of life. *
The
vultures
gather
THE withdrawal of a Soviet military brigade from Cuba, announced by President Gorbachev on September 11, 1991, at a joint press conference with American Secretary of State James Baker, finally provided the answer to a long standing question: how would Moscow respond to George Bush's unceasing linkage of American aid to the USSR with an end to Soviet aid to Cuba? JANETTE HABEL
A CCORDING to Gorbachev,
there were 11,000 Soviet troops stationed in Cuba. International military statistics, in particular those from the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, give markedly lower figures. The ISS claims that there are 7,700 Soviet soldiers in Cuba, of which 2,100 are working on intelligence activities, mainly in monitoring centres and research into United States military movements and activities; 2,800 are military advisers, including officers working in the country's strategic centres; and 2,800 form part of a motorized infantry brigade, that is the Brigade of Military Instruction.
The US State Department gives even lower estimates, arriving at a total of 5,400 Soviet military personnel.2 Finally, the official Soviet press agency itself, TASS, has corrected Gorbachev, claiming that the military brigade comprises 3,000 men.3
While in the past Cuba had a strategic significance for the USSR owing to its proximity to the USA and the information gathered at the base at Lourdes, near to Havana, the brigade has never been an important element in Cuba's defences. This country has in fact one of the most powerful armies in Latin America, while the Territorial Militia can, according to Cuban government estimates, call on 80% of the physically able population in case of attack.
ABSOLUMENT
FiDEL
DOiT
CUBA embargo. The revolution faces a situation even more serious PRix! than 30 years ago, when the US administration abolished sug ar quotas. At that time the Cuban government had to desperately attempt to sell its sugar - of which Cuba is the world's biggest exporter and find oil suppliers. As a result Khrushchev's USSR substituted for the American supplier, PANCHO while the refusal of US enterprises to send any oil or to refine
"Fidel - must - absolutely - go -at what-ever- price"
Furthermore the brigade could in no way threaten the US' own security. Thus, it is not the brigade itself which is important but the symbolism of its withdrawal — as the editorial in the Cuban Communist Party paper Granma of September 14 1991 (see p. 17) underlined — and the circumstances of the announcement of the pullback, at a joint press conference with an American spokesperson and without the Cuban government being informed beforehand.
The 29-year long presence of this unit on the island, which began after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, had a twofold meaning. Firstly as a military force but also as a political statement of the "friendship and solidarity [of the USSR] in the face of US threats". To put it another way it expressed the commitment of Moscow to reply to any attack by Washington on Cuba. Indeed, the cessation of military supplies to the Soviet-equipped Cuban army is more serious than the withdrawal
The Soviet military presence is all the more understandable given the fact that a portion of Cuban soil has been occupied since 1903 as a consequence of the American intervention at that time. The base at Guantanamo is a colonial relic of a treaty signed 90 years ago and renewed "in perpetuity" in 1934, which occupies an area the size of Martinique. Cut off from the rest of the country behind barbed wire, it is occupied by 2,000 marines, an air base and a spying centre. It has been used to train counter-revolutionaries, and in times of tension is the source of various provoca-
It is also used as a base for surveillance of the Caribbean sea lanes, but there are other bases for this purpose in Puerto Rico and Florida so this is not its essential function, which is rather a political one. When relations with Washington are strained, incidents around Guantanamo multiply. The Cuban people feel this incarnation of American power as a constant humiliation. Furthermore, it requires some nerve to maintain the base under the 1934 treaty, which stated that its objective was "to reinforce the ties of friendship between our two countries" when in fact the US is inflicting a ferocious economic embargo on Cuba.
From the point of view of international law, the occupation of the Guantanamo base could be compared to the annexation of the Baltic States, whose inclusion in the Soviet Union was the result of historical circumstances that had nothing to do with the will of the people. The Cuban government's demand for the return of this territory rests on solid foundations especially now that the Soviet unit is being withdrawn.
This demand has been raised since the start of the revolution, especially during the October 1962 crisis, when an American pullout was put forward as one of the five points that would guarantee the island's security after the removal of the nuclear missiles from Cuba.
Guantanamo compared to
Gibraltar
Now that Washington's traditional pretext of the Soviet threat is disappearing, it is even harder to justify the maintenance of this foreign military presence, which Manuel Fraga, the President of the Galician regional government in Spain, has compared to the continued British occupation of Gibraltar.
Nonetheless, the US Defense Department has restated its determination to hold onto Guantanamo on the grounds that it has a "regional mission going well beyond that of opposing the Soviet military presence in Cuba" for "the Guantanamo base provides training and logistic support for American marine units operating in the region."
However, whatever the psychological impact of the withdrawal of the Soviet military force, the mortal danger for Cuba comes from the combination of the end of Soviet aid and the American sponsored
Soviet oil was met by their expropriation.
The total embargo decreed on February 3, 1962 was fully in place by May 14, 1964 and included a ban on sales of food and medicines. This embargo is today being further strengthened by Bush who predicts the rapid fall of Fidel Castro and draws pleasure from "hearing his dictatorship crumble bit by bit."
At the same time the barter accords with the USSR, which were not always on advantageous terms, but which had the merit of stability, are being questioned, although it is quite possible that the Russian and other former Soviet republics will continue to buy sugar. It is not so easy to find 3 to 4 million tonnes of sugar on the world market at a reasonable price from one day to the next, and such a big purchase would itself drive up prices.
Some 80% of Cuba's trade with the USSR was with four republics, Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan, which have huge oil reserves. Cuba has recently signed an agreement with Byelorussia; in exchange for sugar and the building of a rum refinery in Minsk, Byelorussia will deliver industrial machinery and vehicles."
However there is more to the oil problem than this. Aside from the difficulties facing the Soviet oil industry in production, the amount available at world market prices will henceforth be limited. This lack of energy resources is the Achilles heel of the Cuban economy.
Certainly Mexico and Venezuela have said that they are ready to supply Cuba with oil, but there will be conditions Furthermore, the growing chaos in the USSR makes the fulfillment of these accords by no means certain. The Soviets have already indicated that that oil deliveries will be significantly reduced in 1992, fol1. El Pais, September 9, 1991. 2. Informe Latino americano, September 26, 1991. 3. ibid 4. International Herald Tribune, September 17, 1991. 15 5. Le Monde, September 22-23, 1991. 6. Caribbean Report, October 3, 1991
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ECHOUER N'iMPORTE QUEL
International Viewpoint #214 • October 14, 1991
CUBA lowing a significant drop in 1991.
In reality, the situation is worse than in 1959. The Soviet measures are making the effects of the embargo — which is in many respects now a blockade — worse. The Mack amendment - named after a Republican senator from Florida - proposes to forbid branches of American enterprises in third countries from any trade with Cuba, to reduce American aid to countries that buy Cuban sugar and to prevent boats which have taken goods to Cuba from docking in American ports.
Similar measures have been taken in the sporting and cinema fields. The filmmaker Sidney Pollack had to transfer the making of his film Domingo, and American TV chains did not purchase any re-transmission rights for the Pan American Games in August 1991, owing to a veto from Washington.
The building of a nuclear power station destined to lessen the country's oil dependence has been the object of a campaign of denigration under the pretext of safety. This station, which is far from being finished, is presented as a potential Chernobyl threatening Florida. It seems that Soviet advisers who have been involved for a long time in the building of two nuclear reactors, which would allow Cuba to save up to 1,200,000 tonnes of oil a year, have stipulated as a condition for finishing the work that the Cuban government should buy safety equipment, which its current financial circumstances will make very hard.?
If one adds the impact of these measures to the growth of the Cuban debt - which the Cuban government has estimated at $1.7bn, 1° on top of an existing $7bn debt - the cessation of all Western credit for several years (the Cuban government has made the provision of new loans a condition for resuming payment of the interest on the old) we can begin to get a picture of the suffocation applied to this small country of 11 million people by the world's most powerful country, and made worse by the Soviet desertion.
Gorbachev and Yeltsin have given the green light to the USA to carry out whatever plan of execution they may have devised. At the moment the favoured approach is that of economic and political suffocation. The US leadership is looking for an internal collapse which they are also trying to stimulate by unprecedented levels. A branch of Voice of America, financed by the US 6$15m, its transmits abor
70 hours a week.
Interspersed by musical interludes and sometimes doubtful news reports — such as a declaration by a union of Croat machinists calling on Cuban workers "to follow the example of their brothers in the east"', Radio Martí is, according to official Cuban admission, heard by a significant number of the island's population, since it is a source of general information which compensates for the low quality and rigidity of the Cuban media.
The Cuban-American Foundation plays an important role here. It is headed by Mas Canosa, an immensely rich Cuban businessman, a Bay of Pigs veteran who represents the far right of the Cuban emigré community in Miami.12 Yeltsin gets support of Cuban ultra-rightist
To accompany the departure of the Soviet troops and to do away with any ambiguity, the Russian government and representatives of the Soviet government have been increasing contacts with Mas Canosa - the first such contacts had taken place even before the fall of the Berlin Wall43 — who was in Moscow with an important delegation in September 1991. Indeed, it was Mas Canosa who organized Boris Yeltsin's first trip to the US.4 As icing on the cake, the Soviet leaders have given the Foundation the right to open offices in Moscow, an act described as "stupefying" by Lionel Barber of the Financial Times, who recalls that the Foundation "includes former collaborators of the Batista dictatorship. "IS
From the USA to the USSR the collapse of the Cuban economy is considered inevitable. Within this perspective two different tactics have been put forward by the and Spanish respectively. Spain, which is Cuba's main
Community, has increasing contact Castro's government.16 The Spanish have been as they were expressed at peaceful, gradual and moderate political transition. This means lifting the embargo — a position that has been officially adopted by the Spanish government, the Latin American parliament and the French secretary of foreign affairs. It also involves criticizing the "provocative" statements of President Bush. A French right wing commentator, A. Vivien, has written that it is necessary to sponsor "the evolution of the regime rather than trying to crush it. "17
Bush is openly opposed to such an orientation and condemns any cooperation with the regime insofar as it does not proceed to the organization of immediate elections with the participation of representatives of
Is there a real difference between the two positions? During an official visit to Cuba Manuel Fraga, president of the Galician regional government (and a minister under Franco), referred to the Spanish transition as a way of suggesting a transition controlled from above, from inside the team in power itself, in order to guarmoderate, progressive and reformist" change. In order to make the scenario as reassuring as possible, Fraga referred to the possibility of this transition taking place "with Fidel Castro, avoiding, as in Spain, the violent liquidation of the ruling (Francoist) team"
The Spanish scenario In this hypothesis Fidel Castro could, in the manner of King Juan Carlos, in some form be elected honorary president for life. The proposed reform of the method of election for choosing the President of the National People's Assembly could be understood in this light. This scenario has the advantage for the Latin American govemments of avoiding the violent confrontations that they believe would inevitably accompany the fall of Castroism, and whose effects on Cuba and a Latin America in an increasingly precarious economic state are unpredictable
This "Spanish" scenario however runs up against two big obstacles. Firstly the economy in Franco's Spain was a market economy, and the peaceful institutional and political transition involved no radical economic change. But in the Cuban case it is precisely a matter of a fundamental economic change. Secondly, it is quite hard to imagine Fidel Castro opening exhibitions, even if Juan Carlos' role is not limited to 7. Venezuelan oil has been supplied since 1976 as part of a triangular agreement between Venezuela, Cuba and the USSR. The latter gives oil to a Venezuelan company in Holland, in exchange for supplies of Venezuelan oil to Cuba. This operation allows a reduction in transport costs. See Jorge F. Perez Lopez in "Socialist Cuba: Past Interpretations and Future Challenges", Westview Press, Boulder and London. 8. Cf. Perez Lopez, op. cit. 9. IHT, September 28-29, 1991. 10. Informe Latinoamericano, October 3, 1991. 11. Pensamiento Propio, September 1991. 12. In June 1991 he called for the assassination of Castro on Argentine TV. See Pensamiento Propio, Sep tember 1991. 13. Financial Times, September 13, 1991. 14. Ibid. 15. Financial Times, September 13, 1991. 16. See the visit of Cardinal Suquia representing the Spanish bishops. 17. Le Monde, September 28, 1991. 18. El Pais, September 30, 1991.
For Bush and the Miami Cubans getting rid of Castro is a non-negotiable question of principle. Carlos Alberto Montaner, one of the spokespeople of the Cuban Democratic Platform, who has also spoken in favour of a peaceful transition, has been eager to condemn in advance "any Spanish interference".
Although Castro went out of his way to welcome Fraga, going so far as to qualify the attitude of Franco's Spain to Cuba as irreproachable, it remains to be seen how far aid from Spain and the oil-producing Latin American countries is to be conditional on the progress of the "Spanish" scenario, and how the Cuban Communist Party congress will deal with this ques-
If one restricts oneself to the simple possible scenarios, the Cubans have nothing more to do than choose what sauce to be cooked in. However all these "solutions" pay little heed to an essential factor: the attitude of the Cuban masses. While it is true that the population is protesting about the worsening economic situation," it has not challenged the existing political system.
This view, expressed by diplomats in the Cuban capital, International Herald Tribune journalists present after the PanAmerican Games and by the wellinformed commentators of the Financial Times, 2° is explained not only by the continuing support of sections of the population for the revolution, but also by the feeling of national resistance aroused in people by the cynicism of the world's great power, which brandishes human rights while trying to starve them to death.
Unenviable fate of Cuba's neighbours
The Cuban people can hardly have illusions about the fate that awaits them if their despised northern neighbour had the opportunity to take its revenge after 32 years. Despite the extremely serious situation on the island, things still stand comparison with the unenviable fate of its near neighbours such as Haiti, San Domingo, Jamaica or Nicaragua. People know what to make of American promises. The new US ambassador to Costa Rica has just declared that economic aid to that country had been "artificially high" during the 1980s and that priorities have changed after the departure of the Sandinistas from power in Nicaragua.21
It does not seem that either the American or Spanish scenario is imminent, but for how long? The preparatory assemblies for the Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, which will open for the first time since the revolution behind closed doors on October 10, saw several months ago the expression of popular aspirations and criticisms of some aspects of the "rectification process", such as the suppression of free peasant markets and private workshops. As for the youth there was questioning of voluntarism and the functioning of the micro-brigades used for building houses, ideological rigidity, jargon, the method of electing the party's leading bodies at every level and the bureaucratic functioning of the party. Changes are on the agenda on all these points. The traditional argument of the Castro leadership, that unity is the only guarantee of the country's defence, is no longer admissible. Behind the facade of unity, divergences and choices exist, from which the people are excluded. Events in Eastern Europe have already shown the price to be paid for depoliticization and cynicism created by monolithism.
The options currently being discussed concern on the one hand the extension of the economic opening already under way small manufacturing and distribution and on the other the degree of possible political relaxation. A part of the apparatus sees Nicaragua as a negative example showing the possibility of change under the pressure of the American blockade; only the lifting of the blockade, a withdrawal from Guantanamo and a commitment to nonaggression against Cuba could lead to eventual changes.2
Other sectors of the party, in particular the intellectuals, consider that political changes can no longer wait, and while references to Marxism-Leninism should be kept, it is necessary to return to the national sources of the revolution and challenge political monolithism. To sum up, an orientation of the "Chinese" type, combining economic liberalization with the political status quo, is advocated on the one hand, while on the other there are the partisans of political reforms without any clear idea of what that might entail. These differences are, in any case, not yet clear-cut and other options may arise.
It is to be hoped that this closed Congress provides the opportunity for collective and democratic elaboration, the critical revision of the political institutions and a challenge to bureaucratic practices. For this is what is needed to deal with the crucial tests that await the coun 19. The number of factories that have had to close due to lack of spare parts and raw materials is not known, but there is clearly a significant problem of finding work for those laid off. An effort is being made to tum 20. Article by Damian Fraser in the September 14, 21. Mexico and Central America Report, September 22. Incidents took place during the construction of housing for participants in the Pan-American Games. At first the plan was that the micro-brigade workers would get the houses, and this was an important motivating factor. However the leadership in Havana Province decided to tum the houses over to tourism. The workers reacted violently and apparently the regional leaders had to reverse their decision. 23. See Informe Latinoamericano, September 19, 24. This is the implicit line of the Granma editorial extracts from which are published below.
CUBA
"We will not
be slaves"