W HAT game is the United
States playing in Haiti? On October 29, 1991, applying a recent resolution of the Organization of American States (OAS), George Bush signed a decree for that "the serious events in the Republic of Haiti... constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to national security, the foreign policy and the economy of the United States."
As a consequence of this, Alvin Adams, the US ambassador on the island, called in Haitian business men and warned them that they risked losing their visas for the US and a freeze on their assets if they tried to get round the embargo. On the surface it is hard to imagine a firmer position.
But what has this same ambassador been saying in private? This is the question posed by some fifty popular, professional and human rights organizations, as well as by the Haitian Religious Conference. In a letter sent to Adams in November, they wrote: "we find it hard to understand the conditions that your embassy has sought to impose for a month on the legitimate government. These seem strangely in tune with the proposals currently being put forward by the famous 'crisis committee' of our republic's Senate, which finds itself in a totally illegal situation:
1. The postponement of the return of President Aristide to a distant date (in six months);
2. The resignation of the legitimate prime minister, René Préval, before Aristide's return;
3. The choice of another prime minister as the outcome of a joint decision of Aristide and the presidents of the two chambers during the exile of our constitutional president;
4. The formation of a cabinet of ministers by this new prime minister which will begin working to make possible the return of Aristide;
5. The maintenance of the head of the putschists, General Raoul Cédras, as commander of the army.
... Your position, Mr. Ambassalor, amounts to direct support for the main criminals, authors and accomplices of the putsch for whom you are demanding immunity; this leads us to ask some questions about the deeper origins of the coup. It is clear that all kinds of deals are being cooked up to poison the situation and break the resistance of the people with a view to imposing a solution contrary to its will."
Organizations involved in defence of human rights have written to the OAS, expressing their astonishment that the US ambassador had accompanied the delegation of Haitian parliamentarians which took part in negotiations with Aristide in the Colombian town of Carthagena from November 22 to 24. The meeting was presided over by Ramirez Campo, a former Colombian minister who has been charged with the Haitian dossier by the OAS. No text was signed there. In fact, the parliamentarians rejected any explicit mention of Aristide's return to power. A new prime minister to suit
Bush
Bush signed the embargo decree after Aristide expressed his readiness to choose a new prime minister, in concert with the presidents of the two legislative chambers. The new government will be open to members of the opposition. But it seems that the US now wants to get more. Their idea is that Aristide should not return to Haiti until the army has had time to dismantle popular organizations and terrorize the population. Thus, when Aristide returns, the bourgeoisie and the military will not have to face popular revenge.
It is clear that the OAS supports this approach. According to the Reuters news agency, diplomats are saying that France "fears that Washington and its South American allies may prepare to drop" Aristide and "French diplomatic sources underline that the meeting in Carthagena was organized in such a way as to isolate Aristide. "
HAITI
Writing in Le Monde, Marcel Niedergang claims "the majority of the members of the OAS' mission no longer favour the "immediate' return of Père Aristide and wish to act 'flexibly' and try to reply to the 'accusations of human rights' violations made by the opponents of Aristide's regime".
After the Carthagena meeting, Ramirez Ocampo affirmed: "I believe that the embargo will be lifted as soon as a new government is formed." In the declaration published after Carthagena, Aristide accepts "the urgency of forming a new severan apsi principle of his
He must know that in Haiti the Duvalierist counter-revolution is in full flood, that the people have been taken hostage and that he must make concessions if he wants to resume the struggle alongside it. But he must also know that he will get no promise of his returning soon, since there are plenty of pretexts available for endless postponements.
Forged documents may well be in preparation to show that he violated the constitution, that he stole money and that he is ill and unable to govern.
On their side, the putschists are playing for time and trying to establish a position of strength. They face formidable resistance from the people, who, despite the repression, are refusing to send their children to school.
Although they are the first to suffer from the embargo, they are demanding that it is applied even more rigorously in order to hasten the downfall of the putschists. These latter meanwhile, have just been given a breathing space in the form of 110,000 barrels of oil. Other petrol tankers are awaited.
This should enable the dictatorship to hang on until January 5, 1992, the date on which it claims it will "organize" elec- 27 tions. *
1991 index
(Issues 198 - 219)
Lies, damned lies and military briefings