2. Brian Nelson was a former British security agent working in Northern Ireland.
----- photo credits and running heads -----
9
The unlikely peace
A famous wall mural from Belfast in the early 1980s shows three women fighters. The caption says, "IRA, PLO, ANC One Struggle". Given the accommodation between the PLO and the Israelis, the ANC with the apartheid regime and now the discussions between the IRA and the
British government, the mural takes on a whole new significance. Sinn
International Viewpoint #252 January 1994
European Union (EU) funds through the Common Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds have led to a political reorientation of the whole southern ruling class, away from traditional nationalism towards strong support for European unity.
Despite relatively high growth, a sur-
Fein has invoked the Israeli and South African agreements as reasons why the British government should enter into discussions with it. DAVID COEN — 22 December 1993
EW were surprised at the reve-
F
lation in November that the British government, despite many denials, had been negotiating with the IRA for at least the previous eight months. The surprise may have been the terms on which the IRA appear willing to call a ceasefire — terms which fall well short of British withdrawal, merely calling for a statement by the British asserting the right of the Irish people to self-determination. Or, at least that was the position following the talks between Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams and John Hume of the Social Democratic and Labour Party which ended in October.
The real negotiations are between London and Dublin. Dublin is attempting to negotiate an IRA ceasefire in return for a mild declaration by the British that they have no "selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland" and a statement on self-determination which is subject to the veto of the Unionist minority in Ireland. Not only is it prepared to accept the Unionist veto, it will also delete from the constitution of the Republic Articles 2 and 3 which assert that the national territory comprises the whole island of Ireland. The Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will continue; that is, Britain will continue to rule a part of Ireland, this time with the express agreement and cooperation of the Dublin government.
Whatever the outcome of the talks, it seems the Republicans have been boxed in. Massive public expectations of peace could make it extremely hard for the IRA to reject proposals endorsed by Dublin and by John Hume. The greatest danger of all is evident in a casual remark made by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. "It might not matter," he said, "if a DublinLondon agreement couldn't be sold to the IRA." 10
The hidden British agenda is obviously to split the "pan-nationalist alliance" in which Sinn Fein places so much faith, and to draw Dublin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party into a combined repression of the Republicans.
To understand the implosion of nationalist politics in Ireland, and therefore the dangers of Sinn Fein's political strategy, requires some understanding of the political economy of the southern State over the past 40 years. In a way, this is also the history of the Fianna Fail party, which has politically dominated the State since Eamon De Valera first formed a govern-
The attempt to build a stable capitalist State in the 26 counties has failed - it shares at least this much in common with the Unionist statelet in the north. Up to the late 1950s, it attempted development behind high tariff barriers, basing itself on the old Sinn Fein policy of self-sufficien-
When this policy was squeezed by a budget deficit and an IMF-enforced opening of the economy in post-war Europe, the Fiana Fail government reoriented itself towards a new policy, that of development through foreign investment and export-led growth. This policy had some success even after the 1974 crisis. By the late 1970s budget deficits were once again a major problem; at one stage per capita debt was the highest in the world.
The history of the south over the past 20 years might well be titled, "Fianna Fail discovers the European Economic Community (EEC)". To sustain its long hold on power it required finances for job creation and patronage. When the 1974 world crisis finally hit in the late 1970s, the EEC became the main source, having the added advantage of apparently lessening dependence on Britain. The massive inflow of plus in the balance of trade and low inflation, it is estimated that a third of the population lives on or below the poverty line. Between 1986 and 1990 when Gross Domestic Product grew by more than 20%, 136,000 people left the country. In the last 20 years of the 20th century, it is projected that 500,000 will leave.2
In the early 1980s the national question - which the hunger strikes and associated mass protests brought to a critical point — threatened to fuse with the economic crisis and shake the State to its foundations. But the national question was never made to seem relevant to the struggles of the working class and the moment passed.
### Crisis of confidence
The combined effects of economic stagnation and increased dependence on the EU has nevertheless led to a severe crisis of confidence among the southern ruling class. There were no official celebrations of the 75th anniversary of the 1916 insurrection, the beginning of the war which drove the British out of most of the country — a big contrast with the 50th anniversary in 1966.
The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement was a clear indication of where the Dublin capitalist class perceived its main interests
- in stemming the rise of Sinn Fein following the hunger strikes of 1981 and bolstering the SDLP, aided of course by considerable sums from the USA. It also involved Dublin in guaranteeing partition and laid the groundwork for the present
In every decade since Partition in 1921 there has been a military uprising against
1. Fianna Fail ("the Soldiers of Destiny") was founded by Eamon De Valera in 1926. They formed a government for the first time in 1932, and ruled for all but ten years of the period up to 1990. Closely tied to the Catholic Church, their base includes small farmers and the urban petty bourgeoisie, though they have consistently won most working class votes for their populist job creation policies.
2. During the Great Famine, between 1845 and 1850 one million left. Half a million - one fifth of the population -applied for Donnelly visas to the USA in 1990.
International Viewpoint #252 January 1994 what Charles Haughey called a "failed political entity" — the Six County statelet. • Both the IRA and the British recognised early in the present phase that a decisive military victory by either side was impossible. Traditionally the IRA has been distrustful of politics and considered the military campaign as the "cutting edge" against the British. However, it was this lack of a political strategy which in the end proved decisive.
Whatever the bravery, resourcefulness and determination of the IRA fighters, they can't drive the British out through military means alone; recognition of that is one of the reasons for the current talks. A correct political strategy would have involved attempting to mobilise sufficient forces in Ireland (and Britain) which could achieve that. The military campaign too often clashed with the needs of politics, especially when civilians were killed or
Sinn Fein never developed a socialist programme for the whole island, which would appeal to workers in the south as well as to loyalist workers. On social questions, such as divorce, contraception and abortion, the republicans allow themselves to be portrayed as conservative and backward nationalists and, while they were closely involved in the campaign against drug pushing in working class areas of Dublin, they didn't offer a rounded-out solution to the crisis which would appeal to working people, the unemployed and emigrants. Their share of the vote in recent general elections in the south never rose above 2%.
The worst mistake was the failure to challenge Fianna Fail because they assumed that, in the end, Fianna Fail, or at least its base, was on their side. A leading Sinn Fein member spoke in London recently of the "nationalist family", presumably embracing everyone from the IRA to Fianna Fail and sections of the Catholic Church. The implication of this kind of thinking is that family members look after each other and that betrayal by the prime minister, Albert Reynolds, would be unthinkable.
The signs of capitulation have been there for a long time. Former Fianna Fail leader Haughey's silence on the hunger strikes, his implementation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (which he opposed while in opposition), his changes in the extradition law to placate the British, his inaction in the Birmigham 6, Guildford 4 and other such cases were sufficient warning that, despite his republican reputation, he would not confront the British. Haughey was willing when necessary to make republican noises but that was only to distract attention from the economic crisis. Because they didn't address this issue, Sinn Fein was treated as being irrelevant to the concerns of the working class.
As a tactic to break out of political isolation, the so-called "pan-nationalist alliance" might have some merit. As a strategy it is a disaster which has led Sinn Fein to entrust the Dublin government to negotiate with the British on its behalf. The class interests of the Dublin government are totally opposed to those of the working class people in the nationalist areas in the north.
Bad omens for Britain
The omens for the British are not particularly good either. From the 1921 partition settlement, imposed under threat of force, to 1969 they operated with a hands off approach — apart from the 1949 Government of Ireland Act which, in response to the south's decision to leave the Commonwealth and become a republic, wrote its claim to Northern Ireland into law. Only when it became clear in 1969 that the six county state could no longer police the insurgent nationalists did the British reluctantly send in troops.
Policy towards Ireland is now dictated by a number of key considerations. Firstly, military defeat in unthinkable. There are uncomfortable parallels with Portugal after its retreat from Africa. Secondly, while the end of the Cold War means that the strategic reasons for occupation are less important, any retreat could be treated as weakness and thereföre imperil Britain's standing as a military power. Thirdly, while the economic reasons for staying are in fact negative, holding the six counties enables the British to exert a degree of control over the whole island. Before leaving they would need to ensure that the bourgeoisie, north and south, could provide a stable capitalist government. While they might be able to support one rugby team, the ruling classes in Dublin and Belfast are too weak, divided and backward to have any chance of success.
Historically, Ireland has also functioned as a cat's paw in British politics. From Randolph Churchill's threat of the "Orange Card" against Gladstone's Liberals in 1886 to Tory encouragement of an army mutiny in 1912 for the same purpose, to the 1921 partition settlement and the 1974 Sunningdale Agreement brought down by a Loyalist strike, the threat or the actual use of Unionist violence has often weighed much more heavily than their numerical or political significance to the British State would seem to allow.
In the more recent past there are suggestions that the question of Northern Ireland has been used as a lever inside the Tory Party itself. Fred Holroyd and Colin Wallace, both of whom worked for Military Intelligence in the north of Ireland during the 1970s, suggest that sections of the Secret Services plotted against Ted Heath and Harold Wilson. According to this theory, Heath's replacement by Margaret Thatcher was partly engineered in Northern Ireland.
Current British Prime Minister John Major's position is also precarious. The anti-Maastricht Tory right-wing has been grumbling over his "betrayal of the
11
International Viewpoint #252 January 1994
Union" but they don't appear to want to bring him down now for fear either of provoking a general election or having him replaced by a leader less sympathetic to the right. The historical portents however are not good. There is a fair chance that if Unionist support starts to waver, many may start shouting "betrayal".
Recently the Ulster Unionists have restored their close links to the Conservative and Unionist Party. Desperate to carry the Maastricht Treaty through the Commons against the opposition of a minority of his own party, Major was forced into a deal with the nine Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) MPs to bolster his majority. For the Unionists this is a linchpin against any concessions to the nationalists and Sinn Fein report that the tone of British communications changed after the June deal with
The situation in the north of Ireland is partly a product of the decline of the British economy. The slow decay, from the 1950s onward, of traditional industries associated with the Empire was fundamental to the demise of the six-county State. Shipbuilding and textile industries began to disappear. The economic crisis began to affect employment prospects, especially for Protestants. Like their counterparts in the south, the Unionist ruling class began to fear the political consequences and in 1965 began discussions with Dublin on improving economic links and seeking to attract foreign investment. But by then it was too late.
Increasingly unable tovdeliver the traditional concessions to the Loyalist work force and caught between the need to start integrating the Catholic middle class and the weight of the bigotry it had fostered for so long, by 1969 it had lost the ability to sustain itself militarily — hence the intervention of the British. In 1972, following Bloody Sunday, the Stormont government was abolished. 12
By almost every economic indicator, Northern Ireland is worse off than any other region of the British State, even after 20 years of direct rule and £3 billion yearly from the British government. Catholics are still about two and half times more likely to be unemployed than Protestants, in spite of the various anti-discrimination acts and the fact that more than a third of employment in the north is, directly or indirectly, accounted for by the British State. The only growth industry is "security"
As the effects of the long-term economic failure of the British economy permeates the political level and threaten the British State itself, it becomes more important than ever not to make any concessions which would highlight or reveal that weakness. It is for this reason, rather than any desire to keep the peace or to defend the rights of the Unionists, which lead the British to prop up the state-
Institutional crises
The question of Ireland continually inserts itself into the institutional crises which feed off economic decline. Several key institutions such as the monarchy and the Church of England face problems of legitimacy unprecedented for at least a century. The cases of the Birmingham 6 and Guildford 4 have exposed the legal and judicial systems to almost overwhelming criticism. "British justice" is as doubtful as a concept as in its application; nonetheless, it had a certain ideological force now seriously undermined by a string of wrongful convictions in Irish cases.
Historically, the splits in the British ruling class have been over Free Trade and Ireland. The latest could be over European Union. The attitude to European Union of a significant minority on the Tory rightwing threatens once again to split the ruling class. Great Britain, a former imperal power with substantial overseas interests, is being forced to negotiate its way into a subordinate role in a European alliance dominated by German capitalism.
One of the first actions of the new Thatcher government in 1979 was to lift exchange controls. A massive outflow followed - £50 billion during the Thatcher period. The effect was to further decouple British capital from the State, to further weaken its claims to world power status and accelerate the drive to regional blocks such as the European Union.
The Tory right-wing, which takes its bearings from Thatcher, was (and is) always more attuned politically to smaller, provincial and UK-based capital, antiforeigner, anti-Welfare and in favour of low taxation. It is precisely these forces which have historically been most fervently unionist. SDLP leader John Hume's proposed "Europe of the Regions" solution to the problem of Northern Ireland, possibly the most rational from the point of view of the ruling class, was ruled out of court by this section of the Conservative
The Major-Reynolds statement of 15 December is designed in Major's case to strengthen the Union splitting the nationalists. It is based on the recognition that without the support of Dublin and the moderate nationalists of Hume's SDLP, the British cannot defeat the Republicans. Reynolds fervently shares this desire but thinks the British are too unsubtle to achieve it. Hence the complex and ambiguous document which emerged from their talks which promises much but contains little.
It is easy to envisage a situation in which the IRA agrees to a ceasefire as a response to this document, because of war weariness and the realisation that rejection could mean even further isolation and massive repression, aided by the south.
But the Loyalists may be an even greater threat to the Major-Reynolds project. A bloody provocation which bounces the IRA into rejection and therefore isolation would suit their purposes. If, on the other hand, the IRA accepts, then the Loyalists may come to believe that a weak Tory government is susceptible to pressure, especially from their friends on the Tory right-wing. The prospect is therefore for instability and war as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland continues its slow disintegration.
There may be a settlement in Ireland. But it is very unlikely that there will be peace. *
ISRAELI-PLO ACCORDS