Unpleasant surprise
THE 12 December elections were designed by the Yeltsin administration to give all advantages to the liberals and the President, pushing his proposals for a new, authoritarian constitution. All seemed to be proceeding to plan: several opposition parties had been banned or
International Viewpoint #252 January 1994 after the attack on Parliament, also made quite a bad showing at the polls. Even if, for example, Volsky's Civic Union still retains a social influence, through the support it commands among directors in state disqualified, the opposition press curtailed, and television gave massive propaganda for the pro-Yeltsin parties. However, in spite of these conditions, the constitution was agreed by only the smallest possible margin (fifty-seven percent in favour on a turn-out of fifty-three percent
— a meagre thirty percent of all eligible voters), while in the parliamentary poll the nationalists, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and the post-communist alliance of the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation and the Agrarian Party, scored a surprise victory.
POUL FUNDER LARSEN — Moscow, 17 December 1993
ONSEQUENTLY the adoption of Yeltsin's constitution in the referendum did not become the expected major victory for the pro-capitalist forces, backed by the West, in their attempts to consolidate an authoritarian Presidential regime in Russia. In a country ridden by economic depression and profound social crisis the elections showed that there is no stability in sight, and that both opposition to the liberal reforms and divisions among
Yeltsin's acolytes are on the rise. The spectacular success of the ardent chauvinist Zhirinovsky also highlights the dangerous rightward shift in Russian politics.
"Yeltsin's victory"
Both the results and the turn-out
(down almost twenty percent on the Presidential elections of June 1991) point to the anger and disappointment in Russian society after five years of empty promises and ruinous economic reform. This feeling, already apparent in the April referendum (heralded "Yeltsin's victory" by much of the bourgeois press), showed itself first and foremost in the total humiliation of the pro-Yeltsin blocs (Russia's
Choice, the Party of Russian Unity, and
Concord), which received little more than twenty percent of the vote.
In spite of their huge resources and last minute attempts to court regional leaders, these parties were wiped out in most of provincial Russia, and did not do impressively well even in the major cities.
The liberals claim to broad support for their social and economic policies therefore appears to be a weak one.
Furthermore, the pro-Yeltsin forces are now politically quite isolated in the new parliament, since they consistently rejected any talk of a "coalition government" during the campaign in the belief that they would be able to form a government unaided. This was despite the fact that they could not even agree on forming a common platform; instead setting up four heterogenous blocs and fighting among themselves.
After 12 December the inability of the Yeltsinites to construct a stable ruling party seems as pronounced as ever, in spite of their countless attempts: Democratic Russia, the Movement for Democratic Reform, Democratic Choice, Russia's Choice, and so on. This inability points to the weak social foundations of the restorationist project, and to the hete rogenity of the forces involved.
Different parts of the old nomenklatura and new business elites are rallying behind Yeltsin, who is hovering above this fragile alliance; but there is no clear common project, and the various components are more interested in enriching and empowering themselves than in consolidating an alliance for long-term government. In the election campaign this developed to the point where no one denied it when the centrist politician, Arkady Volsky, talked about "the civil war in the cabi-
The centrist forces, which had hoped to occupy the void left by Yeltsin's elimination of much of the former opposition industry, this was not sufficient to gain any significant number of votes.
As regards the much hyped liberalcentrist alliance, led by the economic "whiz-kid" Grigor Yavalinsky, it polled less than ten percent of the vote - far from the major break-through which many had expected. In the face of the continuing drop in already abysmal living standards and the global crisis of Russian society the centre-parties and their attempts at promoting the concept of a socially-oriented market economy" (whatever that might be in the Russian context) were rejected by most voters as too much of the same old thing at a time when people, fed up with Gaidarnomics, have started searching for more radical alternatives.
While the Western press has unilaterally focused on the indeed ominous Zhirinovsky phenomenon it is worth keeping in mind that three other "slates" which presented themselves in some way as an alternative to the Yeltsin government did quite well in the elections.
The Women of Russia alliance, with links to both the traditional women's organisations and (as with most parties) to new entrepreneurial structures, waged a sober campaign focussing on the disastrous situation of the social services and the general onslaught on women's rights. In a situation where almost seventy-five percent of all unemployed are women, and where women's wages have fallen to around forty percent of male wages (down from seventy percent under the old regime), it is hardly surprising that this slate, although generally failing to offer concrete answers to the issues it raised, managed to gain some eight percent of the vote.
The Agrarian Party and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which are divided rather according to their different spheres of activity and influence rather than by programmatic differences, scored twenty-five percent of the vote. The latter in particular, with its 600 thousand membership and access to the old networks of the nomenklatura, as well as
1. Figures on the situation of Russian women from Izvestya, 2 December 1993.
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International Viewpoint #252 January 1994 mighty commercial structures (originating from the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union), is no doubt a lasting player in Russian politics. It is however, badly equipped to embody a real alternative to the liberal reforms or the growing nationalism in Russian political life. Indeed the Party's economic programme is less than explicit on the kind of economic regulation it envisages — and the close collaboration of its chairman, Gennady Zhyuganov, with nationalist circles, through the Front for National Salvation (of which he was a co-chairman), does not bode well for its ability to distance itself from the hard-line proposals of, for example, a Zhirinovsky.
Already by early November an analyst for the Moscow newspaper, Nevavisimaya Gazeta, saw the writing on the wall for the "victorious" liberals who believed that they had freed themselves from all opposition by cracking down on the Supreme Soviet: *The Russian Supreme Soviet had quite a strong social base, and this remains true. They (the Yeltsin camp) claim that this base amounts to no more than twenty percent.
However, opinion polls show that sixty percent of the population want a return to the situation of 1985. This is the result of a major drop in people's living standards. Many people dislike the Americanisation of our life-style, Western cultural expansion, the triumph of consumerist psychology, and the weakness of the State, which is not able to defend its interests nor those of ethnic Russians in the zones of conflict throughout the former USSR. These factors work against the current ruling elite."2
Indeed these factors work in favour of those political forces calling for increased intervention and the resurrection of a "strong Russia" in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and internationally. This was no secret to the Yeltsinites, who therefore excluded most slates on the etatist/nationalist wing of Russian politics from the elections. But they did not obstruct the slate of Zhirinovsky, whose relations with the Yeltsin administration are in reality quite ambiguous.
After his failed bid for the Presidency in 1991 Zhirinovsky did not clearly stand up against Yeltsin: he participated in the self-styled Constitutional Assembly which Yeltsin created over the summer, did not side with the Supreme Soviet in their struggle with Yeltsin, and, alone among the oppositionists, endorsed Yeltsin's new authoritarian constitution.
No wonder that Yeltsin's influential press-secretary, Kostilov, when asked on election night to comment on Zhirinovsky's victory, answered that he would not rule out his participation in the government!3
Yeltsin might have perceived Zhirinovsky as "the lesser evil" among the nationalists; but obviously no one in the Yeltsin camp foresaw the landslide victory for his party. This victory, won with much of the same populist posturing which made Yeltsin the darling of the democrats some four years ago, is not a vote for Zhirinovsky's programme in full (since this is largely unknown), nor is it a vote for "fascism" - although there are undoubtedly quasi-fascist elements in his rhetoric and
It is a vote of protest, drawing on popular anger against the disastrous consequences of liberal reform and reaching out to, for example, many former Communist Party members. In Lithuania and recently Poland, the reformed communist parties have managed to draw this kind of support (and according to opinion polls this could soon happen in Ukraine and Belorussia as well), but due to the specific situation in Russia, and particularly the prevalent mood of nostalgia in relation to the "lost empire", nationalists of the Zhirinovsky-type are also currently well positioned to benefit.
For national minorities within Russia, Zhirinovsky's scarcely veiled anti-semitism and jingoism is a disturbing warning of things to come. But he is far from alone in Russia in promoting the policies of "ethnic cleansing" in Russia. During the state of emergency in Moscow from 3 October the liberal city authorities used the opportunity to get rid of tens of thousands of people, primarily from the Caucasian states, who were making a living in Moscow as, for example, as street traders.
### Political fragility
Above all, Zhirinovsky's victory underlines the fragility of the whole political system in Russia today. The absence of real parties, the unclear division of power, the authoritarian yearnings of the ruling elite, the weakness of the political institutions — all this gives strength to populist outfits such as Zhirinovsky's party.
This is a very dangerous development, particularly if the political struggle which Yeltsin introduced into the army should continue, and if Zhirinovsky manages to convert his passive support into an organised extreme-right force. This is not presently the case, but the political earthquake of 12 December suggests that it is a possible development which no one can afford to ignore.
While the final composition of the new parliament will not be clear until it convenes in January, it seems safe to assume that there will be a solid majority against shock therapy of the Gaidar-type. Formally the new constitution allows Yeltsin to dissolve the new parliament, should it become too troublesome, as he did with the old one.
However, in reality, this might be difficult both in terms of possible popular reactions and as regards his ability to
2. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3 November 1993.
3. Ostankino television, 12 December 1993.
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International Viewpoint #252 January 1994 control the state apparatus. Although Yeltsin retains strong influence among the higher echelons of the "power ministries" (the army, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Security a breakdown of the election results reveals that the anti- Yeltsin parties have massive support amongst the army rank-and-file.
Further, Yeltsin's drive over recent months to force through a constitution which takes away the rights of national republics within Russia — in order to recentralise the Federation which has been consistently weakened over the last years — could soon backtire. The extremely low turn-out in a series of republics (such as, the important Tatarstan) may in turn act as a pretext for regional elites to assert their independence from Moscow, and thereby force the centre into a confrontation in which it is far from certain of winning.
Yeltsin does still have certain room to manoeuvre, particularly if he continues the foreign policy re-orientation which has been quietly under way for some time. Using the sheer economic advantage of Russia to re-establish the traditional, hierarchical relations with the CIS states, and combining this with growing military engagement in the other states (either by "proxy" as in Moldovas Dniestr-province and Abkhasia, or directly, as in western Georgia and Tadzjikistan), Yeltsin has managed to re-assert Russian dominance.
This could be one element in a new, increasingly nationalist profile which would play well with the army and the 25 million Russians outside the borders of the Russian Federation. Combined with a certain modification of the economic policies, so as to satisfy the influential directors and agrarian lobbies, this could be a way for Yeltsin to cut into the support base of the opposition.
However such a re-orientation might very well put Yeltsin on a collision course with the imperialist powers which have been supporting him. Western interests are themselves not unambiguous: security interests, which gave priority to at least some degree of social and national stability in the post-Soviet space (and therefore tend to endorse Russian enforcement of "law and order" in this framework), are in conflict with a certain interest in reducing Russian influence - apparent in Western attempts to curtail Russian armament sales.
### "Irrevocable" reforms
At the same time security concerns and economic interests are also interacting in a contradictory fashion: the economic prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) obviously pay little attention to political stability, being aimed at the swiftest possible dismantlement of the old economic structures so as to make the economic reforms "irrevocable".
In most quarters of Russian politics, Western influence now seems to be on the decline, as it is becoming clear that the much hyped "Marshall-plan for Russia" is nothing but a mirage, and that the reality is quite different: while total foreign investments in Russia are at US$7 billion, Russian enterprises have deposits of some US$10-15 billion in foreign banks. This suggests that far from approaching annual investments of US$50 billion - which the Russian government estimates is necessary for the restructuring to succeed
— there is currently net capital flight from Russia.
The elections to the new parliament were originally called by Presidential decree (on 21 September), and the constitutional draft presented to the voters was also produced by the Presidential administration, without political consultations with other forces. Throughout the campaign the executive structures retained a firm grip over all levers of control - from the mass media to the electoral commissions. The elimination of the Supreme Soviet, the constitutional court, all local and most regional soviets effectively left all formal powers with the Yeltsin controlled executive.
The new constitution formalises this state of affairs by granting the Presidency sweeping powers including the right to govern by decree, as well as to appoint the Prime Minister and all judges of Russia's highest courts. The new parliament can only make "decisions" about state spending if the government accepts it, and ministers are not accountable to the elected body.
Furthermore it will be practically impossible for parliament to impeach the President or even amend the constitution, while the President can dissolve the parliament or introduce a state of emergency quite easily. With the Presidential election by all accounts being put off until 1996 (while some liberals are suggesting that 1998 may be more appropriate!) Yeltsin formally remains in a position to ignore the new parliament and govern by decree, as he has been doing for the last three months.4
The continuing political and constitutional crisis, which has now lasted two years, is not only an indication of the fragilty of political institutions and the degree of disintegration of the State apparatus, but also linked directly to the impasse of neoliberal economic reform after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the priceshock of January 1992.
The various half-baked reform measures since 1989 have effectively cut industrial production in half, while none of the parameters set up by the IMF for "financial stabilisation" have been met: inflation is expected to reach an annual rate of 12-1300 percent at the end of 1993 and the budget deficit is way above the five percent demanded by the IMF (probably at some fifteen to twenty percent).S
The government has not managed to slash subsidies to industrial enterprises and
4. Between 21 September and 15 October 1993 Yeltsin issued 233 decrees.
5. According to Izvestya, 10 December 1993, the drop in industrial production will amount to 16.6% for 1993.
International Viewpoint #252 January 1994 agriculture, nor to implement bankruptcies on a mass scale in state industry. This is in part due to massive resistance on the part of traditional economic structures and lobbies, but also the liberals fear of large-scale social unrest as a consequence of unemployment and impoverishment. Still, unemployment is rising "silently" and the number of jobless might be around 4 million (although those officially registered number only 1 million) as a growing number of industries are closing down for lack of deliveries and/or outlets.
This is particularly pronounced in consumer industry, whose share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the last two years has deteriorated from sixteen to five percent, while the energy sectors share has risen from eleven to twenty-five percent. But even the energy sector - singled out by the IMF and liberal reformers as the "way forward for Russia" — is facing a serious crisis as oil and gas output continues to drop and enterprises are massively defaulting on their payments.
For wage-earners the consequences have been an overall drop in real wages of perhaps a third; although this has affected the branches and regions in a very uneven fashion. So while the average wage is approximately 70-80 thousand roubles a month (US$65) many white-collar workers in the "budget sector" (education, health service, and culture) and workers in light and consumer industry take home earnings only slightly above the minimal wage which Yeltsin promised during the election campaign to raise to 14, 620 roubles (US$12)7
Meanwhile the Moscow trade unions estimated December's "minimal consumer basket" at 105.376 roubles, and the poverty level at 42.850 roubles.8
No unified response
The attacks on workers' living standards has not produced a unified response, as the logic of the reform has been to split, and speed up differentiation inside, the working class. However, on the local and regional levels there have been a considerable number of strikes — often characterised by the persistence of traditional "corporative" structures unifying workers, management and even local authorities against the centre. In a few cases strike movements have spread across the regions, as was the case with the all-Russian strikes of teachers and health workers in the spring of 1992.
A certain turning-point in workers struggles took place with the massive strike in Donetsk bassin in June 1993.9 The strike featured both social, economic and political demands — in the Ukrainian part of the Donbass calls for regional economic self-determination — and quickly spread to the Russian parts of the bassin as well. Many of the demands put forward by the miners - and other workers' groups joining in — did go squarely against the logic of liberal reform. This was the case with demands against the freeing of coal prices, which would in turn imply an abolishment of subsidies and the closing down of major parts of Russian industry (where even if output has dropped some twenty percent over the last five years subsidies to the tune of two percent of GDP are still allocated).
Accumulated discontent
On the eve of the elections the accumulated discontent among workers in many regions exploded in a series of conflicts. Unrest surfaced in the mining regions, when the Vorkuta miners went on strike in November, and the Independent Miners Union threatened to call an all-Russian strike for December. In the event mostly miners from the northern regions of Vorkuta and Norilsk participated.
Together with the miners economic and social demands were also explicitly political demands for a boycott of the constitutional referendum and a boycott of slates featuring cabinet ministers. In a parallel development workers from the gas industry (and other branches) in the western Siberian region of Nadym went on strike on 22 November.
The strike, which involved tens of thousands of workers, was only suspended on 2 December, after the State company Gasprom gave in to all the strike demands, which had become more and more radical and threatened to spread to other regions. In this strike demands for a boycott of the constitutional referendum and for the resignation of the government were also growing. 10
For the left this could be the source of some hope after an election campaign, where most, if not all, leftwing forces were marginalised. The centre-left Socialist Workers' Party (of Roy Medvedev and Lyudmilla Vartazrova) was seen by many as the possible centre piece in a leftwing alliance with progressive trade unionists.
However, this hope soon faded as the main trade union federation, the Federats or a out o thin.
tion of Independent Trade Unions (FNPR), capitulated to Yeltsin after the events of 3-4 October, and the Socialist Workers' Party started seeking other running mates; including moderate nationalist forces of the Renaissance Union and the
Cossacks Union. Eventually their attempts to launch a common bloc failed, but by then the manoeuvres had ruined any ideas of a leftwing alternative for the elections.
Most of the radical communist groups
- the rump Russian Communist Workers' Party, the Russian Communist Party, and the Union of Communists - called for a boycott, whereas the small Party of Labour, which had no possibility of playing an independent role in the campaign, took a more ambiguous position. On the one hand it criticised the elections and the new pseudo-parliament, on the other, prominent figures from the Party were featured on different slates, for example the industrialist Civic Union.
During the election campaign the most positive initiative with leftwing backing - through transcending the narrow circles of the organised left — was undoubtedly that of the Movement in Defence of Democracy in Russia. This movement was launched immediately after the October massacre by a group of Moscow intellectuals, like former dissidents Gleb Pavlovsky, Pjotr AbovinEgides, and Aleksander Buzgalin from the Party of Labour.!!
The founding conference of the movement - many of whose members called for a boycott — was held on 27 November and attracted broad layers of oppositional intellectuals, including many former dissidents. A demonstration in central Moscow on the eve of the elections (10 December) drew more than five-hundred people, which bodes well for the future of a movement, whose potential is far from exhausted with the elections. On the contrary, the adoption of Yeltsin's authoritarian constitution and the meteoric rise of Zhirinovsky pose a serious danger for the future of even the most rudimentary democracy in Russia.
### Litmus test
It is a main task for the workers movement to fight against this renewed authoritarianism, and it will be a litmus test for the Russian left if it is able to inspire, and intervene in, this struggle. *
6. See The Economist, 11 December 1993.
7. In a related move, the government tried to appease another important group in the electorate by promising (on 11 December!) an 80% increase in pensions.
8. Moskovsky Komsomolets, 14 December 1993
9. For an analysis of this strike see Russian Labour Review, no. 2/1993, pp. 4-6.
10. See Izvestya, 2 & 3 December 1993. Associated Free Press reported on 19 November that only 1.2% of all candidates for the elections were blue-collar workers (whereas 22% were businessmen).
11. For the declaration of the movement see International Viewpoint, no. 250, p.9.
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