The test of strength
THE African National Congress (ANC), along with its allies the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSAT) and the South African Communist Party
(SACP), has launched an energetic campaign to pressure South African president F.W. de Klerk into accepting the formation of a multiracial provisional government and elections for a constituent assembly to be held before the end of the year.
MARC LINI — June 23, 1992
A CTIONS around these demands
began on June 16, the anniversary of the 1976 Soweto uprising, with a transport boycott and a strike which was a big success in the Johannesburg townships and to a lesser extent in Durban. According to the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 89% of that town's wage earners did Nearly 70 demonstrations were planned throughout the country. The most important one took place in Soweto, where ANC president Nelson Mandela called for a continuation of the actions until progress in the negotiations is achieved.
Four-stage plan of action
The actions have been planned in four stages. The first of these began with the June 16 events and involved demonstrations and sectoral strikes (particularly in hospitals and city administrations). The second stage, which will take place in July, will consist of street demonstrations, work slow-downs and occupations of sites that symbolize the power of the South African state, like the television stations.
Shortly afterwards, the third stage will take place, in the form of a general strike at the beginning of August. The exact date and length of this strike will be fixed by COSATU in early July. COSATU had originally favored an unlimited strike for the end of July but the ANC requested that it be held in August so that it could be better prepared.
They also asked that it not be presented as an unlimited general strike so that it could be modified in the face of the government's reactions. For some leaders of the ANC and COSATU, the fourth phase of the plan of action, "Operation Exit Gate", will be the final struggle for a change of government.
This anti-governmental campaign will be a decisive test of the balance of forces, a first taste of future battles, and an indication of the mobilizing capacities of the ANC. It will constitute the most important confrontation with the regime since its legalization. Unlike the general strike of July 1991, which demanded the abolition of the Value Added Tax (VAT), the August strike will aim at influencing the very nature of future political institutions. It is precisely on this point that deep differences exist concerning the Convention for a Democratic
Talks break down
In spite of convergences on several aspects of the future constitution, the CODESA talks broke up last month around the demand of the ruling white National Party (NP) to include in the constitution the requirement of a 75% majority for the passing of key votes in the future parliament. The ANC delegation accepted, without a mandate from the rank and file, the requirement of 70% for certain important questions. This agreement led to a sharp confrontation. Fearing the derailing of the negotiation process, the South African government sent a telegram to 50,000 reservists asking them to be ready for a mobilization.
For their part, the COSATU leaders have been generally more determined than those of the ANC to fight until victory, even in the face of employer threats against the use of the strike weapon.
This new and serious escalation of tensions between the government and the ANC is the result of a sharply accelerated deterioration of the social situation. This has been expressed by the current union pressure and unfortunately, by clashes and social decomposition in the townships.
The last few weeks have seen many strikes, including a massive one by hospital personnel demanding wage increases. Every day the reform of the apartheid sys-
SOUTH AFRICA tem opens up new Pandora's boxes. The misery of the townships, massive unemployment, the monstrous racial inequality in education and housing, have not been alleviated in the slightest since the opening of negotiations a year and a half ago. There have only been promises of the "redistribution" of wealth in the undefined future. The unresolved question of Bantustan land will certainly take on an explosive character in the near future.
It is this contradiction between the abstract character of the negotiations and the concrete aspirations of the Black masses that makes the situation tense and risky for both the government and the ANC. Negotiations versus reality
The June 17 massacre of 42 people in the Boipatong ghetto and the police killings several days later highlights the gap between CODESA and everyday reality. The ANC leadership has therefore decided on a temporary and partial retreat from the official talks, fully aware that they have no alternative strategy.
The regime continues to play several cards at once. De Klerk himself often meets with Buthelezi, leader of the reactionary, Zulu-based Inkatha movement. One of Inkatha's leaders, Musa Myeni, has recently alerted his murderous troops that a civil war was imminent, since the country was "like a kraal with many bulls who all wanted to rule."
Given this situation, last year's "peace agreement" between the government, the ANC and Inkatha is meaningless. Armed police, Inkatha gangs and far right groups continue to unleash a reign of terror under the cover of the official negotiations. This is without doubt a taste of the so-called 3 post-apartheid South Africa. * July 6, 1992• # 232 International Viewpoint
International Viewpoint # 232 • July 6, 1992
ISRAEL / BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA