Attacks on Lebanon: More than an electoral ploy
NO Israell government coula, in normal times, accept without reaction the insult represented by the successful attack on an Israeli army camp mounted by a Palestinian commando unit on February 14, 1992, especially in the run up to an election. MICHEL WARSHAWSKY February 28
B EHIND the blusterings about
the "unjustifiable murder of three soldiers" the spokespersons for the Israeli ruling class had been hard put to hide their humiliation: three or four Palestinians succeeded in entering an army camp where, using knives, they killed three and injured several more soldiers, some of them armed. They then withdrew without losses, taking their victims' arms with them. This operation has once again highlighted the operational and psychological problems besetting the Israeli army today, but also the progress made by the Palestinian commandos both from a professional point of view and in terms of fighting
The immediate reaction - the assassination of the Lebanese Hezbollah leader Sheikh Mussawi and his family in an Israeli air attack - surprised nobody, even if it is not certain that the Israeli government had weighed up beforehand all its consequences. History will remember that in February 1992 a group of courageous, poorly armed civilians attacked an army camp, and one of the world's best equipped air forces took revenge by killing a political leader, his wife and five response from Hezbollah supporters. For four days they bombarded Galilee, claiming one victim, causing considerable destruction and paralyzing the north of Israel. Once again the Israeli army invaded destruction... to protect Galilee of course.
As usual it has been the civilian population and not the Hezbollah commandos who have been the victims of the Israeli army attacks. From the military point of view, furthermore, the value of the invasion is unclear. Thus one must ask whether it was not simply an electoral operation, to save face and show that Tsahal (the Israeli army) is still able to hit back. However, such an interpretation fails to take into account the current Israeli-Arab negotiations and the objectives of the Israeli government under Yitzhak Shamir in these negotiations.
As we have explained several times, Shamir has found himself trapped by his own plan, and has found himself at the negotiating table despite himself. For more than six months he has been trying to find pretexts for sabotaging the negotiating process, hoping to do so in a way that will make it look as if the Arabs are to
One of the objectives of the renewed invasion of Lebanon was — as with the decision to deport 12 Palestinian activists or to colonize the Silwan quarter in the middle of Arab Jerusalem — to try and provoke the Syrians (two months ago it was the Palestinians) to slam the door and refuse to continue negotiating with a government which is making a mockery out of both them and international legality.
The Israeli extreme right had left the government in order to try and outbid Shamir in the intransigence stakes. means that Shamir has to try and prove that, far from being trapped, his plan has allowed him to throw the blame for the failure of the negotiations onto the Arabs while making no concessions himself.
Shamir's problem is that he is faced with Arab regimes - and under their influence a Palestinian leadership — who have decided to overlook his provocations and close their eyes to the constant attacks by the Israeli authorities on the rights of the Palestinians and the other peoples of
From this point of view also, last week's invasion of Lebanon was a failure for Shamir. The Syrian delegation came to Washdelegations. However it is doubtful that this decision will be much consolation to the families of the victims of Israeli aggression, whether in Lebanon or the occupied territories. *