BOSNIA - confusion in the peace camp
THE November 4-6 international peace movement conference, held in Ohrid in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, failed to develop a common strategy to end the war in former Yugosla-
December 7, 1992
In reality, however UNITA's election defeat and its reaction to it has now revealed to the whole world its anti-democratic nature and its incapacity to transform itself into a political organization which, if in power, could tolerate opposition and respect demo-
ANGOLA / ex-YUGOSLAVIA via. In their final resolution, 400 participants from over 20 Eurocratic rights. In fact, it was even unable to pean states effectively called for European military intervention in carry out the simple negative task of not alarming a population that is sick and tired of On the positive side, the conference demonstrated that Eurowar. pean governments, the UN and the EC are so conscious of their impotence and confusion over former Yugoslavia that they are • But UNITA had massive outside increasingly open to the initiatives and propositions of the peace help in its appointed role as the movement. The Council of Europe even helped finance the confedemocratic David against the "communist" Goliath in Luanda. Unfortunately, the decline in the west European left and the
No one can believe that the USA "did not peace movement makes many peace activists increasingly uncritiknow" that the image they were promoting cal of initiatives from the major powers. was false. The fact that UNITA is a total A good indication of the new partnership between the Council stranger to democracy has been clear since of Europe and some parts of the Western peace movement was its creation. It rose in revolt against its exclu- the final resolution of the conference which demanded "UN/EC sion from power, not against the single party protected zones in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the UN protecsystem. In the "liberated territories" under its ted areas of Croatia" where "discussion about the future political control, the dictatorial, indeed totalitarian status of these areas" will be "suspended...until normal life has nature of Savimbi's organization was there been restored and the atmosphere of fear has been removed. In for all to see. these protectorates Western soldiers would ensure "demilitariza-
Referring to what it presented as "truly tion, the restoration of justice and impartial administration [and] African" symbols and methods of rule it the reconstruction of economic, social and civic life". functioned as a sect, organized around a per- This demand for "protectorates from below" over Bosnia-Hersonality cult and with power concentrated in zegovina and one third of Croatia (plus further "local zones" as the leader's private circle. Opponents both the conflict inevitably spreads following Western intervention) is real and potential were murdered and there presented as a "civic network" project "which could build on exiswas systematic "punishment" of "errors" ting twinning relationships of many European towns with towns in involving imprisonment and public humilia- these areas as well as on numerous civic networks". tion. The final resolution invokes the magic combination "United
The population under UNITA's control Nations" and "civic initiatives" several times as a kind of mantra were subjected to a totalitarian and terrorist regime. Evidence of bonfires on which Unfortunately there are no such magic solutions for suffering people were burned alive, sometimes accu- Bosnia. The peace movement should think again - Adam sed of witchcraft, are only the most extreme sign. The fact that Savimbi's methods have been so effectively hidden from the outside world is a reflection of the power of his the region.
rence.
for peace and success.
Novak.* allies. Just released
The fact that a large part of the Angolan AL-MITRAQA, no.9 population has accepted his rule has much to do with their isolation from the outside world and their total dependence on his organization. The polarization during the war, and then the failure of any third force to emerge during the elections, meant that the voters closed ranks around the two parties.
The same logic was at work in the MPLA. They had fought a war against UNITA and its allies - such sworn enemies of the people as apartheid South Africa, the USA and Zaire. The MPLA could only feel revulsion at the idea of Savimbi coming to power. This feeling also operated among the people as a whole and played a part in the MPLA's election victory.
In this climate of polarization the small circles of activists and intellectuals inclined to take part in the formation of an alternative to the party-state system agreed to postpone their criticisms and took part in the denigration of "groupuscules" and democracy as such, seen as a weakening of the MPLA camp against UNITA. *
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THE Arabic review of the Fourth International's sections and groups in the Arab region.
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• A dossier on Morocco, including a discussion with Abraham Serfaty;
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• The situation in Jordan and
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