Collor falls but his policies remain
THE vote by 441 parliamentary deputies on September 29 for the temporary removal of Brazil's President Collor to be judged for "the crime of responsibility" for corruption in the Senate was the culminating moment of a political episode that no one had foreseen at the beginning of the year. GUSTAVO CEDAS* A THE first National
Congress of the leftist Workers Party (PT), at the end of 1991, there was a big debate on whether the party should take up the slogan "Out with Collor"; the majority decided against. At the same time agreement was reached on opposition to Collor's programme of neo-liberal economic reforms.
A few months later the question returned in a different form. From a series of sources there came information regarding the existence of a corruption network in the federal government starting with the president and going through his close friend and treasurer of his election campaign, Paulo Cesar Faria, known as "PC"
The scandal really broke when the president's younger brother denounced him publicly after months of family disputes over economic and political interests. Then came the first interview with this brother in the weekly Veja, followed by a media race for further juicy details, all of which further incriminated PC and, more and more, Collor himself.
The PT's parliamentary deputies immediately called for the formation of a Parliamentary Investigation Committee (PIC) to look into the matter.
The proposal was treated with disdain by the other parties, but through force of public opinion parliament had to give a satisfactory reply to the various denunciations and revelations.
At the beginning, the right accepted the creation of the PIC in the hopes that it would come to nothing, like previous initiatives of this kind.
However the revelations by the press and PT deputies continued and the mounting pressure convinced growing sectors of the centre and right to carry out the investigations to the bitter end and prosecute Collor. Many calculated that this question would heavily influence the municipal elections of early October.
There is another factor which explains this attitude. There was tremendous discontent in some business sectors over the amount and growth of the government's corruption and its subversion of traditional patterns of payment for influence.
In this Collor, as an outsider in relation to the traditional government patterns of the Brazilian bourgeoisie, was trying to consolidate his own base. During the 1989 election campaign, Collor had described himself as the only one capable of defea BRAZILEN CORRUPTIN
10.9
BRAZIL ting PT candidate Lula in the elections -and he received large financial support from various enterprises for his campaign.
As such, his corruption served not only to maintain his luxurious lifestyle, but also to buy the support of long term friends and allies. Hidden in a web of ghost companies in Brazil and abroad, the Collor-PC network was stripped bare when revelations came forth from the enterprise sector itself, and when the "bank secrecy" of various suspects was over-ridden. A number of "phantom" bank accounts were discovered, held under false names with the signature of people from the Collor-PC network -accounts which allowed the network to engage in transactions valued at several millions of dollars without being noticed.
This money came from "coimas" paid by enterprises to the network and through various illicit transactions originating in the government itself. It was used to finance political campaigns and the luxurious lifestyle of the president and his family. For example, it was discovered that the management of Autolatina (the Volkswagen-Ford conglomerate in Brazil) had directly financed a rightwing federal candidate in the Amazon region; and that the president had used money from PC (some $3m) to upgrade his garden by adding eight artificial waterfalls, among other things; members of his family received daily "ghost" deposits with a value of several thousands of dollars.
### Ethics in politics
Opposition deputies and journalists set the tone for several weeks. This situation changed when the Movement for Ethics in Politics was founded through an initiative by CUT, OAB, UNE and PNBE?; but most of all as a result of the youth mobilizations organized by student organizations.
The Movement for Ethics in Politics was organized through the national structures of the CUT; it organized demonstrations across the country, giving them a crossparty character.
But it also determined the character of the mobilizations: they reflected indignation against corruption more than they did rejection of the neo-liberal programme or the economic policy. This is not to say that unemployment, the drop in real salaries,
*Gustavo Cedas is an activist in the CUT trade union confederation in Sao Paulo.
1. It is traditional for Brazilian enterprises to have a
"second account" which is lavishly employed to obtain favours from officials.
2. CUT: United Workers Confederation - is Brazil's main union confederation with some 4.5 million members. It has links with the PT.
OAB: Brazilian Lawyers Association.
UNE: National Students Union, which has a leftwing leadership. Its president is from the (formerly pro-Albanian) Brazilian Communist Party and the
PT is strongly represented.
PNBE: National Small Business Thinktank.
----- photo credits and running heads -----
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International Viewpoint # 239 • November 23, 1992
BRAZIL the deep recession, the destruction of a part of industry, and so forth did not figure prominently among the concerns of the immense majority of those participating in the demonstrations. But the concrete "programme" of the mobilizations was: end corruption and, therefore, that the Congress should impeach Collor.
Nonetheless, this movement for ethics and morality in political life signals the rebirth of the will to struggle of significant layers of the masses — and a level of mobilization that had not been seen since the "Directas ya!" campaign of 198319843 and Lula's presidential campaign of 1989.
In this sense, this campaign must be seen as part of the broad democratic struggle in our countries, where both the economic model and the political system are exclusive and elitist. Consequently, pushing out a corrupt president through mass mobilizations has been recorded as radical democratic victory in the mass conscience of Brazil and other countries.
### Youth resurrection
High school and university students, youth in general, took to the streets for weeks on end in cities across the country, winning over mass support for their
There are at least three factors which contributed to this student-youth resurrection after an absence which had lasted since the end of the 1970s: on one hand, youth had been hit by unemployment and the lack of opportunity; on the other hand, there was the growing privatization of education and the increase in fees. These two "sociological" factors may explain the readiness of youth to protest, even if they were not directly raised during the protests.
The third phenomenon was more explicit: the impact of a Brazilian television
"Años Rebeldes" (Rebellious
Years), which related on the main television network, Globo, the true story of a group of young women and men of the 1968 generation that struggled against the dictatorship and joined the guerilla forces.
From the series, the demonstrations took up the songs of the 1968 period. The youth introduced the novelty of painting their faces (for this, they were labelled carapintadas - "the painted faces") and making lighthearted and playful screaming the main weapon of the street demonstrations.
The raising of the "ethics" question tends to force people to go beyond Collor, and all politicians have been examined under a magnifying lense.
The most notorious case is that of
Orestes Quercia, president of the main bourgeois party, the PMDB4. This party 10 and even before the fall of Collor it was has the largest number of federal deputies, coming under investigation for its activities when it governed the state of São Paulo (1986-90). The same patterns of corruption were soon discovered, and this has seriously placed in doubt Quercia's candidacy for the 1994 presidential elections.
The CUT was seen by public opinion as one of the major forces behind the mobilizations. As a national non-party body it was able to provide the framework for a broad movement of "civil society".
Nevertheless, this good standing in "public opinion" concealed a weakness of its specifically union activity in the present
The combined application of a series of neo-liberal reforms (privatizations of state firms and public services, liberalization of foreign trade and deregulation of the labour market) and unprecedented recessionary economic policies meant that the class-struggle trade union movement has lost its capacity to respond on all fronts to the offensive by Collor and the employers.
As a result, the CUT despite its moment of glory in the impeachment campaign remains unable to respond to the specific measures of the government.
### Mass unemployment
In the Sao Paulo region alone, unemployment has reached 1.5m, and the informal sector of the labour market counts nearly a half of the workforce in its ranks. This pattern is paralleled across the coun
The changes that workers have had to face have been accompanied by an aggressıve propaganda barrage. The government and employers insist that they are trying to modernize the economy and overcome the "old model" responsible for the deep economic crisis of the 1980s.
Much of the population has a negative
- and quite justified — view of the former economic model - which they see as a source of bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, waste and clientelism, financial speculation, and involving subsidies and protection that defend the high profit levels
The ruling classes seek to build on this sentiment; they argue: "the state enterprises are a sources of corruption - it is necessary to sell them off" or "let's open up to imports so that the consumer has access to the best and the cheapest goods."
Indeed, if these are not the solutions, it is necessary to propose others. The class struggle trade union movement has suffered both as a result of the recession and massive unemployment and as a result of its inability to rise to the task of presenting an alternative to the previous capitalist model, which they have at least not made the mistake of defending.
While there has been considerable strike activity during Collor's two-year reign, this has been in decline in recent months, reflecting the demoralization of workers
A milestone in this process was the defeat of the CUT only a few days before Collor's fall in the union elections of the Volta Redonda (in the state of Rio de Janeiro) metal workers. Workers of the CSN' state steelworks maintained a militant stand against the dictatorship and its economic policies throughout the 1980s -and where a few months after Collor's inauguration they carried out an all-out strike that lasted for over a month.
### Renunciation of rights
In the recent election, it was the candidates supported by the enterprise management that won, with a pro-privatization campaign favorable to the renunciation of the workers' "acquired rights". A symbol of the country's state enterprises, the CSN immediately joined the list of those slated for privatization.
There has also been a decline in the traditional campaigns around wages and, with the exception of urban public transport, there have been no big strikes in 1992 even by traditionally militant government workers, who have seen their real salaries plummet under Collor.
In the pro-impeachment front, There was agreement amongst supporters of Collor's impeachment that he would take the "constitutional exit" — and be replaced by the vice-president Itamar Franco, as determined by the Constitution.
Nevertheless, this did not resolve the issue of the replacement government and its orientation.
Right away, the rightwing and centrist forces in the pro-impeachment front, as well as the mass media, closed ranks to guarantee a new government fundamentally in continuity with the former. International organizations such as the IMF also exerted pressures to this end.
Itamar had been alienated from the government for several months as a result of Collor's "imperial" style of government, which didn't leave any place for a vice-president.
He went so far as to seek out the widest possible agreement in the Congress — which meant temporarily suppressing contradictory positions on economic policy.
Collor's style of government gave him the ability to attack the working class movement's rights, as well as putting for3. A campaign for direct presidential elections.
4. PMDB: Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, a party with centre and centre right factions.
5. CSN: National Siderurgical Company. Founded by Getulio Vargas in the 1940s it is one of the flagships of Brazilian industrialization.
November 23, 1992 ward economic measures which would seriously affect business groups and sectors. Collor's "authoritarian style" provided a necessary governmental relay for the neo-liberal project.
As such, the ouster of Collor is a first big defeat for the neo-liberal project in Brazil in that the bourgeoisie has lost the ability to govern on the offensive.
The impeachment of Collor was clearly recognized as being the work of the PT, decisively opening up electoral space for the party.
Less than one week after the impeachment vote, the PT became the main party on an electoral level in the country's capital cities, given that it will be contesting the second round in nearly all the major
In discussions on the possible aftermath of Collor's fall which took place the week before the 29th, the PT's National Executive voiced several positions - going from the proposal that the PT should fight for "new elections" to advocacy of the idea that the PT form a new "centre-left" government with Itamar. Eventually, it was decided that no position should be taken before the vote in parliament.
After Collor's removal, the party was divided into two camps both sharing the idea that the PT would be in opposition to Itamar, describing it as a conservative
A coalition government?
On the question of participation in the
Itamar government, it was decided that
"the PT will not participate, and does not authorize any of its members to participate and will implement disciplinary measures against anyone who does."6
What content is the party giving to this definition of "opposition party"?
Different currents in the party defended
(but were defeated on this point) the idea that whether for "ethical" motives or for political ones the PT should see this government as a transitional one, and put forward the call for new elections.
There is a question mark over the 1989 elections — in which Itamar was elected vice-president through various fraudulent activities. Moreover, it is clear that in his rise to power Itamar was implicated in the neo-liberal reforms initiated by Collor. As such, the time is ripe to carry the struggle for ethics to the end, uniting it with the struggle against the neo-liberal program-
Already in his public statements, Lula is acting as if the PT is giving Itamar a chance. In this way, Lula is responding to a certain "sense of responsibility" that public opinion demands of him, without however accepting joint responsibility for the new
As such he has said, "If Itamar is wondering if the PT will be in opposition, I would reply that if he continues the recessionary policies of Collor, if he does not take any measures to promote economic growth, if he does not pursue a policy towards the rural areas aimed at resolving conflicts, if he does not change the agreements on the foreign debt, and if he does not carry out a policy of fiscal adjustment — so that those who have higher income must pay higher taxes — and if he does not implement a policy of re-distribution of wages: then obviously the PT will be in the
And also, "while we will not participate in the government, we clearly say that we are prepared to discuss with other parties a minimum emergency programme that could be approved by the National
Congress, in order to improve the situation in the country."
Notwithstanding these debates, there is a common understanding in the PT that the fall of Collor in itself is a defeat for neoliberalism, but that the party's work does not end there; and that mass forces, strengthened by the impeachment movement, can stop the advance of this project.
As such, the leadership of the party has begun to define the "minimum programme" which would lift the country out of the crisis and be presented to the Nation"
(Congress, the government and society).
BRAZIL In the National Leadership meeting of October 24-25, the PT defined a programme of immediate demands. These include: • Continue investigations around questions of corruption. • Revise the agreements on the external debt negotiated by the Collor government (with the IMF and the private banks). • Fiscal reform. • Renew economic growth. • Food programme for Brazil's poor® The road ahead is full of twists and turns. It is obvious that the new government plans to continue applying the neo-liberal project, which will immediately lead it into conflict with the PT's worker-popular
Moreover, with a monthly inflation rate between 22 and 27%, with a huge public deficit, with the servicing of the external debt consuming a large part of income, with the level of economic activity down to that of 1987 (with the per capita GDP some 7% less than in 1980), the Itamar government does not have tremendous room for manoeuvre. Internal government conflicts
On the other hand, given its make-up the new government will be hit by many explosive internal conflicts - which means that the new situation is very favorable to renewed mass struggles, after the long period of setbacks provoked by the recession and the neo-liberal policies.
Already, the CUT National Executive has declared there would be no peace for the new government, and that they would be putting forward a list of emergency demands for the masses, including over questions of salaries, refusal to pay the external debt, a halt to the privatizations, immediate discussions about the changes to collective bargaining procedures, thorough investigations of corruption, and so
Whatever the ambiguities, the dynamic of the discussion around emergency measures will probably lead to serious political conflicts; the PT and CUT are well placed to demonstrate that there are but two projects for the country: the conservative neoliberal project and the people's democratic
This means that the success of the PT and CUT's initiatives will create an increasingly fragile Itamar government - including from within. Then the PT will be faced with the task of not only defending a minimum programme for the crisis, but also providing a political way out. *
6. Resolution of the National Executive of the PT.
October 13, 1992. 11
7. Brazil Agora, October 12-25, 1992.
8. Folha de S. Paulo, October 25, 1992.
Sandinistas face fundamental choices
International Viewpoint # 239 • November 23, 1992
NICARAGUA
The revolutionary heritage was in any event only presented in its institutional aspect. This was explained thus: "We obtained a national state, a constitution, a democratic, parliamentary political framework and an army." All of which certainly
SINCE the electoral defeat of the Nicaraguan Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FLN) in February 1990, two major questions have been posed: To what degree have the gains of the revolution been maintained?; and secondly, has there been a rapid process of counter revolutionary restoration?
In spite of the political defeat, the changes in the balance of forces have not led to a definitive crushing of the social forces and the party that had been the key to the Sandinista revolution, the FSLN.
VICTOR PRISMA
W
E DO NOT intend to discuss whether or not the revolution has continued;
the answer to that would of course be "no". The point rather is to see what has been happening in the political space opened up by the social forces who led the revolution. This will give us some idea of whether or not the crisis and stagnation that these forces are currently experiencing is ending or if on the contrary, they are deepening and thus opening the road to restoration and the consolidation of bourgeois domination.
Political positions and material interests can contribute to whether political space is either opened or closed as well as whether the social movements will survive or not.
The recent evolution of the FLN must be looked at from this point of view.
Political disorientation
The FSLN is suffering from a process of political disorientation that began before the electoral defeat and had worsened since then. Tensions have mounted as the result of conflicting social interests which have not been subsumed into policies that can appeal to the masses and reorient the FLN
This has meant that the social movements' efforts have been thwarted and the political space opened by the political revolution narrowed, leading to the restoration of bourgeois hegemony.