A Stalinist legacy
International Viewpoint #247 July 1993
Loyalists and the British. It is clear from the results that the majority of their supporters have very different ideas.
The election was followed by dramatic military success for the IRA in which they planted four major bombs. Their opponents have trotted out the charges that these were as a result of the Sinn Féin vote. The reality
THE former Yugoslavia is not the only region where, following the is that the bombings were planned some time collapse of Stalinism, often long standing ethnic rivalries and unresolved ago and timed not to be an issue in the elections — an indication of the political weakterritorial disputes have resurfaced, resulting in protracted and bitter ness of both the military and electoral camconflicts. In this issue we are publishing two articles that examine the paigns of the republicans.
historical background to two disputes — between Abkhazia and Georgia,
Hopefully this victory will give Sinn and Armenia and Azerbaijan — in the Caucasian region of the former
Féin militants the confidence to look again at the programme that they have been following. Hume will want to continue talks be-
Our correspondent draws our attention, in particular, to the cause he wants to use the republicans as a establishment of borders during the period of Stalin's rule. These stick against the British. A Sinn Féin break decisions were often crude and arbitrary. On other occasions they were from these talks and the political agenda they specifically designed to favour one ethnic group over another. It is here represent would strengthen it and weaken both the SLP and the British. * that certainly some of the modern roots of current disputes can be
Breaking the silence
Soviet Union.
Understanding of the crisis in the for- VICKEN CHETERIAN — Yerevan, June 1993 mer Yugoslavia is as confused in Ireland as it is elsewhere. This is as true of the left as of the right; indeed, until a fortnight ago, most public criticism of Serb and Croat expansionism in Bosnia had come from politicians of the rightwing parties. Most of those who got their basic political education in the 'Stalin' school are parrotting the Belgrade line, and this has influenced any republican position on the subject. The larger revolutionary socialist organisations, the Socialist Workers Movement and Militant Labour, keep a careful On Thursday, May 27, People's Democracy, Irish section of the Fourth International, ended the shame of the Irish left by holding a meeting in support of the Bosnian national resistance and for the ending of the embargo on arms to it. Despite the worst weather of the worst recorded May, the room was full as Matt Merrigan, former President of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, Kevin Keating of PD, and the Bosnian, Bratso Bergerovic opened a campaign of solidarity on four demands: • For a secular independent Bosnia. • For an end to Irish support for the embargo on arms to the Bosnian national forces. • For the opening of European borders to victims of the Yugoslav wars. • For support to the anti-war movements in Serbia and Croatia. Following the meeting activists met to make plans for propaganda and agitation on the above demands. *
LONG the Black Sea coast
A
stretching towards the Caucasian Mountains, Abkhazia occupies a surface of 8,600 km square covered with forests, rivers and sandy beaches. The charm of its nature had made Sukhumi, Pitsunda and Gagra among the favourite holiday resorts for the former Soviet elite. Nowadays, the hotels and the sanatorians are occupied by refugees or guarded by armed men, while Sukhumi is a war front dividing the country into two.
Tension existed between the Abkhaz and the Georgians all through the Soviet period. In this muti-ethnic region, the percentage of the Abkhaz population was in free fall, while that of the Georgians was
The Abkhaz believed this to be a result of the nationalist policy emanating from Tbilisi, the Georgian capital. In 1978, the Abkhaz demonstrated, demanding to be a part of the Russian federation. Abkhazia had been a Soviet Socialist Republic between 1921 and 1931. Thereafter, Stalin — himself a Georgian — decided to incorporate it into Georgia. Abkhazia was given formal autonomy.
As Georgia was struggling to split from the Soviet Union the Abkhaz, fearing the Georgians, mobilised in favour of keeping the union. After the declaration of Georgian independence in April 1991, its parliament adopted the 1921 constitution which deprived Abkhazia of any form of self-rule. In response, the Abkhaz parliament voted for its 1925 constitution, a time when Abkhazia was not part of Georgia. The situation became explosive.
Leonid Lakerbaya, the acting prime minister of Abkhazia, said that the Georg ian authorities tried and failed to create a conflict between the local Georgian population and the other ethnic groups. He added that on the eve of Georgian military intervention, Georgian President Shevardnadze spoke by phone with the Abkhaz President Ardzinba, promising not to resort to military intervention and instead seek a peaceful solution.
The next day, August 14, 1992, five thousand Georgian National Guards entered Sukhumi - the capital - and by sea landed in Gagra. The pretext was the protection of the railway link with Russia. Most of these men were ex-criminals who spread terror by looting, killing and burning houses. Lakerbaya considered this to be a premeditated policy. The intention was to empty Abkhazia by driving the population out of their land
The Abkhaz forces fled to the mountains, although the area surrounding Gudauta stayed under their control. In December 1992 they recaptured Gagra, as far as the Russian border. The victory was a surprise. On March 15, the Abkhaz forces crossed the Gumisda river and for two days kept parts of Sukhumi under their control before retreating. How could the Abkhaz, who are no more than a 100,000, challenge the power of the Georgian state?
Andre Sakharov had once described Georgia as the "mini-empire". In a state where 40% are ethnically non-Georgian
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International Viewpoint #247 July 1993 the ex-President Gamsakhurdia had made "Georgia for Georgians" and "five per cent for minorities" his main slogans. Even those identified as Georgians are composed of Kartvelies — or the "proper Georgians" - of Megrels, Svans and others, who are united by a written language but speak different dialects. The Megrels, who are supporters of Gamsakhurdia, do not participate in the Abkhaz war, and their relations with Tbilisi are unstable.
Not much changed with the coming of Shevardnadze. When the Georgian National Guard entered Abkhazia, Albert Topolian, the vice-President of Abkhazia, said that they equally harassed Armenians, Greeks, Estonians and other ethnic groups living there. Initially, he said, the Georgians were cautious with the Russian population, but now the Russians in Sukhumi - like other non-Georgians — are treated as hostages. Only those who can pay a high ransom are permitted to leave the city. Topolian's house and the house of his parents was burnt down, while his 81 year old mother was mercilessly killed. Such conduct has made many of the ethnic minorities join the Abkhaz cause.
lated when they decided to repress the ethnic minorities in their country, at a time when they were trying to escape Russian influence. In the future, Russia can also exploit the existing tension between Tbilisi and the Adjars in the Batumi region, or the Armenians of Akhalkalak for the same
From a total Abkhaz population of 550,000 before the war, 200,000 are now refugees. Most of them have crossed the border to find peace in Russia. It is difficult to produce an accurate figure on casualties, but according to the Abkhaz parliament, there were 1700 dead among the Abkhaz forces.
### Atrocities
Natella Akaba is head the Parliament's Human Rights Commission. She is collecting eye-witness reports about the atrocities committed by the "Georgian occupation forces". In Sukhumi, she has said, it is now forbidden to speak Abkhaz. She is worried about the fate of 30,000 civilians trapped in Tkvarchill, a town surrounded by the Georgians since August 14 last year. Evacuation has stopped after the shooting down of a plane in December where 84 civilians died.
The Abkhaz leaders think that through their resistance, they acquired the right of self-determination. They say the ideal would be an independent, neutral, multi-ethnic Abkhazia. Switzerland is cited as an example. But the ideal does not exist in times of war, and the Abkhaz parliament has recently asked the Russian parliament for "patronage", to accept Abkhazia as an "autonomous republic" within the Russian Federation. If the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe become involved as mediators what will they decide would bring stability to the region; maintaining borders created by Stalin, or the peoples' right to self-determination?
It may be too early to predict the final outcome of the conflict. The Abkhaz forces might try to recapture Sukhumi. They are counting on possible conflicts within the Georgian camp. They are in contact with the Megrel militia chief Kobalia Loti. If there was a conflict between the Megrels and Tbilisi — the Georgian forces in Abkhazia would be completely surrounded. *
### Support
From the first days of the war, Abkhazia received important support from the Memories live on North Caucasian People's Confederation. Adyguies, Cherkess, Kabardins, Chechens are considered ethnically related with the Abkhaz, and many have rushed to help. So did the Ossets, who had previously clashed with the Georgians over the status of South Ossetia, another 'autonomous region' within Georgia. Many from the Abkhaz diaspora have also joined the struggle, coming from Turkey, Jordan and Syria. Lately, the 200 Checen volunteers fighting in Abkhazia have returned to their homeland, after tension between the Checen President Dudaiev and his parliament.
The most significant support came from Russia, which is the source of weapons for the two camps. According to Topolian, Russia is supplying arms at a ratio of "60-40" in favour of the Abkhaz, enough to resist but not enough to cross the Gumisda river and re-enter Sukhumi. The border between Russia and Abkhazia is heavily guarded by Russian soldiers, who scrutinise every passing car or pedestrian. Yet, in the Abkhaz representation office in the Russian city of Sochi I met two Russian officers from the Special Forces, who said that they were on an official mission to Abkhazia. They also said that they had a certain amount of arms to be transported with them.
Georgian politicians clearly miscalcu34
EREVAN, April 24. Thousands of people, line after line, have walked all day long towards Dzidzernagapert, a hill near Yerevan. There, they put flowers on the monument built for the memory of the Armenian victims during the First World War in the Ottoman Empire. What does the day signify to them. "It is a day of commemoration and mourning", said a 72 year old man. "It is a day calling for vengeance", said a young man in military uni-
The memory of the genocide is the cornerstone for the modern Armenian national identity. Religious ceremonies and demonstrations are organised in most diaspora Armenian communities. In 1965, the first mass demonstration took place under the Soviet regime, after which April 24 is commemorated year after year. For a people with a 3,000 year old history, their memory is haunted with this single event.
On April 24, 1915, 400 Armenian intellectuals were arrested in Istanbul and later assassinated. Armenian servicemen in the Ottoman Army were disarmed and executed. The civilian population were driven out of their towns and villages into the Syrian desert, to be killed on the way or to perish from plague or starvation. In three years, 1.5 million Armenians died. West Armenia, their homeland for thousands of years, was emptied of its Armenian population. The survivors were scattered around the world, some finding refuge in Armenian territory
In Turkey, history is told differently. Turkish historians speak about incidents during WWl, where the Armenian population near the Russian border were taken into interior provinces, for fear of collaboration with the enemy. During these events, they say, an estimated 300,000 Armenians died. No genocide. No question of compensation of any sort.
The Turkish refusal to recognise the genocide has made the nightmarish memories omnipresent in Armenian memory. In the 1970s, a terrorist movement known as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) carried out assassinations and bomb attacks to attract international public opinion, and force the Turk-
International Viewpoint #247 July 1993 ish government to change its position.
Present day symbols are mixed with that of the past. In front of the 1915 monument stands two khatchkars — or stones engraved with cross - for the memory of the Sumgait and Kirovabad victims, two pograms that took place in 1988 in Azerbaijan. Next to it lies six tombs of fighters who died in Karabakh. The Armenian TV programme of that day did not show the traditional pictures of the genocide victims heaps of human skulls, or children starving in the desert. Instead, a historian talked of the villages which showed resistance against the Turkish Army. A report about the newly founded Armenian National Army followed
When the Armenian National Movement (ANM — which had evolved from out of the 1988 Karabakh Movement) called for independence, it was challenging not only traditional Armenian relations with Russia, but also the traditional Armenian fear towards Turkey. Soviet Armenian historical stereotypes described Russia as the "friendly people", Armenia's sole protector, without which Turkey would repeat the 1915 genocide. Soviet legitamacy was discredited in the eyes of the Armenians with the pogroms of Sumgait and Kirovabad, when the Soviet state could not protect the Armenian civilians from the Azeri mob.
It was evident that the Moscow leadership could not find any solution for the Karabakh question, on the contrary, it tried to repress it by force, or to manipulate it. Gerald Libaridian, the deputy foreign minister, wrote in 1991 that the ANM had concluded that: "Pan-Turkism is the scare-crow which distorts the nation's view of the past and denies Armenians the right to imagine the future, thus serving the interests of Russian imperialism alone.
Newly independent Armenia had an experimental foreign policy. "The basis of our policy is good neighbourhood...", foreign minister told me a year ago. The Armenian government hoped to establish trade relations with Turkey, which would lead to a normalisation in political relations. There were plans to enlarge the Turkish port of Trabizond on the Black Sea, to make it the centre of exchange between Europe and the Caucasian republics. In 1992, Armenia was encouraged to enter the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Zone. What about the first genocide of our century? Armenian authorities thought that after normal relations had been established, the touchy subject of past barbarism could be approached in a more civilised way. Humanity already had an example. Didn't German politicians publicly apologise for the crimes of the Nazi
The war in Karabakh complicates the already difficult relations. Turkey projects itself as the protector of Azerbaijan (which has a mainly Turkish population) in the international media. For example, the peace negotiations organised by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, rejected any change in the actually existing borders. When the Armenian forces occupied the Kelbajar region in early April, Turkey threatened military intervention, and cut its air and land routes with Armenia, worsening the isolation of the republic. "The Armenians did not learn their lesson from their last tentative adventure in Anatolia, and forgot the punishment they had suffered", declared the late Turkish President, Turgut Ozal. According to reports in Yerevan, Turkey is providing arms and military advisers to Azerbaijan, which has a majority ethnic Turk population.
In spite of this, Turkey has recognised Armenia's independence, but there are no diplomatic relations between the two countries. Raffi Hovannessian, the former foreign minister, said that Turkey has demands which must be met before it can normalise its relations with Armenia. At one stage, he said, Turkey produced a document calling on Armenia to refrain from making any public reference to the genocide, or any demands for compensation. At another stage, Turkey had put additional conditions concerning the fate of Karabakh. Turkey, under pressure from Azerbaijan as well as nationalists at home, has not opened its borders with Armenia, coherent with the Azeri blockade to force Armenia to accept Azeri conditions on Karabakh.
The borders of present day Armenia were created in the 1920s by Russia and Turkey. Stalin, hoping to win over Kemalist Turkey, had placed two Armenian inhabited regions under Azeri rule. Nakhichevan, which then had a 50% Armenian population, and was geographically cut off from Azerbaijan, was nevertheless given to Baku. An 'autonomous republic' of Mountainous Karabakh was created, and, although it was populated by 96% Armenians, again was placed inside Azerbaijan. Of course, such arbitrary decisions were parceled up in "internationalist" demagogy.
During 70 years of Soviet rule, Nakhichevan was emptied of Armenians, and in 1988 it had only 2% Armenians (today there are none). Karabakh was increasingly faced with a similar fate and in 1988 its population went into the streets demanding to be reunited with Armenia. This has ignited a struggle which has not yet found a solution.
The official Armenian position towards Karabakh is more than ambiguous. Levon Ter-Petrossian came to power promising, among other things, unification. Soon, his position changed and last year Yerevan officially gave signs about its readiness for a compromise that would keep the enclave inside Azerbaijan in return for Azeri guarantees towards the Armenian population there. They considered that the war in Karabakh was between Azerbaijan and the Armenian population living in Karabakh. But Azerbaijan refused this proposal considering the war to be a result of Armenian territorial ambi-
Political survival
Nevertheless, the Armenian authorities have progressively been drawn into this conflict. After the occupation of the Shahumian and Martakert regions (a third of the enclave) last summer by the Azeri National Army, mass demonstrations took place in Yerevan. The authorities understood that their political survival depended directly on the survival of Karabakh. Since then they have started sending additional military and humanitarian supplies. For the first time, in April of this year, Armenian regular forces participated in operations in Azerbaijan, assisting Karabakh forces to capture Kelbajar, an Azeri enclave between Armenia and
Should there be a second look at the Caucasian borders? An Armenian officer, who had lead his troops to Kelbajar, was asked what he thought now that his troops are in Azeri territory. The officer explained that it was not natural to have an island inhabited by Armenians in the midst of Azerbaijan, that this was the result of a deliberate and repressive policy, that Kelbajar had been Armenian in the past, as hundreds of architectural remains prove. "It is strange", he concluded, "that now that everyone condemns Stalin, at the same time they insist on keeping the borders he created." *
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