In France, the cantonal and regional elections of March
22, 1992 confirmed the continuing presence of Jean-Marie
Le Pen's Front National (FN) on the political scene. With nearly 14% of votes at the national level, the FN has certainly stabilized its support, but has also become the biggest party of the far right in Europe.
If the breadth of the "Le Pen" phenomenon is now a fact of French political life, the typology, evolution and motivation of its electors are less well known. International Viewpoint spoke to Nonna
Mayer, Director of Research at the National
Centre of Scientific Research (CRS) in the
Centre for the Study of French Political Life
(CEVIPOF). The interview was conducted by
Claude Gabriel in April 1992.
W
HAT is the reality of the presence of the FN in the French institutions?
It should not be exaggerated. It now has three general councillors, 239 regional councillors - there are only 10 departments where it does not yet have councillors - and nearly 1,700 municipal councillors. It is the leading party in thirty municipalities, one of them relatively significant, that of
Saint-Gille. Moreover, it has a deputy in the French parliament and 12 deputies in the European parliament. This does not amount to a very significant institutional weight, but it should be stressed that its influence is greater than the number of its elected representatives.
Since 1972, it has become solidly implanted as a party. Today it has an estimated 50,000 members, enough to cover the French national territory - this is less than half what the FN claims, but it is nonetheless considerable.
Beyond this strong implantation, it has tried to extend its influence in all the professional circles through a number of associations. There are circles of ex-servicemen, of dockers, of women, of youth and of health workers. A whole constellation of circles like this extends the influence of the party. In the universities also, the Student Renewal and the National Circle of Paris Students have had some representatives elected, benefitting from a very high rate of abstention among students. But there is no Le Penite tidal wave. What matters today is its electoral potential, which since 1984 has varied between 10% and 14% of those who actually vote.
When the polls ask "Is there a party for which you would in no case vote?", two
• The FN began to gain influence around the question of racism and immigration. But in the debate over whether the organization should be characterized as fascist or not, one of the aspects to look at is its capacity to go beyond these themes to cover areas which imply other ideological constructions, like for example the defence of the species, ecology and so on. Is this a recent development? In what way does the FN target the different social categories?
The FN is making very clear attempts to enlarge its influence and encroach on the ground of the other parties, particularly since 1991, on the theme of ecology and in the direction of the farmers - the two being quite closely linked - with the creation of a national circle of farmers. Until now this has not worked - the president of the circle, Alexis Arette, has resigned and taken his distance from the FN.
He is a former member of the French Federation of Agriculture
(FFA), one of the networks through which the FN hopes to implant itself in the agricultural milieux.
For the moment it has suffered a setback. In some areas some notables have been won to the basic ideas of the FN, and one can note, in some places, a slight increase in the rural vote for
Le Pen, particularly in the
Centre region, in Champagne.
But, when you look at the national results, the farmers remain, with the teachers, those who remain the most resistant to the FN's blandishments. They combine all the factors which stem the influence of the FN: strongly organized and unionized, strongly controlled by the classic right, by the Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) essentially, and with a strong proportion of practising Catholics. In fact, contrary to what is often believed, the most devout Catholics are the most hostile to the
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FN.
June 8, 1992
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Who votes
FRANCE • What is the make-up of the FN electorate and in particular what has been its evolution over the past five or six years?
Even If it is an electorate in evolution, it has some general characteristics which have been confirmed with time. It is necessary to analyze it on two levels. The FN is a new party, which has drawn from the electorates of the existing parties, and it is necessary to distinguish the political characteristics of its voters from their sociological characteristics.
Their political characteristics first: in 1984, when it appeared for the first time on the French political scene, surveys showed that it received support from all categories of the population and among all electors. But it was an electorate with a marked bias to the right. It benefitted at the time from a radicalization of a part of the right, faced with the arrival in power of the "SocialistCommunist" government.
Starting from 1986, it began to win over layers which were less right wing and more popular, in the wake of disappointment with the Socialist government. Its electorate diversified. The case of Paris is very significant in this respect: in the 1984 European elections, the FN vote was above all concentrated in the wealthier neighbourhoods in the west; starting from 1986, it was the opposite, and the FN bastions moved towards the popular neighbourhoods in the east of the city, even if it nonetheless won votes in all areas of the
Starting from 1988, these two types of bourgeois and popular electorate fused.
The Centre for the Study of French Political Life (CEVIPOF) conducted a big post-electoral survey after the presidential election of 1988. We noted that, among the electors who had voted for Le Pen in the first round of the elections, only a third had voted for the FN at the legislative elections of 1986. There was, then, a big turnover of its electorate. How had the remaining two thirds voted in 1986? Around 50% had voted for the classic right; a quarter had Socialist left; of the rest, a third were not entered on the electoral lists, were too young to vote or else could not be bothered
Contrary to the received wisdom, its electorate came rather from the classic right, but there was also a strong minority of voters from the left or previously apathetic, abstentionist voters.
Certainly, taking account of their different political origin, this electorate is sociologically diverse, less stereotyped than that of the moderate right or of the left. But certain categories vote more for the FN then others: it is primarily an urban electorate — 16 more than 100,000 inhabitants. The EN's 52% of FN voters in 1988 lived in towns of International Viewpoint # 230• June 8, 1992 electoral bastions are situated in the northeast from the line Le Havre, Valence, Perpignan; it is urban France, the industrial France, the France where there are immi-
Then, it is a very masculine electorate. Whatever the type of election, men vote more often for the FN, for a readily understandable reason; the FN challenges all the gains of women (abortion, right to work, and so on). Two categories are clearly more likely to vote for the FN: first, since 1986, the small traders and artisans 1984, it was the big traders, industrialists, liberal professionals.
Progressively, it is also among the workers that the FN gains its best scores, in particular among the skilled workers — around 19% of votes expressed at the regional elections of 1992, against 16% among small employers. It should be stressed that it is not the lumpenproletariat that votes most heavily for the FN. If one takes the average characteristics of these electors, they even have a higher average income to the average French person, they have more inherited wealth, are more often owners of their enterprises: they are more likely to have an educational qualification of some kind, and their rate of unemployment is not higher than the national average. • The confusion about the size of the transfer of votes from the Communist Party to the FN - which represents hardly more than 3% - stems from an illusion, very widespread in France, that the popular neighbourhoods have always voted overwhelmingly for the left. In fact, a popular vote for the RPR exists. It could then amount to a transfer of working class RPR votes to There is a belief on the French left that the tradition of the class vote had been maintained through the years, while in fact it entered into crisis in the 1950s and 1960s with the arrival of De Gaulle in power.
There has never been a social category which is politically monochrome, the "workers vote" does not exist, any more than the "small trader-artisan" vote; there is simply a greater probability that the workers will vote for a party of the left, or for the ecologists, than is the case for the small trader-
If one combines the political variables and the socio-professional variables, it can be clearly seen that the electors who previously voted for the left and now support the FN are more frequently workers. They even have a system of values similar to that of the voters who have remained faithful to the parties of the left, except on two points. Asked about the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion [minimum wage] or taxes on the wealthy, they reply like the other electors of the left, they are in favour. But asked about the problems of immigration or law and order, they answer in the same way as the faithful electors of the FN. Which leads naturally to a question — why this fixation on these
The explanation seems less to do with objective factors (experience of growing crime, frequent contact with immigrants) than subjective ones, at the level of the imagination and fantasy. They are no more often subject to violent attack than the average, but they are afraid of it. They are no more exposed than others to the alleged problems of living in the proximity of immigrants, but they sense it as a threat. It is the phenomenon of the "halo", described by Pascal Perrineau; the people who live close to the estates and blocks with a strong immigrant concentration are more likely to vote for the FN than those who live with the immigrants. • A whole series of articles have appeared on the phenomenon of the protest vote, linked to the crisis of the institutions and the crisis of citizenship, that is a vote by certain social categories which could be a vote of revolt and rejection. Le Pen denounces the "gang of four" (the four main French political parties), while the people for their part denounce the political class, which corresponds to their image of the institutions. Beyond the question of immigration, is there not also a rejection, a disgust with these institutions and a state apparatus in crisis, as in the rest of
There is certainly, as in all the big Western democracies, a weariness with the existing governments. Looking at poll results, it can be seen that Le Pen's electors are more aware of the problem of corruption and the incapacity of the political class to represent them and defend their interests. The succession of political/financial scandals, and the two amnesty laws concerning the crimes linked to the financing of the political parties have greatly served Le
These attacks against the "gang of four" relate to a reality; the four big parties have not succeeded in resolving the economic crisis or in reducing unemployment. At the same time, Le Pen's party appears as one of the last parties which symbolize hope. On the French political chessboard, there are two parties which have not yet been tested in power; the FN on the far right and the Greens on the other side.
After all the great ideological battles of the 1970s and 1980s, one also has the feeling that the electors are turning towards more concrete political issues (environment, law and order, and so on).
Vote in 1992 regional elections
Non-party
PC
PS
Far left
1.5
8
18
Total
Sex
17
Men
8
Women
2
Age
18 to 24
6
10
25 to 34
35 to 49
50 to 64
Over 65
Profession
Farmer
Small owner
Lib. Profs/
6
Higher Manag.
8
2
Middle profs.
9
White collar
1
11
Blue collar
9
Not working
Vote in 1989
Euro-elections
PC
83
PS
6
Ecologist
3
1
Centre
UDF-RPR
-
Other Génération Greens left écologie 2.5 7 7.5 2 6 20 3 8 17 13 8 17 10 19 0 LO 15 21 3 12 3 7 12 2 6 5 15 2 7 17 9 22 NN M 9 9 19 10 20 4 4
1 56 5 7
8 NNT 39
8 7 3
1 2 1
FRANCE
Other FN
UDF right
RPR lists
100%
4.5
14
4
33
100%
15
34
5
100%
3
31
12
5
100%
29
12
NT.
28
13
100%
13
31
100%
17
100%
40
17
100%
3
38
100%
12
15
47
100%
3
45
16
7
41
100%
10
10
34
100%
14
26
100%
19
100%
19
35
17
100%
3
- •
1
3
100%
INN
100%
6
3
100%
11
20
53
15
100%
N N
79
100%
8
FN 7
Abstention 7 Source: BVA/Libération, Antenne 2, FR 3, France Inter/France Info, Paris Match poll on March 22, 1992.
There is also a broader cultural phenomenon characteristic of the Western democracies; our political parties are old. Their roots are in the 19th century, they are based on political or religious cleavages which today have lost their significance. The young generation and in particular women, who increasingly participate in political life, no longer recognize themselves in these parties. There are then both structural and conjunctural factors which explain this • There is a risk of drawing one-sided conclusions about the general political situation from the Le Pen phenomenon. It is said that this represents a lowering of class consciousness, or of social consciousness, which is true. But at the same time, it shows that a part of society is seeking a response to the crisis of the state, of the institutions -through a wrong and reactionary response. This is a contradictory phenomenon. It is interesting in
1 14 2 11 10 relation to the working class suburbs, where one sees for example the FN targeting the CP voters.
It is the type of elector who, ten years ago, would have made a protest vote, without necessarily adhering by conviction to the ideas of the CP, who turns towards the FN. That does not mean that this is a vote "for" the FN, that the voter has acquired its ideas in a definitive manner. • What about the youth vote for the FN?
Before the regional elections, a quarter of young people under 25 said they were prepared to vote for the FN. But there was obviously an element of provocation in their replies. In reality, it was among youth that the FN lists registered their worst scores. There is for the most part an inverse relation between youth and voting for the FN (see table). • That represents a difference with Italy, for example. In Milan, there was a strong youth vote for the Lombard
100% 6 28 18 100% League.
One cannot compare these two situations on all points. There are common factors. but each formulation reflects the specific history of the country.
In Italy, there is essentially a regional problem; the old opposition between the north and the south. • What is the nature, social implantation and reality of the FN as a party?
It has considerably changed. At its first congress, the cadres were rather young. But today it is a party which has aged. Its members are even older, more privileged and more masculine than its electorate. The middle classes and the self-employed are very strongly over-represented. They form an extremist and politicized hard core which situates itself very much more frequently on the extreme right than the electors of the FN.
On the ideological plane, they are more radical than the party's electors; more 1 7 authoritarian, more hostile to the immiJune 8, 1992 # 230 International Viewpoint
FRANCE grants, more nationalist and more conservative in the area of morality (abortion, sexuality). -• What is the link, in your opinion, between the Algerian war and the FN?
Each time that we ask the militants of the FN about their motivations, there is on the one hand, anti-Communism, on the other nostalgia for French greatness, and then the rejection of decolonization. The cadres of the FN are, essentially, militants who opposed the Gaullist policy in the 1960s and supported "Algérie française". The career of Jean-Marie Le Pen is exemplary in this respect; he started off as a Poujadist deputy, then was involved in the presidential campaign of Tixier-Vignancour2; he was at the heart of all the struggles against the independence of Algeria. • What type of activity does the FN pursue in the workplaces?
There are some circles, the most important being Entreprise Moderne et Libertés. Some bosses of big enterprises regularly give financial support to the FN (BIC, notably). There, we enter another debate on the sources of financing of the FN; the Moonie sect, as well as the money inherited by Le Pen himself, but also the contributions of members. Moreover, to gain a good place on the FN's electoral lists, the candidates must contribute significant amounts, going from some thousands to several millions of francs. • Can conclusions be drawn as to the regional implantation of the FN?
Its favoured terrain is the ProvenceAlpes-Côtes d'Azur (PACA) region. It constitutes a symbolic region for them, in the front line of the "invasion of the immigrants". It is also the region where the pieds-noirs?, with a particular contempt for Arabs, are the most concentrated. For all these reasons, the implantation of the FN there is particularly strong. • There has been a change in the nature of the candidates and the FN apparatus. At first, they were refugees from the RPR and the UDF, the former in particular. Some of these people have since defected, and the candidates in the last elections were the true cadres of the far right, people who had spent a long time in the FN.
It is difficult for a small party to find candidates, and above all to implant itself nationwide when it comes to cantonal, municipal or regional elections. At first, the FN experienced difficulty in finding candidates, to the point where it often recruited by advertising.
Since, then the party has evolved. Under 18 preceding secretary-general, it has been the direction of Jean-Pierre Stirbois, the International Viewpoint # 230 • June 8, 1992 totally reorganized, centralized and streamlined; schools for training cadres have been created. This transformation has been continued by the current secretary-general, Carl Lang. The party has professionalized itself. • Have there been surveys on the membership structure and its relation to physical or social violence? Are there links between the FN and the neo-Nazi groups?
To a certain extent, the FN is trying to distance itself from violence. It is taking on an image of respectability. Progressively, it is getting rid of the skinheads and the most unmanageable elements that might compromise its image. In 1984 a survey by the SOFRES polling institute of sympathizers of the FN and the Party des Forces Nouvelles (PFN) showed that a quarter of them were in favour of a coup to gain power. From time to time, obviously, this kind of thing comes out. There is an obvious verbal violence in certain speeches of Jean-Marie Le Pen or the well known film maker and FN supporter Claude Autant Lara. • In the preceding wave of the rise of fascism, physical confrontation was an obligatory feature. Today, there is such a crisis, such a decomposition of the workers movement that, at least for the moment, for a party which is not immediately a candidate to the presidency of the republic, the question of violence is not immediately posed. On the other hand who knows what will happen in five or six years. The FN must conserve a subversive aspect in relation to the state apparatus. For example, in the votes for the presidency of the regional councils, some FN representatives have not voted for the right.
Yes, that is what they have done in Bourgogne and Lorraine, and above all, they seek to block the functioning of the regional councils. It is an indicator.
The polls also show that, if the electors and militants of the FN are not necessarily more violent - something which is very difficult to detect through a poll! - they are nonetheless clearly more authoritarian and partisans of a strong hand; for the death penalty, heavier sentencing, and so • How do you explain the results of the regional elections, when the FN did not attain its objectives?
They were hoping for at least 15 to 20% of the votes, and 40% in Nice. They thought they would emerge as the biggest party in the PACA region, obliging the RPR and the UDF to negotiate with them to govern the region. They wished to show that they were capable of governing a big
French region. One of the weaknesses of the FN, from its point of view, is that it remains perceived as a "sectarian", , "extremist" party, incapable of governing France. Even his electors remain persuaded that Le Pen cannot become President of the Republic and that his party is not capable of
In fact, they only obtained 13.9% of votes cast, or less than Le Pen's score in the first round of the Presidential election in 1988. And in the PACA region, the FN did not get the scores expected.
What happened? In the course of the two months preceding the elections, there was an active campaign against the FN. Systematically, its meetings were harassed, prevented, numerous meetings were forbidden because of public order difficulties, and often there were violent confrontations between militants of the FN and anti-fascist
This anti-Le Pen mobilization had above all got going after the desecration of the Jewish cemetery at Carpentras in the south of France in May 1990. The FN was accused at the time of being indirectly responsible for what had happened, because of the climate of hatred and intolerance which it had inspired in France. Around 50 demonstrations took place, the biggest in Paris on May 14 with Mitterrand present. Organizations were set up to struggle against the FN, alongside already established antiracist and humanitarian organizations.
The 50 proposals of the FN to struggle against immigration, presented by Bruno Mégret in autumn 1991, gave new energy to the anti-fascist forces. In January 1992, faced with the FN's rise in the polls, there was a growing mobilization against it, which had two effects. First, it stimulated the FN voters; the polls showed that they had never been mobilized to such an extent. They appeared as the most convinced, the most faithful to their choice, those who had decided the earliest.
But at the same time this anti-Le Pen mobilization led a certain number of young electors, close to the lett, the far lett, the ecologists and the Communist Party, to vote in order to bar the way to the far right. It is this which made the difference. The FN kept the same number of electors as in 1988, but turnout was 4-5% higher than what the polls had predicted, and this contributed to a decline in their weight. * 1. See Colette Ysmal in SOFRES, l'état de l'opinion 1991, Seuil, Paris. 2. Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, president of the Parti des Nouvelles Forces, founded in 1974 after the dissolution of the Ordre Nouveau in 1973 and the defeat of Le Pen's Front National in the 1974 presidential elections. Tixier-Vignancourt was a candidate in the 1965 French presidential elections. 3. Franco-Algerians, repatriated in May 1962, shortly before the proclamation of Algerian independence.