Tito's total defence system
S
EVERAL historical factors have to be taken into account in order to understand the role of the military in Yugoslavia. The first union of the South Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) was founded soon after the
First World War. The main, if not the sole, motivation for the union was to ensure military security both to the north and the
"old" Yugoslav army disapsouth. The peared at the start of the Second World
War — it put up no resistance against the
Italian and Nazi occupiers. Some remnants of this army formed or joined extreme nationalist units — the Ustasha in
Croatia, the Chetniks in Serbia and the
Bela Garda [White Guard] in Slovenia.
Others joined the partisans and some went into exile.
After the Second World War, the second
Yugoslavia was formed. Apart from security there was now another motivation to bring the South Slavs together: the ideological unity stemming from the socialist revolution and the victory of the Communists. The ideology of the army and that of the Communists were one, and formed, with the political system, a sort of Holy
Trinity. All politicians were Communists, many had high positions within the army, while the military had its people in the representative bodies and in all decision- making forums at all levels.
Revolutionaries, Communists, Soldiers
— they were all one. A cult of the army of the brotherhood of the South Slav nations was fostered; a positive image of the army that had won the war was disseminated in the schools. The ruling elite had to uphold an ideological and military unity that degenerated into a highly militarized, totalitarian and centralist system. The name given to the army - the Yugoslav People's Army — was an illustration of this blend.
The break with Stalin in 1948 led to the creation of a total defence system and to the birth of "self-management socialism". This was meant both as a means of defence against a possible attack by the Soviet Union and as a way of showing that Yugoslav policy was different from Soviet- style socialism.
The doctrine of the total defence system was aimed at external enemies and relied on the notion of defence based on the unity and cooperation of the population. All internal political enemies had been removed from public life very early on. In order to efficiently structure the three-tiered defence system (standing army, territorial defence and civil defence) it was necessary that a limited degree of sovereignty for the republics be created and respected.
The Federal army was based on compulsory military service for all males over 18 and, in the case of mobilization, on reservists. The territorial defence system was under the control of the authorities in the individual republics and was formed of reservists who had done their military service and had been conscripted into the territorial troops, which meant that they must show up for occasional mobilizations, additional training and so on.
The civil self-defence was a big network of civilian organizations, structures inside regions, enterprises and so on and was under the command of the army. The Communist Party's monopoly in all spheres and levels meant that the party became the forum where the three layers of the defence system were coordinated, creating what looked like a centralized the most brutal form by the fact that a huge number of people died, not at the hands of the Nazi regime, but in clashes of a civil war character. In order to demonstrate the "revolutionary" role of the Communists, all other armed groups involved in the Second World War were designated as "collaborators". Many of these "collaborators" were executed, many emigrated The totalitarian regime never permitted any discussion of this trauma, although it continued to be talked about in exile and in private. Problems were never brought into the open, but bubbled under the surface, awaiting the moment when the lid would be lifted. Our generation was unaware — was not permitted to be aware — of the gravity of these questions. Now really we stand open-mouthed in shock at the accumulation of hatred under the cloak of the "brotherhood of nations". As soon as a semblance of democracy arrived, the frustrations exploded. *
Slovenia confronts the army
T HE Holy Trinity of the military-
ideological-political system was first challenged by the democratic and social movement in Slovenia in the early 1980s. The main demands raised were: political pluralism, the demilitarization of political and social life and so on — in other words, the destruction of the Holy Trinity.
The military were aware that such a destruction also automatically implied the destruction of Yugoslavia. For this reason they reacted strongly, calling our activity counter-revolutionary, anti-state and antiYugoslav. However at that time we were not so aware of the implications of our actions, and did not understand that to democratize Yugoslavia was to destroy it. We did not see that Yugoslavia was held together by the military and its ideology.
The consequent work towards demilitarization, human rights and pluralism of social life in Slovenia led to an increasing number of conflicts with the military and the (Communist) Federal authorities. The kernel of activists working in this sphere were subjected to an increasing number of threats and criticisms, which finally culminated in a plan by the Federal army to break the movement. Flowever, heplans fell into the hands of 17
YUGOSLAVIA activists close to the peace movement and first sacrifice for "Slovenian indepenthe information was made public. This dence". Unilateral moves by the Sloconvinced the hardliners to act quickly vene government made the military and three activists were arrested in May hierarchy nervous and led to the worst 1988. The military court infringed all possible outcome. The Slovene basic principles and human rights, includ- authorities, it now seems, were fully ing the stipulation in the constitution that informed of these plans and had made trials should be conducted in Slovene. contingency plans before June 26,
This led Slovenes to the unambiguous when they took decisive steps towards conclusion that the Yugoslav army no independence. longer belonged to them. This was one of Slovenia set the destruction of the beginnings of the end of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia in motion when it stopped and the army became Slovenes' enemy sending recruits and making paynumber 1. This was happening at the same ments into the Federal coffers. During time as the events in Kosovo. There, the the intervention in Slovenia, the FedAlbanians suffered severe repression eral army began to dissolve - losing when they tried to fight for their rights, thousands of men and officers. This and there was a strong feeling of solidarity was a big test for the army and an with their struggle in Slovenia. experience on the basis of which it re-
The 1988 trial of the peace activists Jan- organized itself to meet the new consa, Tasic, Borstner and Zarl united the ditions, in which it is no longer a Slovene opposition. The first initiative for Yugoslav and no longer a people's army. a declaration on democracy and pluralism After learning that it could not succeed was launched by a coordination of social in Slovenia against a united population, movements at the start of 1988. The Com- the Federal army left the republic. The mittee for the Defence of Human Rights decision was made at the start of July started this work in the framework of a 1991, in my opinion, largely because of round table for resistance against the the developing crisis in Croatia, since the regime in Belgrade. After all were set free army did not feel able to control Slovenia, the Round Table was also approached by Croatia and Kosovo at the same time. Slovene officials; in the meantime the The Slovene peace movement arose in a hardliners responsible for the case against climate of growing independent cultural "the four" had been ousted. The peace activity, media and other social movemovement and the idea of education for ments. The aim of the projects and activipeace, demilitarization and the right to ties were directed to raising conscientious objection had broad support consciousness and establishing a paraboth among the Slovene public and politi- digm of non-violence. cians. The fields of activity extended from pre-school and school education to chalRight to conscientious lenges to the military and political hierarchies. The peace movement demanded objection the democratization of life, the demilitari-
One of the first acts of the new Slovene zation of society and political structures government in April 1990 was to recog- and the de-ideologisation of these nize the right to conscientious objection spheres. The movement also sought out and to refuse to send any more recruits contacts with peace, human rights and into the Yugoslav army. Concrete steps solidarity movements in East and West. were then taken to get control of the terri- Its orientation was more cosmopolitan но на тото стороне torial defence structures away from Bel- than national-statist and it had broad popgrade and increase Slovenia's sovereignty ular support. in the military and political fields. Then the struggle for control over military sup- "Slovenia without an army" plies began, which led to a conflict between the Commander of the Slovene The notion that conscientious objection territorial defence forces and the Slovene was a fundamental human right was supauthorities, since the former remained loy- ported at all levels of Slovene social and al to Belgrade. He was soon ousted, but political life in the second half of the before that, in October 1990, the Federal 1980s, while it was strongly rejected in army had occupied the headquarters of the Belgrade. We were able to get military Slovene territorial defence. training removed from the school sylla-
Relations between Slovenia and the bus while the concept of "Slovenia withYugoslav hierarchy deteriorated and by out an army" also had big support at the May 1991 had reached the point of armed start of this year. In February an opinion conflict. The incident in which a civilian poll revealed that more people here suplost his life happened after the Slovene ported a Slovenia without than with an territorial defence had called up its first army. We succeeded in making of the group of recruits to attend a training camp general strategy of a "Slovenia without an in Maribor; the Federal army surrounded army" and de-militarization an active the camp, arousing the opposition of the peace policy both amongst the public and civilian population. at the level of official diplomacy. 18 but the tensions aroused there led to the This conflict was successfully resolved, The idea was taken up by civil society and in the capital Ljubljana more than a International Viewpoint #216 • November 11, 1991
Bu en hundred groups took part in a campaign su with the goal of turning military buildings into cultural centres.
We systematically attempted to convince all the political parm ties that sprang up in 1989/90 to support wa
SI demilitarization and a peace policy. We tin succeeded in getting five parties (including one in the government and two in the
SI opposition) to support the notion of "Slovenia without an army" and an interha parliamentary commission for a peace polen th icy has been set up vi
The question of an alternative security cr policy for Slovenia, including the option de of a "Slovenia without an army" has been ba discussed at the highest level in the state vi bodies concerned with defence, most intensely in the Security Council of the in country's Presidium. In February 1991 a ca declaration was widely distributed and more than 25,000 signatures gathered for a sa
Slovenia without an army. This declaralo tion was signed by, among others, the
SI country's president Kucan, by three other up members of the Slovene presidium, by a ex member of the Federal presidency, Dr.
th
Drovsek, by several members of the Slodi vene government and by a number of perta sonalities well-known in Slovenia.
fa
Now it is becoming ever clearer that the ar pacifist mood in Slovenia was mainly aimed at Yugoslavia. Anti-militarism was ar conceived as a negative attitude to the
Yugoslav army, peace education as an
SE antidote to the patriarchal-militarist culture of the southerners, and conscientious th objection as a protest against the Yugoslav
S army. Now that Slovenes are in a position th to consider the issue of their own army, the anti-militarist thinking has disappeared behind the wall of national euphoria, ethnocentrism, elitism and indifference er to the fate of the poor south. As far as we pr can see today, Slovenia has rapidly lost at the chance to develop in the direction of an unusually peaceful society, despite its gr otherwise successful attempt to display its ex differences with the other Yugoslav of republics. *
Anti-militarism in a time of war N 1988 the Ljubljana peace movement, which was the only movement that had concentrated on pacifism and non-violence, initiated a signature campaign on a peace agreement between citizens of Yugoslavia's different nationalities. This succeeded in mobilizing hundreds of people, but did not manage to create a real network. With these and some people from the former Svarun movement, now known as the Green Action (Zelena akcija) group, we took part in the Helsinki Citizens Assembly. But this association was not able to engage in real activity and did not have substantial popular support.
One of the first broadly-supported movements to address military questions was initiated by the parents of soldiers in Slovenia at the start of 1991. At the same time Slovenia decided to stop sending recruits into the Yugoslav army, but some Slovenes scattered across Yugoslavia still had to do their military service. The parents were especially concerned about those soldiers who were doing their service in areas where it was clear that the crisis was going to escalate. Their central demand was that their sons should come back to Slovenia and do their military service there.
There was no anti-militarist ethic involved in this and the parents emphatically avoided any discussion of pacifism, non-violence and a peace policy. They said that they did not want to discuss ideological questions. After the aggression in Slovenia many similar movements sprang up throughout the country. They expressed themselves in various ways but their main official demand was that soldiers should be allowed to do their military service in their own republics. The fact that the parents avoided anti-militarist arguments meant that their movement could be manipulated by right wing forces and draw them behind nationalist campaigns. The meeting of the mothers in the Serbian parliament during the aggression against Slovenia ended up by demanding that the Serb soldiers be withdrawn from Slovenia to fight for the Serbian cause, so that they should not die in a war in which Serbia had no interest.
A number of initiatives throughout the whole country were started up by women's groups and movements, and such professional groups as doctors and psychiatrists. Various forms of coordination of these groups have been possible. Thus groups in Vojvodina and Belgrade, for example, cooperated to form the Centres of Antiwar Activity. The only initiative that has succeeded in bringing together all the groups throughout Yugoslavia is the Antiwar Campaign in Zagreb.
Its first meeting was in Kumrovec [Tito's birth place] to decide on the basic principles for activity. Among these were the choice of non-violent methods and an emphasis on the peace process and political solutions. The participants were agreed in understanding that the conflicts would be protracted and that it was necessary to undertake correspondingly long-term activities. Even before the meeting there had been actions on an allYugoslav level, such as the first meeting of Yugoslav members of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly in May 1991 in Sarajevo and the meeting "Insurrection for Peace" that took place in the same city in July 1991. However neither of these has been able to call into life concrete follow-up actions. The groups have neither a united political line nor a solid structure. Much time and effort is needed to get the local groups into a condition where they can work consistently.
At the moment peace activities in Yugoslavia have a symbolic value. Many of them appeal to the population not to be drawn into the elite power games. Very many people react positively to this and boycott the call ups and mobilizations. In all the republics people know that the military are fighting against them.
The March events in Belgrade [when Serbian security forces fired on pro-democracy demonstrators], the examples of Kosovo, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia have clearly shown that the military pursues no other aim than its own power interests. Peace activists are often driven out of their own regions by attacks by extremists, since they are considered as people who abstain from the over-riding national struggle. This is specially true in the ethnically mixed regions of Croatia and Bosnia, where many moderately inclined people who have pleaded for dialogue and moderation have had to leave their homes to escape revenge attacks. *
YUGOSLAVIA
Next year,
Sarajevo?