The colonial division of Somalia at the end of the nineteenth century divided the country into Italian, English, French and Ethiopian spheres of influence. The borders of these territorial jurisdictions conflicted with the nomadic conception of space that was based on watering holes. Such a social equilibrium requires a process of permanent confrontation and negotiation between agricultural groups which in turn involves the active construction of a network of economic and matrimonial relations spanning traditional grazing grounds to city markets. This is a precarious existence where violence with traditional weapons holds sway.3
Foreign and non-Muslim domination provoked resistance, particularly the twenty year guerilla war led by Mohamed Abdillé Hassan, who was dubbed the "Mad Mullah" by the English. Emerging from a Darod Ogadeni clan, Hassan defied the British forces from 1899 to 1920. In spite of the lack of unanimity in this struggle as a result of tribal and religious cleavages, history has credited Hassan with contributing to the emergence of a Somali national identity that has spread beyond the borders of land and the ex-Italian Somalia (reintegrated in 1960 into the Republic of Somalia). Djibouti, Ogaden and north east Kenya. Since 1964 Somalis and Ethiopians have clashed over lines of demarcation that had never been negotiated, each supported by guerilla movements operating along the border. While Somalia benefitted from the ethnic identity of the Ogadeni, Ethiopia benefitted from the tribal cleavages in Somalia. These clashes reached a high point in the Ogaden war of 1977-1988. The Somali aggression at a time when the revolutionary regime of Addis Ababa had to confront an offensive on the Eritrean and Tigrean fronts, provoked a turnaround on the part of the Soviets who massively supplied Ethiopia with enough arms and troops to allow it to repulse the Somalis.
The 1978 defeat of Ogaden forced the
Somalis to focus on internal problems and clan politics masked under the term "pan-Somalism" were not long in coming to the fore. For ten years, head of state and clan leader, Darod Marehan, successfully manoeuvred by taking advantage of the divisions within the opposition. But it is important to reflect upon the meaning of the struggle led by Mohamed Abdillé Hassan. Today, it is convenient to highlight the antagonism between Issak and Darod. In fact, throughout the war which pitted the English colonial troops against the "Mad Mullah's" henchmen, the role of the Issags who fought side by side with the British in order to guarantee the integrity of their pastoral spaces was not negligible.
From the beginning of the 1980s, the Syad Barré regime had to confront the Mijirtein rebellion, one of the three branches of the Darod tribes that were regrouped within the Somali Democratic Front of Salvation (SDFS). Danger was avoided thanks to the crushing superiority of the Somali army and the relative isolation of the Mijirtein, who were implanted in the extreme notheast of the country. On the other hand, the Issag dissidents of the 1. According to US press reports, the cost of a peace-keeping force in Somalia is considered to high ($7.5bn), keeping in mind priority commitments in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, leave alone aid put aside for Russia. International Herald Tribune, April 29 and May 13, 1992. 2. Stephen Smith, "Coup de barre chez les Somaliens", Libération, August 4, 1989. 3. Most 19th century travellers speak of their encounters with sturdy nomadic peoples armed with spears and swords. 4. Pierre Rondot, "Quelques remarques sur le personage et le rôle historique de Mohammed Abdillé Hassan", Bulletin de la société d'études d'Afrique Orientale, number 8, 1970.
November 9, 1992
National Somali Movement (SNM) founded in 1981 would plunge the country into a bloody civil war.
### Civilians flee bombings
In 1988, faced with infiltration by SNM operatives in the cities of Hargeisa, Burao and Erigavo, the army, with air support, methodically bombed these towns in order to retake control. The majority of the civilian population then fled to find refuge in camps installed along the Ethiopian border. This exodus reinforced the SNM whose bases could henceforth benefit from inter-
The appearance of an armed Hawiyé opposition under the name of the United Somalia Congress (USC) accelerated events. Faced with a double military pressure from the North and around the Mogadishu region, Siyad Barre and his Darod troops were forced to retreat from the capital after a month of fighting, but not before bombing most of the town's neighbo-
Since then, the war has not let up in the southern part of the country. Hawiyé and Darod fight over control of the useful zone" of the country situated between the Wabi Shebelle and Juba rivers. In the capital and its environs, two rival Hawiyé clans the Abgal and their Murosade allies — under temporary president Ali Mahdi Mohamed, and the Habr Gedir supported on their side by the commander of the CSU army General Mohamed Farah Aidid clash in order to control the influx of imports, international aid and khat, a mild, natural stimulant whose effects resemble that of hashish.
Faced with an unstable political and military situation and in a fragile environment subject to drought, famine, too long ignored, will soon hit a third of the Somali population.S
Since the fighting of November 1991, several humanitarian agencies have sounded the alarm. One of them, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), decided to launch a sweeping operation without waiting for the still improbable international support. Since earlier 1992, around 600 community kitchens have been set up throughout the country to feed nearly a million exhausted people and thus prevent the pillaging of food reserves. 80,000 tonnes have been provided by the ICRC since the beginning of this year but that amount is notoriously insufficent to meet the estimated demands of between 50,000 and 60,000 tonnes a month.°
Around six months after the first appeals, the governments and the media discovered the scope of the catastrophe: "In the face of this non-assistance to a population threatened with death, a small number of nongovernmental organizations continue to provide Somalia with small amounts of assistance. The most important of these is the international Red Cross which will now devote a quarter of its overall 'operations' budget to alleviating what it considers to be the greatest tragedy that Africa has ever
As the security of the convoys is not guaranteed due to the persistant fighting, the CICR has taken the pragmatic position of neutrality and has tried to protect itself by callng for respect of the symbol of the Red
It has accepted armed escorts for its convoys.& Some 3,000 men from the two sectors of the capital participate in this effort supported by the militia chiefs who rent vehicles to protect them. The port has been likewise placed under the "protection"
Trade in the stores of aid provide comfortable income for these "war lords" and this has been increasing. Today only militiamen can be sure of eating. There has been a revival of the caravan tradition where camels have been rented and the safety of caravans has been assured for pay for the duration of the trip?
The other disputed market is tied to the khat trade. Amongst the populations of the Horn of Africa, the daily use of khat has risen dramatically along with urbanization. The result has been a considerable market in this which has benefitted by the war because all of the soldiers chew it and the price has risen. The advance of khat which must be consumed fresh has stimulated the setting up of distribution outlets near the Kenyan border. Small aircraft have been used to transport khat to the Mogadishu region where fighting has occurred over control of the air fields.
### Famine strikes Kenya
Faced with such a situation the exodus of more than 300,000 Somalis towards Kenya as well as the population concentrations in certain localities like Baidoa, has contributed to the spread of the famine. It is now striking at a neighboring country affected by the drought and which must at the same time deal with an influx of refugees coming from Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan.10
The famine is even more spectacular in that many poverty stricken nomadic farmers have waited until the last moment before deciding to leave their grazing lands and traditional watering holes. Deprived of their leased out cattle-capital and of their mobility, the nomadic populations are particularly vulnerable.
While much sincere concern could be noted throughout the first semester of the year 1992, the images of the dying town of
Baidoa have since July had the same effect on western public opinion the famous reports on the Korem camp in Kenya that
SOMALIA were broadcast in October, 1984.!1
To be sure, direct responsibility for the catastrophic military situation that has shaken the country cannot be directly laid at the door of the Western countries, although the latter were largely responsible for providing the arsenals upon which the military force of the militias is based. But it is striking to see how barely eight years after the Ethiopian famine, next to nothing has been done to avoid a new major catastrophe.
Following the media attention given to the famine there has been a pronounced rush of humanitarian organizations to establish themselves in the country. The lack of coordination of aid efforts and the improvisation of those involved have prompted the press to write about "humanitarian bottlenecks"12 and has led to severe criticism being levelled against the United Nations. The United States has decided to grant a massive food aid package of 145,000 tonnes. Here again it is striking that the initial distributions could not be carried out due to a shortage of stocks of the World Food Program (WFP), 13
Thus, apart from several NGOs, no food aid was in place in the region. Considering the cerebral damage that undernourished young children face, can it not be said that once again it is too late?
These last minute charity efforts do not achieve their stated goal, and their cost in terms of human labour and supplies is huge. Recourse to air bridges costs astronomical sums per tonne. 14 Viewed from television sets, the participation of governments and aid organization seems massive. However, six months earlier, the catastrophe could have been limited to the combat zones and the extension of the famine to certain regions in Kenya. In short, all the political and economic consequences for the fragile country of Somalia could have 5. Somalia's population is estimated to be six million, according to World Bank figures. Report on
World Development, 1990.
6. Unfortunately, Somalia has not received more attention. Every day, 500 children die of malnutrition. Tribune de Genève, June 2, 1992.
7. Stephen Smith, Libération, July 29, 1992.
8. "Le CICR doit recourir à l'escorte armée", Le
Nouveau Quotidien, February 19, 1992.
9. A. Bardey, Barr Adjam, Souvenirs d Afrique orientale 1880-1887, CNRS, Paris, 1992.
10. Refugees are arriving at the Kenyan border at the rate of 100 per day (July 11, 1992). Here are the
UNHCR's statistics on Somalian refugees: Ethiopia
500,000; Kenya 300,000; Europe 100,000; Yemen
65,000 and Djibouti 15,000 (August 18).
11. J. Perlez, New York Times, July 19, 1992.
12. Libération, August 26, 1992.
13. The setting up of the American "Provide Food"
air bridge was delayed until August 28; as a comparison, the EEC's food aid commitments in 1992 totalled 185,000 tonnes. Le Monde, September 15,
1992.
14. In 1985, it cost $1000 for each tonne of food aid 23 sent by air bridge from Khartoum to Darfour.
Earthscan Feature, Octobre 18, 1985.