forces in ex-Yugoslavia and the European workers' movement. And the European peace movement has hardly uttered a word on the question. As a result, the political terrain has been occupied by the various machineries of state - and by demagogues.
This situation can be explained by two factors: that of the overwhelming weakness of pacifist and internationalist forces in ex-Yugoslavia; and that of the chauvinist confusion of the West European workers' movement about everything related to the future of Europe. Thus, one side is not able and the other not willing to seek partners for a dialogue which could take us beyond the present state of meekly accepting initiatives launched by the governments of the day. For this to occur, the West European workers' movement would have to put forward a radical social alternative to the liberal, free-market Maastricht project — thereby offering the Balkan peoples a different conception of Europe. We are far from that.
The deafening silence, the absence of even the smallest sign of an independent position from the organizations of the European left, clearly highlights the weakening of even the most elementary class consciousness. Without a doubt, this is a state of affairs without precedent in the last forty years in a conflict of such
Too isolated in its internationalist and anti-militarist outlook, the European far-left has also been too weak to take meaningful initiatives. Our aim must be to nurture active solidarity with all forms of resistance against ethnic nationalism, against racism and war-mongering. There must be no concessions to "realism" and no compromises with institutional manoeuvres.
Planning for the long term
This crisis is going to continue, and it will be possible to patiently build support networks for those who refuse to give into chauvinism and racism and build active solidarity with independent antiwar media and with pacifist groups. In the end, the progressive strengthening of an internationalist option is the only way forward — in the Balkans as in the whole of Europe. *
The
forces of
disorder
AS peace talks inaugurated in London at the end of August moved to Geneva in early September, vicious fighting continued in the ex-Yugoslav province of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH). International Viewpoint spoke to Catherine Samary, who has written extensively on Yugoslavia, on the background to the conflict and the prospects after the London conference.
W HAT do you make of the
results of the London conference? An end to the bombardment, control of heavy weapons, reciprocal recognition of the republics, the closing of the prison camps; a lot of good things are promised, but I am sceptical about what will happen in reality.
Furthermore, even if these commitments were met, essential questions would remain unresolved. There is a danger of a peace that simply ratifies what has been accomplished by force and terror. • Who is responsible for the climate of force and terror?
The main responsibility lies with the Serbian government and its allies. But Croatia also bears some responsibility; there is a Serb/Croat understanding about sharing out Bosnia-Herzegovina to the detriment of the Muslims. • Have the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina been recognized?
The border question is secondary to that of rights inside the countries concerned. In the present situation, there is nothing to stop the Kosovo Albanians or the Vojvodina Hungarians from rising in revolt. Recognition of frontiers only shows the way to a solution if it is tied to a substantial change
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* What comes after sanctions? - Christian Pomitzer (no. 232,
September 14, 1992
Croatia and reciprocal guarantees for the rights of peoples dispersed among several states. The same considerations apply to Macedonia which has an extremely mixed population. • How is this different from the proposal for dividing BH into ethnic cantons?
The problem is the way that Serb and Croat nationalists interpret cantonization. They see it not in terms not of territorial decentralization but of ethnic division. However BH, for historical reasons, does not have ethnically homogeneous regions. Thus ethnic cantonization means that people have to be forced out so that ex-YUGOSLAVIA a region becomes ethnically pure.
Furthermore, the Muslims are sure to lose out. They were only recognized as a people at the end of the 1960s. Being the descendants of the privileged of the Ottoman Empire, they are concentrated in the towns. The ease with which Serb and Croatian forces have occupied the bulk of Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory stems from their support in the countryside. Thus the Serbs, who make up a third of the population, occupy two thirds of the territory, while most of the remaining third is in Croat hands, although Croats are only a sixth of the republic's population. That leaves nothing for the Muslims. This is why the capital Sarajevo has become the key to the fighting and why Croat forces have not come to Sarajevo's aid.
The only solution for BH is a far-reaching administrative decentralization with protection for minorities, which is not worked out on a purely ethnic basis. • How would you characterize the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
The Yugoslav crisis in IV
OVER the past few years IV has published many backwith regard to the recognition of minority ground articles, comments, interviews and documents concerning national rights inside the different states.
the Yugoslav crisis and its regional implications, among them:
At present the formation of a sovereign
* Deaths in Kosovo; the morbid anatomy of a regime — Cathe-
Serbia has for some months gone along with the establishment of apartheid inside that state's Kosovo and Vojvodina pro-
* Last straw for Albanian people — Nina Jerkic (Ibid)
* The slide towards civil war - Michele Lee (no. 191, October vinces, where Serb refugees, encouraged by Great Serb nationalism, have occupied
* Kosovo workers fight back - Document (no. 192, October housing belonging to other nationalities.
In Croatia, there is a gap between the
* Youth rebel against Milosevic — Michele Lee (no. 204, April laws adopted as a part of the drive for independence and the real practice as far as citi-
* Crisis in the Balkans - Catherine Samary (no. 211, July 22, zenship is concerned. In fact, the latter is being granted only to "good Croats"
* War in Europe — Michele Lee (no. 212, September 16, 1991)
Croats living in Australia are getting citi-
* The Macedonian temptation - N. Champi (no. 215, October zenship while Serbs who have lived there for centuries are being deprived of it. Since
* A house beset by demons (Document - interview with forthe centre of the war moved to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian regime has become
* The antiwar movement in Yugoslavia - Catherine Samary increasingly authoritarian and, behind the scenes, the mood in ruling circles is in
* A militarized society and its critics — Marko Hren (Ibid)
favour of ethnic purification in practice.
* Next year, Sarajevo? — Slavko Mihaljcek (Ibid)
For the frontiers of Bosnia-Herzegovina
* Antiwar rebellion in Vojvodina - Document (no. 218, Decemto be respected, the Great Serb and Great
Croat logics of a division of BH between
* The Yugoslav trade unions and the war - Catherine Samary armed groups from the two sides have to be fought. But it is also essential that BH's
* An army in search of a state — Catherine Verla (no. 219,
Croat, Serb and Muslim populations feel secure. The country has a tradition of coha-
* Canton; rhymes with Lebanon? — Slavko Mihaljcek (no. 223, bitation. The basis for cohabitation is to be found in the constitution which recognizes
* Repression of Kosovo Albanians continues - Interview with that the republic has three peoples who
Muhamedim Kullashi (no. 226, April 27, 1992)
have both common rights as citizens and
* The forced cantonization of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Christian national rights as peoples. These constitutional provisions need to be respected. But recognition of the rights of peoples also necessarily implies links with the other republics, in particular with Serbia and rine Verla (no. 161, April 17, 1989)
15, 1990)
28, 1991)
mer Mayor of Belgrade) (ibid)
(no. 216, November 11, 1991)
ber 9, 1991)
March 30, 1992)
Pomitzer (no. 229, May 25, 1992)
July 6, 1992) *
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5
International Viewpoint # 234 • September 14, 1992 ex-YUGOSLAVIA What forces are at work there?
We should be aware that there are other forces than those involved in the war. The media do not attach sufficient importance to the multi-ethnic popular forces, which are in fact quite strong. Last summer they organized "the insurrection for peace" Today they have been pushed into a corner by the war but they remain active and structured, even if they do not have prominent figureheads. The media silence about them is no accident. Many of those involved in this movement are former Commu-
The non-nationalist opposition got some 25% of the votes at the December 1990 elections. It could thus be said that nationalism won. It is true that the presidency headed by Alija Izetbegovic comprises two Serbs, two Croats, two Muslims and a Yugoslav. But it is made up of ethnic parties. The ethnic principle rules.
There are a number of parties and groupings in the Serb camp. The dominant one is that around Karadzic, an ultra-nationalist maniac brought up in the Great Serb tradition. Karadzic traces his political roots to the anti-Communist Chetnik resistance movement of World War II.
Serbs are represented in other political formations, but only in small numbers. However Karadzic has imposed his line by terror. Bosnian Serbs who stand up for BH are under considerable pressure. The alliance between Serbia's president Milosevic and Karadzic is obvious. The war in BH is not an affair internal to that republic; the Serb militia there has use of federal army equipment left behind when the latter withdrew and there has been logistical support from Serbia. But the Milosevic-Karadzic alliance is not a smooth one. Under international pressure, Milosevic, the sorcerer's apprentice, may tone down his support.
The main force among BH's Croats is the Croat Democratic Forum (HDZ) of Croatia's president Franjo Tudjman. At first the HDZ in BH was represented by a moderate wing which wanted BH to continue to exist. But the HDZ in the Croat-controlled part of BH has been purged and the militarist far right has imposed what is in effect its own statelet on BH's territory. The Croat far right armed gangs have been responsible for massacres of Muslims, and, despite official agreements, have failed to submit themselves to the Bosnian territorial defence forces.
The Muslim camp is heterogeneous. In the 1970s Izetbegovic was convicted for writing a text considered "fundamentalist" in which he called for an Islamic state. He represents the religious nationalist current in his community, but he is also a pragmatist and a prisoner of the balance of forces. He has made the mistake of chopping and 6 ciples. First he accepted cantonization then changing his alliances and stated prinrejected it. He has called for a multi-ethnic BH but the nationalist Serbs say that there are not sufficient guarantees against an Islamic state.
But it is the Muslim community which has the best positions and is the big loser in the current state of affairs. However, we should be aware that a fundamentalist far right does exist, especially in the rural areas in the Sandjak, and can only gain strength in reaction to Serb and Croat poli• In BH we find people who have lived side-by-side for centuries turning on one another. Why? What should be the reply to people who argue that this is a sign of historic atavism and who claim that Tito's Yugoslavia was a "prison house of peoples?"
We have to get rid of these clichés about ancient hatreds. History leaves its traces, of course. The Ustashe regime set up in Croatia in 1941 was the bloodiest of all fascist Europe. Apart from Jews and Gypsies, 300-500,000 Serbs were massacred. The Bosnian Muslims, however, were spared (they were considered to be Croats). However, if we look at the longer term view, Muslims and Albanians also struggled against the Ottoman Empire and there were Croat anti-fascists. Hatred and the logic of genocide are not the product of some innate characteristics but of political lines to which other political lines can be opposed. Against the Ustashe and the Chetniks the Partisans fought for a Yugoslavia that brought together the various communities in a federation.
The present crisis is a product of the failure of Titoism. Nonetheless, that does not mean that Yugoslavia was an artificial project. In any case, since the war there have been several decades of peace, of inter-ethnic marriages and rising living standards. While it was certainly led by a single party, it was not true that Yugoslavia was a "prison house of peoples". The confederal system provided an adequate solution to the national question. The problem was that to genuinely overcome national antagonism more democracy was needed. The absence of openness meant that democratic national rights took on a perverted form. It also plunged the country into economic crisis; a non-capitalist economy can only function if the profit motive is replaced by the demo-
Even so, the crisis of Titoism need not have led to war. For this to break out a break with the Titoist heritage on the national question in a negative direction was needed. This was the result of a combination of a number of factors: the crisis of the regime, the world economic crisis, the growth of regional inequalities, the resul ting disintegration of the federation, the rise of nationalist currents to domination over political life and finally the formation of new nation-states.
Serb nationalism inaugurated the festivities with the suppression of the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. At that moment, a political battle could still have been waged; the Serbs were less than 50% of the population of the Serb republic, Croatia and Slovenia could have sought support in Macedonia and BH and won over the Serbs in Croatia to a line of multi-ethnic conciliation and against Great Serb nationalism. But currents in Croatia and Slovenia were already dreaming of integration into a prosperous (and Catholic) Europe.
They proposed to shed "the Turks" to the south and privatize their economies -after having brought it under state control. For these reasons, Slovenia and Croatia considered Vojvodina and Kosovo as Serb internal affairs. As a result, instead of going beyond Titoism in a positive direction, new regimes were set up that were no more democratic than the former regime. On the contrary, the nation states in ex-Yugoslavia can only be formed by leaning on a type of proto-fascism. • The West has only added fuel to the fire it has claimed to be putting out.
Yes. The West's responsibility can be looked at in three stages.
Firstly, until 1991 the West supported the line of a re-centralized "free market" Yugoslavia, as proposed by Markovic. At the start of the 1980s the Yugoslav state had a $20bn foreign debt and the creditors wanted a strong and centralized state to ensure repayment. On top of this there was the fear of "disorder" in the Balkans. This line certainly added fuel to the fire since the push for the "free market" could only lead to the break-up of the federation by sharpening regional differences, as has also happened in Czechoslovakia. This was particularly true in Yugoslavia where the confederal arrangement was the result not only of pressure from ruling elites but of the need for democratic and efficient management of the common space, since such management must respect national soverei-
Secondly, the West went from support for free market recentralization to a disorderly recognition of independence of various republics. Germany encouraged independence declarations from Slovenian and Croatia. This was especially serious in ethnically mixed Croatia. The recognition of independence took place without coherent principles; the label "democratic" was attached to highly suspect regimes. Macedonia has not been recognized, owing to Greek pressure.
Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized amid claims that this would prevent war. In fact, the opposite happened. This process of recognition did not take account of the
THE following is a list of anti-war organizations active in the different parts of the ex-Yugoslav Confederation.; it first appeared in Babel, no. 5/6, June 1992, a publication of the Helsinki Citzens Assembly published in France.
September 14, 1992 ex-YUGOSLAVIA • But the alternative seems very weak.
Antiwar forces exist in all the republics. They are based on citizens movements, and ecologist, anti-militarist and women's organizations, who are calling for the
SLOVENIA
* Center za kulturo miru in nenasilja — Centre for a peaceful and non-violent culture. Mestni trg 13 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. Telephone: 38-61-210-374. Fax. 224 666
* Womens' Movement, Citizens Assembly (HCA). Sonja Lokar, Tomsiceva 5 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. Telephone: 38-61-161 140. Fax. 215 855
* Anti-ratne Kampanja (ARK) — Zagreb anti-war committee. Tkalciceva 38 41000 Zagreb, Croatia. Telephone: 38-41-422 495. Fax: 38-41-271 143
* Democratski forum — Rijeka Democratic Forum c/o Sura Dumanic Telephone and Fax: 38-51-713 291
BOSNIA - HERZEGOVNIA demilitarization of the Balkans.
There are a number of small political parties who are trying to resist. At the end of the 1980s, when the miners of Kosovo were crushed by repression, the Croat B. Horvat founded the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI). Horvat is a well-known socialist econo-
His protests in the Serb press against the Great Serb repression of the Albanians were courageous. The UJDI was rapidly marginalized by the break-up of Yugoslavia and the nationalist tidal wave, but ele-
* Centar za mir — Saravejo Peace Center. Dobrovoljacka 11 71000 Sarajevo B.H. Telephone: 38-71-214- 884. Fax: 646 455 - 663 730
* Anti-war Action : U1 Hasana Kikica BR 8 71000 Saravejo, B.H. Fax. 38-
Forces in a number of republics have adopted an antiwar position, including
71-219 866
SERBIA
* Center za antiratnu akciju — Belgrade anti-war committee. Prote Mateje
6 YU 11000 Belgrade, Serbia. Telephone: 38-11-431 298. Fax: 38-11-681 989
* Helsinki Citizen Assembly c/o Sonja Licht, Omladinskih brigada 216 YU
11070 Belgrade, Serbia. Fax. 38-11-332 940
* Civil Resistance Movement. Mladena Stojanovica 4, YU 11040 Belgrade,
Serbia. Telephone: 38-11-668 324; Fax. 38-11-402 915
VOJVODINA
* European civic center for the resolution of conflicts. Trg. Cara Jovana
Nenada 15 YU 24000 Subotica. Vojvodina, Serbia. Telephone: 38-24-246000;
small Social Democratic parties. This is true of the USD in Croatia and autonomist formations in Dalmatia and Istria. It is also true of Milorad Pupovac, the leader of the Serb Forum in Croatia. The leader of the Croat Peasant Party, V. Cicak, has written virulent attacks on the Great Serb policy and Tudjman's policy in the Croat journal,
There is a battle underway on the information front. The Belgrade journal Vreme is at the centre of the anti-war movement in Serbia, in liaison with free radios and
Fax: 38-24-37116
MONTENEGRO
* Citizens Committee for Peace. Hercegoyarcka 15 YU 81000 Podgorica,
Montenegro. Telephone/Fax 38-81-41914
Some publications that have resisted chauvinism and war:
* VREME. Narodnog Fronta 45/VII Postanski fah 257, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia
* MONITOR. Dalmatinska 52, 81000 Podgorica, Montenegro
* DANAS. 41000 Zagreb, Croatia. Telephone 38-41-435846
* OSLOBODENJE. Dzemela Bijedica 185, 71000 Sarajevo P.O. Box 663
Bosnia. Telex 44 OSLOB 5/44 60 82, FAX 71 467 286 * fact that the region needs some kind of confederal arrangement. The links need to be redefined, but in the framework of an overall political agreement which recognizes all the republics and provinces as sovereign elements.
Finally, the West supported the cantonization plan, as mentioned above.
• The events in the former Yugoslavia give a taste of the possible results of the social crisis elsewhere in Europe, including in the West.
The basic problems posed in Yugoslavia are posed everywhere and remain unresolved everywhere, including in the "Maastricht" Europe.
The first problem is: how to pool our common economic and social resources? Instead of that, economic liberalism means the widening of every kind of division.
The second problem: how should rights — human rights, civil rights and the collective rights of different national entities, and particularly of minorities -- be assured in a complex, multi-ethnic community? Instead of addressing this problem, liberalism demands ever stronger states.
And this is why the West throws fuel on the fire it claims to be putting out. Its impotence has deep economic and political roots.
popular rock groups among Serb student youth. The journal Danas played a similar role in Croatia, but has been shut down on economic pretexts.
The YUTEL TV station, broadcasting from Sarajevo, has been prohibited in Zagreb and Belgrade, but it was very popular owing to its demarcation from the nationalist hysteria.
Even if it is not easy we must:
• Help the refugees;
• Support the amnesty law for deserters proposed by the Serb opposition;
• Make contact with independent journalists and give them material support;
• Give a platform to the suppressed minority of "traitors" to the national cause:
• Oppose military intervention. The Serb opposition to Milosevic is against it; they say it would strengthen the dictator's position among the Serb population and lead to an increase in repression.
Finally, there is the problem of support for the Bosnian territorial defence. If this force retains its multi-ethnic character and presents a programme that offers guarantees for the different nationalities, and if, as Tito's Partisans did, it offers an alternative to both the Ustashe and the Chetniks, an orientation towards military support for such a multi-ethnic defence could be seriously considered. *
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7
ex-YUGOSLAVIA
A turning point in the
International Viewpoint # 234 • September 14, 1992
Even if some Bosnian towns will have to be surrendered, the Serb leaders reckon that the conquest of more than a third of
Croatia and a half of Bosnia amounts, in war?
LESS than a week after the end of the London Peace
Conference, fighting has intensified throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina. On Sunday August 30 Serb militia fired an accurately placed shell into a Sarajevo market leading to further carnage among the hungry people waiting in a queue which they hoped would have bread at the end of it.
This new crime against unarmed people - supposedly under the protection of United Nations troops - showed how little respect the Serb forces have for the agreements reached at the negotiating table.
SLAVKO MIHALJCEK — September 3, 1992
OR the Western powers, and in
F the first place the USA, France and Britain, the big diplomatic show was meant to "humanize"
the conflict; they presented the conterence as the historic moment when the military de-escalation was to begin in ex-Yugosla-
Via.
For three days London saw a diplomatic deployment greater than that of any other international conference concerned with a regional conflict since 1945.
With the British prime minister and the
UN secretary general presiding, the conference brought together an impressive array of participants. Alongside the foreign ministers of the 12 European Community
(EC) countries, were their counterparts from the USA, Canada, China, the CIS and
Japan.
Frontline states represented
Representatives of the frontline countries, including Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Italy and also Turkey had been invited. The EC itself was represented by its president
Jacques Delors, and the Senegalese delegate could be seen paying careful attention to the proceedings in the name of the Organization of Islamic Countries.
All the republics of former Yugoslavia
(Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia) were represented by their presidents. While the
Yugoslav Federation (comprising Serbia and Montenegro) had two seats, representatives of the Serb minority in Croatia, the
Muslims of Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians were received in an annex.
Despite the turnout, the concrete results of the London Conference were thin.
Serbia was named as the aggressor in
Bosnia in most of the speeches, although not in the final declaration, but no new sanctions were adopted.
While it was decided in principle to strengthen the UN force up to a limit of 6,000, the definition of their mission was not changed. Their task remains that of protecting humanitarian aid convoys and there will be no attempt to open permanent aid corridors in Bosnia.
Concretely, this means that the convoys can only get underway with the agreement of the main parties to the conflict and that they can be held up at any moment by small armed local militia forces.
Thus the town of Gorazde, which has a population of 300,000 as well as many refugees and has just been liberated after being besieged by Serb militia for 150 days, has yet to receive a single sack of food or box of medicines.
Apart from the media performances by Milan Panic, the American businessman who is now prime minister of what remains of the Yugoslav Federation, and promises from the chief of the Bosnian Serb nationalists Karadzic to close his concentration camps, Serbia gave no undertaking whatsoever at the London Conference to cease waging war on its neighbours.
Serbian regime satisfied
An analysis of Serbian radio and TV broadcasts reveals considerable satisfaction on the part of the Serbian regime over the results of the conference.
Except for the fascists, all the other elements in the Milosevic government consider that the "Peace conference" was positive in that it put on official record the fact gave tacit acceptance to, all Serbia's territorial gains in the war.
fact, to the creation of a Greater Serbia.
The Belgrade media have noted with satisfaction that the conciliatory attitude of the Western leaders amounts to an acceptance of the new realities created on the ground by the war. A few commentators have expressed their concern about the "negative impact" of the discovery of the "detention camps" for Muslims and have advised they be closed "to improve the international image of Serbia". The arrest of the head of a royalist militia accused of committing massacres in Bosnia is predicted. However Milosevic still considers Seselj, the head of the neo-fascist party in Serbia, to be his most reliable ally.