The politics of hate
Uncertainty on the political level — with regional conflicts in Punjab, Kashmir, Assam and the states in the eastern part of the Union, a fragile central government, communal vio lence — does not inspire great confidence in
THE December 6, 1992 destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya was a international financial circles.
dramatic display of the growing strength of the Hindu extremist combine
Furthermore, they consider Rao's liberalization programme to be too little too late, of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Rashtriya Swayam Savak Sangh (RSS)
especially when so many other countries in and Visa Hindu Parishad (VHP) — and the deepening crisis of Prime the region such as Malaysia, Singapore,
Minister Narasimha Rao's Congress(l) government.
Thailand and China, offer much more attrac-
On February 25, in its ongoing attempt to bring down the Congress(l tive economic and political conditions. Thus they are demanding that the Rao government government, the BJP organized a mass mobilization of its forces to move into high gear in its plans for structural descend onto the capital New Delhi — a show of force partially adjustment.
prevented by a mass deployment of the army and described as a failure
The crisis of the Indian bourgeoisie's entry onto the world market is only begin-
In the following article, Kunal Chattopadhyay examines the rise of the ning. Without a doubt, it has real strengths with which it can score some successes in its
Hindu far-right and the attitude of the Indian ruling classes and the left. It attempts to follow the example of the Draoriginally appeared in the December issue of Naya Antarjatik, publication gons of Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the of the West Bengal State Committee of the Inquilabi Communist country's social structure is so backward that
Sangathan, Indian section of the Fourth International.
it is impossible to see how foreign capital can be allowed to operate freely without imperilling the foundations of the Indian bour-
KUNAL CHATTOPADHYAY — Calcutta, December 17, 1992 geoisie's control of the country.
The government appears to be aware of these dangers and has tried to soften somewhat the impact of the reforms. But its margin for manoeuvre has been reduced by the combined pressures of the economic crisis and the international credit agencies.
At the present time, it seems that the crisis of the Indian economy is deepening and the sickness is far from being cured. The government is going to great lengths to point to the benefits of the reform package, but this has more to do with its attempts to lure forei-
28 by the mainstream press.
HEN, on December 6
W last year a huge crowd of Hindu extremists tore down the mosque in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, the leader of the
Hindu chauvinist Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) Lal Krishna Advani claimed the outrage was the work of a bunch of kar sevaks (Hindus who volunteer for religious service) for whom the BJP had only
"moral" responsibility.
This is a lie. When we refer to the BJP we are talking about a coordinated structure. For parliamentary politics there is the BJP. Its leaders often assume a moderate stance that deceives many, even on the left. For sustained long-term propaganda and the building up of a disciplined cadre force, there is the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS). To spread the word of religious fanaticism there is the Viswa Hindu Parishad (VHP). And there is a second, parallel militant force, less disci-
International Viewpoint #244 April 1993 plined and ideologically trained, but ready to fight, the Bajrang Dal. Despite minor frictions, the whole conglomerate is directed from the headquarters of the RSS in Nagpur.
Similarities with European fascism
This kind of division of labour makes the BJP different from other bourgeois, and election-oriented left, parties. All these parties have front organizations to garner votes and take the organization's line to particular sectors. But the BJP does not simply seek to capture parliamentary power and is perfectly willing to take extra-parliamentary and even extra-constitutional steps. They are prepared to destroy the bourgeois democratic structure and take (counter-) revolutionary steps against parliamentary politics. And in this the BJP has distinct similarities with the classic fascist movements in Italy and Germany in the 1920s and 30s.
The basis of the BJP's change in strategy and organizational restructuring is the crisis of the Indian economy. From the beginning of the 1980s, state sectordependent capitalist development was facing increasing problems and the capitalist class began to look to a restriction of the public sector, privatization and the removal of controls on the the movement of capital.
The BJP wanted to go beyond the middle caste, medium-sized and particularly trading sectors of capital on which its predecessor the Jan Sangh had based itself. They wanted to prove to the big bourgeoisie that they were a responsible party. Putting forward a liberal face, it selected Atal Behari Vajpayee as its leader (Vajpayee was a former foreign minister under the 1977 Janata party government at a time when the Jan Sangh was applying an "entry tactic" into the broad nonCongress opposition.) and attempted to present a modernizing economic programme and a modern cultural-political profile.
However this space was preempted by Rajiv Gandhi. In 1984-85, many bourgeois leaders and liberal intellectuals confused Rajiv's rather juvenile passion for computers with a determination to introduce a modern ethos.
After this belief was dispelled there was general disillusion with this model of modernization. The petty bourgeois masses in particular were presented with three alternatives, each of which in different ways combined the promise of modernization with some conservative or reactionary themes.
For V.P. Singh, ex-prime minister and leader of the Janata Dal, the way forward lay through the one-point programme of affirmative action for the backward castes through the implementation of the Mandal Commission report. For the Communist Party of India (Marxist) - the CPI(M) -the line was economic development with a more centralized fiscal structure and the downward spread of capital through a relative dispersal of capital, associated with a tighter leash on the working class and all oppositional movements while remaining within the bourgeois democratic system.
The third option was that of Lal Krish-
Hindu chauvinist politics had always existed in the Jana Sangh. But while, in the period just before independence and after partition, the tensions and the mass killings in the Punjab and the two Bengals had created a powerful appeal for the slogan that Hinduism (or Islam) was in danger, the 1960s and 70s were different. Bourgeois democracy and relative economic prosperity appeared destined to lead to the extinction of far right parties like the Jan Sangh. The failure of the Vajpayee strategy - the BJP got only two seats in the lower house in the 1984 elections — gave warning signals of an imminent collapse and the RSS theoreticians decided to rebuild Hindutva - Hinduness.
They banked on the inevitable economic problems besetting a large part of the petty bourgeoisie due to capitalist modernization. Various local superstitions, false beliefs and a growing dependence on religion and, underlying all this, a growing crisis of confidence, were now to be turned into a political weapon.
### "Hindu" identity
A major obstacle to the development of a "Hindu" identity is the fact that Hindus are the majority of the Indian people Crude propaganda items — "all Muslims have four wives and breed like rabbits" etc. — can only make headway when, for some other reason, anti-Muslim feeling is already getting the upper hand. Minority communalism can raise the cry that the minority is in danger for all the concrete reasons flowing from discrimination by the majority.
But this is not possible for the Hindus. So the slogan had to be broader and vaguer — Hindutva, the very essence of Hinduism, is in danger. In danger from a number of enemies: in the first place the "Muslim community". They live in India but they are foreigners. The precondition for their becoming Indians is that they adopt the mainstream culture. But what is this culture? Answer: the culture based on the ancient Vedic and Smriti or DharmaShastra texts.
This is, in fact, a minority culture and thus there is also the question of how the majority of really existing Hindus are to be made to accept it. The basic approach for how to do this was worked out in the 18th and 19th centuries (see article on p.31) but the problem remains that any Hindutva created on the basis of the Vedic texts would be too intellectual and have only limited appeal.
### Harnessing the epics
Hence, popular dimensions must be tacked on. For this, the ancient epics were pressed into service. Through the influence of Tulsi Dal, the great popular poet of the Middle Ages, the Ramayana epic is a major common bond for the common people of the Hindi speaking areas. Indeed, as long as overt religiosity does not intrude too strongly, this is true for Muslims as much as Hindus. Even outside the Hindi belt, the influence of the Ramayana is not inconsiderable.
Hence the choice of the destroyed Hindu temple of Ram Janma Bhoomi once on the site of the (now also destroyed) Ayodhya mosque - as an issue. This, the supposed birthplace of Ram, had been defiled by the Muslim invaders and it was an unacceptable shame that independent India had done nothing to redress this ancient wrong. A whole new concept of the nation could be built from this starting
There was little in the way of argument that could be mustered against the slogan "Hinduism in danger" given that those who raised it claimed that it was a matter of conviction that went beyond reason. Rama being the incarnation of god himself, there could be no historical dispute over whether he was a myth or a reality and over his birthplace. If the Hindu priesthood - the Sants — declared this particular spot to have been his birthplace, then
And then could come the plea with reference to democracy — since the majority of people, the majority community, believes it, it must be accepted.
The mass fascist movement around the temple issue began in 1986. As the Congress government floundered amidst scandals, the BJP managed to keep its identity separate. The communal propaganda was churned out incessantly through the VHP. The BJP did not drop communalism from its election plank, but it benefited from the calls for "opposition unity" to oust Congress as the result was the V. P. Singh government propped up on
29
International Viewpoint #244 April 1993 the left by Left Front and on the right by the BJP, which thus gained credibility as a national party.
The BJP's aim was to use V. P. Singh's new-found popularity, the Bofors issue and so forth, to weaken Congress. But it had no intention of allowing the new National Front government to last out its full five year term and recreate a viable centrist alternative to Congress. So, the moment the government decided to adopt the Mandal Commission report on affirmative action for lower castes, the BJP went
Because of its strategy of creating a united Hindutva, the BJP stresses a common Hindu identity rather than caste divisions. Given the reality of these divisions it takes a pro-upper caste stance by default. All RSS chiefs have been brahmins (upper
But at the level of rituals, the RSS often insists on cutting out overt casteist rituals. It therefore correctly saw that V.P. Singh's implementation of the Mandal Report was aimed at dividing its own potential base.
Recognizing the danger signals, the BJP secretly joined hands with Congress to fuel upper caste violence throughout India, particularly in the educational institutions, against affirmative action. And, on the other hand, this was when the party chose to intensify its stir to unify Hindus as Hindus through Advani's Ratha Yatra. This programme left a train of 43 riots, arson, murder, looting by rampaging mobs crea30 ted by the Bajrang Dal, and so on. Ultimately, Advani was arrested in Bihar and, promptly, the BJP drew support from the government, which fell.
The BJP's major gain was that all this made Hindutva a major issue in the 1991 elections. Most elections in India have taken the form of plebiscites over one or two central issues. The aim of the BJP was to discredit its opponents one by one and then make Hindutva the central plebiscita-
The BJP made significant headway in northern India. But its progress was hindered by the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi which created a "sympathy wave" from which the Congress(I) benefited in the second round of polling, leading to a minority Congress(I) government. Nonetheless, the BJP emerged as the second biggest party in parliament with significant votes even in regions where it had previously been non-existent - for example, West Bengal where it got 12%.
A new and more serious problem for the BJP was the new economic policy of the Narasimha Rao government. Much of it is a carbon copy of what has been advocated by the BJP.
It became evident that while the big bourgeoisie was in agreement with the BJP on economic policy it was by no means reconciled to the prospect of the BJP carrying it out. They prefer to see economic restructuring proceeding under the leadership of Congress, their traditional
The next setback for the BJP came when, despite internal factionalism, the Congress(I) managed to stabilize its rule. It had become clear that the big bourgeoisie was not ready to run the risks of bringing a fascist party to power. Indeed, the Indian bourgeoisie is more aware of the complexities and dangers than are most leftists.
The BJP-RSS combine has become increasingly enraged by the attitude of the big bourgeoisie over the past year and a half. They now want to create a situation where the bourgeoisie feels that, for better or worse, they are the only option open to
So the "movement" has become steadily more heated. Step by step, with calculated gaps, tension was stepped up. The maintenance of a public, constitutional image fell chiefly to Vajpayee and to some extent to Advani. And to keep up the spirit of the cadres, and the vast masses aroused by the communal campaign there were the VHP leaders, the RSS organizers, and other BJP leaders such as Uma Bharati and Sadhvi Ritambhara.
A parliamentary game
Prime Minister Rao, his party and most leftists, all assumed, being parliamentary personalities, that this was all still a game, if a little extreme, that would be played out within an essentially parliamentary framework. None of them really believed that the mosque would actually be destroyed. Indeed, in private, many left-