Women and fundamentalism
International Viewpoint #242 February 1993 and the Islamic level. And each level plays a role in the struggle against Zionism".
In some of Hamas' political writings, one can even read that the Palestinians represent the vanguard of the anti-Zionist struggle. This re-ordering of the circles contradicts what Hassan El Banna wrote in his celebrated theory which made Egypt the first circle or key link in the chain, "concept-rule" which made that country the leadership of the Islamic world. El Banna believed that the first step towards realizing the Islamic project was the construction of an Islamic state in Egypt "which unites the voice of the Arabs, works for their benefit and protects the Muslims of the whole planet from any aggression and propagates the word of God and his message". 16
For Hamas, patriotism is a "part of religious doctrine", while for El Banna that doctrine embodied the deepest and most stable elements of patriotism and could not allow the latter to be fulfilled at religion's expense. One could also compare here the concepts of levels of nationalism used by Hamas and in the tradition of Sayyid Qotb. This latter considered national adherence as a blasphemy related to the ideology of Jahaliyya, the enemy of Islam..
My answer to the question posed at the start of this piece, is an answer which itself leads on to a series of other questions which do not concern Palestine alone, including:
Was the bloody struggle between Nasser and the Brothers inevitable? And does Nasser bear the sole responsibility for it or are the Brothers themselves partly responsible, or was it a product of a social and cultural structure that requires further study?
If the resurgence of Islam has taken place by the alternation of its hegemony with that of other currents; will the third wave of hegemony that succeeds that of the fundamentalists be a melange of the two or something else of which we now know little?
Will Palestino-centrism resolve the problem of alternating hegemonies (and perhaps of power) or will it exacerbate it and mark out the limits of the fundamentalist perspective and lead us back to the national question but in new forms?
In the absence of a single fundamentalist reference point, but of several connected to particular regimes with different perspectives, will the movements have to make alliances which will modify the meaning of political Islam or will they pull back from such involvement and abandon their recent aggressive dynamism? *
16. Lettres d'Hassan El Banna, Beirut, 1984.
FUNDAMENTALISM in Palestine is an offshoot of Sunni fundamentalism in the Middle East, and essentially constitutes a political party which is nourished by the real hardships suffered by the masses - while revealing the inability of other parties and organizations to respond to their distress. MANAR HASSAN
The other political parties do not pretend to provide a comprehensive solution, applicable to every facet of communal and private life, and therefore fundamentalism, which has a ready and clear answer for every question of this sort (for example, in the field of education, in family life, inheritance, art, etc.), is received by the disappointed masses as a magical cure for all the ills of society. Its comprehensiveness captivates all of those who had despaired of even a partial solution to their difficul-
Like fascism in the 1930s and 1940s, fundamentalism has arisen against the backdrop of a socio-economic crisis accompanied by a severe crisis of expectations, and is characterized by xenophobia, and hostility towards culture, rationalism and individualism, while its aim is the preservation of the existing social
Barbaric regression
It constitutes an integral part of the barbaric process of regression which humanity is going through today, and in this Islamic fundamentalism is identical to its Christian and Jewish counterparts. The only solution it proposes is returning to medieval values while retaining modern technology.
Fundamentalists of all religions see themselves as "the chosen", and abhor the values of equality and democracy, asserting in so many words the inferiority of women to men, the advantage of tradition (and backwards tradition especially) over thought, of obedience over freedom, and of belonging to the herd - be it the Islamic nation, the Jewish nation or the Christian community — over any association based on free choice.
The basic assumptions of fundamentalism are the following:
• The crisis in Arab society - which is Islamic by nature (according to the fundamentalists) and even constitutes a "naturally Islamic society", arises from its having distanced itself from the divine commandments if Islam, and from its elites having been infected with a Jahiliyah of western origin. Although the term Jahiliyah is usually thought of as meaning the pre-Islamic era, it does not refer to a specific historic period, but rather to a society ruled by "man-made" laws and not by God's laws.
• Arab society can only be saved through the struggle for an Islamic state, whose nucleus will be the Arab peoples; a state where Shari'a (Islamic law) will be the only law, and its interpretation will be up the the Supreme 'Ulimah, and not a secular government.
• Democracy, equality, national liberation, socialism and Communism are the agents of "cultural Imperialism", whose objective is to destroy Islam so that the materialistic, hedonistic and individualistic
• All of the movements which adhere to the abovementioned principles (democracy and so on) are the enemies of Islam, and, therefore also of Arab society. The proof of this, from the fundamentalists' point of view, is the fact that Muslims and members of other communities work together in these movements. The struggle for these values is corrupt and rotten and must be defeated.
• The peak of Western corruption, in the eyes of the fundamentalists, is Feminism and the women's liberation movement, which combine egalitarian and democratic values and applies to women. Not only are the women who are active in these movements corrupt, licentious, and apostates whose blood it is permissible to spill, so is everyone who supports them.
Informed by these assumptions, fundamentalism works for the preservation and strengthening of the patriarchal society and its institutions; and especially of the
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Logo of women's organization, Al-Fanar
International Viewpoint #242 February 1993 patriarchal family, which constitutes the fundamental unit of the patriarchal social order based on private property. This relationship can be seen clearly in fundamentalism's demagogic call, on the one hand, for equality and for people to be satisfied with little, and on the other hand, its demands for charity and for the rich to support the poor. In other words, charity will take the place of the need to change the existing social order.
Israeli oppression, accompanied by cultural arrogance and the attempt to erase Palestinian national identity, is a permanent factor both within Israel's 1948 borders and in the territories which were occupied in 1967. It is important to point out that this oppression is also accompanied by a consistently positive attitude towards the traditional patriarchal leadership and towards patriarchal social values, and even allows the traditional leaders to autonomously enforce traditional practices on their communities, at least in the spheres of religion and family law.
Stifling of national identity
This practice definitely helps prepare the ground for the absorption and acceptance of fundamentaist ideas within Palestinian society, the expression of whose national identity is stifled by the oppressi-
However, this is only one arm of the pincers in whose grip Palestinian society finds itself. The second arm is the behaviour of the Palestinian political parties which are active in this sector of society within the 1948 borders — who have developed a sure recipe for thwarting the national struggle: They have always confined the struggle against land-expropriation to local events; on Land Day (commemorating anti-expropriation demonstrations in 1976, during which 6 unarmed Palestinians were killed and many injured by the police), they sent their monitors to prevent - by force if need be - any expression of nationalism, such as the waving of flags, etc...; and turned these days from times for giving expression to the national struggle, to days of festivities, speeches, and Coca Cola - finally burying Land Day in an impressive ceremony called "the Israeli Arab's national Holiday".
Likewise, the Palestinian leadership outside the 1948 borders, in their conception of the role of the Palestinians inside the State of Israel, confined them to the limits of the rules of the parliamentary game, assigning them the objective of putting pressure on the Israeli government from within - sometimes even avoiding calling them Palestinians. These leaders 26 fear the formation of a social perspective as part of the national struggle, and all cling, in one way or another, to different versions of the doctrine of stages, which places national liberation ahead of social
The struggle of the peasants whose lands were stolen, the struggle of the workers both of whom suffer from a double oppression, and of the women whose oppression is three-fold: national class, and sexual - they put off until the morning after national liberation is achieved. The surrender of these leaders to backwards tradition due to their distorted view that Islam is the most fundamental stratum of Palestinian national identity, plays directly into the hands of the fundamentalists. To the neglected masses, the fundamentalists seem more reliable, more honest, and armed with a more comprehensive outlook.
The massive influence of Hamas was actually established by the authorities, who nurtured it and allowed it to act without interference for a long time. Up until the increase in the waves of murders inside the State of Israel by Hamas members, the number of fundamentalist prisoners being held in detention camps and prisons was the lowest in relation to the size of the organization, compared to the other organizations. Except for Sheikh Yasin, no Hamas leader has been jailed.
The Islamic Movement inside the 1948 borders rated a similar nurturing, if with different conditions. They were allowed to set up a cable TV station for the dissemination of their opinions, the publication of their newspapers meets no interference, unlike those of Abna' El-Balad and other nationalist groups, which are closed anew every morning.
In retrospect it is clear that from a strategic point of view, fundamentalism did justify the hopes which the Israeli government pinned on it, when it cultivated Hamas as an opposition to the national liberation movement. Although indeed, from a tactical point of view, Hamas did join the struggle against the occupation in the territories occupied in 1967, mainly in order not to lose its influence on the youth, all of whom supported the objective of national liberation.
However, the fundamental motivation for their joining in was to give the uprising — which was by nature a tremendous democratic process, opposing all forms of oppression — the direction desirable to both fundamentalism and the Israeli authorities. The murder of Jews just because of their Jewish ancestry led to the opposition of liberal groups within Israeli society to the Palestinian liberation movement. Fundamentalism's distorted values, especially in regards to the status of women and of women's liberation within the national liberation process, were adopted by the strike committees of the other Palestinian organizations.
### Murder of women
Tens of women were murdered as alleged "collaborators" just because their personal behavior was not compatible with the norms of the patriarchal tradition. The prevention of political activism by women, the return of the veil, and the proclamation of the culture of mourning brought about the decline of the mass movement, and its utilization as a tool in aid of Israeli oppression. Thus the tremendous revolutionary process was turned into a social counterrevolution.
International Viewpoint #242 February 1993
Just as Hamas has demonstrated its pragmatic character, its populism and chameleon-like traits — which has allowed it to bask in reflected glory from the struggle for national independence, despite its hostility towards all of the nationalist movements, so has the Islamic Movement within the 1948 borders succeeded in taking on the coloring of democracy and equality ostensibly in response to the masses' aspirations towards these values, but with the aim of thwarting them and emptying them of all content.
The movement's fundamental objective is to gain the Israeli regime's recognition of their right to rule culturally over Palestinian society within the State of Israel, through the strengthening of the patriarchal family and of the values of backwards tradition, along with complete separation between Muslims and nonMuslims. Thus, for example, the Islamic movement established Muslim soccer, judo and karate teams, which are closed to non-Muslim Palestinians. And thus it did away with liquor stores in areas where it won control of municipal councils, and above all, they brought in separation of boys and girls in the schools in these
The services they have rendered to the Israeli authorities are many and varied. Their leader, Sheikh Abdallah, declared that it is permissible to give up some of the land of Palestine to the Jews, and he was an enthusiastic supporter of the Madrid Conference. But with characteristic Jesuitical hypocrisy, he also defines those who oppose it as good Palestinian patriots. He also announced publicly his rejection of the Fatwa (Islamic religious legal pronouncement) legitimizing the killing of members of the Palestinian dele-
But his primary service to the Israeli authorities is in preserving a policy of apartheid in accordance with the fundamentalists' original ideology of "separate development". He opposes any joint activities of Jews and Arabs, including meetings between Arab and Jewish schoolchildren, which have been carried out in the sparsest manner, mainly as lip service to a commitment to democracy. Thus he aids the apartheid regime by not compelling it to employ force in its efforts to impose apartheid.
An additional contribution to the authorities took the form of an obstruction of the founding, during the last election campaign, of a unified Arab party. In
August of 1991 the Sheikh declared the necessity for a unified Arab party with the objective of weakening Rakah (the Communist Party) whose ranks include both
Jewish and Arab members. Later on, when it became clear that an Arab party would not be able to arise without the inclusion of Christian Palestinians, the Islamic Movement desisted from supporting it, and even announced that it viewed Shas, a Jewish fundamentalist party, as preferable. The campaign defamation, which the fundamentalists carried on, blocked every attempt to unify the parties led by Mi'ari and Darawshe, reopened the nationalistic debate with Rakah, and resulted in more than half of the Arab electorate supporting nationalis-
We have seen that on many questions, the fundamentalist movement - because of its populist character and its being nourished like a tape-worm by the real hardships of the masses — is prepared to bypass its "sacred" principles, and to cultivate a pragmatic policy. Its rejection of nationalism does not prevent its support for elections, and its rejection of the principle of national equality does not stop it from utilizing this argument when the masses are striving towards it. The principle of rejection of luxuries does not prevent it from financing its newspapers by publication of advertisements for western consumer goods such as luxurious automobiles and men's underwear, and its hatred of sport, as representing "barbaric western values", doesn't prevent it from setting up Islamic soccer leagues.
No compromise on women
However, on the question of women's liberation and equality, the fundamentalist movement is not prepared to compromise at all. It applies its claim that the status of women in Islam is the most correct and the best ("provided she knows her place") unhesitatingly and uncompromisingly. For them, the women's liberation movement is the central enemy, because the entire patriarchal society, whose existence fundamentalism has gone to the defense of, is built upon the oppression of women.
There is something ironic in the fact that, outside of the feminist movements themselves, the only movement which daily devotes hours and hours to discussions, debates, decisions, summations and the setting on policy on the question of women is the fundamentalist movement. No issue occupies so much space in the consciousness of its activists as the question of women: their character, behaviour, dress, traits, and especially their power to tempt and seduce.
This fact is so obvious that even a blind person can see that for the fundamentalists - that is, for the patriarchal society - this is a life and death matter. The centrality of the issue of women's liberation in Palestinian society — as in Arab society as a whole — must make it clear that the question of backwardness versus progress, democracy versus despotism, and liberation versus oppression are directly connected to that of women's liberation, and anyone who disregards this fact is, in objective terms, an ally of the Islamic fanatics. Therefore, there cannot be any compromise or armistice between the movements for women's liberation in Arab society, and fundamentalism, whatever the circumstances may be.
Lies, deceit, gossip and defamation of character, theoretical distortion, coercion and even violence are the weapons which fundamentalism employs against women - who are fed up with their oppression. Thus it rests upon characteristic male anxiety, while nurturing and reinforcing it. We mentioned earlier fundamentalism's victory in banishing women from the public and political spheres in the course of the uprising, but even "Al Fanar", an organization which was founded a year and a half ago in Haifa, has rated not a few defamatory, mud-slinging sermons in Islamic Movement mosques inside the state of
The Al-Fanar organization, whose perspective is based upon the basic assumption that Palestinian national liberation will not be truly achieved without women's liberation and equality, and which was the first to expose the connec tion between the backward traditionalism of Palestinian society and the authorities' support for it, quickly became the focus of attacks by the fundamentalist fanatics. The struggle which Al-Fanar initiated against the murder of women because of what is called "desecration of family honor", the organization's opposition to marriage between close relatives - which leads to the birth of retarded children and victims of other genetic disorders, its struggle against forced marriage, which constitutes rape with the blessing of tradition and the religious establishment, and its denunciation of the barbaric custom of circumcision of Bedouin girls by the severing of the clitoris - seemed to the fundamentalists to be the most terrible threat.
### Feminists under siege
The Islamic Movement's spokesmen proclaimed that there is no place for such an organization and its claims. But worst of all, other organizations and parties did not rise to the defense of this young feminist movement, and some of them even joined in the attacks on it. This state of
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International Viewpoint #242 February 1993 things calls for clarification and analysis, as we must not simply address the evil, enviousness, or stupidity of various organizations and parties. This phenomenon has extremely deep social, cultural and political roots.
As mentioned, all components of Palestinian society suffer from a variety of forms of oppression and discrimination. Besides the concrete features of the oppression, the Israeli regime practices a cultural selectzia, whose objective is the erasure of Palestinian national identity, something which finds expression beginning with the curricula in the schools, continuing through the mass media, and culminating in the prohibition of any form of national expression or symbolism, from the censorship of nationalist poetry to the forbidding of the Palestinian flag.
Thus Palestinian society is pushed into viewing its past as the true expression of its nationalism and tradition as a fundamental component of this past. And so nostalgia becomes part of the Palestinian national ethos and any criticism of it constitutes a serious injury to the nation. The Palestinian feminists' criticism of the patriarchal tradition and of the oppression of women, which perpetuates the society's backwardness, creates a cognitive dissonance for all the political streams and most of the intellectuals. They are worried that the disclosure of their society's weaknesses and backwardness will be used as ammunition by the enemies of the nation, 28 and so they attempt to silence and eradicate it.
Therefore, even though some of them declare their opposition to fundamentalism, they see it as a legitimate ally — with principles — unlike those who hang their dirty washing in public. Thus for example, former Knesset member Mi' ari claimed that he advises women (members of Al Fanar) "not to attack the issue of murder of women in such a blunt and strident manner, but to be more self-restrained". When asked what his attitude was towards the fundamentalist movement, which attacks members of Al Fanar and slanders them, he answered: "they have a principled position and they are expressing
Guilt and illusions
Against this backdrop the fundamentalists are succeeding in spreading feelings of guilt and illusions among all the organizations and political currents which cling to tradition, with claims that the masses are totally religious. These groups are dragged along by the fundamentalists in their struggle against the women's libera-
The nationalists, for example, who know about fundamentalism's general opposition to nationalism, try to appease it and placate it, by banishing the issue of equality and liberation for women from the programme for national liberation and by postponing addressing it until judgement day.
The democratic liberals make their support for the struggle for women's liberation and equality conditional upon women's observance of tradition and patriarchal values. But worst of all are those leftists who attempt to get close to the fundamentalism because of its critique of the corruption of the regime and its rhetoric about "cultural imperialism".
They are exchanging the democratic struggle against real imperialism for the illusion that their allies in the struggle against imperialism are the fundamentalists — that is, the guardians of the existing social order. And in their awareness of the fundamentalists' sensitivities regarding the subject of women, they view giving in on this issue as a small price to pay for unifying the ranks.
Of course, all the entreaties of the vacillators will not change fundamentalism's attitude towards them, but will only increase the pressure on them. The fundamentalists will not accept the values of the Arab democratic movement even if its leaders pray five times a day and participate in Friday prayers at the mosque, nor will they accept the Palestinian nationalism of George Habash who opens his speeches "in the name of Allah the merciful and forgiving" from the Koran. These gestures will only result in adding contempt to the hatred which the fundamentalists already harbour towards these movements.
It turns out that the strength of fundamentalism is based, not on the religiosity of the masses, but on their sufferings which are the outcome, primarily, of the hesitancy, cowardice and incompetence of the leadership of the so-called political parties be they leftist, nationalist, reformist or pan-Arabist. However, fundamentalism's infiltration into the political realm reflects its inability to provide a social alternative for the masses, and its being drawn to make only those changes in the power structure which have impact upon its religious concepts as well. Some examples:
• In Jordan, King Hussein chose not to directly confront the fundamentalists, but to include them in the government. Within a year, the fundamentalist ministers succeeded in getting themselves hated by the masses, and especially by the urban middle classes. Their demand that women should not be given drivers' licenses and the forbidding of fathers' attendance at their daughters' graduation ceremonies caused them to lose popularity and made it possible for the king to expel them from the government without any public interest.
International Viewpoint #242 February 1993
• In Um al-Fahm and Kafr Qasm (inside the 1948 borders), the fundamentalists won a majority of the votes in the 1988 elections and became the omnipotent municipal rulers. They abolished coffee houses and prevented the sale of hard liquor, separated boys and girls in the schools and compelled women to wear head coverings. The result was that in the 1992 elections the "strongholds of Islam" were the only places where the percentage of votes for the Communist Party rose -in Um al-Fahd by 75% and in Kafr Qasm by 64%. This was clearly a protest vote against the fanatics.
• Hamas' vociferous opposition to negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians is nothing but a cover for its true objectives. Hamas proved this by placing as a condition for its joining the PLO, that it be allocated 45% representation in PLO institutions and presumably in the future it would support autonomy on condition that it be given a monopoly on education which would be run according to Hamas'
Control over education
The Islamic Movement within Israel also aspires to control over the Arab educational system and media. However, it is afraid of making these demands openly out of concern that its alliance with the Jewish religious establishment in the Israeli government would make them into collaborators in the eyes of the masses. They will let others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them — to struggle for "cultural autonomy" for the Arabs in Israel and then, in exchange for their support, they will demand control of education and media in the Arab sector.
• As a political party, Sunni fundamentalism has reacted in an interesting manner towards the successes of the Shi'ite fundamentalists whom, by the way, they perceive as heretics. The success of Hezbollah in Lebanon in holding out against the Israelis and even causing it casualties, caused "Islamic Jihad" for the first time to adopt methods organization similar to those of the Lebanese Shi'ites. In July of this year, Hamas called upon (Sunni) Muslims to observe the fast of Ashura, the most holy fast in Shi'ite Islam and to give it present-day meaning — as Khomeini had advised in his book Islamic Government.
This is not of course, an indication of Shi'ite religious influence on the Sunni Hamas movement, but rather of veneration for Iran, which has succeeded as standing her ground as an Islamic state. Likewise, this is an inevitable consequence of Saddam Hussein's failure to establish himself as Sunni Islam's warrior for the liberation of the Arab nation. His bankruptcy in the eyes of the Arab masses highlights the populist basis of fundamentalism and its opportunism.
As we have seen, any attempt to compromise with fundamentalism and to reach a state of co-existence with it is doomed to failure, whenever such attempts are made on the erroneous basis that religion has a central role in public, political and national life.
Unless feminist, democratic, socialist and even liberal organizations do not adopt the fundamental attitude that one's religion is a completely personal matter, the confusion will continue and the fundamentalists will go on gathering strength out of the confusion and hesitation to act of those who oppose them verbally. Because Arab society in Palestine, as in the Arab East as a whole, is built upon the patriarchal tradition, the question of women's liberation becomes the cornerstone of the process of liberation in general. Feminist strategy in Arab society must move along the following axes:
• Absolute independence of the feminist organizations, both from other political organizations and from their programmes, while perceiving women's liberation as a central democratic task in the process of national liberation;
• A struggle for the total separation of religion and state. This separation involves giving believers of all religions the freedom to behave according to their own views, but dismantling all state-affiliated religious institutions. Only the total abolition of state involvement in the choosing of kadis, rabbis and priests and in the payment of their salaries; the total uprooting of religion from the educational system, turning the clergy out to make their living from the contributions of believers, will make possible in Palestine and in the other states of the region, of a democratic, pluralistic and progressive society.
Civil marriage and civil family law are the central facet of legislation required for equality of women.
• One cannot carry on a debate with fundamentalism because it totally rejects a critical or rational approach, such as the attempt to understand society through its material basis or to understand human actions as the outcome of needs or impulses.
We must define fundamentalism according to its precepts: as denying human rights and freedom, equality and democracy — and we must struggle to remove the medium which allows its parasitic growth: hardship, ignorance, inequality and poverty. *
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