Polish elections reveal scepticism and fragmentation
THE LEGISLATIVE elections of October 27 1991 forcefully confirmed the disillusionment felt by the Polish people with the current political scene. The policy of the "construction of
", followed for two years by the political elites originating from Solidarnosc under the surveillance of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), has been massively rejected. But in the absence of a credible alternative, this negative consensus has not produced a consensus in favour of another policy. In fact, the extreme fragmentation of the voting meant that no formation got the votes of more than 6%
November 25, 1991 • #217 International Viewpoint дательство re-organized.' We thought it necessary to demolish this totalitarian structure and instead form a system of youth organizations, divided by social and political criteria. I was part of this current as a delegate to the Komsomol's 21st Congress. We had alternative proposals for everything — we had our own candidate for charman, we proposed to change the name and regulations... And we lost.
Following that, different youth struc tures were formed within the opposition
- one was the FSY, another The Russian Democratic Association of Youth, identifying with the Democratic Party. That is, one went to the left, the other to the right. The FSY exists in seven cities, but its Leningrad branch is one of the strongest. We have the support of some Komsomol base organizations, numbering some 10,000 people on paper. But of course this is fictitious; in reality there are some 25-30 activists on which we can count. • What kind of activities do you carry out?
To give one example: next week we will give out a leaflet protesting against the draft. Some weeks ago the draft for the Soviet army was announced, even though a month before Gorbachev gave an amnesty to all former soldiers charged with desertion. By doing this he admitted that the state of things in the army is abnormal and inhuman, and that the structures of the army and the military courts are not able to deal with this themselves. However, the draft is still compulsory.
We think it should only be carried through if the laws on desertion are changed; people suffering from inhumane conditions should have the right to opt out and the powers of the military courts should be transferred to the jurisdiction of civilian courts. * 1. The current was named after the city of Surgut where it held its first conference.
capitalism" of registered electors. CYRIL SMUGA
ALL the parties, without exception, have received a lesson in humility". One cannot but agree with this judgement made by the editorialists of the daily Polityka', for only the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN, a nationalist formation), which lays claim to the tradition of Pilsudski? and which could pride itself on a record of 12 years of opposition, increased its number of votes in comparison with the presidential election of November 19903.
The continuing rise in the number of
- 39.37% in the first round of the presidential elections of 1990 and 46.6% during its second round, 56.8% this time — indicates the disillusionment with the political process felt by a growing number of Poles.
The rejection of the neo-liberal policy, known as the "Balcerowicz plan" imposed by the two successive governments of the new regime, is patent. The parties of the two successive prime ministers — Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki - scored a total of only 8.07% of registered votes, and the Democratic Union lost more than 1.5 million votes, in comparison with the score for its candidate in the presidential election of November 1990, despite having been in opposition for
A new feature is the collapse of the electorate of the parties which carried Lech Walesa to the presidency: whereas the latter had scored more than 6.5 million votes in November 1990, the organizations which supported him then together obtained less than 4 million
USSR / POLAND votes this time. Lech Walesa, whose presidential function will be reinforced by these elections, given a parliament deprived both of legitimacy and a majority, would be wise to take account of the attrition of which he is the first victim, after only eleven months as president.
If the Catholic hierarchy refrained from giving precise instructions on how to vote, Catholic Action, and, to a lesser extent, the Centre Alliance, as well as some candidates from Trade Union Solidarnosc, benefited from the widespread support of the priests, a great number of whom did not hesitate to indicate the correct choice to their flocks at Mass on Sunday, October 27. The relative modesty of the scores of these formations, which have used and 1. Polityka, no. 44, November 2, 1991. Polityka is one of the principal Polish daily newspapers. It is close to the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (exCommunist Party). 2. Polish statesman of the inter-war period, originating from the nationalist tradition of the Polish Socialist Party, and the instigator, in May 1926, of a coup d'état which inaugurated a dictatorial regime. 3. Its candidate, Leszek Moczulski, received around 411,516 votes, or 1.49% of registered voters. 4. Trade Union Solidamosc, Centre Alliance, Peasant Movement, Catholic Action and Liberal Democratic Congress. 5. We should note also that the most openly reactionary and anti-Semitic groupings did not succeed in having anybody elected to parliament. 6. "Solidamos 80" originated from a split inside the clandestine movement at the time of the round table negotiations in 1989. It comprises a small fringe of radical workers (of the right, but also of the left in certain areas notably in Warsaw where the organizer for this union in the carmaking enterprise FSO is a member of the Fourth International). "Solidamosc 80" enjoys a significant implantation in the Surinein ese cie i sained is only parliamentary seal 1 1 during these elections
RESULTS OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, OCTOBER 27, 1991
NUMBER % OF REGISTERED VOTERS %OF POSITIVE VOTES
POLAND Registered voters 27 516 166 100 Total votes cast 11 887 949 43,20 Positive votes cast 11 218 602 40,77 "Left" Democratic Left Alliance (SDRP) 1 343 989 4,88 Labour Solidarity (SP) 229 981 0,84 Social Democratic Movement (RDS) 51 606 0,19 "Peasants" PSL (Polish Peasants Party, ex-ZSL) 972 653 3,53 Agrarian Peasant Movement (formerly Rural Solidarnosc) 612 536 2,23 "Liberals" Democratic Union (Mazowiecki) 1 381 010 5,02 Liberal Democratic Congress (Bielecki) 839 151 3,05 Union of Real Politics (ultra-liberal) 252 419 0,92 "Christian Democrats" Christian Democracy 264 759 0,96 Party of Christian Democrats 124 526 0,45 "Right" Trade Union Solidarnosc 566 539 2,05 Centre Alliance 977 140 3,55 Catholic Action (National Christian Union) 979 384 3,56 Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) 841 395 3,06 National Minorities
German Minority 131 258 0,48
Western Polish Union 25 803 0,09 Silesian Autonomy Movement 39 265 0,14
Others
Beer-Lovers Party 366 848 1,33 Party "X" (Tyminski) 52 727 0,19
Others and local lists 1 165 613 4,24
12
International Viewpoint #217 • November 25, 1991
100
11,98
2,05
0,46
8,67
5,46
12,31
7,48
2,25
2,36
1,11
5,05
8,71
8,73
7,50
1,17
0,23
0,35
3,27
0,47
10,39
SEATS
(460)
60
1
48
28
62
37
5
4
27
44
49
46
16
10
Earn to
POLAND manipulation. In 1990, he had already had recourse, with a certain success, to the theme of the "acceleration" of the reforms, launching an attack on the conservative role supposedly played by the state and economic apparatus inherited from the old regime. On the eve of the elections, he once again attempted an
Steal in 10 lessons 1 lesson = 200 om abused the equation "Polish = Catholic", indicates that even the grip of the Church on society has also entered into crisis.
The respective scores obtained by the lists of the Trade Union "Solidarnosc". the Trade Union "Solidarnose 80"°, and of the Union of the Democratic Left (comprising the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland - SDRP, former Communist Party — and the former official OPZZ trade unions), while they should be interpreted with prudence, bear witness to a shift in the relationship of forces inside the working class to the detriment of the trade unions originating from the anti-Communist underground.
The score obtained by the Social Democracy (former CP), which came second in terms of votes and will have a parliamentary group of 60 deputies, tends to mask the fact that the Polish left, all tendencies included, is the big loser of these elections. With less than 6% of the registered voters and hardly 14.5% of those who bothered to vote, it did not succeed in gathering around its candidates the protest vote of all those who do not support the social regression orchestrated by the new regime.
The post-Stalinist left (SDRP) lost nearly 170,000 votes in comparison with the score of its candidate Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz during the presidential election of 1990. The post-Solidarnosc left, with less than 300,000 votes, meanwhile, remains marginal®.
The left organizations centred their campaign on the necessity of preserving a state social policy and on criticism of the neo-liberal extremism of the right. However, they did not break in any significant manner with the idea that politics is the business of specialists, taking place in decision-making centres from which the majority of the population are a priori excluded. The concept of workers' selforganization — a value that was fundamental to Solidarnosc in the years 198081 - was absent from the pre-electoral jousts. The Polish left has thus paid for its submission to the dominant statism and to the conception of democracy as nothing more than parliamentary combat
The traditional division of the Polish political between the old regime and the old opposition — is blurring. Thus, all the groups emerging from the tradition of the anti-bureaucratic opposition together did not succeed in mobilizing a quarter of the reg istered voters, whereas the parties originating from the old regimel! centred their agitation on the disastrous balance sheet!! of the two years of transition towards capitalism - have not succeeded in profiting from the popular
At the same time, the new lines of divide between an anti-capitalist left, bearer of the values of individual liberty and of equality, and a restorationist right, increasingly tempted by authoritarianism and a Catholicism tainted with fundamentalism, are still too unformed affected by the divisions originating from the past to be clearly affirmed as yet.
The electoral results indicate, in their fashion, that the structure of Polish society is collapsing under the blows of the economic and social policy implemented by those who have appropriated the traditions of the anti-bureaucratic combat. But these elections also show that this collapse has not been accompanied - at least in a form which is reflected in the popular consciousness — by the birth of a
They underline extreme weakness of the new political institutions and the absence, even potentially, of an alternative option.
Already it is clear that the new parlia ment lacks legitimacy. Moreover, none of the potential blocs dispose of a majority allowing them to form a government. Although the majority of parliamentarians approve of the pro-capitalist option being implemented, it is hardly likely that the simple pursuit of the neo-liberal policy, so clearly rejected by the people, can contribute to the stabilization of the institutions. The growing social discontent could, in these circumstances, express itself on the streets.
The president can still resort to social operation of this kind; interviewed on television on Wednesday, October 23, he said that a left development is contrary to the soul of the nation" and made it understood that he "knew where the bridgeheads of treason could be found".
The apprentice inquisitors
The members of his inner circle, ministers of state linked to the parties of the right, did not wait for this green light to launch the idea of an accelerated "deCommunization". This amounts to nothing less than an attack on the civil rights of those who, right or wrong, are assimilated by Walesa's cronies with the old regime. All talk with vaguely social connotations is, in the opinion of these apprentice inquisitors, to be blacklisted.
Walesa makes no secret of the fact that he hopes that the new parliament will leave his hands freer: "I am not a dictator, but I ask; how many centres of power do we have in this state? It is necessary that somebody leads. I say it; two forces have made a bloc. On the one hand the majority originating from Solidarnosc, which fears dictatorship and a strong regime - and one can understand [these people]. On the other, the post-Communist forces, which see in the excess of democracy the possibility of hiding the old sins, of new schemes and anarchy.
"To change the laws, some time is required and [these post-Communist forces] are swift moving and know how to profit from mistakes. They have the same slogans — more democracy, no decrees which will protect against excess. But during this time Poland will be sliced up, sold, and carried away in suitcases... "2
Although his popularity is at an all time low, Walesa appears as the last guarantee for the policy demanded by the IMF. And if his design demands the taking of some liberties with regard to democracy and human rights, the IMF will be the last to 7. The OPZZ. (National Agreement of Trade Unions) is the trade union organization originating from the old 8. At Wroclaw, the list of Labour Solidamosc, which included some militants identifying themselves with the Fourth International, obtained 10,299 votes, or around 2,000 less than the minimum necessary to obtain a deputy 9. Labour Solidamosc, Social Democratic Movement, Peasant Movement, Democratic Union, Liberal Democratic Congress, Trade Union Solidarosc, Centre Agreement, Catholic Action and KPN. 10. The Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SDRP, former Polish United Workers Party [PZPR ]) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL, formerly ZSL) gained the support of less than 10% of registered votCIS 13 11. See IV 215. 12. Polityka no. 43, October 26, 1991.
IMF: the global bailiff
International Viewpoint #217 • November 25, 1991