3. Rabochaya Demokratia No.2, 1993.
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RUSSIA
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Authoritarian yearnings
IT IS clear that the referendum vote has not resolved any of the fundamental problems facing Yeltsin. The economy remains at a low and
Yeltsin's promises will certainly not facilitate a recovery. Political opposition has not disappeared; the outcome of the vote has strengthened the regional bureaucracies to the detriment of the centre.
International Viewpoint #246 June 1993 ce', and against Yeltsin.
From the outset it was clear that the most important aspect of the referendum would not be the voting itself, but the interpretation, and indeed manipulation, of the result afterwards. In this sense the April 25 referendum did continue the 'tradition' of
POUL FUNDER LARSEN — Moscow, May 11, 1993
V ELTSIN is now trying to
grab the initiative after almost six months of political stalemate - and pursue the line of a 'soft' constitutional coup by pressing for a new Constitution to be carried at breakneck speed. It remains to be seen whether he will succeed. but after the bloody clashes in Moscow, on May Day, the political confrontation has clearly taken on a more vicious character. The authoritarian yearnings of yesterdays democrats are coming out into the open.
Even if the turn-out, at 64%, was slightly higher than expected — though markedly down from the 74% of the Presidential elections in June 1991 — and the socialeconomic policies of Yeltsin were surprisingly endorsed by the 53% of those voting, the attempts of the Russian and Western media to portray this as a landslide victory for Yeltsin are far from the truth. Overall, Yeltsin lost millions of votes compared to his score in June 1991 and a majority of those voting actually called for early presidential elections.
But to appreciate the real situation -and the real dilemmas facing Yeltsin — we should look at the regional break-down of READ ALL STAR ABOUT ME The Yeltsian WE'RE BAC NG BO IS.s BIG BORIS the vote. In ten of the republics inside the Russian Federation there were firm majorities against both Yeltsin and his policies: in Dagestan Yeltsin received 14%, in Ingushetia 2%, in Tatarstan the turn-out was around 20%, and Checkenya boycotted the referendum altogether. Even in a large part of the 'heartland' of European Russia (for example, Lipetsk, Smolensk and Ul'yanovsk) majorities voted against the President. However, Yeltsin managed to poll 58% through strong support in Moscow and St. Petersburg and, on his native soil, in the Urals.
On the question of support for Yeltsin's social-economic policies 48 of the 88 regions participating in the referendum voted against Yeltsin. This included industrial centres like Novosibirsk, Omsk, Volgograd, Voronezh and Kuzbass, the centre of Russian coal mining heavily courted by Yeltsin over the last few years.!
In several regions questions on increased powers to the regional authorities were added to the ballot: in St. Petersburg nearly 75% voted for the city to be upgraded to the status of a 'republic', while a sweeping majority in the important republic of Bashkortostan voted for 'economic independen-
Drinkies 'YELTS' IN CHARGE ANGBORIS Borisograph INDEPYELTSIN BORIS IS BIG BORIS THE ONE LOOKING BIGBORIS X VOTE GOOD ME GILVER BIG BORIS X
Soviet and post-Soviet referenda, serving primarily as tools in the political battle among the top echelons of the apparatus, with few paying serious attention to the actual outcome of the voting. The bulk of the media was engaged in a pro-Yeltsin campaign of an intensity and fanaticism unknown in Russia since the early 1980s. With Yeltsin back in his well known populist posture — raising pensions and minimum wages, lowering petrol prices, and promises to fight unemployment and crime — and the opposition inefficient and divided, his victory was never in danger. Using the impetus gained from the referendum the Yeltsinites are now pressing ahead with privatisation, attempting once more to bring under their control the state credit policy and enforce bankruptcies in State industry. Alongside this are attempts to carry out a constitutional reform with strong authoritarian overtones.
One of the dominating issues looming behind the conflict between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet is the question of property, and the mechanisms for its privatisation.
Yeltsin and his neo-liberal followers are implementing the voucher privatisation scheme, which gives disproportionately large influence to the speculative fortunes accumulated over the last few years — with the speculators either buying in directly or gaining control over the investment funds that will acquire large chunks of industry. The very design of - atomised — voucher privatisation makes it extremely difficult for the workers collective of an enterprise to win a controlling stake.?
Contrary to the claims that voucher privatisation "returns property to the people" the concrete process has been one marked by, on the one hand large-scale fraud and
1. All figures from Rossiskaya Gazeta, April 28. In many mining towns of Kuzbas, for example Mezhourechensk and Leninsk-Kuznetsky, and southern Russia less than 50% voted.
2. When the voucher scheme was launched Anatoly Chubais, the head of the state property fund, claimed that a voucher would equal a large Volca car or at least 10,000 "old", pre-January 1991, rubles. Today, taking into account inflation is around 300,000 "new" rubles. Currently, however, the voucher is trading below 5,000 "new" rubles on the Moscow exchange.
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245 • 245•73 5
Declaration of the Party of Labour
The brutal assault on the May Day demonstration showed that the Yeltsin regime is interpretating the results of the referendum in its own distinctive fashion:
as a mandate to use clubs and water-cannon against attempts by workers, women, children and old people to say 'No!' to a policy of plunder.
The Party of Labour does not endorse the slogans of the extremist elements in
International Viewpoint #246 June 1993 close inter-action between government structures, and on the other the shadow economy, which Vice-president Rutskoi recently estimated at 50% of the Russian
GDP.3
It is evident that a situation, where state structures determine the value of property the Front for National Salvation and the Russian Communist Workers Party.
and outline the rules for its privatisation,
Nevertheless we have stood and will continue to stand together with working while huge shadow fortunes wait in the people in their struggle to defend their inalienable rights against a 'democratic wings, is prone with corruption. In a recent regime whose only argument against its opponents is the use of force.
scandal for example, the whole port of
It is clear that the attack on the peaceful May Day demonstration was a delibera-
Nakhodka, in the comparatively prosperous tely thought-out and carefully staged provocation. The demonstrators were met
Russian far east, was sold off for R18 milwith clubs and water-cannon in the narrowest part of Lenin Prospect, towards lion — currently some US$20,000!
To prevent speculators from ripping off which the march was directed by a solid row of dozens of heavy vehicles and hundreds of armed and trained 'guardians of law and order'.
the most valuable and profitable enterprises at rock-bottom prices several regions in the
This bloody assault, and the mass media hysteria which preceded it, bear the
Russian Federation, for example Chelyamarks of a rehearsal for the introduction of a dictatorship by the overthrow of binsk, Volgograd and Novosibirsk — inithe Constitution. This must not be allowed to happen.
tially singled out as laboratories in the pri-
We demand an investigation into this crime, and the trial and punishment of vatisation process — have temporarily suspended share auctions linked to the voucher
We demand the holding of parliamentary hearings to determine the degree to privatisation, much to dismay of the which high-placed state officials are responsible for these events.
government. Meanwhile, the 'Directors
Opposition' around the Civic Union is pro-
We say 'No!' to the President's authoritarian regime!
posing an alternative to the government pri-
"No!' to the Constitution which the regime is trying to force through using such vatisation programme, through the handing over of enterprises to the workers collec-
'Yes!' to popular power and to early general elections! * tives. However, this will not in itself guarantee social justice. It will benefit the collectives of strong enterprises, while others will get little or nothing. (Particularly, in the case of those working in the 'budget' spheres of education, health care or culture.) And, even as regards profitable industrial enterprises this model will, in the absence of a genuine democratisation of social relations inside the enterprises and externally, amount to a de facto transfer of ownership to the management. This is the main reason for the support this idea has received from industrialist circles.
A major stumbling block for the attempts to subject the enterprises to the compulsion of the market — and eventually privatise them — is the failure to implement a working mechanism for bankruptcies. In spite of the 18 months of pro-capitalist reform not one state enterprise in Russia has actually been bankrupted; a failure that speaks volumes about the passive and structural resistance to marketisation in
Russian society. Paradoxically this failure on the part of the liberal reformers is also a major reason for their success in clinging to power - because the low unemployment rate, officially 1.3% while production has dropped 30%, is an important factor in maintaining a certain social stability.
The fate of the government privatisation programme will, to a large extent, be decided in the regions. However, another decisive battle — closely linked to the issue of enterprise closures — will be fought out in Moscow, at the heart of the state apparathose who organised the carnage.
methods! tus. This will be about the control over the state credit policy. In spite of a host of foreign advisers and all the 'good intentions' of the monetarist zealots around Gaidar, the Yeltsinites only managed to maintain a tight' credit policy for a few months after the big price bang of January 1992.
Since then all attempts to reinforce this line have failed and the enterprises have either been bailed out directly by the central bank or accumulated inter-enterprise debts eventually to be settled through the central bank. In April an agreement was reached between the government and the central bank to limit credit emission, but with interest rates at 120% yearly and inflation expected to reach more than 1000% in 1993 there is little reason to believe that enterprises will feel discouraged to accumulate further debts.
The only sphere where Yeltsin may move quickly to limit credits is in relation to the CIS states, in this way continuing the economic 'go-it-alone' attitude towards the non-Russian states prevailing since the demise of the Soviet Union.
In spite of ingenious accounting methods to cover up the facts many believe that the budget deficit will reach 30% of Gross national Product (GNP) in 1993 — a far cry from the 5% "allowed' by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Strict compliance with the IMFs prescriptions in the fields of credit and monetary policies has been presented as the precondition for receiving Western 'aid'. But despite the package of nominally US$43 billion in new credits from the leading imperialist powers, put together last month, the faith in "Western salvation" is receding. The actual sums forthcoming - be they credits or investments — are negligible compared to, for example, the capital flight from Russia. Last year this was estimated at between US$20bn and $40bn.4 Indeed, if Russia eventually receives a new wave of large-scale credits this could very well be a short respite, since it will see Russian foreign debt soaring from the US$ 85 Billion to $120 billion by 1994. In the words of liberal Vice-premier, Alexander Shokin, "If we cannot use these resources effectively Russia will go into such a spiral of foreign debt that it won't be able to come out of it."5
But the single most disputed issue in the aftermath of the referendum is undoubtedly the question of a new constitution -a conflict which encapsulates all the contradictions between the bureaucratic elites. So far this struggle is unfolding along lines similar to the political confrontations of the last six months: There are two drafts for a constitution — one by the President and the other by the Supreme Soviet - and both
3. For Rutskoï's vitriolic attack on privatisation and corruption in the Russian state apparatus see Russiskaya Gazeta, April 20
4. The World Bank estimated direct foreign investments in Russia at US$1.2 billion as of mid-1992. Kommersant, April 17
5. Reuters, May 6
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Manufacturing consent
The following statistics came from Russia's parliamentary press office. They have not been challenged by the president's office. The referendum was held on
• In March the president's image appeared on the television between 2 and 3
International Viewpoint #246 June 1993 cator. "Restoring law and order" on the fringes of "the empire" is a cause that could help to unite liberal and etatist forces?
Of more immediate significance for
April 25.
times a day.
• After April 10 the president's image appeared on the television between 11 and 17 times a day.
• After April 20 the president's image appeared on the television between 20 and 25 times a day.
In addition to these statistics there have been a number of abuses of media time.
For example, in the week before the referendum an hour long programme was shown which presented the president as a family man', showing him 'at home' in a humble flat with his wife and children. The 'humble flat' was in fact not where the president lived at all.
Yeltsin's attempts to broaden his power base are probably the fissures that have opened up amongst the industrialist forces and the regroupments inside the corps of enterprise directors as a result of the slow, but real change of relations inside and between the enterprises. A pro-Yeltsin Association of Privatised and Private Enterprises and an organisation of Entrepreneurs for a New Russia (also pro-liberal have been founded in the last few months, while support for some kind of liberal-centrist alliance is gaining ground within Volsky's Rusthe real game away.
"Russia needs a strong, authoritarian government that can restrain public discontent within limits not threatening economic reforms and ensure the development of private enterprise. This government must remain authoritarian until the economy becomes efficient enough to offer good wages and salaries to the people and thus make protests and discontent subside. This was how things developed in Greece, Chile and Taiwan where the government relied on elite troops, or in South Korea, West Germany and Japan in which the USA had major military bases or troops stationed." - Renfrey Clarke * are claiming to be the only legitimate one, creating a peculiar situation of constitutional 'dual power'
However, both contenders have to take note of the dramatic weakening of the centre and the growing powers of the regions, and consequently both are busy handing out concessions to the regional bureaucracies. For that reason Yeltsin envisages convening a constituent assembly without general elections (!), but with a strong representation from the regions. He hopes to by-pass the Supreme Soviet and thereby complete the velvet coup' he tried to pull off in March. There is certainly no shortage of calls for such a coup — or even a "Chilean solution' — from the emerging bourgeois layers of entrepreneurs, speculators and former nomenclaturists. Mikhail
Yurev, a vice-president of the influential
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs spelled it out recently: "I do not rule out that all these games will result in the abolishment of the Parliament, and a period of some kind of authoritarian rule.
The current power vacuum has already driven me to the point where I am not against this. If this junta occupies reasonable economic positions, and does not interfere too much in these questions, then why not?"6
This authoritarian neo-liberal model, of which the ambitious entrepreneurs and pro- capitalist intellectuals in Moscow can still only dream, is now implemented in the small oil rich republic of Kalmykia, a subject of the Russian Federation. Here a young multi-millionaire, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, was elected President after waging a campaign under the slogan "I am not a socialist, I am not a communist, I am not a democrat — I am a capitalist". He has preceded to dissolve all the Soviets and parties on the territory of the republic and enforce a so-called "Moratorium on political activi-
But this is hardly a viable option for the Yeltsinites at the level of the Russian Federation as a whole. Firstly Yeltsin has to walk the tightrope between acquiring more powers at the centre while not alienating the regional elites. And secondly, the social base for this type of authoritarianism is quite narrow at least in the short term, since the pro-capitalist strata cannot yet base themselves on a consistent (capitalist) logic and are therefore not in a position to force through their unilateral 'solution' to the systematic crisis of bureaucratic rule.
Consequently, Yeltsin has to construct a broader alliance behind his political project of a "Presidential Republic". The partners for this are drawn from a variety of different sources - including from some of the "independent' trade unions, formed over the last few years, with leaderships eager to gain influence at any cost.
In this context, the efforts the Yeltsinites have put into rehabilitating the Cossacks — including the formation of Cossack units to "defend Russian statehood" in the conflict-ridden northern Caucasus region — is an important ideological indisian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.
This suggests that "a strong Presidential power" could hope eventually to base itself on a compromise between sectors of the liberal and statist forces, within the perspective of a market reform with strong elements of state interventionism.
The outcome of the present, protracted power struggle is, however, far from certain. The clashes on May Day, provoked by the Moscow authorities, mark an escalation. But passive resistance from the regions and from the sectors of the Bureaucracy and the centre opposed to Yeltsin's reform concept effectively blocks any rapid strong arm solution.
The forces dominating the opposition remain firmly situated within the logic of the apparatus, and even if they counteract some of the most harmful aspects of the economic reforms they represent no global alternative to Yeltsin. Indeed on some issues, for example relations with the CIS states, the opposition nurtures positions that are at least as reactionary as Yeltsin's.
For the time being no independent alternative with a mass base is in sight — though there are beginnings among socialists and in the workers movement. Still, on balance, the present power vacuum at the top may give the left what it needs — time to organise and develop. *
6. Also see box on media bias, page
7. One Moscow leftwing economist recently remarked in a personal conversation with me, "If everything else fails Yeltsin could go for the nationalist option. It is now largely forgotten, but Yeltsin was the first prominent Russian politi cian to meet Pamvat." The inclusion of Rutskoi as his Vice. president was another early sign of Yeltsin's interest in blocking with parts of the supporters of a "Greater Russia".
8. One example of this trend was an article in the liberal business paper Oelovoi mir on April 23, "rehabilitating Valentin Pavlov, former Prime Minister, coup plotter and proponent of state capitalist model
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