INTERVIEW — Paris, 21 October 1993 W HAT has happened in Israeli society since the signing of the accords?
In Israel it is as if the new situation has always existed. And this is perhaps the most interesting phenomenon. This event of historic proportions has been widely accepted and the immense majority of the population is behaving as if it were entirely normal. The far-right demonstrations that took place immediately after the signing of the accords have since calmed down. The settlers and far-right parties are in the process of re-evaluating their response, with the objective of preventing the implementation of the agreement; and there are differences within their ranks. Given the unpopularity of their demands, they do not want to be seen taking a position of outright opposition to the process.
Is there a danger that in this milieu a kind of extra-legal armed force will emerge?
No, it is more likely that there will be direct actions by small isolated groups, which could do great damage. Israeli security forces are on the lookout for these kind of groups. It is not excluded, for example, that small groups - some of whom have connections in high places — will organise a bloody provocation in an Arab village. And this could in turn unleash a dynamic of destabilisation that would jeopardise the entire process. The great majority of settlers, and even the far-right Gush Emunim, have annouced that they will not go beyond a certain limit and that they would not commit seditious acts -and I believe that this is their real position. There will be more demonstrations; but since the dismantling of settlements is not on the agenda, they have a problem mobilising people.
They are trying to mobilise people on
### PALESTiNE the basis of the accords, saying, for example, that they will not obey the proposed Palestinian police force. Bilateral commissions have been set up to discuss the kind of links that there will be between the Israeli armed forces (who will be in charge of the settlers and the settlements) and the Palestinian police force (who will be responsible for the territory. They are discussing how to coordinate their actions.
Can it be said that a section of
Israeli society is beginning to question the ideology of
Zionism?
For Israel and Israeli society, these accords signify recognition for the first time of Palestinian rights over the land of Palestine. The entire history of Zionism has represented a negation of this right and the will to erase Palestine from the land of Eretz Israel. One of Ilan Alevi's books is entitled "Under Israel, Palestine"; the agreement lifts Palestine out from underneath Israel and gives it a certain place — a place that is far from providing justice to Palestinians; a place that is even far removed from what is minimally acceptable to Palestinians; but which legitimises this place for Palestine beside Israel. This has tremendous significance.
And the peace and anti-war movements? From the outside it almost seems as if there has been a kind of demobilisation after the signing of the accords.
How mobilised are they and what is the political content of their demands following the accords?
Indeed, there has been a significant demobilisation which has not only affected the central current of the Israeli peace movement, Peace Now, but also the most radical wing which felt that the government was doing its job. They felt that the government was advancing both the necessary strategic perspectives and, on a daily level, the demands around which people should mobilise.
I think this is a very dangerous attitude which has given Rabin and his government credit that they do not deserve. There is no doubt now that the government is going to take measures that go beyond the narrow limits set by the Oslo agreement; this can be seen with the freeing of political prisoners which appears to be imminent, and which will give tangible results.
It can also be seen with the rhythm of negotiations. For once it is the Israelis who want things to go faster, and the Palestinians are having certain "logistic" problems with the setting up structures to take over the administration of the Occupied Territories, beginning in Gaza and Jericho. But there is a waning gap between recognising these facts and giving confidence to Rabin; this is a trap to be avoided at all costs.
This is why we, along with others, are trying to put together a series of demands around which a substantial section of the peace movement can be mobilised. Rabin reacts to external pressures, and we are in a position to put the pressure on. For the moment, rightist pressures are much less substantial than what many feared, but I believe they will return and they will have a real influence on the government's decisions and its ability to go forward with the implementation of the very accords that it signed.
What is the climate in the
Occupied Territories? Is there mobilisation or demobilisation, illusions or disillusionment? How are the different groups reacting? Concretely, how is the arrival of the PLO leadership being prepared?
In a general sense, a majority of the population is preparing itself for a new situation, and organising its life in accordance with the new framework. There is a bit more freedom and independence, with a certain sense of autonomous power — but no euphoria. People are very much aware of the accord's limitations - independence is a long way away - and the problems that will arise. They know that the occupation will continue. They have
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International Viewpoint #250 November 1993 reservations concerning the future Palestinian administration. There is a fight for power, which is more a fight between clans and individuals than between different strategies.
The fact that when autonomy and the new administration are mentioned, there is talk of police sends shivers up the spines of many Palestinians, and not only those of opposition activists.
There is little sign of opposition to the agreements...
Yes, there is quite a bit of disarray. There is opposition to the accords, which are seen as a step backwards. But in my opinion this opposition has yet to develop an alternative strategy that could translate this opposition into mobilisation. It has abandoned the terrain of struggle, which has been partially occupied by Fatah itself. Fatah was at the head of demonstrations for the liberation of political prisoners, in close and successful cooperation with the radical wing of Israeli pacifist forces.
I think that the opposition should at least have been, if not at the origin of these demonstrations, then involved in them and participated as equals with Fatah and ourselves. The secular opposition is still organising meetings to denounce the accords, with very little attendance.
As for the Islamic opposition, Hamas in particular, it is profoundly divided. Sheikh Yassine is the uncontested leader of Hamas and a spiritual and political leader in the Occupied Territories. He is currently in prison and Yasser Arafat has demanded his immediate release. He sent a letter to Arafat, which was quoted in the press a few days back; it is considered to be very moderate by those close to the Fatah leader.
Rumour has it that Hamas is divided. On the one hand, there is a pragmatic current which is ready to negotiate its place in the new framework, to participate in elections and to not oppose the setting up of the autonomous Palestinian administration. On the other, there are the hardliners, represented by the spokesperson for those deported to south Lebanon, Doctor Rantissi, who want the accords to fail and to "punish the traitors"
In administrative terms, it is clear that the setting up of the PLO administration will create enormous problems. Given the bureaucratic and corrupt character of the mini-State apparatus that the PLO is, how is recruitment taking place? 20
I spent a few days in the police recruiting centres in Jerusalem and Fatah's area of Bethlehem, but not in the PLO centres or in the Palestinian national centres. Let's just say that it wasn't exactly the political and intellectual elite. While those in charge of recruitment were former political prisoners that have earned their stripes in the struggle against the occupation, the same cannot be said of their assistants, especially of those who have just recently mobilised. Many go there in the hopes of finding work; others are looking to secure some power. I believe that the scramble for power is at least as present as the thirst for independence and freedom.
This can be seen everywhere. As such, in the women's movement, there was a call from PLO headquarters in Tunis for the establishment of the foundation of a ministry or office for women's issues. There has been no discussion on a working paper or legislation concerning women's status under Palestinian autonomy. Instead, according to certain members of this movement, there has been a violent battle to see who will represent the movement in the Palestinian State or semi-State structures.
What tasks can progressive anti- imperialist forces in the region set for themselves? Are there concrete demands that can be made?
I firmly believe that the new situation, and the situation that will be created by the implementation of the accords, will create new openings for political activity, for mass mobilisation within the framework of autonomy in Gaza and the process of setting up a Palestinian autonomous territory in the West Bank.
The Israeli army is withdrawing from Palestinian daily life. There are laws and military decrees banning all forms of organisation, all forms of political, cultural and social expression, all types of demonstrations, any kind of political debate. These will all disappear. There are those who will say, "yes, but there will be a Palestinian police force that will restore the same order." I'm not convinced — this too will depend on the struggle, and if this terrain is abandoned, democratic hopes will be even
Nothing is certain. I don't see how Arafat will be able to easily do what the Israeli army itself could no longer do — or, at least, only with great difficulty. The unions, women's movements and political parties have some space opened up before them, space which they can use to mobilise the population. Firstly, they can demand more than what is in the text of the accords and go beyond the accords in the area of the rights acquired therein. Secondly, they can address the ultimate objective of independence and make their mark on the kind of State and society that the accords will produce.
We don't have the right to say that the jig is up. This is politically false; but it also a bad reading of the reality before us. I repeat, nothing is certain. There is a relationship of forces, one of whose elements is the creation of these spaces of "freedom" which can, if they are properly used, improve the relationship of forces. I'm not saying that the relationship of forces can be radically altered, but it can be improved.
To be concrete, there is nothing preventing union confederations from organising congresses and meetings. They don't have to wait for autonomy to do that. And if the Fatah union confederation doesn't want to do this, I'm sure that the others can do so, and create a charter for the defense of workers, for example.
They can demand, for example, the
International Viewpoint #250 November 1993 return of the more than two billion shekl that the Israeli government took from Palestinian salaries to finance a social security system to which Palestinians never had access. The money can be reinvested in the only thing that the Palestinians would do well to copy from the Israelis: a social security system.
This is a clear programme, around which people can be easily mobilised. It is very concrete; every worker has paid a sum of money and this money still exists — it has been calculated by an Israeli organisation, Kav Laoved, that defends Palestinian workers and which has managed to demonstrate exactly how much money has been stolen from Palestinians, money which is theirs by right.
The Palestinian delegation - instead of begging in New York one day, in Paris the next, and in Brussels the next — should demand this money. This is a demand that the unions can put forward, clearly spelling out what the money is meant for: to build a Palestinian social security infrastructure.
Why not plan - there is nothing utopian about this, it is concrete, it can be done tomorrow — a Palestinian women's congress. And if the Fatah women's organisation doesn't want to do it, do it without them. This would be very popular with hundreds and thousands of women which are calling on Fatah to begin a national debate on the status of women under Palestinian autonomy. Is this a struggle whose defeat is foretold? Certainly not.
Many people fear the inevitable cooperation between Israel and the PLO to control the money that comes in, and to determine the relations between the
Palestinian police force and the
Israeli army. In this field, are there specific demands that the left can put forward?
The control of economic factors will be the most difficult. On the other hand, it will be easier to affect the type of democracy that is put in place. After 25 years of occupation, the idea of a human rights charter in the Occupied Territories is something that speaks to every woman and man in the Territories. Not so long ago, Faisal Husseini was saying that the first act, the first decree would deal with human rights and not police. This should be forcefully taken up by the popular organisations and the human rights organisations which carried out courageous work during the occupation. There is no reason for them to let their guard down now.
It is much easier to set up structures for local administration than it is on the national level. There should be a demand that they have a say, and that they should form the base of Palestinian autonomy, or at least be able to negotiate their place in the Palestinian administration. This is something concrete, which can easily be achieved starting immediately.
There are already popular committees and networks; there are still activists, there is a memory and accumulated experience. Why not reactivate them right away and integrate them into a process of develo ping Palestinian autonomy? Why not point to what were the beginnings of Palestinian autonomy — at the beginning of the intifa da we always spoke of autonomous territories, liberated territories, in which there was Palestinian self-administration — and rebuild the popular and relatively democratic structures that were repressed by the Israeli army, structures that were inclusive and the fruit of a united front between different political and social forces.
On the economic level, at least as far as social services are concerned, there will have to be a series of struggles to demand that the PLO and the future sources of financing, including the EEC, finance the existing network of clinics that was set up within the framework of resistance to the occupation through popular mobilisation, by voluntary groups, and by NGOs. This is the infrastructure for a quality popular healthcare system which, in a way, has already proved itself.
In the PLO, in the Palestinian medical corps, people want to privatise right away, or replace the popular health networks with State medecine based on the hospitals of the military administration - hospitals which are in a state of decay and in no position to meet people's needs. A mobilisation of a part of the medical corps and healthcare users can be mobilised to defend the clinics and get funding — for a more just and rational sharing of funds, instead of the creation of new private clinics. This is another possible area of struggle.
There is no shortage of issues, just a lot of work that needs to be done and can be done. But this a conscious decision that has to be made by the mass organisations, the NGOs and political formations that have a political programme that goes beyond obtaining places in the police force. A strategy centred around this type of mobilisation has to be drawn up.
How are Palestinians with Israeli citizenship reacting? Are they even more cut off from
Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories or, on the contrary, closer to them?
They responded to the accords with demonstrations that were relatively large, even enthusiastic, in comparison to the downturn that preceded the signing of the accords. For them, too, it was the first time that they could freely fly the Palestinian flag. It is clear that Gaza and Jericho, or even Palestinian autonomy, will have only a very limited impact on their situation. For the moment, it is something rather external to their own situation.
If we were dealing with Palestinian sovereignty, in one way or another that would give them a point of reference for their national identity. But the fact that the Palestinians of Gaza, even those of the West Bank, have self-administration does not concern them, except very indirectly.
Because they have a superior status?
No, because they have a very different status.
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A new phase
International Viewpoint #250 November 1993
What danger is there that of a
Palestinian split in the community between those who are outside and those who are in the struggle inside Gaza and Jericho? How can abandonment, division and separation be prevented?
WALID Salem is both a Palestinian academic living in East Jerusalem, and
For the last 15 years, the Israeli dream, a political activist in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. He has been above all the Labourite dream, has been to the separate the Palestinian question in the arrested several times for the role he played in the leadership of the
Occupied Territories from the Palestinian intifada, and was accused of being a member of the Popular Front for the national problem in general — in order to
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Early this year he was released from his atomise the Palestinian national question.
latest detention - 18 months in the Negev prison, built by Israel after
This was the main reason for refusing to the outbreak of the intifada and considered to be the toughest of all the recognise the PLO, because recognition would mean recognition for the whole detention centres. We asked him for the opinions of the Palestinian left.
Palestinian question as a national question.
In future issues we will return to the debate in the Palestinian left,
There would be specific problems all over, particularly in relation to the question of alliances with the Islamic but they would be treated as part of a national problem, with a national movement, requiring a national solution. Instead
- and this was the framework defined at the Madrid negotiations — Israel was ready to negotiate with a representation, even a genuine and national one, of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories.
There are two possible readings of
Israel's recognition of the PLO. Either
Israel had to accept the fact that it was impossible to solve the problem of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories outside the framework of the PLO, without the
Palestinian leadership itself taking up the matter. This would represent a big victory.
The other possibility is that Israel finally obtained what it wanted from the
PLO, transforming it from a Palestinian national movement into a leadership of the
Occupied Territories. This is how Fatah and PLO dissidents read what is happened.
In these ranks can be counted founding members of Fatah such as Hani El Hassan and Khaled El Hassan, Mahmoud Derwish and the former PLO ambassador to Beirut, Shafik El Hout.
According to them, after the Oslo compromise, the PLO no longer represents all Palestinians but only the Occupied Territories. If this is true, it represents a tremendous setback. For Palestinians on the outside, this would constitute a real danger of the "Kurdisation" of the Palestinian question, and the dismantling of a national question into a number of local questions:
the problem of the Palestinians of Jordan, those of Lebanon, and so forth.
I don't think that matters are fully settled. But there is a real danger, which would have historic significance. For the
Palestinians of the diaspora — the majority of the Palestinian people - this would be a massive setback. *
22 fundamentalist current. INTERVIEW — 21 October 1993
UPPORTERS of the
S
Gaza-Jericho accords often point to the unfavourable relationship of forces for the Palestinians. Do you think these accords were inevitable?
The PLO president Yasser Arafat contends that the Madrid process was inescapable. The reasons were, on the one hand, the collapse of Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist bloc and, on the other, the Iraqi defeat. But Arafat's claims are contradicted by a number of facts.
First, Palestinians are living in a revolutionary situation. They are not confined to the framework of a State. In general, revolutions are less sensitive to changes in the relationship of forces than States, which are outlets for diplomatic relations. But Arafat is behaving as if the PLO was a State apparatus, while the Palestinian people itself has no State.
The upheavals on an international and Arab level are very negative. But in Palestine we had the weapon of the intifada. The PLO could have seized upon it, broadened the uprising and given it a programme for action, in order to chaging the relationship of forces on a Palestinian level. While there may be an undeniable regression on an international level, it is not for all that inevitable that it should affect the situation in all countries and all revolu-
There have to be nuances made between the particular and the general, between the absolute and the relative. In other words, the deterioration of the relationship of forces does not necessarily lead to a gloomy situation in Palestine. It was possible to create a relationship of forces in Palestine that would fulfill the rights of the Palestinian people: the right to return, to self-determination and to an independent State.
It should also be noted that the objectives of the intifada went well beyond those Arafat had at Madrid. These included a call for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the territories occupied in 1967, to be placed under international jurisdic. tion up until independence.
Why did Yasser Arafat not take on the demands of the intifada as his own?
While the intifada called for independence, Yasser was attached to the idea of autonomy. But this is not all; he also helped put down the intifada, to abort it. I am not exaggerating when I say that Arafat's renunciations contributed more to the crushing of the intifada than Israeli repression, Which at least could be fought by resisting. Renunciations are a much more formidable weapon. Instead of using the gains of the intifada to create a more favourable relationship of forces, Arafat renounced the intifada and set more and more minimalist objectives until he called, as he recently did during his visit to China, for a halt to the intifada.
The imperialist countries have promised to "help" Gaza and Jericho. How real is this aid?
International Viewpoint #250 November 1993
Let me first point out that these promises have created many illusions among Palestinians in the area of job creation and salaries. The economic plan developed by the PLO for the next five years has called for 12 billion dollars, while the World Bank has spoken of a programme that requires 14 billion dollars. And today, in the wake of the Washington Conference, we know that aid will not even reach the sum of two billion dollars.
The 42 countries present in Washington weren't able to come up with any more than that - and we know that even these two billion dollars will not be fully handed over. And all the money promised by the EEC, Japan, the USA and the UN before the signing of the accords has to be subtracted from the final sum [to calculate the amount secured as a result of the agreement].
But the needs of Gaza alone in the area of infrastructure and job creation for the whole active population have been evaluated by experts at a sum oscillating between five and six billion dollars. Arafat
In the west, the prevailing feeling is that people can be bought with money. It is forgotten that a people has its dignity, a conscience, a sense of belonging and commitment to a national struggle. Suffice it to say that Arafat does not have the means to buy the Palestinian people. The Gulf countries, his traditional source of financing, have not given a single penny.
How is the aid process going to unfold?
It will be supervised by the World Bank and the PLO will be nothing more than a tool in its hands. The plan drawn up by Abou Alaa, the head of the PLO's economic department, calls for full World Bank control of the development process. Thus there is an official Palestinian request for the World Bank to be the main actor. This is an unheard of situation, in which the leadership of a country itself proposes to be dependent.
The Harvard Plan was drawn up jointly by Palestinian economists that support the negotiations process alongside Americans and Israelis. This plan also calls for active World Bank involvement. In practice, the World Bank already controls the process. It has gone ahead and done economic evaluations and asked that a banking establishment be set up. Thus, it has already begun to control economic trends in Palestine.
There is talk of a kind of common market between Israel,
Jordan and the Occupied
Territories. There is talk of lifting the boycott of Israeli products.
How real is this project? How can Israeli products compete with Arab products in Arab markets? We know the difference in production costs, if for no other reason than the high level of salaries in Israel.
The Palestinian commercial bourgeosie will be a comprador bourgeoisie that floods Israeli products onto Arab markets. It will play the intermediary role of "commissionary" as we say in our Palestinian tongue. This is a project that goes beyond the Arab region. It is called the "Middle Eastern common market", and would include Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey in mixed projects, trade, a regional development bank and a system of pricing agreements. The setting up of such a system also has political objectives. The first such objective is that of isolating certain countries like Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Iran and Yemen - all the countries that were opposed to the USA during the Gulf War aside from Jordan, which cannot be excluded.
The second objective is that of compromising Arab unity and preventing it from coming to fruition. All these Arab countries are going to develop relations with Turkey; Egypt, for example, which will do so without having relations with brother Arab countries like Tunisia and Morocco.
Another objective of this common market is to make the Israeli presence more acceptable, more natural. Israel will be able to develop its economic potential and become a country of the centre, whereas now it is a country halfway between the centre and the periphery.
Finally, the existence of this Middle Eastern common market would strengthen US imperialism against the EEC and the Asian dragons. It is fundamentally an American project which perpetuates imperialist hegemony in the economic, military and political spheres.
How do you explain the contradictions inside Fatah, its contradictory declarations, the volte face of Hani El Hassan, the positions of Haidar Abd El Chafi, and the assassination of leaders like Abu Chaabane and Assad
Saftaoui?
Contradictions inside Fateh are based on a complex array of factors. You have to go back to their historic origins. Fateh had three historic leaders: Arafat, Abu Jihad and Abu Iyad. When I say leaders, I mean those with a base, with their own group within Fatah. This was the case for the three men I mentioned; with the killing of Abu Jihad and Abu Iyad, only Arafat remains. People like Hani El Hassan and Khaled El Hassan are not in the same league; they don't have a base and their criticisms cannot lead to splits in Fatah. Arafat can easily elbow Hani El Hassan out of the way. As for Khaled El Hassan, he recently founded a party, the Party for the Right to Return, for Palestinians abroad. It is difficult to say how much influence this group has, but I'm sure that it wouldn't be able to mobilise on a large scale. Another member of Fatah, Abbas Zaki, is trying to replicate the experience of Abu Jihad and Abu Iyad through the building of his own base. He has set up groups in the West Bank, Nablus and Galilee. He has a conciliatory position; he began by challenging Arafat, and has now taken a few steps back.
In Gaza it's a different story. There are not political struggles but rivalries for positions of power. Abu Chaabane founded the "Fatihoune" in order to establish his position.
Not all Palestinians have been
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International Viewpoint #250 November 1993 taken into account in the accords. Jordan considers
Palestinians to be Jordanian
"citizens". What does the future hold for those "forgotten" in the accords?
The agreement signed by Yasser Arafat does not mention the refugees of 1948; this implicitly means they are seen to be settled in the countries where they currently reside. The Palestinian leadership has quite simply abandoned them. As far as the 1967 refugees are concerned, the agreement mentions the possibility of repatriating a certain number of them, a number which remains to be specified by the Israelis and Palestinians. Subsequent Israeli declarations have discussed the possibility of return for those that left in 1967 with an exit permit but did not return within the prescribed time. But the accords do not include those who were forced to flee by the 1967 war. Israel destroyed three Palestinian villages, obliging their inhabitants to flee abroad; the same thing happened to people in the camps arond Jericho, whose inhabitants were forced
Arafat said that he will demand the right to return for 1967 refugees. The Jordanian regime has officially declared that it is willing to give Palestinians the choice between returning to the Territories and remaining in Jordan. Those that remain in Jordan would get Jordanian citizenship. As for Lebanon, the question has not been settled; but there are signs that things are moving in the direction of the settling of Palestinians where they are.During the last round of negotiations, Lebanonasked Israel if it could take charge of the upkeep of inhabitants in the certain northern regions of Palestine, as Lebanese citizens. This represents a change in the position of the Lebanese government. This question of settling Palestinians was already posed in the 1950s by US and European imperialism. Today, alongside Israelis and the Arab reaction, they feel that this is the time to proceed with this plan. There would be a "Kurdisation" of Palestinians, spread out across several countries and thereby losing the unity of the people.
What then are the perspectives in this new context?
The Palestinian struggle has entered a new phase. It needs a new, alternative leadership. It needs a new programme, alternative to that of the bourgeoisie. Currently, in the face of the failure of the bourgeoisie, we have three programmatic orientations that are trying to provide this alternative: 24 first, there are the fundamentalists of Hamas, wh refuse to recognise the PLO, its charter and its programme. The second are the nationalists in the Salvation Front, who support the National Charter and who hope to amend the programme, especially in relation to the stages of the struggle. This orientation is underscored by a nationalist ideology. Finally, there is the socialist and democratic orientation, based on Marxism and which takes on the Charter and the programme of the PLO as its own.
For these latter two components, the PLO is an institution, an activist force, a Charter, a programme and, finally, the representation of the identity of the Palestinian people The PLO as such has disappeared The Charter remains, as does the programme, the moral reference point and the identity, represented by those forces who remain attached to the programme and the Charter and to this political and moral entity. These forces must rebuild the PLO with new people and new structures, which can represent the legitimacy betrayed by Arafat and the supporters of theaccords.
Recently there were calls from opponents of the accord to form an Islamic national front...
There was a debate within the "ten fractions"!, the framework that includes the three orientations I just mentioned, including the fundamentalist current. They agreed to set up a "Islamic Democratic National Front" - not only a National Islamic Front, but Islamic and democratic. Its first objective is to scuttle the accords, and the second is to rebuild the accords. This means that Hamas has agreed to this final point, too, the rebuilding of the PLO. And Hamas is in agreement with the Charter, as they clearly said in the communiqué released after the meeting of the "ten" in Damascus four days back.
As such, the Palestinian struggle has produced a new leadership, the Islamic Democratic National Front. It remains to be seen what perspectives they will give the Palestinian people following the accords. Henceforth, future perspectives are linked to this front, since Arafat has abandoned the struggle.
But we have to recognise that the struggle has become much more difficult for a series of reasons. First, Arafat will want to prove his good intentions toward the Zionist State in the regions under his control - by preventing activities against Israel by Palestinian activists. The accord says that the Israeli army wii have the right to intervene in Gaza and Jericho in order to hunt down the authors of such acts. In order to prevent the Israeli army from entering, Arafat will have to prevent these acts from happening in the first place in order to avoid giving Israel a pretext for intervention. This is going to complicate the struggle.
Moreover, the Israeli army is going to be redeployed outside populated Palestinian areas. Certain Israeli objectives are going to be more difficult to achieve than beofre. Finally, a third element of complication, the struggle against the Zionist entity is going to have a new dimension. It will no longer only be a mass struggle and a military conflict with the Zionist army. It will also include against Israeli exploitation - but now the capital will be both Israeli and Palestinian. I have confidence in those forces that constitute the front; they will come up with solutions.
Thus, to the national struggle a democratic struggle has to be added, for human rights against repression, for women's freedom, for ideological and political pluralism. As for the intifada, it is on a downward slope. It will continue to struggle against the occupation. Now that Arafat is within reach of power in Gaza and Jericho, we are entering a new phase of the national and democratic struggle, different than that of the intifada. *
1. The ten fractions make up a kind of front of opposition to the Madrid process and the accords. Its main elements are the PFLP, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular Front (General Command) of Ahmed Jibri, and Hamas.
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