The leaders change, but the army still rules
"Save democracy! "Do you think its possible?" (Cartoon from Algerian paper El Watan 3 after the January coup undertaken allegedly to save democracy from fundamentalism).
ALGERIA whole effort culminated in a grandiose ceremony based on the rites of the patriotic religion, burning appeals to the spirit of the war of liberation and national unity. It was also an ecumenical assembly of all the liberal currents and the government, an encouraging sign for the prime minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali and the SCS, who will be hoping that the state of grace continues and
JUST a few days before his country's 30th independence anniversary celebrations, Algerian president Mohamed
Boudiaf, brought to power after the coup of January 11,
1992, was assassinated at Annaba. He was there for a meeting, at which he was campaigning on behalf of his
"Patriotic Assembly" at a time when meetings and demonstrations by other political currents are prohibited.
CHAWKI SALHI - June 30, 1992
HE fifty fundamentalists who tried
T to march in Annaba shouting "we will live and die for the Islamic
Republic" failed to attract a crowd. In Oran a small group of young people made a similar attempt. But that was all. Some young people have discreetly expressed satisfaction at the assassination, but it seems that the Islamic Salvation
Front (FIS) has been smashed and is unable to organization a reaction. This incapacity is an important fact for people. The fundamentalists, meanwhile, are awaiting a
The dominant feeling among the population is anxiety. With Boudiaf gone, instability is back. A variety of conspiracy theories are flourishing; some say that the military were behind the assassination, aiming to head off an amnesty for the FIS leaders;
others that this was revenge by high ups accused of corruption. Such theories cannot be disproved but they are unlikely. Boudiaf's death in fact presents the army, which has been made to look impotent, with big problems. The police who man the hundreds of road blocks set up throughout the country are certainly shaking in their boots.
Furthermore, the assassination is a moral victory for the fundamentalists, who have so far been unable to respond to mass arrests, the dismantling of their organization or the trial of their leaders by the military tribunal in Blida. Two days previously, one of them, Ali Belhadj, made a courtroom scene and his lawyers withdrew, demanding the presence of foreign observers. Mister Vergès, a lawyer for the Natioassassination, the papers were headlining the military prosecutor's hardline press conference. Such was the atmosphere before the assassination.
The Supreme Council of State (SCS) has not yet found a successor. A seven day period of mourning has been announced, and the 30th anniversary demonstrations cancelled. After the killing there was a sort of mood-adjustment campaign; the television was full of films of the attack, Boudiaf's last words and televised messages from leaders of the bourgeois opposition, who trooped in, Ben Bella after Ait Ahmed, to praise a leader who the previous day had been prohibiting their own activities.
A wave of emotion was thus artificially created; at first the news had been greeted with indifference, as another proof of the regime's uselessness, but it became a tragic event. The official theatrics allowed the regime to head off popular anxiety, the reborn fear of civil war and the fear of even more poverty and unemployment. The that it is enough to get the next anti-popular measures of the IMF plan accepted.
### Moment of panic
The military caste appointed Boudiaf as head of state in a moment of total panic. Nothing had prepared him for this sudden return to the Algerian political scene. He recently stated to a Tunisian paper that during his Moroccan exile he did not read the Algerian press. Indeed, six months ago, Boudiaf was completely unknown to the Algerian people. The regime had done its utmost to remove the names of the famous leaders of the national liberation struggle, driven from power in 1962 by Boumedienne's coup d'etat, from the school books and
Furthermore, Boudiaf, who had lent his support to the campaign by the Moroccan regime to suppress the right to self-determination of the Spanish Saharans, stood accused by the regime of complicity with the king of Morocco. He could not have returned to Algeria in the ordinary way. It was thus a total upset to find him at the head of the regime created after the suspension of the elections of December 26, 1991, which promoted him as "father of the nation" until and during his impressive funeral.
Despite this, however, Boudiaf did a useful job for the regime in his national paternal role, as was shown by the emotion generated by his funeral.
The real achievements of his six months in power are, however, not especially note-
SALVONS LA DENOCRATIE Ta ecars
ADON PELT?
nal Liberation Front (FLN) during the war of liberation, was refused entry. But there was no popular outcry. On the very morning of the
July 20, 1992•
International Viewpoint # 233 • July 20, 1992
ALGERIA worthy. The struggle against corruption came to a halt almost at once, just after the publication in the press of the first list of generals accused of helping themselves to state funds, a list at whose head stood the former president Chadli Benjedid. "Red alert, the country is in danger, the army threatened" headlined one brave patriotic daily, known in its time as a ferocious enemy of the left.
His stature as the coordinator of the group which launched the national liberation struggle in 1954 made Boudiaf an obvious figure to entrust with bringing together various political forces; however his limited political vision, his absence of tact and his harassment of the press and the political parties worked against such efforts. The "consultative council" which was supposed to win party support for the government's actions and which took three months of hard work to assemble, instantly disappeared into oblivion.
### Patriotic assembly
Boudiaf's central task was to set up a "patriotic assembly" to prepare for elections in the coming years. This had good chances of success after the FIS' victories last year. However after a few weeks of the Boudiaf regime the FLN, the FIS and the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) were rejected, accused of "playing the game of Fran-
The so-called moderate fundamentalists were threatened with the same fate as the FIS and other political groups outlawed. Even those best disposed to the coup, such as former president Ben Bella, were obliged to retire into a dignified silence. Supported by the Berber-liberal Cultural Democratic Assembly (RCD), the Party of the Socialist Vanguard (PAGS, the Communist party) and some wholly insignifi300,000 votes last December, Boudiaf and Ghozali would have had to look for further support to the seven million non-voters.
The big ceremonies planned for the thirtieth anniversary of independence were the last chance for efforts to bring together those who saw in Boudiaf the only alternative to the FIS or simply to civil war. However, in the stagnant political atmosphere and with the restrictions on liberties, failure was likely. Perhaps the death of Boudiaf will breathe life into the regime's
Boudiaf had stated that two months of internment was nothing. When he was arrested in 1962, he expressed his revolt by writing a book. The League for Human Rights is now demanding that the victims of military rule "are well treated" and the recently appointed human rights observer 4 those who had nothing to do with the pre- has expressed his wish for the release of all sent crisis. The democrats have given up on democracy and now demand "modernity" On the fundamentalist side, the leaders, defended by Ali Yahia of the League for Human Rights, can put themselves forward as martyrs, all their violence and threats of repression forgotten for the moment.
### Attacks on policemen
While the fundamentalist attacks on policemen have aroused universal condemnation, the permanent road-blocks and searches are annoying people as well as serving as a daily reminder of the regime's inability to guarantee security. The restrictions on political activity and the pressure on the press have reduced the regime's stabillity and its ability to absorb shocks. Meanwhile, while the FIS has disappeared as a concrete alternative and its supporters are dispersed and demoralized, fundamentalism nonetheless retains its legitimacy as an expression of popular protest and the spectre of the FIS hovers over the country in the runup to the Blida trial of its leaders.
Beneath the political fog lies economic regression. Boudiaf, who for 20 years headed the Party of the Socialist Revolution, spent his last months denouncing socialism and promoting the market economy. Indeed, in a situation where two thirds of food is imported and every sector of the economy depends on the import of spare parts and raw materials and where the servicing of the foreign debt amounts to 80% of export earnings, what else is there to do than follow the IMF's instructions?
The devaluation of the dinar, which has fallen from 1.4 to 0.25 French francs in a few years, will continue and will mean higher prices, including for bread and milk, whose prices tripled on June 20, 1992 Nonetheless, the IMF continues to demand the total abolition of subsidies on such products. Social distress is sharpened by the threat of liquidation of state enterprises, which Ghozali has described as lame ducks". But it is hard to see which sector of our economy can survive the world market. While awaiting a dramatic reduction in workers' purchasing power and their subjection to super-exploitation, the IMF is occupying itself with de-industrializing
The most important economic move underway is the return of the cartel to the oil fields. For between three and five billion dollars Ghozali is organizing a shrinkage of incoming hard currency through selling oil fields. Recolonization is under-
Things have not reached quite this point properties, cut up into mini-cooperatives in 1986, will be distributed in individual lots and then sold, before they go bankrupt and are resold. Meanwhile the next few years will see a stagnation in harvests and massive grain imports.
This disastrous picture has not prevented near unanimity in support of the economic opening, the only debate being over the
It seems that France wants to codify the regime's capitulation and plan its return to Algeria, rather than being content with the current gentleman's agreement, which involves restructuring the debt and offering new loans in exchange for advances towards economic liberalization.
Only a few lonely voices, those of the revolutionary socialists, can be heard demanding the cancellation of the debt and a break with the IMF. Some are calling for a war economy, meaning no more indebtedness; with imports in line with receipts on the basis of the payment of the debt
Illusion of power
The emotion aroused by Boudiaf's death is related to the illusion that it was in fact him who was in power. From this point of view his death must usher in a period of uncertainty. But this is not how things real-
The military hierarchy has played the decisive role in Algerian politics since independence. The defence minister, Nezzar, was the main architect of the January coup, but he is ill and will not want to play a prominent role. Boudiaf's successor will thus be Ali Haroun or Ali Kafi, the leader of the old Mujaheddin who would tend to revert to a system of alliances with figures from the FLN. All this will not change a
Boudiaf's assassination has had a psychological impact that can only grow. The regime is expected to show signs of determination. It will be tempted by stepped up repression against the FIS, and will probably give way to the temptation. Now that blood has flowed, the regime will feel able to demand the heads of Abassi Madani and Belhadj. At the first sitting of the trial of the FIS on June 27, the tribunal got into a mess and the press offered an audience to Ali Belhadj's imprecations and to the legitimate protests of his lawyers. The trial, which was postponed until July 12, may, if it is not postponed once more, now be pushed through with global support.
However massive and indiscriminate repression will not occur; the regime does not need it. Life is already under firm control, while if it pushes its luck the regime may provoke an explosion. While the coming layoffs and dramatic fall in purchasing power require an iron hand, the regime is already too fragile to attempt an extreme solution, even if opinion was ready. On the
other hand the likely toughening towards the FIS will work against the relaxation wished for by the more enlightened sectors of the regime.
Back from its anti-fundamentalist crusade, the political class is looking for a reshuffle. Ait Ahmed, Ben Bella and the FLN leader Mehri had been talking about national reconciliation and the pro-Boudiaf press was paying attention, aware of the regime's isolation and its imminent failure. Only a few figures from the RCD were opposed to such a course.
Reconciliation with the FIS, however, is highly unlikely, since the army does not