International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Poland: Towards a Political Recomposition?

· International Viewpoint No. 251, December 1993 · pp 25-28 · 3,979 words

Eastern Europe World economy

Towards political recomposition?

THE elections of 19 September led to the formation of a coalition government between the Polish People's Party (PSL) and the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD). The prospect of running the government is provoking a number of splits within the left, while the parties of the right are trying to regroup themselves as two parties — one which is conservative and Catholic, the other bourgeois liberal.

But most importantly, for the first time voters have disregarded the historic differentiation between those who administered and those who

International Viewpoint #251 December 1993

The political parties The PSL originates from a fusion of the ZSL, former peasant satellite organisation of the United Polish Workers' Party (POUP), and seveopposed the former bureaucratic regime, opening the way to a series of cross-alliances. JAN MALEWSKI - 19 November 1993

T

The SLD and the PSL received twice as many votes as at the last election, while the Union of Labour (UP) tripled its vote. By contrast, parties involved in the outgoing government, which hoisted the flag of economic liberalism — the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) and the Polish People's Party-Popular Alliance (PSL-PL) - saw their electorate melt away. While the main liberal party, the Democratic Union (UD), maintained its vote, it did not make the breakthrough it

The elections also signalled the relative failure of the operation over the summer by President Lech Walesa, who had attempted to regroup Solidarity trade unionists, employers, peasant leaders and regional figureheads in the Non-Party Bloc for the Reforms (BBWR).! With less than five percent of votes cast, it barely made it into par-

Divided into a number of small parties, the Catholic right wing - which concentrated their campaign on calling for an anti-communist purge and a struggle against the secular State — managed to hang on to its voters but did not achieve any deputies due to the inability of any single group to obtain the required minimum percentage of votes.2

At the time of the (partially free) elections of June 1989, Poles massively rejected the former regime and thus opened the way to the formation of the first government with origins in the anti-bureaucratic opposition. The vote was not only against the dictatorship. The fall of the regime gave birth to the hope that a new period was opening up, although most,people accepted that there would be austerity for a certain period.

This hope rested on historical precedent, as throughout the previous few decades, whenever it was shaken by popular revolts, the former regime would direct national income towards mass consumption.

The new government cruelly disappointed these hopes. The political elites with origins in Solidarnosc - won to liberal ideology during the 1980s — took the country down the path of restructuring on a capitalist basis, convinced that it was not only lack of democracy, but also excessive social protection and the underdeveloped character of the private sector, which were responsible for the economic stagnation of the former regime.

As a result they measured their success on the number of privatisations carried out, on the degree of enrichment of the new bourgeoisie and on the reduction in income of the majority of the population. The disarray and passivity of their original social base — workers in large enterprises — was interpreted as a sign that their policies were accepted they were unable to see that their policies were pushing the people too far.

"The research I have been doing," the psychologist Janusz Reykowski has written, "shows that in general Poles do not have a feeling of citizenship, insofar as they do not see themselves as having a relationship with the government or having a role in its formation. Ordinary Poles (...) feel alone in the face of a ral leaders of the minority in Rural

Solidarosc.

The SLD was founded by several dozen political and trade union organisations around Social Demo cracy of the Republic of Poland

(SDRP).

The UP brings together leaders of the left wing of Solidarnosc as well as activists from the POUP who left or refused to join the SDRP

The KLD is a small party made up of ultra-liberal advisers close to

Lech Walesa, whom he called upon to join the government in 1990.

The PSL-PL originates from Rural

Solidarnosc. Its main leaders were in all the liberal governments from

September 1989 onward.

The UD, the main liberal party, orig inated in 1990 from the civic committees opposed to Lech Walesa

Its leaders, largely former leaders and advisers from Solidarnosc, were behind the initial push towards the restoration of capitalism. *

1. Reclaiming the symbol of the former organisation founded by Jozef Pilsudski to legitimise the Bonapartist regime which emerged from the 1926 coup d'etat, Lech Walesa attempted to bring together a number of well-known figures by using populist and corporatist phraseolo gy, with the goal of giving himself a base for his own perso nal manoeuvres. The majority of the leaders of the "syndicalist" current in Solidarnos - the Network of Large Enterprises (Siec) — joined its ranks, thereby giving the bloc considerable influence among the working class.

2. The new electoral system is based upon districts, but with additional seats going to the winners on a national level. Parties require at least 5% of the vote to be represented, while blocs or alliances need at least 8%. Parties which obtain more than 7% are favoured, and receive access to the seats set aside for national slates.

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POLAND

Internationa/ Viewpoint #251 December 1993 situation which goes beyond them. So they rebel (...). Poles who lean to the left are not socialists or communists. (...) People did not vote for the programme of the left, but against the government."3 For the historian Tomasz Nalecz, the electoral victory of the left is "the expression of nostalgia for the slogans and ideals of August 1980" and the result of the "disappointment of society with the political elites."4

Polls carried out after the elections confirm these observations. According to the OBOP Institute, 54% of those polled said that the left had won because the cost of the reforms was too high. For 35% of those questioned by the CBOS Institute, the SLD won the most votes because previous governments had ignored the problems of ordinary people (only 20% saying that "life was better in

The new government is thus confronted with a high level of expectation and will be judged according to the effects of its policies on daily life. 47% of those polled by the CBOS hoped that the new government would slow down the privatisations, 35% wanted it to improve living conditions and 32% hoped that it would reduce unemploy-

Utopian

According to another poll, nearly 80% of Poles believe that the new government will increase salaries in the public sector along with pensions and retirement funds. These expectations are not merely utopian; during the 1970s the living standards of the population as a whole rapidly improved and during the revolutionary upsurge of 1980-81 Poles had real-life experience of workplace democracy.

However, the expectations are more and more at odds with the social structure, which has been greatly transformed over the last four years. Whereas until 1989 urban society was made up primarily of similarly waged employees, the number of salaried employees from all sectors has gone down by two million (11.4%) in four years — a decrease particularly visible in large State industries. By contrast there has been real growth in employment in private firms and the service sector.

Today the private sector employs 46% of the workforce, while in the last three years there has been a 100% increase in the self-employed. There are now 1.6 million private entrepreneurs, of which 15% are former nomenklatura 26

(State or Party bureaucrats). Unemployment affects 2.8 million people (15.4% of the active population), 40% of whom are long-term unemployed

The social structure of the countryside has also changed, primarily due to the beginning of the privatisation of the State and co-operative agricultural sector but also due to the first capitalist forays into agriculture, made possible by the elimination of administrative checks on land sales. The countryside has seen the appearance of people who own hundreds of hectares of land, who are involved in industry and foreign trade.

However, the rapid change in the social structure has not yet led to the redefinition of the political interests of the new classes. According to a poll carried out by the INFAS polling institute, the votes of the new bourgeoisie were cast in the same way as those of the majority of the population, with a slightly greater proportion going to the liberal parties. 17% of private entrepreneurs voted for the SLD, 13% for the the UD, 9% for the KLD and 8% for the BBWR.

### Division

The political scene still reflects historic divisions, but at the same time is characterised increasingly by current debates on the country's political and economic orientation and its social consequences. There is much dissension for example in the areas of social and economic policy and the relationship of the new State and the Church. While the parties which originated in Solidarnosc battled with one another for four years concerning the various governments' policies — battles which led to the fragmentation of the current - those with origins in the former regime, condemned until recently to the opposition, were able to maintain a facade of unity in spite of internal differences.

The same applies to the social democrats and their parliamentary bloc, the SLD. "What unites the SLD," writes Adam Michnik, "is the common history of its members and their opposition to the anti-communist purges. Other than that, there is only disagreement - with respect to attitudes, political opinions and interests."

Social democracy was founded in the ashes of the POUP, on the initiative of a number of left-wing intellectuals the "July 8 Movement" — who wanted to dissolve the party of the former regime and replace it with a modern left. During the last congress of the POUP, this minority made an alliance with a wing of the party apparatus which was seeking to preserve itself.

However, there were inherent divisions in that while its strength was based on the investments made by members of the nomenklatura (on a personal basis and to profit the party it also had a base in the trade union movement and various "mass fronts" of the ex-POUP. While the neo-liberal wing of the party took the leadership of the SLD and dictated economic policy, it could not ignore its traditional support — recently converted to the defence of the oppressed, with serious support both in the trade union and women's movements. The anticommunist witch hunt, begun last year by the rightwing, led the party to close ranks but divisions continue, and have already provoked sharp conflicts between social democratic ministers.5

Organising

The presence in the new SLD parliamentary group of 61 deputies from the OPZZ trade union, as well as some activists from groups violently opposed to neo-liberalism — such as the three deputies from the small Polish Socialist Party (PPS) — has now made it possible for the anti-liberal current to consider organising within the party without fear of marginalisation. The Vice-President of the OPZZ even let it be known that his comrades could overthrow their government if it began to renege seriously on its electoral promises.

For its part the liberal current is increasingly looking to a governmental alliance with the UD. Aleksander Kwasniewski, the leader of the SLD parliamentary group and its most outspoken representative, explained in a recent interview, "The Democratic Union would make a good governmental partner. It has specialists, prestige abroad and friends in the media (...). Today we are in government with the PSL, but the SLD never shuts the door behind itself."

3. Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 220, 20 September 1993. Janusz Reykowski is a professor at the University of Warsaw and a founding member of the SDRP

4. Ibid. Tomasz Nalecz is a professor at the University of Warsaw and a founding member of the July 8 Movement, a faction of the POUP which was dissolved in 1989. Once a leader of the SDRP. he left due to his belief that the party was unable to "sever its umbilical cord" with the POUP.

5. The 18 November issue of Zycie Warszawy reports a conflict between the Minister for Labour, Leszek Miller, and the Vice-Prime Minister and Minister for Finances, Marek Borowski. The former wanted to index retirement payments for 1994 whereas the latter was opposed to any measure which might go against the agreement with the IMF. • Apparently, Borowski called on his comrade to step down.

THE conditions laid down by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the eve of the election and accepted by the Suchocka government are a good illustration of monetarist doctrine. The IMF did not limit itself to demanding limits on inflation; it also stated how it should be done - family allowance payments should not exceed the sum spent in 1992; accident and pre-retirement allowances should be cut back; real salaries in the public sector should be reduced by 5%.

Moreover, the Polish govemment must align its oil taxes with those of Wester Europe (which means a big price increase) and limit subsidies on energy, hot water and rents. Bank credits to the public sector must be limited to the sum of 70, 500 billion zlotys for the year and preferential credits given to agriculture and construction should be limited to 19, 500 billion zlotys. The sum of borrowing by Polish banks abroad cannot surpass US$1.25 billion. This restriction of credits will lead to a situation in which, in a number of cases, privatisation is the only way to modernise industry. And in case there is still any doubt, the IMF considers (in a report released on 22 September 1993) that the rhythm of privatisations, in particular that of banks and financial institutions, is still too

Finally, the budgetary deficit, limited to 5% of GNP in 1993, must be reduced in 1994 to 4.5% of GNP. And this must be achieved by reducing social and goverment spending - in a country where already less is spent than in the majority of European countries.

The IMF conditions are founded on the highly debatable premise that Polish inflation is produced by low revenues. The goal is not to impose an anti-inflation policy, but rather to place pressure on low revenues so that primitive capitalist accumulation can be

Other conditions laid down by the IMF are not even based on ideology. The tax on imports must be lowered from 6% to 3% in 1994 and eliminated in 1995 (in spite of the fact that the growing trade deficit is a significant factor contributing to inflation!). Since customs duties are Poland's only protectionist measure (it has no non-duty protectionist measures such as norms, so common in imperialist countries), imported products will be given a great sales advantage through the elimination of the tax. Finally, the IMF has specified that foreign firms in Poland must be allowed to send out of the country unlimited amounts of profit.

The IMF conditions are a way of imposing the restoration of capitalism, based on an accelerated accumulation of private capital and increased pauperisation of the majority. It can be summarised quite simply: what is given to the rich must be taken from the revenues of the poor, or else inflation might destabilise the process of capital accumulation. *

International Viewpoint #251 December 1993

Last spring, during the voting on privatisation legislation, the SLD was already divided.° 28 deputies voted in favour of the legislation, 17 against, with the remainder abstaining. Today, SLD ministers are seeing to it that the legislation is applied, although a recent poll by CBOS shows that 61% of public sector workers do not want their enterprise to be included in the programme and that the trade union rank and file is hostile to privatisation.

The PSL, is also divided. According to its former Vice President, "the PSL is (only) united by its desire to govern, its fear of the threat to agriculture, and its appreciation of the limited sovereignty of the country as it capitulates to the dictates of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund."

After the electoral failure of the Catholic parties, this party is being courted by the Catholic hierarchy, in the person of Mgr Orszulik, longtime episcopal secretary and an experienced politician. The announcement by Waldemar Pawlak, PSL leader and the new Prime Minister, that he was wiling to ratify the Concordat is a sign of the rapprochement now under way.

Faced with the task of running the government, the PSL and the SLD will have difficulty settling the differences in their ranks. And there will be potential

The IMF dictat pitfalls for the new government, in the economic, socia and ideological fields.

The new government inherits a delicate economic situation. The State has a heavy public debt of 11 hundred-million zlotys (about US$55 billion). Servicing this debt will cost about 18% of Gross National Product in 1994. Further, 1993 saw the appearance of a considerable foreign trade deficit, by September reaching nearly US$2 billion. The negotiations under way for the reduction of the foreign debt take place in the context of attempts to preserve the agreements with the International Monetary Fund, the demands of which are far from purely economic (see above box).

The new government's room for manoeuvre in the area of economic and social policy will be limited so long as the "economic reforms" initiated four years ago remain unchanged. When Waldemar Pawlak introduced his government, he declared, "The new government does not ask itself whether it should pursue or reject the previous economic policy. Rather, we are wondering to what point and how it is possible and necessary to improve it."

The second area in which the governing coalition will have great difficulty maintaining its cohesion is that of Church-State relations. In the previous parliament, the Church managed to impose a

"respect for Christian values" on the media, the Catechism in schools, the outlawing of abortion and the signing of a Concordat with the Vatican which gives it many ideological and material privileges.

The Prime Minister announced that the government will "take the necessary measures to positively close the process of ratifying the Concordat which has already been signed," even though the majority of SLD deputies were opposed to this. He did not mention the question of abortion, although a recent poll showed that 65% of women are in favour of liberalising access while 80% consider that the ban on abortion is a blow to the material condition of their families.

Women deputies have set up a women's inter-party parliamentary caucus, which has asked the Prime Minister to nominate a woman for a Women's Issues Office, and has announced that it will propose legislation liberalising the

6. This programme calls for the privatisation en bloc of 600 firms (for the moment only 367 have been designated), each of which has a yearly turnover of more than US$10 million and has made profits in previous years. 15% of the shares in these companies will be distributed amongst the employees while the remainder will be spread between about 20 national investment funds managed by banks and managerial enterprises. Part of these shares will be made available to Polish citizens in exchange for an investment certificate, the cost of which cannot be more than 10% of the average salary. This is a combination of privatisation and semi-forced savings.

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% votes cast

International Viewpoint #251 December 1993

1 9 20 3 26 83 289 58 8 8 86 3 66 85 7 6a

Votes 1993

Votes 1991

SLD 1993

SLD 1991

UP 1993

UP 1991**

PSL 1993

PSL 1991

PSL-PL 1993

PSL-PL 1991

BBWR 1993***

UD 1993

UD 1991

KLD 1993

KLD 1991

UPR 1993

UPR 1991

Solidarnosc 1993

Solidarnosc 1991

PC 1993

PC 1991

RDR 1993 ****

ZChN 1993*****

ZChN 1991*****

KPN 1993

KPN 1991

Self defence 1993

Party "X" 1993

Election Results % registered votes 51,00 100,00 40,77 100,00 10,23 20,41 4,88 11,98

7,28 2,51 7,72 15,40 3,53 8,67 1,18 2,37 2,23 5,46 2,71 5,41

10,59 12,31 2,00 3,99 3,05 7,48 1,59 3,18 0,92 2,25 2,45 1,00 2,05 2.21 3,55 1,50 3,00 3,19 3,56 2,89 3,06 1,39 2,78 1,37 2,74

Senators

Deputies

100

460

XX

37

171

60

3

41

5

36

132

48

1

0

28

2

16

4

74

62

1

0

37

0

3

9

44

1

0

49

Party "X" 1991

52

German minority 1993 xx

German minority 1991 x: These votes applied only to two regions and are too small to be of significance.

xx: Thirty-nine other deputies elected in 1991 do not appear in this table, their parties having disappeared

** For 1991 the stated votes are comprised of those for Labour Solidarity (SP) and the Social Democratic Party (RDS), which went on to

*** Formed in June 1993, on the initiative of Lech Walesa.

**** The right-wing RDR, led by the former Prime Minister, J Olszewski.

***** The National Christian Union has stood each time in coalition with other parties abortion law.? The UD deputy Barbara

Labuda, who presides over the women's caucus, has also announced that she will be calling for the legalisation of "common-law marriage" (cohabitation) and opposing the ratification of the Concordat. The government will find it difficult to appease both the Church and its women supporters and this will open up some space for the left-wing.

The Union of Labour (UP), which made a breakthrough in the elections, is the best placed to occupy this space, being the first party not to be based on the historic division between supporters and opponents of the bureaucratic regime. While the UP considers that "the market, privatisation and competition should not be challenged", it nevertheless "rejects) the dogma by which market regulation should have a generalised character," and has declared its desire to draw up an alternative economic programme.8

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0,19 0,47 X x

The discussions preceding the formation of the Pawlak government were a test for the UP, since a number of its leaders were hoping to enter into the government and so were ready to support the neo-liberal course. In the end, the UP completely turned round, putting forward its programme and refusing to capitulate to the neo-liberalism of the SLD leadership?

### Mobilisations

However, the UP remains a very inactive party, popular amongst intellectuals, but lacking links to the trade union movement and with virtually no working class support.

Throughout 1992, social mobilisations were taking place at a rapid pace. The preparations for the elections brought them to an end, the people prefer to place their trust in the government. But it is likely that demands will again

1 be made once it becomes clear that the government is neither willing nor able to satisfy their expectations.

The character of any future working class radicalisation depends in large measure on the UP and trade union representatives in parliament giving a platform to the social movements and helping them formulate a programme of transitional demands. If this parliamentary left is unable to link up with the coming strike movements, it will be the Catholic rightwing which is the beneficiary. It would then be difficult to build on the success of the left-wing in the recent elections. *

7. It is comprised of 52 of the 73 women deputies in the parliament and includes deputies from the SLD, UP, UD and PSL.

8. Przywrocmy nadzieje (Restore Hope), the programmatic document of the UP, Warsaw, August 1993.

9. One of its leaders, Marek Pol, head of the FSR auto plant and former POUP leader, accepted the post of Minister for Industry "on a personal level".

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