Resisting "ethnic cleansing"
THE mainstream debate about the tragic events in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is framed in terms which only add to our
For the establishment the question is "for or against Western military intervention?". There is then a subsidiary debate about the aims of such an intervention — should it go all the way to Belgrade to remove Serbian nationalist dictator Slobodan Milosevic.
In fact, any such intervention would only add to the bloody confusion in the former Yugoslavia as the powers involved pursued their own strategic and diplomatic interests in alliance with their favoured forces on the ground. New discriminations would be installed and already existing
However, that does not mean that nothing can be done, as becomes clear when we look closer at the political and social forces at work in the
International Viewpoint #242 February 1993 sense of confusion and powerlessness.
ones upheld ambiguous. There are problems with the short text of the agreement, and its relevance to the actual situation on the ground. The crisis.
In the following article, Catherine Samary, recently returned from a visit to the Bosnian capital Sarajevo, takes up the challenge. CATHERINE SAMARY - January 19, 1993
HROUGH an examination of
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the forces at work in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we can start to map out an approach to the problems of the whole territory of ex-Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina's fate will be played out in the Croatian and Serbian capitals of Zagreb and Belgrade. Indeed, a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) - where there is no "ethnic" majority, where "everything is mixed" can simply not survive in a wider context of never-ending conflicts.
Bosnia-Herzegovina now faces the threat of being divided up through an agreement between the nationalist powers in Zagreb and Belgrade. As such, the nature of the regimes in Croatia and Serbia will be determined by the outcome of events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the idea of a multi-ethnic and multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina wins the day, this will cement the idea of reciprocal guarantees as a way to overcome the logic of hatred exploited by the nationalist regimes.
The very existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina demands the guarantee of each citizen's rights and rights for the different communities. If these rights are recognized in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this will have repercussions in Croatia and Serbia. This could be used to counter the Greater Serbian and Greater 10
Croatian chauvinist logic — not to mention the logic of "ethnic cleansing" — in Serbia as in Croatia.
In short, the central issue is whether the defense of the national rights of the various communities of ex-Yugoslavia implies the formation of ethnic nation-states or, on the contrary, if a new union of sovereign multi-ethnic and multicultural states is necessary.
The old Yugoslavia is finished; its name has been usurped by the Serbo-Montenegrin Federation and is in any case unsatisfactory from the point of view of the non-Slav peoples, such as the Albanians. All the states that have emerged from the break-up -including Macedonia — must now be recognized. However, they all contain peoples that are dispersed beyond their own borders.
A Balkan Confederation
A Balkan Confederation which includes at least Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania (and Bulgaria and Greece?) is the only alternative to "Greater Serbia", to "Greater Croatia" and "Greater Albania", which could only be built through endless wars and displacements of population.
The proposals on the dividing up of Bosnia-Herzegovina contained in the agreement recently reached in Geneva are at best international bodies - through the intermediaries of the British representative Lord Owen and the American Cyrus Vance — are negotiating with those responsible for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, before the carving up on maps even took place. In other words, the application of the agreement will pose more than a few problems.
In an interview with the French daily Le Figaro on January 18, the Croatian president F. Tudjman gives his interpretation of the agreement: "I do not consider Bosnia to be a nation [..] This plan presumes that Bosnia will remain (sic) a confederal state, made up of three constituent nations. If Yugoslavia was not able to survive as a federation, how can we expect Bosnia to be able to survive on such a basis..."
In other words, Tudjman now supports the idea of the "cantonization" of B-H into three ethnic entities; like the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic and the Serbian regime, his attachment to the word "nation" reflects his desire to cut Bosnia up into actual republics with the right to separate. The Croatian representatives are happy with the agreement, since it cuts off Herceg-Bosna, a region adjacent to Croatia.
The concentration of Croats in western Herzegovina does not mean that it is a homogeneous territory; there have been growing conflicts with Muslims, sometimes leading to massacres (as in Prozor, with Croat tanks). This has been accompanied by a purge in the HDZ — Tudjman's party — in Bosnia, where the paramilitary far-right wing of the party has ousted the most "Bosnian" of the leaders like Stepan Kruzic.
The Croats of the Party of Law (Ustashe) and their militias, who wanted to
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International Viewpoint #242 February 1993 annex Bosnia-Herzegovina in its entirety to Croatia, have been brought to heel and absorbed — because Tudjman has chosen to present a "moderate profile" and to divide up Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Belgrade regime.
The Serbs in B-H are more dispersed than the Croats; thus the policy of a corridor of "survival" and the discontent with the proposal made at Geneva of provinces not linked with one another.
This means that the proposed text is being interpreted as a cantonization into three entities. On the other hand, the idea of multi-ethnic provinces, a decentralization of power towards the local level, of a presidential college (with representatives from the three communities and the right to veto) is positive.
This idea has been taken from proposals drawn up by, for example, Zdravko Grebo, a very popular Sarajevo intellectual. But the three national (or ethnic) communities do not have "territorial" rights in his plan: he proposed a system with two chambers, a citizens chamber and a chamber of ethnic communities including "Eskimos" (those who do not identify themselves as belonging to any nationality with equal representation and the right to veto. Further, he proposed that this system of two chambers be replicated in the provinces and localities in order to avoid the logic of ethnic majorities in the definition of power while protecting collective rights.
Unfortunately, what counts today is the relationship of forces on the ground and not the text...
A Greater Serbia The project for a "Greater Serbia" is defended in the most coherent fashion by Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party which received 30% in the last elections. It is without a doubt also the "raison d'être" of
Karadzic and in general that of the extremist leaders of the Serbian Autonomous Republics proclaimed in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (and soon in Macedonia?). It is supported by the far-right mercenaries and paramilitary forces, and has some support in the poorest, peasant quarters of the Serb diaspora.
The responsibility of the regime in Belgrade and of the army (formerly Yugoslav, now Serb) is hidden behind a cloud of hypocrisy — Serbia has never been at war with
Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, they claim.
The intervention of the army was never made against the Croats' or Muslims' right to self-determination - but in the name of what is presented as the Serbs' right to self- determination: "If the others no longer want anything to do with Yugoslavia and separa-
Serbia® te, we too will separate from them to remain together and form our own state, because we don't want to find ourselves in a minority position in a hostile state".
This was the substance of the 1986 Serbian Memorandum of the Academy of Sciences, which inspired Milosevic (including his project of affirming Serbian sovereignty in the Serb Republic, to the detriment of the rights acquired by its provinces).
One could easily make a direct link between this Memorandum and the "Greater Serbia" now being carved out on the ground. But this is not an official policy. "Yugoslav" President Cosic, the real force behind the Memorandum, explicitly wrote that he was against "Greater Serbia" and for the recognition of the identity and rights of the other communities. His half-support for Milosevic's "moderate" rival Panic, like Milosevic's attitude in Geneva, can be interpreted as a bluff intended to gain time and as a "division of labour". But more likely it is a sign of differentiation within a conflict-ridden alliance with the nationalist far-right.
In any case, we must judge these forces by their actions. Real disassociation with the "Greater Serbia" project and the warlords who carry out ethnic purification, would imply a halt to all logistic support to the Serbian army in Bosnia, an open conflict with the far-right groups and the outlawing of paramilitary formations. Milosevic and Cosic have thus far been playing the sorceror's apprentice; they risk becoming hostages of the extreme right which has grown
When a majority of the Serbs of B-H voted for Karadzic it was not throwing its weight behind the idea of "Greater Serbia".
They were voting primarily against the break-up of Yugoslavia which they feared. Thus, in order to unmask Karadzic any agreement has to meet demands for guarantees for all communities and citizens.
In France, the media speak mostly about Serbian agression. It is more accurate to underline the agreement that has been made on the backs of the Muslims - and of the mixed populations of the cities in general -between the Serbian and Croatian regimes.
Moreover, in this conflict, the very use of the term "Muslim" demands some explanation. Serbian and Croatian nationalist propaganda spread the idea that there is a danger of a Bosnian fundamentalist republic, and hope in this way to push through their carve up of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian regime has been secretly negotiating with the Serbian nationalists while formally recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina to the point of concluding a military agreement with its president A. Izetbegovic.
In Sarajevo today, the Muslims are saying, "God save us from the protection of the UN forces (FORPRONU) and the (Croatian) HVO". In private - though not yet in public, for fear of jeopardizing the refugees on Croatian territory - they denounce the "two demons, one which devours our souls and the other which devours our bodies."
Those who make up the Muslim population are part of a Slavic community which converted to Islam at a distant point in the past, and are now in their majority non-religious and atheist. The Ustashe Croats count them as Croats and the Serb nationalists also deny them any specific national identity. Many of these "Muslims" (heavily urbani-
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International Viewpoint #242 February 1993 zed and therefore often in mixed marriages) prefer to be called "Bosnian" — a label which has the merit of invoking the long history of Bosnia, whose medieval state had a "heretic" church which was neither Catholic nor Orthodox. Serbs and Croats living in Bosnian cities, unlike their rural counterparts, also call themselves Bosnians.
A multi-ethnic army
The Bosnian army in the cities - in Sarajevo and the industrialized region of Tuzla, for example — reflect this reality. The High Command of this army in Sarajevo is composed of three officers — one Serbian, one Croatian and one Muslim — who are all from the former Yugoslav army and in the tradition of the World War Two partisans.
The victims of this war are the Muslims and the mixed populations of the cities — intimately related to one another since, for historical reasons, Muslims are largely concetrated in the cities. While the Muslims have a relative majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with 40% of the population, the villages are much more homogeneous and dominated by the Croatian and Serbian far-right; as a result, these latter forces have have the upper hand in terms of control of territory.
That said, in the campaigns of territorial "cleansing", many villages have been razed; in the Serb strongholds, it is often Serbs who do not accept ethnic cleansing that are the first victims of the heroism of the fascist militias.
This is not simply a military conflict, but one which involves a terrorist policy of massacres, rape, torture. This policy is aimed at ripping apart all the ties made in Bosnia-Herzegovina — in terms of territory, buildings, families and networks of friendship. Once you want to create a Serbia or a Croatia that is in conflict with this intricately woven fabric, it is necessary to stir fear in people, to incite flight through a combination of massacres, aggression and various forms of terrorism.
Then we come to the question of foreign military intervention. First of all, we are faced with a process of creeping fascism which is not only limited to Serbia or to Serb forces in Bosnia; it can also be seen in the Croatian camp. No left movement of organizations linked to the workers movement, which could command the support of international brigades, exists to oppose the far right. Analogies with the international brigades in Spain in the 1930s are wide of the
As soon as we talk about intervention, two questions arise: who and why? We can not be content with a purely pacifist position and place all the warring camps on an equal 12
"ETHNIC (LEANSING"- YES- WHERE
THAT HAS A FAMILIAR HAVE WE
RING TO IT HEARD IT BEFORE?
### BOSNIA footing. Further, there are particularly worrying developments in the "Greater Serbia" policy that must be stopped — or else we risk seeing a phenomenal increase of violence in the Serbian province of Kosovo, whose majority is Albanian, which would spread further afield into Macedonia.
But behind the term "foreign intervention" there are several realities. A foreign intervention already exists with the presence of UN troops. The UN troops have met a lot of criticism in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, for good and bad reasons. For bad reasons, because certain forces on the ground want to "resolve" the questions of nationality and territory solely through the use of force. For good reasons, because if the UN is present after the process of ethnic cleansing, they will only serve to consolidate it. Neutrality in such a case merely covers the unequal military relationship of forces which benefits the Serbs - which is clearly
At the same time, the UN forces which protect the humanitarian supply routes, have made it possible for the people of Sarajevo to eat, since they can only do so thanks to these supplies. Indeed, the Bosnians have demanded that further humanitarian corridors be established in Bosnia-Herzegovina, among other places in the east where there are many refugees who risk death from hunger and the cold. This should be taken into consideration when it comes to taking a position on the presence of UN forces.
We must be against any imperialist intervention, which would totally escape the logic of a political settlement of the conflict by those concerned. If the Serbian government was the target of such an intervention, it would only strengthen Serbian nationa-
The request for military and logistic aid - for a limited foreign intervention — against the heavy artillery that surrounds
IF WE STOP THINKING ABOUT
CANT QUITE IT, EVENTUALLY
PLACE IT WE'LL KEMEMBER
WASSERMAN Sarajevo and other big cities, holds out the danger of a military spiral and the pursuit of policies that do not correspond to the interests of the concerned populations, but rather those of the United States and Europe in the
The military question needs to be viewed according to the following political approach: for a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, against its dismemberment. The Bosnian resistance which is fighting in the cities, made up in large part of mixed populations and of Muslims, must be supported. This mixed resistance is still a reality; it runs the risk of perishing if it does not receive some support — and with it will perish the possibility of a multi-ethnic and multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina. This resistance finds its most concrete form in the Bosnian army.
There are two different political currents among the Bosnians. Everybody has been hoping for outside intervention, but from two different angles. In government circles one can hear appeals for a US military intervention against Milosevic. On the left the demand is rather for limited logistical aid — supplies of arms or help in breaking the encirclement of towns but not foreign ground forces.
This current also hopes to see the back of the United Nations force before too long, even if they do not call for it to be immediately withdrawn. There is considerable bitterness towards and tension with the UN force. Aside from frequent comments on the forces involvement in trafficking in besieged and deprived Sarajevo there are also inter-related humanitarian and defence issues. An often heard remark in Bosnian Defence circles is "if we had enough arms we wouldn't need the convoys".
A lot is said about what has been happening in and around the industrial town of Tuzla which has an ethnic mix close to the
International Viewpoint #242 February 1993
Bosnian average (about 45% Muslims, 33% Serbs and 20% Croats) and where the nationalist parties lost the last elections. A mixed Bosnian defence force has been organized with the full support of the town authorities and with the arms of the Territorial Defence which had been kept. The town is at the centre of a heavily industrialized region of a million inhabitants.
The Tuzla army is headed by a Croat officer who has refused to support the Croat HVU. It controls an airport which has two runways and good conditions of access. An aid corridor could be established to Tuzla to help besieged towns which have so far remained without assistance. However, the UN has refused to open this corridor since they cannot get the agreement of the Serb extremists who think it would reinforce Bosnian positions. We must go to Tuzla and make links with other working class towns and insist on the need to open the airport for humanitarian aid.
### Military aid
We should therefore make a call for military aid to this multi-ethnic Bosnian force within the political perspective I have outlined. The demand for lifting the embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, made in an unspecific fashion, is dangerous — such arms could well fall into the hands of Croatian paramilitary groups which pretend to be in a military alliance with the Bosnian government, while at the same time betraying the Bosnian cause.
Arms destined for Bosnia are now held up at Split. Thus, the lifting of the embargo must be subordinated to the task of aiding the Bosnian resistance to free the mixed cities. We must demand full information on the camps and their conditions through the massive dispatch of missions from independent organizations; all the camps must be opened up and all their occupants freed. We must demand that tribunals be put in place in order to judge the crimes of war and the
Criminals must not believe that they can continue to act with impunity. The crimes exacted by the militias, or by the fascist forces, in which psychopathic criminals play an important role, should be brought to heel by such tribunals.
This would, moreover, force the governments of Belgrade and Zagreb to disassociate themselves from these actions, which would, even if their actions were only of a diplomatic nature, facilitate the task of those seeking to put an end to such crimes.
As far as the prison camps go, we must demand full information on their existence.
We must treat Belgrade and Zagreb in the same manner, and we must demand that the camps be opened up and all the prisoners be released. A concrete policy supported by the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and official missions can advance work in this direction.
At the outset, nobody wanted to believe the atrocity stories but then they were forced to open their eyes — although the risk remains of being taken in by one or another falsification operation used for various uns-
The hastily drawn analogies between Serbian president Milosevic and Hitler are false and counter-productive. The force of the condemnation of crimes and rapes committed is much greater if it is based on the real situation and not on inflated statistics. Furthermore, these crimes must be denounced in all the camps even if a disymmetry exists between Serbians and Croatians.
Beyond that, we have to re-examine the question: we are clearly torn by the need to denounce the present-day reality of the UN and the forces that control it on the one hand, and the need, on the other, for an intervention force that is not the tool of various states. There is certainly a debate to be had there and "transitional" formulas need to be found - bringing together the demands of Third World countries on the UN, against the Security Council, for full transparency and a control of its mandates on concrete
There are many things to do, such as help for the Bosnian Defence, and pressure around the questions of the camps and the International War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Tribunal and on the fact that rape should be considered amongst such crimes. However nothing effective or longlasting can be achieved without linking up with people and organizations in the Republics. Every collective should try to make such journeys to make political and humanitarian links.
I myself went to Sarajevo at the New Year with a group of 15 French people organized by the Montpellier collective of the European Citizens Assembly. We had several aims: firstly to simply be with the people of this town where everything is short owing to the siege but to which foreigners can bring aid. But also we wanted, in partnership with the city's peace centre permanently installed in the Town Hall, to set up a permanent and properly equipped office to deal with links ups and trips by antiwar organizations.
We also had meetings and discussions with Church representatives, journalists from the independent press and radio, politicians, local officials, the school and hospital services, artists, services dealing with refugees and others. Everyone can come up with forms of aid appropriate to their profession.
As far as the refugees are concerned we must continue to demand broad and nonexclusive access to our countries in forms which help families and friends to stay together. The Bosnian government official responsible for refugees, Ms. Omersoftic can be met with. She insists on the government's basic desire to re-establish contact with (and do a census of all their fellow citizens to help in developing a dialogue and encouraging them to return.
There is anxiety about the situation of Bosnian refugees in Croatia, specifically, fears about both Islamist and Catholic religious pressure, that the refugees may be encouraged to emigrate instead of going back to B-H in an attempt to change that country's ethnic composition, and of a loss of skills to the West.
### Time to act
We must not forget the need to make links with the civic movement in Serbia, help to the independent press there, establish links with organizations dealing with refugee problems and women's organizations. To counteract nationalist brainwashing operations we have to develop our sources of information and links amongst all nationalities.
In particular, a new working group has been set up in Belgrade in liaison with the antiwar movement in Serbia. It aims to keep track of all the crimes and civil and minority rights' violations in the war in former Yugoslavia. It works through an analysis of the press and evidence from witnesses. Young people also have specific work to do in support of the student movement in Belgrade.*
Useful addresses
INFORMATION on the course of the war is available from WAR
Report, Yugo Fax, 1, Auckland St,
London SE11 5HU, UK.
The Sarajevo bureau for contacts and visits can be reached via the
European Citizens Assembly in
Montpellier, France, tel: (France) 87
60 84 05 or in Paris at 31 rue de
Reuilly, 75012, France, tel: (France)
(1) 43 79 09 23; fax (1) 43 79 32 02.
The organization in Belgrade keeping an account of war crimes is called the Humanitarian Law Fund, it can be contacted at 11000 Beograd, Terazije 6/lil, tel (Yugoslavia)
11 658 430; fax 11 646 341.
Its executive director is Natacha
Kandic. *
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