FRANCE
Yes, but...
THE vote in the September 20 French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty on European union ended with a victory for the treaty's supporters, albeit by a very slim margin. The "yes" vote was slightly over 51% and the "no" slightly less than 49% of the more than 25.6 million votes cast. FRANCIS SITEL
W HILE a sigh of relief went
Around the French political class at the result, attempts to present the result as a further proof of the genius of French president François Mitterrand or, alternatively, as a miracle given the three million unemployed and the total lack of credibility of Mitterrand's regime, are not very convin-
When the referendum was announced by Mitterand, victory for the "yes" camp seemed assured in advance, with opinion polls giving it around 60%. At that time everyone was praising this new demonstration of Mitterrand's political skills; the vote for Maastricht would also be a vote of confidence in his reign, while the pro-Maastricht alliance could form the basis of a new presidential majority of the centre to counteract the inexorable decline in the fortunes of the Socialist Party (PS).
There were two basic grounds for this confidence. The first was that for years opinion polls have shown the French public to be highly favourable to European unity. The present turmoil in much of the continent and the Yugoslav tragedy in particular have tended to reinforce this view, giving weight to the argument that European union could provide a pole of stability in the present and future storms.
The second is that the "yes" camp was a very broad coalition of the great and the good, based solidly on convergence between the PS, the (centre-right) Union for French Democracy (UDF) of former president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and many ecologists, all presenting themselves as the face of openness and modernity. The no" camp, meanwhile, could be presented as a ragbag of backward looking and chauvinist forces, ranging across the neo-Fascist National Front (FN), the French CommuInternational Viewpoint # 236 nist Party (PCF) and various fragments of the far left and the Greens. The "yes" camp expected to enjoy a field day denouncing this unprincipled cartel of political marginals.
Between the two camps was the Assembly for the Republic (RPR - the other mainstream rightwing party apart from the UDF). Its leader Jacques Chirac, the mayor of Paris, could not risk seeming anti-European and had to argue for a "yes" despite the views of much of his electorate, who, imbued with the traditions of De Gaulle, are utterly hostile to any notion of suprana-
With the overwhelming majority of the political class on his side and a solid majority already in place among the voters, Mitterrand seemed to have started the game with a winning hand. Indeed, much of the campaign seemed to underline the two basic strengths of the "yes" camp — public opinion continued to show strong support for European unity even among many hostile to the Maastricht Treaty as such, the PS-UDF alliance proved its solidity, the RPR split wide open, while the far right elements in the "no" camp served to repel many sceptics over to the "yes". However, somehow, things did not go as planned as an unknown quantity crept into the equa-
Surge in public interest
This quantity was the unexpected upsurge in popular interest in the European question, and even in the convoluted text of the Maastricht treaty itself, matters hitherto perceived as a matter for the elites. Both the polls and the participation show this increased interest. The Danish "no" of last June had revealed that the mysterious workings of the Euro-bureaucracy in Brussels did not hide self-evident truths, and that, perhaps, the people could in fact decide.
Instead of the expected indifference, which had led the politicians to mount only the most feeble and banal campaigns, the sudden interest provided an opportunity for a number of ambitious outsiders, among them Philippe Séguin on the right and JeanPierre Chevènement on the left.' It soon became apparent that the no/yes division cut across all parties and society as a
The politicians had two central concerns. The first, based on an attempt to identify the Maastricht Treaty with Europe, was to prevent voters on the left who supported European construction looking too hard at the actual Treaty or daring to oppose it. The second, mainly affecting the right, was to stop voters from rejecting the Treaty in order to bring down Mitterrand. However,
GAGME!
Where to now? complicate maters. to some extent at least, this framework broke down, exposing the real issues at stake.
And in the event it turned out that the self-styled "moderns" were remarkably short of ideas. Their response to the sudden rise in support for a "no" was marked by exasperation. A powerful whiff of arrogance and blackmail towards the "ignorant and badly informed" could be smelt in their speeches. It should also be admitted that much of the argumentation for the "no" was nationalist and chauvinist, with the RPR prioritizing its opposition to voting rights for foreigners from other EC countries in its interventions in the debate in the Senate. However, other, more significant questions were also raised.
### Defending the nation
One of the main points around which opposition crystallized was that of the nation. At first this, as was predictable, manifested itself in denunciations of the "European unity" process for its threat to "French identity". This was the keynote of the National Front as well as of the RPR's 1. Philippe Séguin, minister for social affairs in the 1986-1988 Chirac government is, like the former minister of the interior Charles Pasqua, opposed to the RPR's official position of support for the Maastricht treaty, combining populist and nationalist arguments. Séguin and Pasqua organized the "Rassemblement pour le non", the rightwing campaign for a no vote.
Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Mitterrand's former minister of defence, who resigned after the outbreak of the Gulf War, is the historic force behind an opposition current in the PS, called CERES and subsequently Socialisme et République. He campaigned against the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, employing both social and nationalist arguments. In September 1992, he launched the "Mouvement des Citoyens" which seems to be preparing the ground for his exit from the PS.
FROM its first discussion on Maastricht a remarkable degree of unanimity was to be found against the treaty and in favour of a
Pasqua; nor was this theme entirely absent in the speeches of Cheènement and the
FRANCE
Communist Party.
However, underneath this question lay another, not wholly reducible to this natio-
"no" vote on the central committee of the French Revolutionary nalist approach: is the framework of the
Communist League (LCR - French section of the Fourth Internation state obsolete, requiring the creation national). A poster campaign was undertaken rejecting the of a state-type supranational entity, and jusbosses Europe and putting forward LCR policies such as a 35tifying a transfer of sovereignty?
hour working week, the right to vote for all those resident in
A negative response to this question was
France and free abortion and contraception on demand. Some common ground for otherwise antagonistic forty meetings were held throughout the country in September.
positions; there is in fact little in common
At the start of that month, it became clear that principled unibetween a reactionary obsession with a ted work against Maastricht from an internationalist point of supposed (and always restrictive) "French view was possible. Other forces open to this approach came identity" on the one hand and concern from critical Socialists, (including the Socialisme et République about the threat to democracy posed by a current), the dissident Refondateurs and Reconstructeurs curlooking to supranational oligarchy rents of the Communist Party, anti-Maastricht greens, the Red construct a European imperialism.
and Green Alternative (AREV), the Libertarian Alternative as well
The second question that increasingly as many independent trade union, feminist, and anti-racist milicame to the fore during the campaign was tants. In Marseilles it was even possible to hold a joint meeting that of the social and economic model implied by Maastricht - one of neo-libera-
The Trotskyist organization Lutte Ouvrière ("Workers lism carved in stone. The cornerstone of
Struggle"), for its part, denounced the "masquerade" of the refethe treaty is the single currency and the rendum and called for an abstention on the grounds that both independent central bank. Or more precise-
"yes" and "no" camps were dominated by the bourgeoisie.
ly, the draconian conditions which must be
An appeal "for a leftwing no" signed by fifty representative fulfilled to implement the first and the masmilitants and intellectuals made a significant impact. It served as sive powers granted to a group of powerful a basis for many meetings, including one with some 1,500 money obsessed bankers to form the people in Paris, which gave a platform for a left and internationasecond. The Treaty opens up a prospect of list "no"; it also laid the groundwork for future collaboration with undiluted monetarism, a clear reduction in democracy and the certainty of policies that will make unemployment worse and mean cuts in all forms of social rights.
In fact, the denunciation of monetary policies exacerbating stagnation and unemployment struck a chord even in ruling class circles: even members of the National
Council of French Employers (CNPF) voiced harsh criticism of these policies.
Voting rights for who?
Many other issues were raised, among them that of voting rights for EC citizens resident in other EC countries (but not for non-EC immigrants); the German question in the light of that country's new strength and problems and the argument as to whether enhanced EC unity would provide a guarantee against rising nationalism in the light of the Yugoslav crisis. But throughout everything a basic theme was coming to the surface: Europe, certainly, but what kind of
Europe?
On the "yes" side the basic idea was that of an economic superpower with the strongest currency in the world. Such a prospect certainly upset super chauvinists, but it was far more fundamentally in contradiction with a truly internationalist spirit. Those who opposed Maastricht from such a position were arguing: we do not want a Fortress (largely Western) Europe, jealously guarding its exclusive privileges, barricaded to keep out people from the East and the South while inside inequalities of all kinds swell providing fertile ground for with the local Communist Party.
new-found allies - F. S. * racism and fascism. They wanted a Europe open to all the peoples of the continent and on the southern side of the Mediterranean and indeed to the world as a whole. The very opposite of Maastricht.
After their slim victory, the ruling class sighed with relief. However, the alarm has gone off for the political class. Some 90% of parliamentary deputies voted yes to Maastricht as did most of the candidates in the 1988 presidential election (representing about 76% of the votes cast then), all the parties and leaders who have been in government over the past 20 years. But the same treaty got only 51% support in the country at large. Against the advice of party leaders some 58% of RPR voters, 38% of UDF voters and 20% of Socialist voters voted "no" - the latter despite the fact that a "no" vote might have meant the swift end of the present Socialist government.
Furthermore, 55% of those "without party" voted "no". This is at once a wounding repudiation of the politicians and a sign of social division. A majority of farmers and manual workers voted "no" (by some 60%), as did those under 50, the southermost and northernmost regions, and the banlieues (suburban working class housing developments).
Majorities were cast for the "yes" among middle management (65%), senior management and the liberal professions (68%), those between 50 and 64(53%), over 65 (55% and in the West and East regions, the Paris region and Rhône-Alpes bordering on Germany.
All commentators have noted the appearance of these "two Frances" - while often implying that this is really a division between "intelligence" and "broad-mindedness" on the one hand and "narrow-mindedness" and "mediocrity" on the other.
In fact, the France that said "no" is that of hard work and hard times, of people whose basic economic insecurity makes them less than mesmerized by the charms of the single currency. Those on the left who fought for a "no" addressed the central task of not leaving this constituency in the hands of reactionary forces. This France ought to be, and has in the past been, the bedrock of the left; if it is now influenced by the right, then this is a comment on the failures of the big left parties over the past years.
This vote adds yet another element of uncertainty to our contemporary world. On the strictly French level, Mitterrand's scheme for a centre realignment has been undermined.
We are approaching elections that will see the end of the Mitterrand epoch, the return of the right to government and a 1 1 deep crisis in the Socialist Party. *
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A dynamic campaign
The unification
International Viewpoint # 236 • October 12, 1992 vious five years and the proportion of new machines was certainly higher, since the figure includes buildings. The West German Ifo-Institut calculated that the building stock (worth DM330bn) was largely sound (DM265bn). These few figures give us some idea of the huge devalorization effected by the annexation.
THE current crisis of the European monetary system has its roots in the fall of the Berlin Wall. Or, more precisely, in the high interest rates with which the German state is attempting to deal with the soaring cost of the absorption of the former non-capitalist East German state into the capitalist Federal Republic. In the following article Hans-Jürgen Schultz reviews the history and current stage of the East German economic
An adjustment period of at least ten years is needed when a country which, at least from the point of view of labour productivity, is less economically viable, joins an economic block or the world market. The European Community can offer several examples of this. In the East German case, this well-known fact was pushed aside, with foreseeable results.
The East European market was lost, catastrophe. HANS-JÜRGEN SCHULTZ — August 20, 1992
E AST and West Germany were
united in spring 1990 in the belief that the market economy could solve all the problems of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR - East Germany). Since then it has been part of the job of every responsible official to predict the "Eastern boom" for the near future. This has been true not only for the government or its paid experts. The press have striven to give the impression that these prophets are still in the know despite all the evidence before their own eyes.
Even the trade unions have joined in. When the DIW (German Institute for Economic Predictions) briefly mentioned that incomes in the "joined territories" would lag 20 years behind, it drew down the wrath of the president of IG-Metall, who considered such discoveries "irresponsible and highly tactless", since they could result in a "mass exodus". The illusion cannot be publicly exposed; nobody must disturb it, lest panic and confusion break out.
The left has in principle faced no problems in arguing against this; it has only had to refer to what is in front of everyone's nose. However its own predictions have themselves turned out to be largely based on wishful thinking. The left said that the East German workers would not allow their enterprises to be taken away - and this would be even more true when it came to their jobs - and that they would stubbornly defend social benefits such as nurseries or low rents. Therefore, a "hot autumn" was forecast for 1990 and then continually re-forecast for the near future, until finally the prophecies faded away.
Today, the economy of the former GDR 12 has been almost destroyed. Despite all its defects, the GDR had been the tenth biggest industrial country on earth. In terms of GNP it was 15th - ahead of South Korea, despite having two and a half times less people. Individual incomes were almost as high as in Italy or Britain and 50% higher than in Spain. Within a year of the economic annexation, incomes had fallen by a half (1990: - 14.4%; 1991: -30.3%) and industrial production had
This catastrophe is not the result of "40 years of socialist economic mismanagement". It is true that towards the end an economic crisis was becoming apparent in the GDR. However, the unprecedented economic collapse that the country has since suffered is the consequence of West German policies. Even if the East German economy were to grow 3% faster than that in the West it would take until 2060 for the East to catch up.
### Massive job losses
Apart from agriculture (1989: 920,000 employees); construction (560,000) and mining, industry (3.2 million) is the only basis for the country's economic existence. Certainly, compared to West German competition it was inferior — labour productivity being only half as high. Nonetheless, it was still competitive compared to South European enterprises. (Which, of course, in terms of the old Stalinist theories about the "competition between systems" was itself a crushing defeat.)
Nonetheless significant wealth was created. The GDR's fixed assets were worth 1.745 billion marks - in West German terms, 12,000 billion deutschmarks (DM) - of which 800bn in industry. Not all of this was "rotten". A fourth of all plant had been installed in the prebecause the crisis there meant a drastic fall in effective demand. Certainly this no longer had the significance that many imagine (the share of GDR exports going to Eastern Europe fell constantly between 1980 and 1989, from 65.4% to 48.5%). But no country can brush off such a col-
Worse have been the losses on the Western and internal markets. Exports to the Western industrialized countries rose strongly in the 1980s (from 24.1% of exports to 48.5%). They were subsidized and propped up through customs' barriers. Marketing was organized from the centre. With the collapse of the East German state the combines suddenly found that they had no sales apparatus any more. Furthermore, the currency union raised their costs threefold. Under these conditions there was, from one day to the next, nothing more to sell.
### Flood of products
As a result, West German products flooded into the former GDR. They were both/either cheaper and/or better. But the buyers from the big West German retailers were to say the least more restrained when it came to buying competitive pro-
Under these conditions, any national economy, even that of West Germany, would have crumbled. Already by spring 1991, industrial production had fallen to less than 40% of its former level. That could only have been avoided if an attempt had been made to modernize the East German economy (for which DM300bn would have been needed) and if it had been subsidized long enough for new products to be developed and a marketing structure built. This was not done.