South
Africa
after the
"yes"
vote
IN A referendum held on March 17, 1992, white South
Africans voted by a large majority to support the "reform process" initiated by the de Klerk regime in 1990 and the negotiations currently underway aimed at drawing up a new constitution for the country. In the following interview, members of the secretariat of the Workers'
Organization for Socialist
Action, a South African revolutionary organization, give their view on the result of the referendum and their assessment of the current stage of the negotiations process.
T HE De Klerk government
won a significant victory in the recent referendum. How do you explain this clear change in white sentiment, which has occurred without any change of government or in the nature of the state?
A big majority voted "yes" in the racist referendum: 68% against 32%. Most political analysts had predicted a closer result, with the right wing expected to get over 40%, which is what the pre-referendum by-elections had seemed to indicate.
The white electorate had two choices: either the old apartheid policies, which are now seen as impractical; or a power-sharing negotiated settlement, which business and most of the white 5 middle class now see as offering the
International Viewpoint # 226 • April 13, 1992
SOUTH AFRICA greatest safeguard for their interests and
The rapid return of South Africa into the world community, with the lifting of trade, sporting and cultural boycotts, helped convince many whites who remained suspicious of the negotiations that a power sharing settlement really represented the best option.
Even a large section of the Afrikaans-speaking white workers, from traditionally very conservative areas of the country, voted yes, although they are the section of the white population worst hit by the current economic recession and also the social layer which has the most to lose under a deracialized system.
Three factors lie behind the strong endorsement of the negotiations by the white electorate:
• The lack of an alternative to negotiations. It was clear that the policies put forward by the right wing would lead to great political and social instability.
They would mean a state of emergency, political unrest, further international isolation, and so on. The experience of the 1985 uprising was fresh in everyone's memory.
• It was clear, in spite of the far right's propaganda, that the negotiations were not about handing over power to the Black masses.
The way in which legal apartheid had been scrapped without any substantial change in the social and economic position of whites showed that De Klerk's enterprise was not going to jeopardize the privileged position of the majority of whites.
• The actual course of the negotiations had made whites confident that they were being entered into from a position of strength, with the ANC (African National Congress) being forced to make the majority of compromises.
In the last few months particularly, the ANC has appeared as a very respectable political movement rather than a liberation organization with an armed wing.
It was also clear from the Namibian settlement and the performance of SWAPO (the South West African People's Organization) that the fundamental way of life of whites was hardly affected.
The fact that racism has become an autonomous factor and that many whites now have to compete with Black workers for jobs explains why almost one million voters still remain opposed to negotiations. If the negotiations do not lead to an economic upturn, and violence and crime continue to spiral, many of those who "reluctantly" voted "yes" will turn against the government.
Those who interpret the result as meaning that the white electorate is now prepared to hand over power to Black majority rule are making a grave mistake.
The government campaign made it clear that the mandate they were seeking was for power sharing and if that was not accepted at the negotiations the government would go back to the whites to seek
This is why a large number of whites who would normally support the right wing in elections supported the "yes"
Since the referendum the government has taken a very hard line in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations, as seen in their proposals on the interim government.
They have proposed a two chamber parliament with a chamber representing minority groups that would have a veto on decisions reached in the other chamber. Also they propose the creation of advisory councils, like the advisory councils with no power for Blacks under grand apartheid.
They are insisting that the ANC completely abandon the armed struggle and disband MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe - the ANC's armed wing) before any agreement on an Interim government.
Of course with MK posing no security threat this demand has more to do with trying to divide the radicals from the moderates in the ANC and ensure that when the government shares power with them they will act to respect law and order and will not tolerate the existence of private armies. • How would you characterize the current feeling amongst the Black population? Is there a widespread feeling that society is changing Mandela has won the first round?
There was widespread relief amongst many Blacks that the "no" vote lost. The immediate prospect of a Conservative Party government, of harsh repression and civil war was averted - at least for the moment.
Yet at the same time there is not much optimism amongst Blacks that major change is at hand. The scale of the violence on the Reef, in Natal and even in Cape Town is tempering any hopes Blacks might have in the "New South Africa"
For millions of Black workers and rural people poverty is deepening as a result of the recession.
Illusions that negotiations, scrapping of apartheid, the right to vote will bring about major changes to people's lives is steadily being eroded by the violence, falling living standards, the sharp rise in unemployment and violent crime.
At the moment, in the absence of a credible alternative many Black people are still prepared to place their hopes in negotiations.
Many working class activists are confused by the contradictory situation where the deracializing of the system is taking place but at the same time the working class is suffering major attacks.
For many the situation is one where they have one foot in the negotiations and another remains in the mass movement favoring mass action.
The ANC leadership's response to the "yes "vote has been muted. Clearly, by supporting the "yes" vote, the ANC recognized that the negotiations were not being undertaken from a position of equal strength but that power was still chiefly held by whites.
Many in the leadership of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) are aware that De Klerk will use the "strong mandate" to force even more concessions in the negotiations and were therefore not over-enthusiastic about the referendum result. • Could you briefly describe what socio-economic changes could occur in the coming years and what the legacy of apartheid will be?
While the CODESA negotiations proceed not much is being done at the socio-economic level. Although there is much talk about a social contract and the need for an economic forum involving government, the bosses and the unions, not much progress has been made.
Meanwhile, the bosses continue with their rationalization program which involves large scale retrenchments, closure of inefficient plants, imposing of wage freezes, and so on.
For its part, the ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance is demanding that they be consulted on the economic restructuring and the government should not proceed unilaterally. In this regard, the government has suspended its program of priva-
The government intends, on a limited scale, to redirect state expenditure to address some of the most pressing social problems affecting the urban and rural poor. However, this represents a mere drop in the ocean and at any rate is constrained by the regime not wanting to alienate further sections of the white elec-
Under current conditions economic revival depends very much on attracting new foreign investment. This in turn depends on the negotiations leading to stable social and political conditions that would encourage inflows of foreign capital.
Here the international situation is
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also crucial, that is the state of the world economy and the ability of the major industrialized countries to offset the effects of the current recession.
This does not mean that the political reforms and the ending of sanctions will not have a stimulating effect on the economy. It will also accelerate the growth of the Black middle class as access to management training and the professions
What we are saying however is that it will not be of the scale required to address the huge inequality between Black and white. For example, four conglomerates own 75% of the shares on the Johannesburg Stock exchange.
More than 90% of industrial property and 87% of the land is owned by whites. This is not even to mention the huge backlog in hospitals, clinics, schools, housing and so on.
Unemployment is estimated to be approaching 50% of the entire Black • What has been the attitude of the main trade union federations toward the referendum and the negotiations? The international press has mentioned some tensions between COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) and the
There has been a debate as to whether COSATU should participate in CODESA. The COSATU Central Executive Committee resolved to seek membership in CODESA - a position strongly rejected by COSATU's second strongest union, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), who argued that the interests of their members would be adequately represented by the ANC and SACP.
NACTU (National Congress of Trade Unions) has come out in support of those organizations rejecting CODESA but has not lent its weight to advance any mass campaign for an alternative.
Tensions also emerged between COSATU and its allies over the referendum. While COSATU rejected the referendum as racist the ANC and the SACP called on their white supporters to vote "yes." Amongst the rank and file there was substantial rejection of this position.
For many worker activists who had joined the SACP looking for a radical anti-capitalist organization this was one of the first indications of a contradiction between the rhetoric and the practice of the SACP leadership. • Is the demand for a constituent assembly still on the agenda? How can an alternative to the short-term likelihood of a coalition National Party-ANC government be
The demand for a constituent assembly represents the expression of the demand for full and equal democratic rights which has been central to our national liberation struggle.
Since we believe that the negotiations at CODESA will compromise this, the demand for a constituent assembly
It also helps us to expose the regime's actual commitment to democracy. It is very clear now that the government is doing everything possible to circumvent this demand and is placing great pressure on the ANC to move away from it.
This is the thrust of its proposal around the Interim government. Initially, the government wanted CODESA to be the constitution-making body but are now proposing that the Interim Government be the constitution-making body.
However, in the unions there is growing support for a general strike for a constituent assembly if the government resists this demand. Our real problem is translating the demand for a constituent assembly into a mass campaign.
So long as the demand remains at the level of propaganda it remains very abstract as it is possible for the government to give any agreement they reach at CODESA the tag of constituent assembly and thus confuse the masses on the
The mainstream of ANC, SACP, and COSATU are content to promote this demand at CODESA through negotiations and shy away from a mass campai-
At the same time inter-organizational rivalry between the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) has prevented the forces outside of CODESA from initiating any serious campaign around the demand for a constituent
In WOSA we are attempting to link the call for a constitutional alternative to a programme of fundamental social reforms around which the working class can be mobilized — demands for a living wage, against retrenchments, for mass electrification and housing. • A new period has now opened up. An organization like WOSA has a long term project of struggling for national liberation and socialism. What will now be the central axis of
In WOSA we are aware that with the major changes that have taken place internationally, the collapse of Stalinism, the increased belligerence of imperialism, and the South African government's opening up of negotiations from a very
SOUTH AFRICA strong position, the struggle for national liberation and socialism has been put on the defensive.
The mass movement is in a much weaker position than it was, say, in 198586. This has been compounded by the confusion created by the ANC's turn to negotiations.
Our strategic approach in WOSA is to promote campaigns around radical
We believe that as the struggle against legal apartheid ends, the more fundamental aspect of that struggle continues - the struggle for fundamental social reforms aimed at overcoming the impoverishment of our people.
This approach requires fighting for the political leadership of the mass movement. At this moment we see that it is terribly urgent to build a broad-based proclass struggle current inside the trade unions, civic organizations, and so on, on
It is possible in a few years, on the basis of initiatives of this type and with a new wave of struggles, after it becomes clear that the political settlement has not resolved the social questions, that the building of a mass working class party will be on the agenda again. • Is there still a threat of violence from the far right? What role is Inkatha playing now?
The far right will be under two
The more moderate section will now be pulled more to entering negotiations and advancing their demand for white self-determination at CODESA.
The more radical neo-fascist element may consider a kind of urban terrorism aimed at destabilizing negotiations.
The right wing base remains potentially very big, with close to a million voting "no" and with a large section of those that voted "yes" still very sympathetic to their cause. These people have a ready access to arms and very good contacts in the security establishment.
Although Inkatha has denied signing a non-aggression pact with the AWB (a far right group) there is clear evidence of growing contact between the right and those bantustan leaders opposed to the ANC line.
Inkatha is finding itself in a weaker position as the ANC and the government move closer together in the negotiations and is moving towards a separatist position for the so-called Zulu nation.
This is drawing them closer to the far right, and helps explain the sudden upsurge of terror attacks in the townships, on trains, and so on. * April 13, 1992 : # 226 International Viewpoint
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