Guiding principl
International Viewpoint #251 December 1993
1 THE Brazilian politi-
cal, economic and social crisis will only be resolved by the victory of the popular democratic forces. One hundred million Brazilians live in poverty; sixty million are completely destitute. Of every thousand Brazilians born, ninety will die before they are five years old and of the remaining nine-hundred and ten, scarcely ninety will complete high school.
This situation stems from the policies applied by a dominant class indifferent to the hunger and misery suffered by the majority of the people.
These policies take place within an economic model which is not only exhausted but places profit in the hands of the few. Following ten years of instability, which has aggravated the crisis, the collapse of the neo-liberal project has shown yet again the inability of the dominant class to generate an alternative model. In the same period, the working class has increased both its political and electoral strength, fighting for control in ways which have never occurred before in Brazil, including the founding of the Workers' Party (PT), the creation of the Central Union of Workers (CUT), the campaign for direct elections, and the impeachment of Collor. In the present electoral campaign it is attempting to defeat the dominant class and form an alternative popular democratic government (hereafter PDG).
2. Overturning the present State is part of the democratic revolution. Achieving real reform of Brazilian society will entail the defeat or drastic limitation of the dominant class. National-populist reformism, which believed it could reconcile opposing interests, has already collapsed. So has that section of the left which imagined it could effect democratic reforms without the support of the people - some times relying on the support of the bourgeoisie, at others on a political vanguard. Now, when the PT may well become the government, the establishment and its mass media is exerting enormous pressure to make us become part of it. We will not do so. The PT's struggle for government is basic to Brazilian workers achieving hegemony. However, we do not mistake government for power, which is much wider and rooted in economic and social relations. Nor do we confuse Lula's programme with our more radical, alternative strategic project, and in the 1994 elections the PT will argue for the construction of a new economic, political and social model.
By taking this approach, the PT explicitly rejects two forms of struggle for social18 ism which have been unsuccessful in the past. The first is that of operating only outside existing institutions, or treating them merely as an opportunity for propaganda. The second is of operating solely within the establishment. The PT reaffirms as a strategic objective the formation of a PDG from both a popular base and electoral majority.
Our project of social transformation will work only if it is supported by a solid and self-organised base of the exploited and oppressed. To achieve a true and substantive democracy we will have to set up workers' councils and consult constantly and directly with the people. We believe that the success of our struggle for reform and the democratisation of the State and society depends on both popular and governmental action against the existing
3. The 1994 elections will be dominated between those who wish there to be structural reform and those who wish social apartheid to continue. Following the collapse of Collor, the bourgeoisie is attempting to maintain its programme of "modernisation". The business world, and in particular the oligopolies, continues to refuse to reduce its profits and in return for any concessions it takes tax or other advantages. The bourgeoisie must be defeated and submit to the redistribution of income and the elimination of poverty. We are aiming for real change, so that poverty, hunger and exclusion will not continue.
4. For structural reform it is necessary to create a popular democratic movement. The 1994 election campaign must be a starting point for and expression of this movement, which must be based on a revived union movement, workers' and students' organisations, civil bodies, popular parties, and organisations of women, black and indigenous peoples. It must also be particularly aware of those who are marginalised and excluded by society. A movement which transcends the election campaign is essential to support the Lula government.
The PT cannot ignore the deep inequalities based on racial discrimination, in addition to economic exploitation and political oppression. The PT will not achieve a hegemony of the masses if we do not know how to argue with a black voice. Racial and sexual discrimination must be combatted with the same radicalness as the exploitation of the forces of labour. We must
AT its eighth national meeting in June of began to prepare for the 1994 Presidenti
Lula da Silva, is currently leading in the p
What direction will a Lula government ta pressures and obstacles that it is certain t we publish major extracts below,' these confront both capital and the so-called
"universal culture"
which masks discrimination. We will not win the elections if our programme does not also express black resistance. Socialism will be a reality in
Brazil only when the social apartheid caused by racial oppression is destroyed.
The CUT's present crisis requires strong determination by the PT's militants, if it is to increase its capacity to focus and direct the claims of the Brazilian workers and also continue to work on ways to overcome the economic and social crisis which has worsened so drastically over the last five years, as a result of Collor's neo-liberal project. They must consider the economic framework which has contributed to the recession - with the consequent exclusion of thousands of workers, who are now either unemployed or under-employed — so that the CUT leadership may put forward their proposals
A project of this nature also necessitates considering the consequences for the labour movement of technological advance and the changes brought about by new forms of business management (including in the organisation of production), in the light of changes worldwide. It also requires planning for the training and re-training of the workers in this country.
The correct preoccupation of the PT that unions should be autonomous resulted in it maintaining a neutrality before the obstacles faced by the union movement, and absolving itself, in large part, from working out a policy to guide the PT's militants. In this sense, we are partially responsible for the crisis in the CUT.
5. It is necessary to win public opinion to the idea of structural reforms. The Brazilian people are tired of the lack of alternatives, of barren illusions, of unfulfilled promises. This feeling is even stronger amongst the most poor, the excluded, the workers on low incomes, the small business-people
- those who were always the most affected by the "changes". This climate of desperation has fed conservatism. Those who
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s for "94 election
International Viewpoint #251 December 1993 s year the Brazilian Workers' Party (PT) lections. The PT's candidate, Luis Ignacio How will it grapple with the enormous ace? In the PT's Guiding Principles, of which I many other questions have been tackled. struggle for change must win the heart of each Brazilian with ideas of democratising ownership, income, land, means of communication and power. It must be an alternative, strategic, long-term project which breaks the iron band of short-term alternatives, plans for stabilisation which lead to even more instability and poverty, economic policies which do not confront social apartheid, and the cynical logic which states that it is necessary first to build the country then re-distribute wealth. It must be a programmatic platform which unites the majority of the people, and which affirms the social and moral superiority of radical democratic values, of humanity, solidarity, ethics, socialism. These are the ideas which in 1989 brought together millions under the slogan "Without fear of happiness".
6. Our programme for government must, in concrete ways, give shape to reforms which are anti-monopoly, antilarge estate and anti-imperialist. It will be aimed at those who make up the bulk of the population: workers, the unemployed, the middle class, and those who run small to medium-sized businesses.
Although many liberal theories still have a certain credibility, the crisis in the last government showed that the main problem facing the country is political and ethical; of equal or greater importance than the intellectual and technical coherence of our project is knowing that the social and political forces can really be mobilised to make it work.
In the last fifteen years we have witnessed the emergence of the workers' movement in Brazil, which has radically reshaped the national political struggle and redefined the concept of democracy. One major result is that its political and social dimensions no longer appear to be separate. Democracy has stoped being a means or a stage in the struggle for social-ism. It has combined with socialism in such a way that the values of liberty and equality cannot now be detached.
It will fall to the PDG to take measures in which growth is linked to fair redistribution of income, construction of an internal mass market, radicalisation of democracy, state investment, incentives for technological research and development, urban reform, land reform, taxing the rich, elimination of indirect taxes and a fair tax system compatible with popular democratic reforms and the fight against monopolies, enabling a full frontal attack on the problems of hunger, unemployment, healthcare, education, property speculation, housing and transport suffered by the majority of the people. This supposes an independent foreign policy, and the smashing of the privileges of the oligopolies, large estate-owners and financial conglomerates.
7. The popular democratic reforms must break the control of the monopolies over the national economy. We must confront those who defend the market and private capitalist business, and who discount all alternatives for economic organisation.
The dominant class and the monopolies will form an obstacle to the economic reforms which must be carried out by the PDG. From now on we must demonstrate the existing contradiction between neoliberal theory and its practice in this country. The same elites which defend the privatisation programme and advocate reduction of the role of the State in economic activity will not voluntarily give up the profits, exemptions, subsidies and generous loans which they receive from the
The real world market is controlled by less than seven-hundred companies, and the two-hundred largest determine thirty percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The real market in Brazil is one in which a few businesses determine prices in each section of production, speculate with hidden resources and manipulate the people by way of the mass media, including advertis-ing. A few hundred large banks, industries, large businesses and nationally and foreign owned agro-industries account, with a few State businesses, for seventy percent of our economy, and directly control both the internal market and exports. This will be the sector which will show the major resistance to our programme of structural reforms. To confront it and win, and so to consolidate its programme, the PDG will work on the institutional plane, mobilising its allies and also directing itself towards those involved in cultural and scientific activities. Amongst the people and in the unions, it will develop a full campaign of information and will call on the social movements to extend their organisations within businesses, workplaces and homes, as an anti-monopo list consciousness in defence of the programme.
To defeat those sections which now hold economic power will demand combined action by the government and its allies, especially in the union movement, through economic and administrative measures, self-organisation of workers, the stimulation of anti-monopolist feeling and the winning of support from small business-
This mobilisation will press for the widening of the government's parliamentary basis and will allow us to form alliances which will also support our action in the National Congress.
8. To recover growth, redistribute income and combat social apartheid the PDG must recover the capacity for planning and social and economic action. The economic model to be developed must be based on a strong market of all 150 million Brazilians, rather than 30 million as at present. For this the State will have to exercise an important role in economic regulation, be it in regulating productive investments or investing directly in certain strategic sectors.
The redistribution of income must be accompanied by an expansion in production for the mass market. The overcoming of social apartheid will require the democratisation of society, land reform and policies which stimulate and support the small businesses and also the informal economy, which cannot continue to be treated as a marginal problem. It is essential that hunger is combatted and that all have access to a basic education, including those who did not have access to education at the appropriate age,so the excluded also become citi-
Special attention must be given to tax reform, of a progressive character, which penalizes those who hoard their wealth and income, which takes on speculation and which rearranges public finances to promote productive investment and social policies.
Also there must be deep reform to the financial system, to guide resources towards production and eliminate the parasitical character of the capital markets.
1. The text has been edited considerably for reasons of style and space. For a full version of this document see Inprecor para América Latina, no. 35, September 1993 (available from /V for £2/30FF, cheques made out to PECI).
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International Viewpoint #251 December 1993
9. The democratisation of land ownership is indispensable for growth combined with redistribution of income and of wealth. The radical democratisation of the system of land ownership, to the advantage of the indigenous peoples and shanty-dwellers, combined with a new agricultural policy compatible with regional variations and also stimuluses differentiated between the small and medium-sized producers, are basic strategies in the formulation of a national PT project.
In the present historical moment -shaped by a situation which combines a deep economic and social crisis with the exhaustion of the model for financial development based on external resources - the redynamising of the Brazilian economy, within the framework of socialisation of national wealth and income and the reclamation of citizenship and social justice, will only be possible by evaluating all the many possibilities for the national economy, and breaking from the present external conditions. A new model of agricultural policy and primarily, land reform, are basic requirements for this.
Our government's action will make possible the rebuilding of the shanty-towns and the formation of new rural businesses directed by their own workers. The policy will liberate productive forces, stimulate the country's economic development and modify in our favour the relation of forces in the struggle for socialism.
In addition, land reform is relevant to the environment; for example, the devastation of the Amazon region will only be reduced by a fall in migration towards that region, which presupposes the democratisation of land ownership in other areas.
On the technological plane, without land reform it will be impossible to guarantee our project of economic decentralisation, because our country's mineral resources, the basis of a new "technological revolution", would continue under the control of the large land-owners, and in particular the large national and internatio nal companies.
10. Democratising the State, eliminating the distortions inherited from the dictatorship and destroying the monopoly of the mass media is a pre-condition for the success of the PDG. We must incorporate in the 1994 election campaign the following principles:
• Strict proportionality in the electoral system (to each elector a vote of equal value, so safeguarding the representation of each state);
• The rejection of a high percentage of vote being required for parties to be recognised and represented in parliament; 20
• Adoption of legislation which • strengthens the parties (for example, election by party list);
• Democratisation of the ownership of and access to the mass media;
• Rapid investigation and rigourous punishment of all those involved in corruption;
• Democratisation and external control of judicial power;
• Democratisation of the armed forces and struggle against the ideology of "national security";
• Respect for trade union rights and the free organisation of workers in businesses;
• Regulation of the Articles in the 1988 Constitution which enable plebiscites, referendums and popular initiatives for legislation.
11. The PT proposes a political-electoral alliance around the Popular Democratic Programme (hereafter PDP). Our policy of alliances will create a politico-social bloc of support for the programme of structural reforms, the peoples' candidates in the states, Lula's candidature and a federal government under PT hegemony. We wish to establish alliances with the organised movements and with civil bodies. The 1989 programme for government is an initial base for discussion with our allies, who must not be treated merely as our pawns in the electoral contest.
12. Our election campaign is beginning to build support for a government committed to structural reforms. It must be capable of awakening great enthusiasm, so drawing together the forces which will bring Lula to victory. Therefore, the programme, which directs the alliances, and the campaign, which organises and mobilises broad sections of the people, are two of the main bases of our "governability".
The realisation of structural reforms will unleash profound class conflict, shocks and ruptures, which will be met with action from the Party, the social movements, our allies, our parliamentary representatives and allied state governments and city councils. This is why we need a programme capable of attracting the vote of the majority, and even more importantly, inspiring and mobilising millions of people ready to struggle in defence of our government. This is why the PT wants a polarised election, in which our candidate will appear as he is: "a complete alternative to the actual system."
13. The popular democratic reforms depend on the radicalisation of democracy. The execution of the reform programme will open up possibilities for involving small and medium-sized businesses in supporting the measures initiated by our government. At the same time we must isolate the dominant class and reduce its power of manoeuvre. The Brazilian crisis will only be resolved by sacrificing the interests of that minority which controls economic and political power, influences public opinion, has charge of international relations and, with its military, resists change as it has always done. It will not stop at breaking the law if it means the obstruction of the reforms. We will only be able to confront any attempt at destabilisation if we base our governability in the ability to execute our programme with popular support, with coherence, with clarity, with radicalness, and with organised support from the social movements and P leftwing parties, from Parliament, from the state and city governments, from a political offensive in international relations, from the creation of a structure of national communications, from the democratisation of the armed forces, and from the development of a strategic plan which incorporates the idea that we will not be a government of "national unity".
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14. The consolida-
T tion of successive democratic governments will occur through the structural reforms. Brazil will only achieve the stability which we desire when economic development is orientated towards social needs, and when the incorporation into citizenship of the majority of the population and the redistribution of income become national goals. This is why the structural reforms will have to take place as soon as we take the government. In this way we will reverse the inflationary process without falling back on recessionary or other methods of this type commonly recommended by orthodox economists.
15. A policy of independent Brazilian integration in the world scene supposes the adoption of a new model of economic and social development, based on a mass internal market. The PDG will maintain full political and economic relations with other countries and will permit the presence of foreign capital in Brazil. But it is clear that a government hegemonised by a socialist party and pledged to realising reforms which are anti-monopolist, anti-large estate
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International Viewpoint #251 December 1993 and anti-imperialist will resist the "new order", , and particularly the claims of the United States over the continent. Exploiting our human, technological and natural potential, developing an internal market which involves millions in both production and consumption, exploiting the regional and world burden caused by the state of our economy and also inter-imperialist contradictions, the PDG will confront international resistance and make an independent intervention in the world market.
The strategic alternative project needs to tackle the question of the place which
Brazil should occupy in the world, as much in economic as political terms. In the first place we wish to achieve continental integration, which does not mean merely the creation of a free trade zone in Latin America. We should be aiming towards an economic, political, social, scientific and cultural model, founded in respect for self-determination and independence, rather than seeking to construct transnational relationships.
•RABALHADORES tion will help to This concep-
prevent Brazil and other countries of the continent from being economically and politically subordinate in the new world order which is being constructed. It will allow Brazil to participate in the shaping of a new international scene founded on respect for democracy and independence.
In the same way, the construction of Mercosur must be based on the demands of the workers for development, democracy and social justice, and not neo-liberal
In promoting the São Paulo Forum — the greatest expression of leftwing organisations in the history of Latin America — the PT and similar parties within the continent will create a fundamental example in promoting discussion and political initiatives in the renewed popular forces and proposals directed towards establishing an alternative democratic and socialist project.
Brazilian foreign policy must articulate multi-lateral initiatives of resistance to the pressures exercised by the large economic blocs on developing countries, with regard to international business, the supposed protection of intellectual property and so forth, which tend to aggravate the exclusion of a large part of humanity.
At the same time, Brazil will struggle for the democratisation of the international forums and organisations, without prejudice to our participation in these or promotion of others. Diplomatic action by the Brazilian government will concentrate on national independence, regional integration with other countries in Latin America, solidarity, struggle against the militarisation of international relations and economic and social inequalities.
16. Victory in 1994 will mean the PT and its experience of government will be a point of reference for the international socialist movement. The collapse of "real socialism" and the decadence of social democracy - expressed in electoral defeats, corruption scandals and, mainly, compromise with neo-liberal economics, confers on the PT, and on those which share with it the defence of democratic socialism, a role of international dimen-
The PT must increase its relations with those independent organisations which reaffirm their commitment to the struggle for socialism, and encourage and participate in those international forums which give continuity to this struggle.
In a world dominated by disputes between the large capitalist powers, by American decadence, the loss of social gains, the growth of militarism and conservatism, and the worsening of living standards for most people on this planet, the PT's arrival at government in a country the size of Brazil will establish new conditions for the struggle for socialism; it is within this perspective that the PT will conduct its international relations.
17. To win the elections and alter social and power relations, the PT must maintain cohesion. In 1994 the Brazilian people will have the historic opportunity to inflict, by their vote, a defeat on the dominant class. There are some who view as defects our main virtues: radicalness, combativity, difference to the other parties and commitment to socialism. Electoralism and administrativism are not the way forward for a government committed to radical democratisation of ownership, profits, information and power. More than ever, it is necessary to maintain the coherence of the PT and remain a party firmly committed to the oppressed and exploited majority and the construction of a new socialist and democratic order.
18. The speed of application of the PDP will be defined by the correlation of forces and in particular the level of popular mobilisation and self-organisation. Clearly our victory in 1994 will awaken enormous expectations to which we must respond rapidly with concrete governmental initiatives. To create the necessary correlation of forces we must begin by converting the Presidential election into a plebiscite on structural reforms, and especially on the measures which we will take in the first hundred days of government.
The election of the President, the winning of state governments, the expansion of our parliamentary group and the constitution of a political and social bloc of support for the government, must be accompanied by political initiatives which reduce the political power of the dominant class, especially in the mass media. However, the potential for advance by our government will be limited without a high level of activity by the social movements. In the final analysis, the success of our government will lie in popular self-organisation, partici-
We must have no illusions that the dominant class will not be in the best position to use all the methods at its disposal to obstruct our putting into practice our anti-imperialist, anti-large estate and antimonopolist programme. If we are not able to carry forward our project our government will not be capable of leading the country from its crisis, our people will be destined to hunger and poverty and our country will be subjected to neo-liberal
We will break the resistance of the dominant class by combining action by our government, our Party and allied forces with independent workers' action. We will not hesitate to give support to large popular mobilisations, measures which democratise to their roots the mass media, full and intense diplomatic activity (which priortises building a united politics with those countries which struggle against dependency) and also legal action.
19. To enable the application of the PDP the government must continue its political initiative, co-ordinating its actions with the forces which support it. The government must apply the PDP from a strategic plan which defines the way in each situation to isolate the conservative forces, win the middle classes, and, fundamentally, broaden and consolidate popular support. In this way we will accumulate the forces necessary to apply our programme at greater speed.
2. Mercosur is the trade alliance between Argentina Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay
21
The Workers' Party's (PT) eighth national leadership meeting was held in
June of this year. The left won a substantial majority for their positions.
Our correspondent examines the progress which has been made since that meeting and what obstacles the PT must still overcome.
International Viewpoint #251 December 1993
20. The PT needs a new leadership to direct both Lula's campaign and party activity in the next few years. It is clear that the present leadership has lost its legitimacy, a situation worsened by organisational problems and the weakening of relations with the social movements and our munici- CARLOS HENRIQUE ÁRABE - São Paulo, 25 November 1993 pal governments.
The new leadership must be committed to the following:
• To the revolutionary socialist character of the PT, a democratic socialism which is as much an alternative to real socialism" as to social democracy.
• To the strategic value of democracy, which for us is both a means and an end, a method of transformation and an ideal of political organisation.
• To the revolutionary beliefs of the PDP, which adheres to anti-capitalist, antimonopolist, anti-large estate and anti-imperialist beliefs.
• To the viability of a party which affirms democracy to be the main thread of party life.
• To the renewal of the ethical and democratic contract within the Party, for the regeneration of internal democracy and against the domination of a few.
21. The PT needs to reaffirm its role of leadership, its mass character and the importance of internal democracy. Increasing party democracy will require the reevaluation of demands, the joint participation of our allies in discussion and decision making and the strengthening of the Party press, political education and mechanisms for consultation. It is also necessary for there to be democratic control of the party leadership and of the activists who hold executive power in the government or are in the legislature. Without over-excessive leadership, but while contributing politically, the PT must increase its links within organised civil society. Listening to public opinion, but without being led by external elements, it must have a large presence in the big cities; we must broaden the dialogue so as to create firm links — and not just electoral — with those who are generally on the margin of union and popular movements.
The directive character of the Party must show itself in the democratic working-out of our politics, the discussions opened up with our allies, the contest for hegemony, the confrontation with the values of the dominant class and in the re-affirmation of the strategic objective of the PT: the struggle for a socialist and democratic society, with neither exploiters nor exploited. * 22
T O begin with, we should
note the following: • The main resolutions, agreed at the eighth national meeting in June, clearly specified what a popular democratic government would generally involve;
• The leftwing character of the resolutions were a response to the deepening crisis which has engulfed the country and is in part responsible for the growth in popularity of the Lula campaign;
• Two other elements have contributed to this growth in popularity: Firstly, the paralysis of the Itamar government, and secondly the successive collapse of various Presidential candidacies, due to the corruption scandals which have ravaged the centre and the rightwing;
• However, these elements are not sufficient for the revival of the mass movement. The social movement is on the defensive and leadership by the Central Workers Union (CUT) remains
• There is a clear contrast between the strength of the Lula campaign and the campaigns of candidates in the regional states;
• Despite the positive decisions taken at the June meeting, the Party's organisational problems continue to persist, and in some respects have actually worsened. This has made it difficult to implement them.
### Opportunities
The above is an overview of the contradictory situation inside the Party. Although the conditions for dealing with problems which obstruct the building of the Party are certainly better than they have been in the past, we need to act quickly if we are to grasp the opportunities which could turn the political situation in our favour, and we must also prevent or reduce the bourgeoisie's ability
It would be very easy to have illusions about the current situation in Brazil. The factors which strengthen the image of the PT and the Lula candidacy, though important and resulting in large part from the political initiatives of the party, are not linked to an increase in the political and trade union activity of the
Since the June national meeting, the PT has proved unable to develop strength in the area of campaigns "within the framework of the institutions" demarcate itself in opposition to the Itamar government (which is currently dominated by the Social Democratic Party [PSDB]' and in a state of advanced decomposure), or to play a pivotal role in the efforts to clean up corruption. On the other hand, it has had some success in re-organising the social movement, conscious as it is of the strategic importance,both for a Lula victory and for the exercising of power by the PT, of a mass movement which supports structural reforms.
### Intervention
During the June meeting the CUT was recognised as central to providing some impetus to this social movement. The new party leadership was mandated to develop a political line for intervention in the crisis of the CUT, which would unite PT trade union leaders and
The fifth congress of the CUT will take place in June 1994. The debates have just begun but remain limited within the framework of the positions of the last congress, which no longer reflect the reality of the CUT today. The creation of a structure for the intervention of the party and the regroupment of an array of trade union forces around the resolutions of the PT's June meeting will be decisive for the revival of militant trade unionism and providing the CUT with a central role in the building of the campaign and an eventual Lula government.
One important sector, the rural workers, have maintained a high level of organisation and activity, which has included land occupations involving thousands of families. We also have to
1. In spite of its name, the PSDB is not linked to the popular and democratic movement and is politically somewhere between social democracy and traditional liberalism.
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The Workers Partyne
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