Before the Algerian elections
International Viewpoint #218 • December 9, 1991
ALGERIA • In your opinion, after the state of emergency, does the FIS still have strong popular support?
The FIS has lost a lot of already by this spring it had lost its hegemony among the masses. But, despite this, it has been able to occupy a central place on the political stage because other forces do not amount to an alternative.
The democratic parties have put all their energy into futile polemics in the National Assembly, leaving the field free to the FIS to appear as the consistent, genuine opposition.
However, it is the economic crisis that is at the heart of people's concerns, and about this the FIS has little to say. It has failed to build a trade union and only puts itself at the head of social discontent when movements have already devel-
The FIS continues to loom large on the political scene: it filled a big stadium this autumn to demand the lifting of the state emergency; it has held marches, including one from Tizi to Ouzou on November 23/24, to present itself in a combative and all-conquering light. This may serve to justify its participation in the elections in the eyes of a militant rank-and-file.
Recently, some FIS groups have been sabotaging the activities of other parties - Ben Bella has several times been preEast. It is not clear if this is part of a conscious policy or the work of over• What is the popular feeling about the approaching elections?
People's main concern is the economic crisis. Furthermore, democracy has lost credibility among the people. The state of emergency has made even more clear the derisory character of the supposed alternatives, who debate in the media while being unable to change anything.
The regime, which, besides the government, also involves the army, the president and so on, has appeared as the ringmaster. There is a widespread feeling that the big parties do not want the people to decide, since these parties don't know what they would choose.
The positions of various leaders of the opposition have strengthened this confusion. For example, Ait Ahmed one day goverment, the army and the economic policy; a leader of the
Democratic Movement For Algerian
Renewal, a puppet party of the FLN,
"the unity of all" and the sup pression of democracy to save Algeria...
People believe that the government is behind everything and the party leaderships are minor actors.
At the same time there is this campaign, orchestrated by the government 20 cladisas will be postponed". These that says: "be careful, stay calm; the class militancy, calling social peace with the blackmail of a possible coup d'etat - even if things are never put as openly as this.
There has even been a rumour that the general strike which the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) tried to organize in June 1991 was nothing but a manoeuvre by the regime to block the
This is all working, with a loss of confidence in democracy and the dismantling of all the social organizations born out of the uprising of 1988. These days there is nothing but the parties, and they are not impressive.
The few workers who followed the fundamentalists' call for a general strike in June have been sacked and remain out of work despite a campaign around this question. This has made workers powerless and sowed fear at a time when there is a wave of job cutbacks.
Thus people are not very interested in the election campaign, which is aimed at winning social peace. A high abstention rate is thus to be expected, but not a boycott, since people see no alternative. Furthermore many young people will not vote because they do not have identity
The system of electoral cards is chaotic - this used to be a worthless piece of paper — many people have two, others none at all. Finally, in my view, the turnout among women will be low and their husbands can now no longer vote in their place. However, if the FIS takes part, people will follow the electoral duel with more interest, even if they don't vote. • It seems as if the economic situation has got a lot worse recently. The government has introduced new IMF-type reforms. Have there been reactions among the work-
The crisis began long ago. The previous government of Hamroush already started on a programme of structural reforms of the sort seen elsewhere in the Third World, to get international credits before its electoral campaign. The provisional measures taken then camouflaged the gravity of the reforms entered into.
The IMF obviously wants Algerians to be even poorer, to provide a cheap labour force and improve Algeria's place in the world market. To do this the govemment devalued the dinar (dividing it by five), which hit the population's living standards hard. This devaluation was hidden behind a simple administrative operation - profiting from the fact that the dinar is not convertible.
On a particular date it was announced that the dinar would be reduced in value by 50% and that after two years it would be worth four times less. The effects were hidden behind high taxes above all on goods bought by the middle classes
- such as household appliances, while the most basic products, such as milk or cooking oil, remained at low However, the IMF insisted that the govemment stop subsidizing prices, Hamroush promised this in a letter of
The June elections did not take place and the IMF decided that it could not go on indefinitely financing despite the spectre of fundamentalism. The Ghozali government found itself obliged to honour Hamroush's promises in order to get further credit; indeed, it went further and sold rights to oil exploitation to foreign companies. Thus the IMF is looking to regain everything lost during the colonial revolution and as a result of popular pressures, by pulling down every protectionist barrier.
These measures led to a very confused debate within the political class, organized by Ghozali himself. The idea was to get the population to accept these sense" measures while dis crediting the more populist solutions coming from within the FLN and head ing off militant opposition.
The neo-liberal offensive by the government hit the population hard and a whole series of strikes broke out in the more privileged layers of wage workers — higher education, doctors, airline pilots and so on — demanding wage rises, which often seemed enormous compared to the miserable wages of other
The UGTA was pushed into action by the pressure from its rank-and-file. This led to negotiations between this union government, with less than impressive results.
The minimum wage was to rise from 2,500 to 3,500 dinars by July 1992, which in no way compensates for the massive rises in the prices of the most
Meanwhile neither the IMP nor the French bank Crédit Lyonnais, which is heavily involved in Algeria, gave a cent, waiting for the final vote on the liberalization of prices and perhaps also a clearer view of the political scene. • Has the PST succeeded in presenting lists in these legislative
Unfortunately we were not able to construct a front with other organizations. However, we are putting forward 53 candidates in 16 departments throughout the country. Among those on our lists are the of the railworkers union and other leaders of struggles.
The PST has many women candidates. While we are putting forward only 1% of the total number of candidates, we are putting forward 25% of the women in
Furthermore a group of militants from the Communist Movement of Algeria has just joined the PST.*