A completely different situation has developed in the PZL-WSK aeronautic factory in Mielec where plans to reorganize production have led to waves of layoffs which have been accepted by the 1 "Exactly twelve years ago, we had the same scenario in this country and the same actors. But while the current government authorities were then participating in sit down strikes, they now inhabit posh government offices. And those who now strike and write appeals to their former colleagues are branded violent hordes who are trying to destroy the state" wrote a columnist in the daily Social Democratic organ Trybuna on August 12. 2 Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 170 of July 21, 1992. 3 See International Viewpoint no. 234 September 14, 1992. 4 See Zycie Gospodarcze, no. 35 of August 30, 1992 and no. 36 of September 6, 1992 as well as Nie no. 37 of September 10, 1992. 5 Named after Leszek Balcerowicz, the vice-minister and minister of finances in the first two governments of the new regime.
half of the year due to the payment of various end of 9
6 Incomes are traditionally higher during the second the year bonuses.
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revive
International Viewpoint # 235 • September 28, 1992
POLAND unions who have done nothing to save the factory from bankruptcy. This factory which produced transport planes for the Warsaw Pact has been totally destabilized by the changeover to a system of payments in hard currency for exchanges between the ex-COMECON countries.
In mid-July, when the workers received only a small portion of their wages, a sit down strike was called with the support of the OPZZ and Solidarity unions. After one month on strike, the workers won a small wage hike and work began again, without, however, an agreement being reached concerning the fate of the 4,50010,000 workers slated to be laid off in December. The government proposes to divide the factory into several joint stock companies and has spoken about creating a tax-free zone.
### Demand collapses
A similar situation faces the Ursus tractor factory where the strike that had been called by Solidarnosc and a small union that came out of a split in it, was not supported by the OPZZ. While 70,000 tractors were scheduled to be produced per year, the factory only produced 4,000 because the peasants can no longer afford to buy tractors. The strikers demanded state aid that would allow them to reconvert production as well as a change in the factory's legal status.
Though the strikes in the Lubin copper mines and factories and the FSM automobile factory at Tychy also raised wage demands, the outcome was quite different. Both the KGHM copper combine and the FSM are potentially profitable and are up for privatization. At the former it is directly the governmental policy -the famous popiwek - that is the main obstacle to wage hikes. At FSM where the Italian car firm FIAT is taking control, it is the resistance of the workers to becoming a cheap labour source for FIAT that was the origin of the conflict.
Since July 22, 3,500 workers have been occupying the plant and the director's offices. In the face of FIAT's refusal to negotiate with an "illegal strike", the government gave the go-ahead to FSM to fire the strikers. 400 lay-off notices have been mailed out. The latter have hardened their resolve and have even resorted to a hunger strike which continues as of this
The attitude of the unions in the face of this discontent has been uneven. Though Solidarnose *80 has supported the strikes, and its militants in Upper Silesia have, to the chagrin of the government, introduced the use of flying pickets to spread the strikes, the national leadership of Solidar10 force in the big factories, has tried to nose which still remains a formidable dampen the strikes by speaking of negotiations, and if that fails of future nationwide actions at some undetermined time.
According to a press report: "Solidarnose is in a particularly difficult situation. It is limited by its support to the Suchocka government, which was formed as the result of the work of Solidarnose parliamentary representatives, and it fears losing influence amongst the workers. In general, it is the last to join strikes or does not participate officially."]
However, while denouncing the sectoralism of other unions, it has found itself incapable of stopping or controlling strikes. The differences within it, already present before the strikes, have sharpened under their pressure. Today more than ever before, Solidarnosc appears as a transmission belt of the government.
The OPZZ and the other important autonomous industrial unions have attempted to fill the void left by the Solidarnosc leadership, and have used the social climate to step up pressure on the government for wage demands.
### Strike committees
An important development was signalled by the strike committees at FSM and KGHM which founded a national inter-union negotiating and strike committee last July 10, in which the OPZZ and Solidarnose '80 unions have participated as well as the Federation of Miners Unions, the Polish Miners Union, the train drivers's union and the peasant organization Samoobrana. As a result, the various strikes which had up until that point been uncoordinated, took on a coherent form with a common list of demands aimed at the state. Among the 21 demands drawn up by the committee is the demand for the immediate cancellation of the popiwek -the tax that has blocked the implementation of the wage hike agreements.
The other demands reflect the mass discontent about the situation as well as the absence of an alternative project acceptable to all the signatory organizations. This is the case for the demand that "chaotic privatisation which is tantamount to theft by the capitalist and political elites be immediately halted", as well as various demands aiming at a more "statist" and "interventionist"
The founding of this committee in spite of the absence of Solidarnosc union forces, was seen by the workers as a means of changing the balance of forces in their favour. New strikes began with the call for a 15-minute protest action by the OPZZ that were, according to the press, followed in half of the country's enterprises. The perspective of a unitary general strike that has been promoted by the OPZZ and the Samoobrana (the two forces that the press most frequently identifies with the old regime), was adopted.
On August 11, the two forces informed the government of their intentions. But soon after, on August 13, it became clear that the union leaderships were balking at actually leading a general strike. For Solidarnose '80, unity with forces who had been identified with the "communist devil" clearly posed a problem. The OPZZ wavered out of fear of the potential dynamic of such a move.
In fact, a national general strike must either lead to the fall of the government and to a radical change in the policies followed over the last three years (though the OPZZ does not have an alternative programme), or it will end in a defeat which will weaken those who participated in it. When the hesitations of the union leaderships became apparent, the two lead strikes took contradictory paths: a sell-out in the copper strike at Lubin, and a determination to fight to the finish in the FSM strike. Union unity - incomplete in the first place — did not move forward.
However, the national committee has continued its activity. "What is vital is the capacity to act together and present a united front in negotiations with the government" for "as long as the enterprises are public, a central union confederation is necessary to negotiate with the government", explained OPZZ president Ewa
Faced with this developing union united front, Solidarnose has lost its privileged position. As a leader of Solidarnosc' "Network" in the big enterprises has put
"historic differences and apparatus interests must take second place to the higher interests of the workers". This network, which brings together Solidarnosc committees in 260 of the country's enterprises, first tried to convince the union leadership to act but finally decided to call a nationwide two-hour warning strike for September 10 and form a National Strike Committee with its headquarters in the Huta Warszawa steel plant in War-
Strike call heeded
The committee called on the government to end the wage controls and the dividend system, free enterprises of their debts and guarantee the workers a role in their reconstruction.
The strike call was followed in 60 enterprises and many other commissions showed their support. 5,000 out of 7,000 workers at the Gdansk shipyard where Solidarnosc was born took part in the stri7 Gazeta Wyboreza, no. 173, July 24, 1992. 8 Interview in Gazeta Wyborcza no. 201 August 27, 1992.
September 28, 1992 ke. Roman Galezowski, the Solidarnosc leader in the shipyard and a Network leader, who is considered within the latter to be close to president Walesa, explained his fraction's attitude: "When I organize a referendum. in the yard and 1,650 people demand radical action and an end to union dues payments to the national leadership which is not doing anything, I have only two options: either to listen to my union members or to the union leadership. If I do the second, I will be kicked out of Solidarnosc".9 Other Solidarnosc officials also took their distance from the national leadership,revealing the divided and weakened state of the union.
The government responded by putting pressure on the directors, and avoiding any direct confrontation with the strikes. A statement issued on July 22 reads: "The Council of Ministers cannot be a party in these conflicts... the government cannot take responsibility for decisions on wages taken by management under the pressure of these strikes. It can on the other hand. draw the legal consequences concerning directors who take irresponsible decisions" 10
At the same time, the team around the labour minister Jacek Kuron prepared an emergency project for a social pact aimed at revitalizing the austerity programme launched in 1989-90. This new version of the same old policy involves maintaining wage controls, speeding up privatization and imposing strict financial limits on the state sector. However the approach has changed. For the past three years, all the variants of the policy have been imposed by the government without negotiations with the workers or unions. Given the weak legitimacy of these governments which are the product of elections with massive abstention rates, this has meant their ever more widespread repudiation. This time the idea is to implicate the workers' representatives in the taking of unpopular decisions at every level.
Thus the popiwek will henceforth be negotiated each quarter by a national tripartite negotiating commission. Formed of representatives of the government, the bosses and the unions, this commission will give legitimacy to wage freezes. Thus unions, or other representatives elected by workers, will have a third of the votes in the commissions.
### Basic aim unchanged
Despite this, the aim is still the same as ever. The draft of the pact leaves no room for doubt about this: "One of the most important questions is to find owners for the public enterprises, since an enterprise that does not belong to anybody cannot be efficient. This owner can be a private individual, a joint stock company (for example formed by the workers) or the public treasury... The main way to find an owner is privatization, and that is why we give it so much space in the pact."I!
As bait for the workers, the pact will make leasing by workers' associations in the smaller enterprises (less than 1,000 workers) easier. The only novelties are the proposals concerning debt and changes to the tax system. 12 On the latter issue, it is proposed to abandon the "dividend" mechanism for a mechanism of three-way division of the profits: one for accumulation (this must not be less than one third of the profits), the second for the workers, and the third, a sum equal to the second, for the state.
This scheme, which will not have much impact on workers' incomes, has the advantage of facilitating self-financing by enterprises and putting an end to the automatic worsening of the indebtedness of unprofitable or barely profitable enterprises represented by the dividend.
### Dotting the "i"s
So that nobody should be in any doubt about the government's intentions, Jacek Kuron dotted the "i"s: "We must be aware that in the first place we must change the way our public enterprises are run. Sometimes we hear that such enterprises also exist in highly industrialized countries.
"This is a misunderstanding. Such an [economic] creation (of the recent past in Poland), even when called an autonomous subject, does not exist in a market economy. Here there is a management and a self-management council, but there is nobody representing the interests of the state, of the owner.
"The enterprise must be managed by someone in a style aimed at maximizing profits and development, and only secondarily at paying higher wages. This must
POLAND be the aim of the unions. This is the regime we must create. We have given ourselves a mere three months for this. This is the time span we have set for negotiations with the unions". 13
That is to say, everything is up for discussion apart from the orientation imposed on the country by the new regime over the past three years. This orientation is now to be rounded out by the abolition of the self-management rights won by the workers in 1981, rights which despite many attempts to negate them, have meant that workers have retained a measure of workers' control in the big enterprises.
It is surprising that the element of workers' strength represented by the existence of these self-management councils enjoying wide prerogatives is not being taken into account by the unions in working out their strategies.
Only the Network, and only then inconsistently, stresses the right of workers to oversee the reorganization of the enterprises. The decline since the heyday of Solidarnose in 1980-81 of worker support for the notion of "taking our fate in our own hands" is shown by the fact that strike committees during the recent strikes were not elected; in general they were formed by appointed union and inter-union committees. This is a big asset for the government as it manoeuvres to find a new legitimacy for a policy whose bankruptcy is already clear. * 9. Interview in Gazeta Wyborcza no. 171 July 22. 1992. 10. Quoted in Gazeta Wyborza no. 171 July 22, 1992. 11. Quoted in Gazeta Wyborcza no. 213 September 10. 1992. 12. This involves the authorization of debt negotiation in the public market as well as renogotiating enterprise debts. These latter involve practices borrowed directly from the IMF! 13. Quoted in Gazeta Wyboreza no. 213 Septenber 1 1 10, 1992..
From shock to slump
International Viewpoint # 235 • September 28, 1992
- with people purchasing 25% less milk products and 50% less clothing and shoes. About half the population is now living below the official poverty line. Malnutrition is increasing - a recent poll of young people in St. Petersburg found that 40% were "constantly hungry" while a further 40% said they "often felt hunger".4
WHEN RUSSIAN President Boris Yeltsin addressed the
Russian public on August 19, the first anniversary of the failed coup d'etat, there was little left of the triumphant attitude of last year's victor. In spite of massive media coverage in the liberal press and Yeltsin's invocation of a
"Russia that has not only a great past but a great future"
gloom was the dominant note in most comments on the occasion.
One year after the ascent of the Yeltsinites to near absolute power they have little reason for optimism. The
IMF-inspired economic shock therapy carried out by acting prime minister Yegor Gaidar is in a dead end while a fierce power struggle is taking place in the pro-capitalist camp.
This struggle centres on the intertwined questions of the economic reform strategy and the foreign policy objectives of the "new Russia" particularly in relation to the non-
Russian republics of the former Soviet Union, most of whom are now part, with Russia, of the so-called