The liberal deceit
FOR the past three years the whole of Africa has been the scene of crisis and political change. Of course, each country has its specific features reflecting different colonial and contemporary histories. Some countries remain as yet unaffected and in some, also, previously existing armed
International Viewpoint #243 March 1993 conflicts complicate the picture.
important to underline the role that those states played in developing local private accumulation, in legitimizing "national territories" and in the building of an often elusive national consciousness.
It is an odd experience to see international institutions pretending to sud-
But the fact that so many countries have seen similar developments at the same time points to the existence of common causes. CLAUDE GABRIEL Paris, February 26, 1993
N OT since the end of the
1950s and the start of the 1960s have events on the continent been so synchronized. At that time the unifying feature was the end of colonialism. What is the new common denominator?
It is a commonplace to say that Africa is today a continent adrift. Whatever the real contrasts between the particular contries this broad-brush diagnosis points up the link between the decline in agricultural productivity, the crisis in the exports of raw materials, the fall in productive investment, the rapid deterioration of the education system and health care, the growth in emigration and so on. An all-pervading malaise afflicts every aspect of socio-economic life in Black Africa.
An entire economic and political model is crumbling. The crisis of the neo-colonial state is combined with other socio-economic earthquakes. The system of post-colonial relations which gave Black Africa its place in the world economy is on the point of breakdown. This is why so many coun tries are seeing the same political develop-
The 1970s gave an illusion of the possibility of continuous upward growth. Despite the increase in oil bills for non-oil producers, on the whole the African countries benefited from a big increase in export income along with easy access to financial markets.
This was also convenient for the industrial powers who supported industrial investment based on debt which would guarantee them some additional markets for producer goods. The price of a kilo of coffee rose from 115 to 334 cents between
1970 and 1980, of cocoa from 68 to 260, sawn wood from $95 to $365 a cubic metre and a ton of phosphate from $11 to $47.
This was the epoch of the dream of industrialization, the building of gargantuan factories and much speechifying about the new economic order and technology transfers. However, in fact, nothing changed in terms of the basic structures of dependence and indebtedness grew inexorably.
The same confidence persisted into the following decade, even as the sun was already beginning to set. The world market price of African raw materials slid and demand stagnated. Technological reorganization in the imperialist countries and changes in world trade flows sharply changed the continent's position in the international division of labour. The majority of the continent's countries were affected by this.
The great demolition job
At the same time, the first structural adjustment plans were implemented; the great demolition job was underway. In 1990, external foreign investment made up only 6.8% of trade flows, compared to 24.6% in 1982. The share of direct investment fell from 10.3% to 4.7%.
The decline in attractiveness for foreign investment was accompanied by a declining share of world production; with 500 million inhabitants the continent's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is today lower than that of Belgium.
A social and political crisis was added to the economic crisis. We will not here deal in detail with the nature of the postcolonial states in Africa. However, it is denly discover the corruption which rots these societies. The political systems set up at independence always worked with the blessing of foreign donors.
There were two complementary forms of this system. The first was the general redistribution of foreign aid through the public sector, the army, as well as ethnic and family networks. It made use of resources that the regime controls through its day-to-day management of foreign aid and export income. It also meant the permanent growth of jobs in the administration and privileged aid given to a village from which this or that minister originated. The second form is that of the straightforward looting of public wealth by the ruling cliques.
These two forms must be distinguished because the 1980s saw a certain decline in the former but the continuation of the latter.
The first level was the main means of maintaining social cohesion and giving legitimacy to the regime. Here there was a cascade of redistribution and various social layers got something — even if in an unequal and oppressive form. This level of private management of public property went into crisis in the 1980s as stagnation and structural adjustment plans cut state income.
The social shock was quickly felt and deep. The rural villages were in as much trouble as the towns. Social differences sharpened while all classes and layers were affected: the peasants whose income was falling, the white and blue-collar workers put out the door as a result of privatization, state employees sent into the informal sector as part of "slimming down" of the public sector, students who left university with no hope of finding a job and even a part of the urban petty bourgeoisie who lost contact with the networks of redistribution from above.
To maintain the old model of social and economic regulation a huge increase in foreign aid would have been needed However, this too was in decline due both to the international crisis and the budget problems of the donor states themselves.
----- pull-quotes on this page -----
----- photo credits and running heads -----
8
International Viewpoint #243 March 1993
The powers-that-be then faced generalized social discontent whatever the constitutional system or whatever democratic openings they granted. For example Senegal, where a multi-party system has existed for years, has not avoided the waves of protests and repeated strikes and
Visibly alarmed by the international institutions have tried to get a grip on the situation by using aid with strings. At the outset there was no intention to link the structural adjustment plans to democratization - this is a recent and opportunist idea. However, during the 1980s African governments began to be pressured to make fundamental changes in their mode of socio-economic management. We now have a wide experience of the doctrinaire character of such injunctions which confuse the private and predatory management of the state with the size of the public sector. The need for such a sector, above all in a post-colonial context, is ignored.
The slogan "the over-bearing state", suggests that a rapid reduction in its economic scope would bring about a reduction in corruption. Privatization is supposed to impose different management criteria, setting off a virtuous spiral in pursuit of strictly commercial objectives.
However, nothing is less obvious in Black Africa. First of all, the low savings' level and extreme weakness of local capital makes privatization highly risky. In many cases it is the regime barons who take over, turning a public into a private monopoly.
Meanwhile, nothing fundamental changes. The search for short term profit, speculation and low levels of re-investment are the main characteristics of the African private sector. And the scene is completed by the inadequacy of the banking system and the reticence of foreign investors. In
Guinea, for example, enterprises have been shut down altogether since they could not
There is, thus, a financial cost (leaving aside the issue of social costs) which the
World Bank has not taken into account. The influx of new money connected with privatization and the reduction of public spending has perverse effects that have been overlooked. Once the external adjustment has been obtained the reduced domestic demand discourages activities directed at the local market.
The cleaning out of public finances is thus often obtained at the expense of the drying up of investments needed for growth. As a result certain costs of production grow, reducing the profitability of invest-
The scope of the catastrophe is so great as to have finally come to the notice of the remote spheres of the variousinternational institutions. In 1988, in the Courrier ACPCEE, the European Commission's Director of Development, Dieter Frisch, agonizes over the worrying turn of events: "Some governments may be tempted to put their names to reform programmes that they cannot fully stick to and whose consequences they have not fully considered... But above all, we fear that such programmes, largely drawn up by foreign experts, are not really adapted to the constraints and specificities of the countries concerned, and this may put their viability in question". (The author of these thoughts resigned from his post at
Gloom in Paris
In France, which is heavily involved in Africa, the same gloom hangs over all the official commentaries on the 1980s. A government report on cooperation and development in Africa openly admits that a series of big mistakes were made relating to the imposition of liberalization and the logic of aid with strings.!
In the French case there is also the additional element that the franc zone, which was supposed to give some protection from external economic pressures to member African countries is itself running out of
Nothing works any more, not even the Lomé Convention which links most African countries to the European Community.
The Stabbex system of compensation for export losses can longer keep up with the sharp deterioration in the terms of trade. On May 2, 1991, speaking in the Senegalese capital Dakar, European Commission president Jacques Delors recognized that another system was needed to create "an entirely renovated partnership"
The real problem is not simply the "over-bearing state". There is also the issue of the social nature of the regimes. The aim of the battle for democracy must be to begin to tackle the problems of underdevelopment and poverty. And it is from this point of view that we should at the reality and limits of the present "democratization process" and opposition forces in these
The first thing to remember is that most of these countries have seen significant popular mobilizations in the course of their political crises. The urban population has mobilized and in its majority given support to opposition parties and trade unions However, with very few exceptions the political opposition and "democratic" forces have not wanted to base their programmes on the demands of the people sup-
There has been much talk about a state of law and civil society but little interest in the social needs of the majority. Some of these forces' strategists, furthermore, see things far more in terms of "pressure politics than the foundation of an ideologically defined party. In many cases, indeed, this is all a dispute among the elites. Many figures from the diverse former regimes cropped up in "oppositional" guise.
1. Ministère de la coopération et du développement, service des Affaires financières et de la coordination géographique
Situation pour 1991. Documentation française, Paris
----- photo credits and running heads -----
9
International Viewpoint #243 March 1993
The oppositions make a habit of calling for foreign intervention. In Congo, the new leaders have even talked about having
South African observers for their forthcoming elections. Virtually all of them seem unaware of the structural constraints of economic dependence. There is a kind of masochistic fascination involved in their efforts to show their competence in fulfilling the axioms of the IMF and World
They habitually identify the totalitarianism of the outgoing regimes with the size of the state sector and their democratic programmes are thus accompanied by an acceptance of adjustment plans. One example is the economic programme of the
Kenyan opposition, drawn up with the help of the German Friedrich Naumann Stiftung which includes privatizations and public sector job cuts.
The example of Zambia is illuminating. A year after coming to power, President Frederick Chiluba and his Movement for Multi-Party Democracy have started to meet problems. Zambia has been presented as an example of peaceful transition and a renewal of the political elite.
Now, however, the ruling party is split, popular discontent has revived and the government is being denounced as the tool of powerful businessmen. The number of figures from the former regime in the new one has been noticed.
The new regime saw its first task as the privatization of 300 enterprises. Despite this, racketeering and corruption are once again being denounced and the population sees no improvement in its lot Recent by-elections have seen 70% abstentions.
Other countries have seen similar developments. In the Congo, the election of Pascal Lissouba has done nothing to change old habits of unprincipled sharing out of power. However, in all such cases the Western embassies have been promoting their protégés, influencing debates and providing constitutional expertise.
Even the most radical oppositions seem to lack any overall grasp of the global relations of domination that underpin the present crisis. Notions of managing dependence have replaced any references to an anti-imperialist project. This is an additional contradiction at a time when the working population is engaging in independent
Part of the reason is the international "crisis of socialism" but there is also a lack of strong traditions of an independent workers movement such as exist in Latin America. Thus while the economic crisis is sharpening discontent, it has not as yet led to a better understanding of the incompatibility of different social interests. 10
The West has started to try and plug the breaches and gain time. In Zaire they have tried bring into being a coalition between the group in power and their main opponents. The same was seen in Senegal with the entry into the government of A. Wade, who then left the government again to stand in the recent presidential elections. France is also promoting cohabitation in Togo where it is continuing to prop up the dictator Eyadema while seeking allies in the "opposition" government produced by the
The Western powers are moving pragmatically, giving whole-hearted support neither to their erstwhile client dictators nor to the oppositions and preferring a compromise between the two. The results are clear: in Zaire, Togo, Madagascar, Kenya and the Cameroons the dictators have manoeuvred, won time and fired on the crowds. In the Ivory Coast, Malawi, and the Central African Republic, the old system staggers on through repression. Indeed, in Kenya and the Cameroons the old regimes have managed to win general "democratic" elections to get international credibility to conti-
National conferences
Most of the "democratic transitions" take place through National Conferences which bring together virtually all political forces and unions - with churches and religious leaders often playing a central role - to negotiate over constitutional reforms and elections. As at the start of the 1960s the constitutions are often written by foreign experts and are modeled on Western constitutions but with added weight for the
In many cases, the oppositions based themselves on mass mobilizations to win these conferences before going on to reduce their strategy to electoral competition thereafter. After being used as a battering ram, the population is excluded from the making of fundamental constitutional choices.
These changes have incited intense debates, among them endless disquisitions on the question of whether democracy is a precondition for development or the oppo site. In fact, of course, the battles for democracy and development have to be undertaken together. The real problem is to decide what kind of democracy and development. In other terms, we have to define the social nature of the project.
There are some basic landmarks here. For example, is it conceivable that these countries can escape from underdevelopment without real efforts to change the position of women? Subsistence agriculture, the environment, the informal sector, population, protection of children, the networks of cooperation all this is the
"women's world". However, they have had little or no role in the National Conferences, and there is little sign of any interest in this essential topic from the oppositions.
There are a whole range of other crucial issues: freedom of the press, union independence and democracy, control of the income of elected representatives, reductions in military spending, access to education for all, barriers against capital flight, cancellation of the foreign debt, the organization of peasants and attention to their needs, secularization of the state and so on.
"Tribalism" The question of the organization and control of political power is also posed. The proliferation of political parties raises a debate on "tribalism" which divides up the political field into a multitude of lobbies fighting over the assets.
Such phenomena have two very different sources. One is the aspiration of a part of the population to decided the fate of their communities and its land. The other is racketeering based on regional or village networks. Of course, all too often, the second takes advantage of the former.
Ethnic conflict is often presented as an immutable feature of political life in Africa — as the antithesis of modernity. In fact, however, the most disparaged forms of such ethnicity are a product of the capitalist crisis, of competition between racketeers and of the social nature of the neo-colonial state.
Liberia, Somalia and Chad give us some perfect examples of this. Such conflicts are modern products of economic and political dislocation. It is growing poverty that produces such fragmentation The smaller the surplus product to be divided the more violent the disputes over it. When local production collapses, market exchange can continue on the basis of the siphoning off of food aid and pillage of rural areas, fuelling ethnic and clan conflicts. In Somalia, a demand for services from television teams has created a substitute market with its own supplies, inflationary pressures and competition against the background of the prevailing economic inactivity.
Africa may be marginalized, but it is nonetheless for all that a victim of the dictatorship of the world market. Serious demo cratic thinking needs to take this truth as its starting point. * 2. Southern Africa, August 1992. "Has the MMD been hijacked?"