International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

El Salvador: What Does the Recent Agreement between the Salvadoran Government and the FMLN Rebels Mean?

· International Viewpoint No. 222, 17 February 1992 · pp 11-12 · 2,110 words

Armed forces and soldiers Latin America

THE final signing of the peace accords between the Farabundo Marti National

Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Salvadoran government' on January 16, 1992 in Mexico are first of all a victory for the Salvadoran people and its vanguard over the warmongering forces who have been opposing peace since the start

However, if the sectors of the army that have enriched themselves from this war against the people have had to give way, they are by no

M. VELAZQUEZ and P. PACHECO

T HE FMLN has shown itself able

to respond to the desire of the population for peace. They have done this from a position of strength, having created a powerful guerilla army, but also by becoming the political representative of significant sectors of Salvadoran society.

In recent years, the FMLN has attempted to find a negotiated end to the conflict and isolate the most intransigent sectors of the army. The fact that the far right ARENA (Nationalist Republican Alliance) government was forced to the negotiating table to sign a peace accord amounts to an indisputable gain for the Salvadoran revolutionaries.

However, the most intense phase of the negotiations, in 1991, was marked by a series of external factors which had a determinant effect on the two sides — and on US imperialism - and created a situation in which a peace agreement was possible.

The change in the international situation after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the so-called socialist coun tries, the election defeat of the left wing Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the US invasion of Panama, the change in the relationship of forces consequent on the Gulf War, the falling apart of the Soviet Union and the offensive against the Cuban revolution, as well as the recession in the US present a complex panorama for revolutionaries everywhere, the FMLN being no exception.

In this context it is necessary to underline the FMLN's ability to avoid the definitive defeat of the revolution wished for by ARENA and imperialism.

While the agreement reached does not meet all the original objectives of the revolution, it nonetheless opens the discussion on such central themes as demilitarization, respect for human rights, freedom of expression and political participation. The revolution now finds itself in a new phase where the socioeconomic demands of the masses will be at centre stage. The civil war and the armed revolt of the revolutionaries have not been in vain.

Above all, the underlying cause of this war should not be belittled: the dictatorship, the electoral frauds, the massacres of the population, the systematic torture, the misery and colonialism where 14 families control the entire political and economic life of the country.

As FMLN leader Shafik Handal stated at the time of the agreement: "For a very long time, and repeatedly, Salvadorans have tried to change this situation by peaceful means, including electoral means; but all doors have been closed. We had to rise up and take up arms to open them, and we do not regret this. In Salvadoran conditions the revolutionary armed struggle was necessary and legitimate."

### Armed revolution: an anachronism?

Obviously the Mexican government and other "friendly" governments, as well as imperialism, want to use the agreement to argue that revolution is impossible and that the taking of power and social transformation by means of arms are "anachronistic", in exchange they propose working partnership, nego-

EL SALVADOR of the negotiations. means crushed. tiation, civilian life and conciliation.

The future in El Salvador will not evolve in a straightforward fashion and the agreement should not lead to euphoria. Some complex problems have already appeared. Despite the limited amnesty approved by the legislative assembly, some sectors of the right are demanding "pardon and forgetting" to expunge their crimes, such as the murder of the six Jesuits in 19892, that of Archbishop Romero, those committed by the death squads or the army massacres of the population.

The difficulties confronting the carrying through of a serious land reform are made worse by the fact that the sharing out of land in the conflict zones depends on the will of the big owners to sell "their" lands at market prices. They will assuredly not want to be separated from their property. Furthermore, the legal maximum for properties has been set at 245 hectares.

In addition, there are a host of question marks over the army cutbacks. The Salvadoran goverment has done no more than make a bilateral pledge to the United Nations on this point; the detailed plan of army reductions is not as such a part of the agreement. In the latter one finds an imprecise formulation according to which the size of the armed forces in peace time will be in line with their constitutionally defined function.

While there has been talk of a 50% reduction in the size of this force, it has 1. See International Viewpoint no. 218, December 9, 1991, for details of the agreements. 2. During the FMLN offensive of November 1989 six Jesuits from the Central American University were brutally murdered by the army. In December high 11 ranking officers were sentenced for this crime.

International Viewpoint #222 • February 17, 1992

EL SALVADOR also become publicly known that the government has presented the inflated figure of 63,000 soldiers and has been leading a campaign of forced recruitment. President Cristiani is thus trying to keep most of his army - estimated by the FML and others at 35,000 men

Finally, it is clear that this peace hangs by a thread. The underlying social probunsolved and some have got worse. It will not be easy, above all in the current neo-liberal framework, to move towards a solution. Even if Cristiani has stepped back from his initial attitude and has finally agreed to discuss his economic plan he has little room for manoeuvre to make significant changes in his privatization and job reduction programmes, furthermore in fashion throughout Latin America.

Salvadoran and foreign capital has reaped rich rewards from the war and are getting ready to do the same with the was good business, and so will reconstruction be.

Political and social civil war

If "war is the continuation of politics by other means" the civil war that has been gripping Salvador will, if peace is consolidated, be displaced onto the politbuilt up a great organizational capital and influence on the mass movements; its first show of force and its mobilizing capacity was massively illustrated on January 16 in the very centre of the capital and elsewhere in the country after the signing of the agreement. This will happen again when the FMLN commanders

The FMLN's social support is the main means of pressure to ensure that the peace agreement is applied and to advance towards revolutionary objectives. As Chano Guevara, guerilla chief in the Guazapan zone declared: "We will have peace in this country when the Salvadoran people have food, clothing, shoes, and enough medicines, sanitary assistance, education and freedom expression. These are the real questions for which we have struggled throughout this long war."

The government is certainly going to try by all means to "win the hearts and minds" of the Salvadoran masses. It will benefit in this from the advantage conferred by a monopoly of state power, eventual credits for reconstruction from diverse countries and also the advice of countries like Mexico on such things as the application of so-called "solidarity programmes" aimed at undermining the FMLN's social base.

The right will obviously be seeking to distort and hold back the application of 12 likes, and the those parts of the agreement it diswhich it has only accepted under the pressure of the military stalemate, the domestic economic situation and imperialist pressure for a negotiated settlement. The orientation towards the US is motivated not only by the recession in Salvador but also and above all with the desire of moving forward the Latin American integration project.

Imperialism's pressures on the Salvadoran right are not disinterested; the US government knows that a negotiated end to the war will work in its favour since the international relation of forces is in favour of capital. In this sense neither the US nor the Salvadoran right have renounced their plans to crush the rebellion; now, however, they are trying to defeat it on the social and political level, believing this to be easier than inflicting a military defeat on the FMLN.

The logic of the negotiated settlement is towards a search for national consensus at all levels and a desire to present even the most extreme contradictions as manageable through elections and collaboration. However, even if it is possible to succeed in organizing free elections in Salvador, these will in no way lessen the intensity of the social struggle.

consolidation, deepening extension of people's power are now essential factors in this new phase of the Salvadoran revolution. Just as the FMLN has learned how to successfully combine different types of war, today it must try together the institutional and legal struggle with the struggle for the maintenance and development of self-management of the popular movement; it must keep the political initiative without allowing the mass movement to be subordinated to the hazards of the collaboration underway. This means walking on a

A complex panorama

Furthermore, the panorama is rendered even more complex by remarks such as those made recently by FMLN leader Joaquin Villalobos: "Before, the concept of revolution had a date and a symbol. The assault on power, the taking of the palace and the immediate and mechanical solution of all problems. This led to dictatorships that denied liberty under the pretext of resolving economic problems.

"The basic problem of a revolution is the political problem, the way in which the regime's equilibrium is constructed and in which the permanent rules for governing are set up in society and, starting from that, the definition of the spaces available for [carrying out] the economic and social changes that make up the other part of the revolution... we [the FMLN] will form the point of departure for a new revolutionary era." Later on, he affirms that Salvador has seen: "the first revolution without contras [counter-revolutionaries], the first which has not divided but brought together and the first which can count on the agreement of the US and even on its support."

Villalobos goes on to affirm: " We have obtained the changes in pursuit of which the FMLN had been driven to take up arms. We are taking part in a revolution which is fundamentally expressed by the elimination of all the elements of the dictatorial regime. The dissolution of the National Guard, the reduction in the size of the army and its subordination to the civil power are all features of an extremely significant democratic change. have not made concessions. Perhaps we have made them at the level of ideas, but concessions about ideas, in the reality of the present-day world and a pragmatic point of view are not of dramatic impor-

Such declarations are important, since, without under-estimating the difficulties presented by the new world situation for revolutionaries throughout the world, and for the FMLN in particular, we can still question whether the international changes demand a "revolution of a new type" as is proposed by the Salvadoran leaders.

Is it a matter of a change needed to survive in present circumstances or is what is being implied implied a lasting and comprehensive strategic and theoretical redefinition, according to which classical revolutionary methods (not only socialist) are no longer valid for social transfor-

Revolutionary leaders draw hasty conclusions

The Salvadoran leaders seem to be drawing hasty conclusions, proposing a new model of revolution "from below" (as if all the others were "from above" like mere coups d'etat). However, if the fortress has not been taken by storm it remains intact and the enemies are the same, however hard it is for some to

The Salvadoran revolution, although it has not triumphed, has not been crushed either. The downward revision of its objectives must be understood as the product of a substantial, but not definitive, change at the international level. The Salvadoran revolution is a revolution under siege by the new world order currently being formed. This does not offer much encouragement in the short term, but ideas should not be abandoned.

Solidarity with this revolution must continue. We must be ready to continue solidarity and fraternal debate with our comrades in the FMLN and the Salvadoran people. They will without doubt be the target of attacks from the right on all fronts, both with traditional arms and with others just as dangerous for the revolution. * 2. El Nacional, January 28-29, 1991.

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