The crisis of the Socialist regime is amplified by the crisis of the antidemocratic institutions of the Fifth Republic, initiated by De Gaulle in 1958. This involves an extreme concentration of power at the summit of the state by an increasaccelerated sharply over the last few weeks including a wave of social struggles in Autumn 1991 and the development of a political crisis.! The limits of the social mobilization, the deep crisis of the workers movement and above all the desynchronization between social and political crises leave some remaining margin of manoeuvre to the government but this is shrinking. The crisis could deepen in the months to come, in particular after the next regional elections in the Spring. FRANÇOIS OLIVIER
990 marked a "low tide" of working class combativity. It is necessary to go back to the year 1946 to find such low figures for hours lost in strikes. Mitterrand himself boasts of having defused social conflict:
"The government, which is very hardworking, which is always attentive to its job, is settling situations and conflicts one after the other. There is no generalized movement... In 1988, there were 91,000 days lost a month... In 1991, for the same period it is 26,000. In 1976, the number of days lost was four million. In 1991, it was
Constantly, through 1990, 1991, there have been less days lost
But the dirty work of the Socialist leaders has not been enough to eliminate the
Without modifying the main outlines of a situation characterized by the downturn of the workers movement — a declining strike curve above all in the private sector, the dislocation of traditional industrial sectors, the structural weakening of the trade union movement - the struggles of this autumn indicate a social remobilizaquarter of 1991 has seen a demonstration by 200,000 peasants, a strike movement by health personnel which lasted more than a month, a national strike by a whole profession, the social assistants, a bitter strike at the Renault Cléon car factory which was followed by great sympathy in the country, struggles in aeronautics and among air transport personnel, significant mobilizations in the public and nationalized sector around wages, and a relatively successful national the FO and CT trade union federations on October 24. These partial or sectoral strug gles have been massive, unitary and combative. The fundamental issue has been wages. The loss of purchasing power over the last ten years is almost 10%. But beyond this, there is, in certain sectors like health or among the social assistants, a demand for recognition of qualifications or status. These struggles indicate a change in the social climate, even if their results in terms of wage increases have been limited by the relationship of forces and by governmental intransigence. However, the rejection of government policy goes well beyond these movements. The - вот сот discontent is general. Apart from wage demands, workers have been expressing their rejection of the social democratic management of the crisis. Under the guidance of Minister of the Economy and Finances Pierre Bérégovoy the policy of the strong franc, of deflation and of cutting budget deficits has meant unbearable social costs for the mass of unemployed, whose purchasing power is now at a record low. While wage costs are slashed and profits explode, unemployment continues to rise, and now stands at almost three million.
### Rising unemployment
At a time when the world economy is going through a new period of "cooling", tens of thousands of people have been made redundant, in both traditional and high-tech industries. The CGT estimates the number of dismissals since June 1991 at nearly 100,000. This wave of layoffs approaches that of 1982 in size. The argument that high profits yesterday and today would mean investments and jobs tomorrow has been exposed in the eyes of everyone for the fraud it is. The deepening of the neo-liberal policy has created a gulf between the Socialist Party (PS) and the "people of the left" and the Socialist gov• ernment has seen a substantial narrowing of its social base. The vast gap between the programme of May 10, 1981, on which the Socialist Party came to power, and the realities of the Mitterrand decade is the first element in an explanation of the collapse of the Socialist regime.
Both President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Edith Cresson are at all-time lows in the polls, while the PS has lost ingly monarchical president, the withering of a regime that has been in power for more than ten years, and an increasing limitation of the prerogatives of parliament — without forgetting the corruption and affairisme of a number of Socialist and right wing deputies, which add to the crisis of political representation.
In response to this, Mitterrand is now taking a gamble which could allow him to take the political initiative, proposing changes in the constitution to be ratified by a referendum. These changes are: the reduction of the presidential term from seven to five years (other possibilities have been floated, for example, a nonrenewable seven-year term) and the introduction of a substantial measure of proportional voting.
New alliances
The aim of these proposals is to cushion the predictable losses of the Socialists at the next elections and to create better conditions for new alliances with the bourgeois centre and the Greens, all turning on the division of the traditional right in the face of the rise of Le Pen's fascist National Front.
Such is Mitterrand's plan: the fragmentation of parliamentary political representation, the division of the right and a Socialist-centrist coalition with authentic representatives of the right like Raymond Barre. This presupposes a Socialist Party which retains 20-25% of the vote and which is a sufficiently attractive focus for an alliance with the centre. But nothing is less sure. The Socialist Party could experience a collapse without precedent since 1968-69 at the next regional elections. It may no longer be able to constitute the axis of power. The right, with or without the extreme right, will probably win a very large majority. Opinion polls indicate that 22 out of 26 regional councils will be taken by the coalitions of the right or right/far right.
The country could become ungovernable. Mitterrand will then be obliged to bring forward the anticipated elections to contain the political crisis. Whatever happens, the return of the right is predictable, with the fascist party, the National Front, likely to win almost 20% of the vote.
This is the major problem of the French political situation: more than 50 years after the Vichy regime and the collaboration with the Nazis, the upsurge of a mass neofascist party with nearly 20% voting sup1. See International Viewpoin, no. 215, November 28, 1 3
International Viewpoint #220 • January 20, 1992
FRANCE port.
This weighs first and foremost on the traditional right. The declarations by mainstream rightwing politicians such as Jacques Chirac — who spoke of the "smells" of immigrants — or Giscard d'Estaing against "the foreign invasion" mark a profound transformation of the traditional right. Confronted with the problems of immigration from the south and the east, and the difficulties of European construction, the right is increasingly abandoning references linked to the French Revolution or to the Resistance of 1940-45, reverting to the most reactionary themes in its history. But some are ready to go further and prepare for direct or indirect coalitions with the FN. This creates, inevitably, new differentiations in the right, from which Mitterrand hopes to profit.
But inasmuch as the left or the workers movement does not reverse the current political tendency, both the possible outcomes - a Socialist-centrist coalition or return of a right under FN pressure — will feed the political crisis and the continuing progress of the FN.
A fascist party
This is a fascist party. Le Pen's 50 measures against the immigrants, going from the placing of immigrants in camps before their expulsion, to the retrospective cencellation of all naturalizations since 1974, his proposals to destroy national education, his "social" programme which seeks to increase the exploitation of the workers by obliging people to work an average of 49 hours while reducing their wages, his desire to liquidate democratic liberties and the workers organizations — this is a fas-
Some reassure themselves by pointing to the absence of reactionary or counterrevolutionary mass violence, the classic violence of fascists. Even if there are many provocations by FN thugs, there is not, it is true, fascist mass violence. If it is also true that there is no counter-revolutionary violence, this is, unhappily, because the revolution is not exactly around the corner.
All the same, the accession of the fascists to power is not an immediate threat since no fraction of big capital has made such a choice. But there is no room for complacency. Already, these parties are accumulating their forces, and not only in France note the rise of the Flemish nationalists, the Austrian fascists, the Lombard Leagues in Italy, the activity of Nazi groups in Germany, and so on. The danger is real, and sharp turns are possible
In this situation, the crisis of the workers movement is deepening. The Socialist Party is no more than a rudderless boat. Subject to the imperatives of the government's austerity policy and to the dictates of the Fifth Republic, it loses each day a little more of its militant substance.
It is further undermined by its internal • divisions. The debates among its various currents are more than ever operating under the influence of the next presidential elections. The PS is increasingly becoming little more than a collection of "presidential stables" organized around future candidates. As long as Mitterrand is at the summit of the state, the institutions of the Fifth Republic cement the unity of the PS. But what will become of it when Mitterrand abandons the reins of power? Already, the duel between Rocard and Delors (twe of the possible candidates at the next presidential elections) threatens Socialist unity. The next electoral battles could put the explosion of the Socialist Party on the agenda.
### Realignments on left
There is some resistance here and there. The tendencies "Socialisme et République" and "Gauche Socialiste" reject the rightist drift of the current social democratic policy, but they are far from offering a class orientation independent of the leadership. "Socialisme et République" Chevènement, represents a cross-class nationalist reaction (with diverse appeals being made in the direction of the Gaullists) to the European project, while the "Gauche Socialiste" of Dray and Mélanchon lays claim to the tradition of Mitter-
The French Communist Party (PCF) is also sinking deeper into crisis. Having refused to condemn the Moscow putsch of August 23, 1991, this party every day demonstrates that it remains among the most Stalinist. Self-proclamations, on the theme "The PCF is changing, we are no longer Stalinists" are not taken seriously. The decline in the PF's militant activity has reached a critical threshold.
Finally, the crisis of those two fundamental pillars of the PCF — the parliamentary and municipal deputies and the trades unionists — is sharpening. A good third of the deputies are no longer under the control of the leadership. A substantial part of the leadership of the CGT trade union is opposed to strict subordination to the PCF apparatus. This means a considerable weakening of the party, which nonetheless, given the collapse of the PS, believes it can limit the "damage". Buttressed by the hard core of its apparatus, the PCF hopes to cushion its electoral decline by projecting itself as the party which resists the rightward drift of the Socialists and which rejects the Europe of the 12. Social resistance and nationalist proclamations — the campaigns to "produce French" for example - intersect each other in the PC's current approach, which combines references to self-management with manipulatory practices in the unions. Thus, the national leaders of the PCF and the CT recently sold out the strike at Renault Cléon, a strike it could no longer control - an expression of the limits of the "democratic" orientation of the PCF. There is opposition to the PCF's current line from sectors of its leadership, but unhappily these oppositions are evolving towards rightist, indeed ultra rightist, positions. Thus PCF leader, Charles Fiterman is behind the Refondation current, a crossroads for ideas and debates with the militants of the left of the PS: "Refondations" is, for its initiators, a place of reflection for a new reformist current, though many of the militants involved are searching for an alternative to the social-democratic policy.
Philippe Herzog, another member of the PF's Political Bureau, goes much further; he has just launched another associa-
"Confrontation", which brings together PCF trades unionists, some Socialist leaders like former prime minister Rocard, and some bosses, among them representatives of some of the principal enterprises (Péchiney, RhonePoulenc, Crédit Lyonnais).
The situation in the trade union movement reflects this crisis of the workers movement. The trade unions have experienced a structural weakening, losing more than 50% of their members over 10 years. The current struggles do not reflect a strengthening of trade unionism, except in some sectors, like those of small companies. Division and battles between apparatuses dominate the picture.
The centrist drift of a whole layer of the trade union movement influenced by the PS and the Stalinist stranglehold in the CGT is paralyzing the union movement. 3 The national teachers federation is on the verge of a split. This gloomy general situation is of course the product of the global relation of forces between classes, which does not favour the working class and its organizations. Only the combination of a social and political crisis bringing "new the struggle could reverse the course of things. * 2. See International Viewpoint, no. 218, December 9,