Hassan II which robs the economy while repressing the people.
Such a system leads to contradictions even within the ruling classes and, even more, between the middle classes and the system. This means that Hassan II's regime is increasingly isolated and is becoming the director indirect target of the struggles, expressed in particular by the demand for a constitu-
Morocco is today ripe for the overthrow of Hassan II, and an at least partial dislo-
Our organization began to understand this during the autumn of 1990 and more precisely with the demonstrations of Jan-
1. In January 1984, riots broke out in several Moroccan cities, particularly in the north of the country, in reac tion to price rises.
Hassan II accused "Khomeinists"
and lla Al-Amam of having fomented the disturbances.
A wave of arrests followed.
2. The qa'idiyine ("rank-and-file") students: a radical left student current close to Ila Al-Amam.
3. The CDT is the union confederation close to the
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP
- see note
4). Founded in 1978, it is the second largest, after the
UMT (see note 6).
4. The USFP was legally (re)founded in 1975. It came out of the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), a left split off from the Istiglal party in 1959 (see note 7)
led by Mehdi Ben Barka.
5. The makhzen signifies the domain and the royal treasury, exacting a tribute from the population.
• Railway
February 3, 1992 • #221 International Viewpoint uary and February against the
Gulf War where the convergence of forces and the isolation of Hassan II among the
SPAIN
400
MOROCCO raising class demands, and this has had an influence on some political formations. This is par-
Tangier 5 Tétouan people were very clear.
• You have spoken about the political nature of the dominant popular senti-
Atlmlic
=Kenitra
Fes
Casablanca
Meknes
A MADEIRA
Oued Zem ticularly clear in the inter-
Ouda relation of the current workers' pressure and the CDT, and through the latter, on the radical wing of the USFP. This is sharp-
Bouarfad ment in Morocco today, but what are the underlying socio-economic fac-
• Satie:
Marrakech Ar Rachidia
Xean
-Agadir MOROCCO tors?
These developments have, of CANARY I course, an economic basis. Since the end of the 1970s, the
ALGERIA relative advantages given to the middle classes have van- -Boudour Bou Kra ished. During the 1980s the regime's economic weakening became more intense, tied on "Ad Dakhla WESTERN the one hand to the war in the Sahara and on the other to the
AFRICA world crisis, and the increasingly harsh demands of the International Monetary Fund Gwiral (IMF) in favour of unrestrained economic liberalism.
This has led to a deterioration in the conditions both of the working classes and middle classes and has contributed to the regime's isolation. The relations of dependence, particularly with respect to Europe, with the rapid development of subcontracting in textiles and leather-working in the 1970s and 80s, facilitated the racketeering. Moroccan entrepreneurs are less real capitalists than prison guards of cheap and super-exploited labour. These operations are quite illegal, breaking labour legislation and have thus needed police protection. In return the police have wanted a cut in the proceeds. At the same time, entrepreneurs who want to carry out industrial or commercial projects according to the law have met more and more difficulties.
The racket has been growing; since the 1984 insurrections the Interior Ministry's police grip on the life of the country has spread in all fields, including information and culture and the economic system.This has infuriated not only the middle classes but a section of the ruling classes. The "Makhzen mafia" has even annoyed some foreign interests, which find it more and more difficult to operate normally in Morocco. • The trade union movement and workers' movement in general have played a central role in the last big mass movements, notably at the end of 1990 and the start of 1991. However this has not translated Itself at the political level, where demands remain limited to what is acceptable to the middle classes -and in particular to the USFP which can be considered a party representative of this social milieu.
In fact, the working class does not yet
Sid Inia Tartaya Layoun Smara SAHARA
MAURITANIA have the political structure that would enable it to express itself in an independent fashion at tnis level. A big revolutionary political party of the working class does not yet exist, although this is the aspiration of many militants - and not only in our organization - who wish to participate in the construction of such
This is the case with some radical currents, such as that which has split off from the USFP. This current was for a long time known as the "Administrative Commission" before recently forming the Democratic Party of the Socialist Vanguard (PAGSD).
In the union movement, one can see, above all in the CDT, a certain awareness developing among the leaders of the specific problems of the working class. This is reminiscent of what Nicos Poulantzas called "the pertinent effect of the working class on its political leaders" on the radical wing of the USFP, crystallized in the CDT. It should be remembered that the Moroccan working class has shown elements of class consciousness for a
It was very highly unionized in the 1940s, under the aegis of French or Spanish militants, who, whatever their misconsciousness and a tradition of independent class struggle action in the unions. This marked the Moroccan Labour Union (UMT) for a long time after indepenexplains its syndicalist tendencies, which were exploited by its bureaucracy both to draw it out of the grip of the political parties and to maintain their own grip on the
In the mines and big factories in Casablanca, the workers have a tradition of cratic project which has even led it to attempt to conciliate Hassan II. Even if the USFP and the Istiglal party? have recently proclaimed need for a constitutional change, going beyond a mere amendment, it is not clear that this turn is expressed in the outlook of the leaders; indeed one can expect the contrary: Some of them will surely seek a compromise with the King. But the powerful mass pressure and its expression by the CDT, and the discontent of the middle democracy, which is incompatible with Hassan II. The working class, which has made a conscious choice to today limit itself to the democratic field, also has the possibility of going over to a revolutionary struggle in a later phase.
The first phase, which is now underway, must allow us to concentrate our forces to beat Hassan II, even in the framework of the monarchy, to dislocate to some extent the Makhzen Mafia, and win democratic gains. The possibility of going over to a higher state rests on the class consciousness of the Moroccan working class, which is relatively high by Third World standards. Serious rank-and-file work by revolutionaries, in close connection with CDT militants who are not at present revolutionaries and even with certain UMT militants, can allow progress along this revolutionary road. • Morocco is a country of explosive particular with respect to the urban poor as has been seen in recent years. Does not an awareness of this constitute a strong restraining force on the mid-
There is, certainly, a contradiction here. Is this an obstacle in the immediate term? I don't think so. At the moment all forces can come together around the objective of the fall of Hassan II. In the popular mind, Hassan Il is the enemy of the people -this was very clearly expressed in the 6. The UMT is the country's biggest union confederation. The Istiqlal and the Communist Party work inside 7. The Istiqlal ("Independence") party, founded by Alal Bo-Passi in 1944, is the party of the liberal national 19 bourgeoisie.
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ly at odds with the old guard, whose petty bourgeois reformist ideology is marked by opportun- ism and by a bourgeois demo-
International Viewpoint #221 • February 3, 1992
MOROCCO 1984 demonstrations for example.
In a big city with a social history like Casablanca's, there is in fact an objective link up in struggles between the proletarian nuclei of the big factories, and what I call the "proletarian masses" of the popular neighbourhoods. Both live in the same neighbourhoods. organizational effort need to be deployed there, at a higher level than is currently
Going beyond these present objectives to more revolutionary and more radical objectives is closely linked to the development of this link up. This is why we insist, both for immediate and strategic reasons, on the self-organization of the masses in the popular neighbourhoods and the factories, where the workers should organize themselves in rank-and-file committees that can outflank the bureaucratic apparatuses in certain unions and dynamize them. This is what happened with the students in the movement rank-and-file organization of the qa'idiyine. In this way the link up between the proletarian masses and the nuclei can take shape, but on one condition: it is necessary that the revolutionary view, it is well known that in the Arab countries these semi-proletarian masses are leged field of activity for the fundamen-
This is because revolutionary forces have not been able to present a coherent perspective, remaining restricted, particularly in the case of the
Arab Communist parties, to a traditional
"economist" approach. I believe that, on the contrary, we in Ila Al-Amam have been able to formulate an overall revolutionary perspective integrating the aspirations of these masses. Our militants and sympathizers in the popular neighbourhoods closely combine the objectives of the democratic struggle for immediate demands with the strategic demands of a revolutionary platform.
• Thus, according to you, the main why the fundamentalist movement is relatively weak in
Morocco compared to other countries in the region, despite the extent of the social and economic crisis, is the role played by the
Moroccan revolutionary movement.
This is, in any case, true for the cities like Casablanca. I am not of course, saying that the fundamentalist movement does not exist, but it does not have the strength that it has in other big cities in the Arab world. This is doubtless less true in the other cities in Morocco where the proletarian movement is less significant than in Casablanca or the main mining regions. Things are much less clear in the mainly petty bourgeois towns where the fundamentalist movement is stronger. But 20 of the Moroccan revolution, this is a since Casablanca is the main stronghold obstacle to the fundamentalist
Another important factor blocking the path of the fundamentalist movement is that presented by the problem of the identity of the marginalized regions, in the form of the Berber question, the questions of the Rif, of the Souss and others, with the new emphasis given to the Berber and regional identities. In the north, for example, the main site of the 1984 insurrections, one meets, both in the Arab and Berber speaking regions (Riaffa), very significant problems of regional specificity. These regions, along with the Souss, are the main centres of
We are the only people with a clear platform on these questions in the framework of a revolutionary alternative. This allows us to respond rapidly and oppose a coherent and tangible alternative to the mythical alternative of fundamentalism. This is one of the reasons for our influence among the students of a university such as Fez, who come from these regions. And it should not be forgotten that the Berber question concerns 60% of the area of our country, while in Algeria it is only 15 to 20%.
We are only at the start of this activity; it was only in the last decade that we inte grated the Berber problem into our thinking. Our clear positions on this question are three or four years old, but they are
Potentially, it is quite possible to combat fundamentalism, on the condition that the link up is made between the proletarian pole in Casablanca and the peripheral regions. Even the predominantly petty bourgeois towns, where fundamentalism finds more fertile terrain, could beyond their present limits in the context of a global revolutionary movement. This has been clearly seen, for example, in Marrakesh, a city linked to the surrounding Berber areas, during the big demonstrations of January 1984.
The classic reformist democratic forces have a strong grip on the middle classes and the convergence of these forces with our own activity creates a big movement the direction of democracy which shows the masses that a certain number of conquests are possible without falling under the fundamentalist spell, and it may be this that explains the fact that fundamentalism has not gained as much here as elsewhere. • Can the question of regional identity neutralize the traditional role of the peasantry as the base of the monarchy, or even create antagonism between this peasantry and the regime? Are there other factors working in this direction?
We ourselves for a long time made no progress on the peasant question — we had an "economistic" approach in the 1970s, centred exclusively on the concentrations of agricultural workers in the irrigated regions where the big properties are found. A more precise analysis in the 1980s showed first of all that the ruling classes are determined at all costs to avoid the formation of a permanent agricultural proletariat, even if this means losses in terms of productivity — in this they show a very lucid class conscious-
The peasant problem, in the regions traditionally dominated for centuries by the makhzen, are very complex and one cannot talk of struggles taking place in these involve the cities and - more or less spontaneously since the January 1984 insurrections — the peripheral regions, particularly the north. towards spreading struggles, but the process is only at the beginning.
I have noticed that in Europe, in regions where there is much immigration from the north of Morocco, such as Belgium and Holland, there is a very marked development of awareness: the problems of the Rif arouse great interest. In the course of the meetings I have done there, the rare fundamentalist militants I have encountered had simply nothing to say about these questions.
However, I don't want to belittle the difficulties. A significant proportion of the rural areas remain in the grip of the monarchy's systems of domination, of the "Moroccan fellah, defender of the throne", through the intermediary of notables, above all in the rural regions of the
There is thus much work to do, but I think that insofar as a revolutionary movement can be developed starting from the proletarian centres such as Casablanca and the peripheral regions, an overall dynamic can be created.
• You have mentioned how the fact that the Sahara is now of secondary
Importance has created space for certain forms of struggle against the regime to develop. This has its obverse: until recently the Saharan war has primarily worked in favour of the regime and the hopes of revolutionaries that it might be the catalyst for a radicalization against the monarchy have not been realized.
It is undeniable that the war in the
Sahara has given Hassan II 15 years grace, from 1974 to 1989. The dominant tendency in the past four years has been for this problem to be overshadowed by concrete struggles by the people and the democratic and progressive forces, but the problem has not for all that been
At present the decisive question for the regime is the referendum on the Sahara
- the government is stepping up its efforts to sabotage this referendum and it is clear that some opposition leaders are supporting it in this. The Sahara war con-
February 3, 1992 • #221 International Viewpoint tinues to act as an obstacle to popular mobilizations and their radicalization.
I also wonder how far a certain reserve recently seen regarding coming the together of the opposition abroad is related to this. Very recently, a conference took place in the south of Holland - near to Maastricht - of much of the Moroccan opposition. However there were certain regrettable absences. Some failed to come owing to previous frictions between groups, but I also wonder if some absences, notably from France, were due to the referendum.
• The fact that the regime has been able to use the
Saharan question for 15 years suggests that for the
Moroccan masses the question of Morocco's historic claim to that territory remains live. Should this not make us stop and think?
Is it simply chauvinism and ideological mystification which makes people see the problem in this way or are there more substantial factors at work, among them aspects of the behaviour of Polisario [the Saharan liberation organization] or its links with the Algerian regime?
Two levels of this problem need to be distinguished. Of course, there is the dominant presentation of Moroccan history, made up of the glory of empires, which has been absorbed by the Moroccan people. The map published in 1956 at the time of independence by the founder of the Istiqlal,
Morocco extending as far south as Senegal. This map was put up by all the shopkeepers in the towns. At the same time, the Green March organized by Hassan II in 19758 was also a march towards a new this goes together with the dominant version of Moroccan history based on theMakhzen ideology in fashion from Idriss I to Hassan II. The Moroccan national movement, and specifically, the Istiqlal party, have breathed new life into the does not in fact exist in the deep tradi- myth of a unifying monarchy, which tions of the Moroccan people. Today, feelings in popular circles are more confused. People have had enough of this war which is costing
MOROCCO students not only because we have been in radical opposition to the regime but also because we have been very firm on the Saharan question and on the right to self-determination for the Saharan people.
There has been some sympathy for
Polisario's struggle against the Moroccan regime, but also the idea that it calls into question the legitimacy of the monarchy.
The idea of the "Moroccanness of the
Sahara" is much more rooted in the middle classes than in the popular masses.
But it is questioned in the Berber speaking or marginalized regions or by militants who reject the monarchy, even if they do not make the causal link between this institution and the Saharan question.
Fears over the Algerian role have dominated and continue to dominate in parts of the Moroccan movement - and it is clear that questions need to be asked about this. For Ila Al-Amam, support for the right to self- determination for the Saharan people was above all a question of principle, without illusions about the
Algerian regime - I don't mean to say that it should be put in the same bag as that in Morocco, but we were aware of its limitations.
We give full support to the struggle of the
Polisario
Front out of principle, but that does not mean that we consider it to be the vanguard of the revolutionary movement in the Arab west
(Morocco, Western Sahara,
Mauretania) as I myself wrote in 1972. Things are clearer now. The fact is that the Polisario Front is the crystallization of the struggle of the Saharan people, in the same way as the PLO is for too much, even in terms of lives in some the Palestinians. As a consequence, we Eldorado for the Moroccan masses who believed that the region's phosphate and other riches would solve all our internal problems.
By the end of the 1970s disenchantment had set in over the economic prospects. Despite the hopes, in fact things had got worse. From the start of the 1980s - and this is one of the underlying reasons for the popular explosions of 1981 and 1984 - the question of the Sahara no longer played its old restraining role, even if many retained their former positions on the legitimacy of the demands of the Polisario Front.
On the other hand, in the middle classes the question of the Sahara has remained a stumbling block for ideological reasons connected to the entire history of the Moroccan national movement under the grip of the bourgeoisie since 1930, and peasant regions of the country. During the 1980, examples of war weariness and a certain admiration for Polisario, which dared to confront Hassan II, could be seen. The big demonstration in Marrakesh in January 1984 obviously raised basic demands, but the leaflets put out for it also saluted Polisario's struggle, without this hindering the mobilization.
On the other hand, in the Berber regions, where the consciousness of a specific identity is sharper and where the makhzen myth of a linear history of the country is rejected, there is a certain fellow feeling with the Saharan struggle because it challenges this myth. This is evident in the Rif and among immigrants from that region in Holland or Belgium.
Our ideas, which are at odds with the dominant ideology have been able to have such an influence on the qa'idiyine support it, and I personally support the struggle for the right to self-determination wholly and without reserve.
In my opinion, the perspectives for a positive development for the whole of the region do not rest only in what is positive in the struggle for the liberation of the Saharan people and of the Polisario Front, but also in the possibility of seeing Morocco advance down the road of democracy and of a radical revolution, thus becoming capable of giving political aid to the positive forces of the Saharan people and Polisario in overcoming the negative risks. * 8. The Green March was a huge march organized in 1975 by the regime from the south of Morocco to the former Spanish Sahara (Western Sahara) to mark the man of headmit power its wifer we announce. 21 ment by the colonial power of its withdrawal.
International Viewpoint #221 • February 3, 1992 independence versus the state