Women and the
International Viewpoint #215 • October 28, 1991 democratic evolution opened with the beginning of the intifada.
One of the aspects of this regression has been the appearance of the "culture of the intifada", characterized by austere behaviour — the forbidding of feasts and leisure activities, which have been reduced to watching the television. These norms of
THE outbreak of the intifada in December 1987 was marked by the entry into action of new participants in the struggle of the
Palestinian people; youth and women. The role of the latter in the struggle has shaken the traditional organization of
Palestinian society. The weight of tradition, and the rise of the fundamentalist movement, have however created an increasingly difficult situation for women. We publish below an article by Lashar Khalife, taken from El Fanar ("The
Lighthouse"), the newspaper of a Palestinian feminist group in
Haifa, followed by an interview with e member of the group.
DOCUMENT
WO significant stages can be
T distinguished in the changes in the status of Palestinian women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The first period opened with the outbreak of the intifada in December 1987, and continued throughout the first year of this movement.
The first three months of the intifada were characterized by a wave of spontaneous and massive popular mobilization, affecting social layers which had previously hardly participated in action and political struggle; women, workers, peasants, inhabitants of refugee camps and so on. This participation was reflected by the self-organization of the masses in the framework of popular committees, charged with the management of everyday life, which expressed the will of these sectors to emancipate themselves, take control of their affairs and establish a new scale of moral values.
Challenge to patriarchal traditions
Women challenged patriarchal traditions and customs which confined them in the role of passive and weak creatures whose essential task was the care of children and the house.
In the context of the intifada, Palestinian women began to participate fully in all areas of political action, breaking down patriarchal traditions, taking part in the non-traditional tasks assumed until then by the men (participation in and taking of responsibility for leadership, guard committees, and so on).
At the end of the first three months, when the popular committeeș were brought under the control of the different political factions, the mobilization of women continued in spite of everything, but with a certain regression, marked by the retum of women to their traditiona
20 functions. Their activity in the popular committees and the neighbourhood committees was then reduced to teaching and as the Popular Army.!
The gains of this first period of the intifada could be summed up thus; the emergence of popular organizational structures at the initiative of the people, which allowed broad participation; the emergence of a new scale of values which favoured the participation of women in non-traditional areas, and, consequently, the waning of a number of traditional attitudes; the weakening of the absolute power of the father, the domination of brothers over sisters and the appearance of more democratic relations inside the family; the beginning of a withering of fidelity to the family in favour of a national fidelity; the dislocation of the social order which existed before the intifada.
The second stage of the radicalization of women in the occupied territories dates from around the end of the first year of the intifada and more precisely the banning of the popular committees in July 1988.
Struggle shifts to clandestinity
The struggle then shifted from the general popular mobilization to clandestinity?, reserved for the cadres and the main political factions; groups specializing in specific forms of struggle (the throwing of stones) appeared. This has led to a dangerous social and political phenomenon; the glorification of militarism in all its forms in place of popular mobilization.
The decline in the level of mobilization has obviously engendered an overall regression in the participation of women, marginalizing them and setting back the conduct obviously affect women — who are subject to control of their behaviour and dress.
Finally, what could be called the "culture of the veil appeared, which has set women backwards and reinforced their social and political isolation. This emergence of the "culture of the veil" is also due to the respect shown by all tendencies of the political leadership to reactionary customs and traditions and to their incapacity to impose a political and social programme for the democratic transformation of the social structures, an unavoidable condition for genuine national emancipation. Field free for fundamentalists
This incapacity has helped to leave the field free for the fundamentalist movement — it has a clear political and social programme, which has become an alternative because of the inconsistency, indeed the non-existence, of the secular national movement and the mass movement.
Women being a pillar of the traditional patriarchal order, the fundamentalist movement understood that the consciousness of the latter had evolved because of the struggle.
They were conscious of the energy of women and the menace they represented to the former retrogressive order. They launched a virulent campaign to exclude women from social and political life and relegate them to the household and the home, launching appeals for the control of the conduct of the women in the family, forbidding them to mix with men, proscribing all permissiveness and calling for the reinforcement of the power of the head of the family (his control over behaviour, his right to constraint, coercion and the use of violence).
The fundamentalist movement enlarged its influence through appealing for the wearing of the veil, presenting this as a national duty - the proof of respect for the martyrs.
The wearing of the veil was officially imposed in Gaza in the summer of 1988, by slogans and communiqués, as well as 1. Rima Hammani, "The Intifada and the Woman Question'''. Conference; "The Participation of Palestinian Woman in the Intifada", Bissan Centre of Research and Development, Ramallah, 1991. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Fathia Nasra, "The Intifada and the Woman Question". Conference; "Report on the Activity of Women and Teaching", Bissan Centre, 1991. 6. Islah Ahd El Jawad, "The Intifada and the Woman Question". Conference; "Social Relations in the Family During the Intifada", Bissan Centre, 1991.
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PALESTINE intifada
October 28, 1991 • #215 International Viewpoint by the use of terror, physical aggression perpetrated by groups of children and adolescents against women who refused to do SO.
This setback of the second period of the intifada can be illustrated by several phenomena: the decline of popular participation in general in political action, and of women in particular — only a small minority of politicized and organized women have persisted; the number of early marriages is growing and the age of marriage has dropped from 21 before the intifada to 17 years; the desertion of the primary and secondary schools and universities, for several reasons -amongst others, the closure of these establishments — but also because of the early marriages and the lack of family help; measures of encouragement to motherhood'; imposition by terror of the wearing of the veil; reinforcement of the family unit and the role of maternity to the detriment of the political organization of wom-
"A fight
for
equality"
MANA Hassan is a founder member of the Haifa-based feminist group El Fanar
("The Lighthouse").
International Viewpoint spoke to her about the work of her group and the situation of Palestinian women within Israel's pre-1967 borders.
AN you describe the circumstances in which your group was created? El Fanar was founded by five women eight months ago in Haifa, in the part of Palestine occupied since 1948. The condition for being a member of El Fanar is participation in the weekly meetings and debates, as well as the payment of dues. Today, there are 20 of us, not counting sympathizers. The group intervenes in Haifa and our project is to create groups in the villages of Galilee, the Triangle', and the Negev, which will require a lot of energy. • What were the reasons for its creation?
First, because of our conviction that women must organize themselves in an autonomous feminist context. Until then, the majority of women's organizations on the political scene in Palestine were not autonomous; worse still, they depended on political parties, they were only a section of, or the showcase for these parties. • How were these organizations conceived?
When these organizations or "women's parties" were set up, their goal was not to fight for the liberation of women but rather to uphold the existing traditions that forbade the adhesion of women on a basis of equality with men. The woman was integrated in a special structure and her work was not the same as that of the other • Did these organizations have an orientation favourable to women?
These "women's parties" are subject to the programme of the mother organization, but the Palestinian political parties, including those of the left, have no progressive social programme so far as the status of women is concerned. The submission of these organizations to the programme of the party results in their adaptation to the status quo and not action for the liberation of women.
We are convinced of the need for the construction of an autonomous feminist organization, where women can express their interests and struggle on the basis of those interests. Unhappily, until now this has never been done, the existing political parties refuse to confront the patriarchal oppress women. They have, rather, tried to accommodate to • Does that mean that it is not possible to work with these organizations?
No, one of the objectives of El Fanar is common action with all the womens' organizations in Palestine, in spite of the criticisms we make of them. We have tried to do this from the time of the first demonstration that we organized, on June 24, 1991, against the assassinations of women known as "crimes of honour". A little before the demonstration, appealed to all the womens' political organizations, proposing that they participate. Unhappily, none of them responded, not even to the extent of sending a representative.
They explicitly refused to participate for fear of "moral decay"! We obviously replied that when we went into the street against this criminal phenomenon, it was a moral act! Our organization struggles to
PALESTINE put an end to forced marriages, arranged by the fathers, against the will of their daughters. This also has a moral significance for us.
We have attempted other initiatives, such as a demonstration in Tayibe in the Triangle, to protest against the murder of a woman and the attempted murder of another, but unhappily the response of the womens' organizations and the reasons invoked were the same.
What has been the impact of these demonstrations?
One of the objectives of El Fanar at the first demonstration was to start a debate in Palestinian society on these killings, specifically, and on the status of women, generally. To our great joy, we succeeded in opening a serious and positive polemic. For the first time in the history of the Palestinian press, following the demonstration of June 24, 1991, articles appeared regularly over a two month period in all the newspapers of the territories occupied in 1948 (not those occupied in 1967) - of course, this debate had two sides, those who supported us, and those who attacked
We have succeeded in shaking the general consensus on this taboo of "family honour". Beforehand, there was total silence on the problem, as if it was something natural, which should continue. This time the debate is posed clearly and publicly. • What kind of activities does El Fanar prioritize?
In its programme, El Fanar announces that it will struggle against all laws or customs, against all traditions, against everything that oppresses women. The field of intervention of the group is thus very
The situation of the Palestinian woman is very bad, both within the frontiers of 1948 and those of 1967, particularly following the social repercussions of the intifada (the cause of this is obviously not the intifada). The Palestinian oppressed at the level of work as well as those of education and the family.
Take some examples at the level of the family; I will begin with the question of "family honour". In general, the existence of such a phenomenon in Palestinian society is denied, and yet the facts are there; according to the statistics, 40 women are killed each year for this reason.
But the statistics are not reliable because most of these deaths are recorded as suicides. Research in the Negev has concluded that last year 20 women were murdered. In the Negev alone, I am not even talking about the Galilee, the Triangle or Gaza...
According to our estimates, this phenomenon is surging forward, because of 1. The name given to the group of villages to the west of the "green line", to the south of Wadi and to the 21 north of Petah Tikvah.
International Viewpoint #215 • October 28, 1991
PALESTINE the degradation of the economic and political situation in Palestine. • Can you give another example?
Forced marriage or the constraint of marriage on women or young girls against their desire is another common example. There also we do not have accurate figures on the percentage of forced marriages. According to our estimates, this percentage is high and affects educated women, indeed students, as much as those who cannot read or write.
The social pressure which is exerted on these young girls is such that they feel totally alone in a terrifying universe. In Palestinian society there is no link, no centre where women can find refuge. So many of them approach El Fanar, but we do not have the material means to create this centre where we could help women, support them psychologically, and so on.
The marriage process is linked to another phenomenon, that of the abandonment of studies by girls, whereas there are laws on this subject inside the 1948 frontiers. According to the law, education is obligatory, fathers are supposed to send their sons and daughters to school. This law is not respected in the case of girls; they are obliged to end their studies at adolescence. • How do you explain the nonapplication of the law?
In this area, we believe there is collusion between the authorities and the patriarchal habits and customs of our society. The law should be applied.
The authorities close their eyes to the fact that families withdraw their girls from school; they wish to maintain them in an inferior status, this facilitates their domination of the society inside the 1948 frontiers.
The Palestinians of the occupied territories are not considered as citizens, whereas the Palestinians of the 1948 territories 2 are Israeli citizens and the law applies to • them - the same laws are supposed to be applied to them as to the Jewish society. • And the women workers?
In the absence of all precise data concerning the employment of women, I restrict myself to citing the feminized sectors of Palestinian society - teaching and health, which are traditionally considered as womens' work.
The woman worker suffers, in our view, a triple oppression: a national oppression, a class oppression, and a socio-patriarchal oppression. Work is a necessity for women, but, whether they are married or single, they have to give their wages to the
I know of many cases of women who work outside, and work in the house; they do the housework, the cooking, look after their husbands and children, and they increase the wages of the husband by add-
This oppression is double. In itself, work does not liberate women. In our opinion, even if women have found work and won economic autonomy, this is not enough; what is needed is an organization or a framework where they can organize themselves and raise their level of consciousness. • What are your projects currently?
Currently our action is situated at two levels; to win women, and then develop a periphery of women of which we will be the centre. It is very important. We will try to build sections in other Palestinian towns and villages.
Our project is also to initiate studies on all subjects, to deepen our knowledge of the life of married or divorced women in Palestinian society. • What difficulties do you come up
The biggest difficulty resides in the fact that El Fanar is a "new idea" inside Palestinian society, an idea which characterized as revolutionary; El Fanar constitutes a threat to current dominant and backward ideas, and menaces the existing political organizations frameworks. Following our demonstration on June 24, we received numerous threats, that we would be killed in the same manner as the young girls already assassinated, to "preserve honour"!
Some movements, like the fundamentalists, spread rumours to slander us. They attack El Fanar under the pretext that it stands for "moral depravity" and sexual
A Palestinian newspaper published within the 1948 territories wrote false and misleading articles claiming that we were not autonomous, that we were exactly like the other womens' organizations. We reject this kind of allegation: our organization is feminist and autonomous in relation to any party or political programme; on the contrary, our only concern is to raise the level of consciousness of Palestinian women.
We wish to have more members, but we have no illusions, it is not going to be easy. Very many women who have expressed the wish to contact us have done so in secret. We are aware of these difficulties and we know that today our organization cannot mobilize on a mass basis, but the fact is that very many women join us on a clandestine basis, in spite of everything.
The political organizations are not very keen on us — they apply pressure using the carrot and the stick. One day, their members seem friendly with us; the next, they use means of indirect pressure. Only the fundamentalist movement attacks us directly. • You said that women were oppressed at three levels. What part do you play in the national struggle?
We make the link between the national and social struggles. In this respect, we suffer pressures from all sides, first from the political organizations, who respect tradition in their frameworks, and on the other hand from the Israeli authorities, when we take part in the national struggle.
By social struggle, I understand feminist struggle. At the level of our activities, there is an equilibrium, from the point of view of the importance accorded to these two types of struggle. For example, we struggle against the crimes of honour which affect women, and we struggle at the same time against the expropriations and against all form of oppression in Palestine.
For example, on August 7, 1991, the day of international solidarity with the families of the village of Ramleh, in the west of Galilee, where lands have been seized, following an expropriation, it was our duty to take a position; so we distributed a leaflet, criticizing the policy of the leaderships. • What conception of internal democracy do you have in El Fanar?
From the organizational point of view, we think that El Fanar is democratic, but also from the point of view of the type of struggle that we lead. Our fight is a democratic one; it is a fight for equality. The feminist struggle is in our opinion, a democratic and national struggle.
All these decisions are taken by majority vote. We have weekly assemblies in which all the members participate. Each week, there are around 20 women present. All the decisions have first been debated in the presence of everybody and by everybody. Moreover, there are more specialized commissions, like the finance commission, and so on.
But democracy is one of the foundations of our organization. There is no contradiction between democracy and feminism. If there was, our organization would not be feminist! *
Nibbling away at the right to choose
USA
I AM
THE
GUARDIAN
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The struggle for a womans right to choose to have an abortion suffered a setback when the US senate contirmed
Judge Clarence Thomas, a Black conservative, in his appointment to the Supreme Court by a silm 52-48 majority.