A radical cause
ON December 5, presidential and legislative were held in Venezuela. This took place in the middle of a major political crisis — a president obliged to step down following charges of corruption— with rumours of an impending coup d'etat, an economic recession and the decomposition of the traditional two-party system (between the social democratic AD and
International Viewpoint #252 January 1994 leap forward with those who had had a good experience in the armed struggle. In the meantime, the international relations secretary of the Communist Party of Italy, Renato Sandri, came to Venezuela in 1970 and had a long conversation with Petkoff, urging him not to split the party.
the social-Christian COPEl) that has governed the country for years.
Officially, the old conservative politician Rafael Caldera (founder of the
COPEl) was the winner, under the banner of an opposition force, the
Convergencia alliance.
Causa Radical, that defines itself as a "free, revolutionary organisation of working people", ran Andres Velasquez as their candidate. He was an electrical worker and trade union leader in the 1970s in the Guyana region, one of main initiators of the so-called "new trade unionism", and now the governor in the state of Bolivar. He received one third of the total votes cast giving him second place — and is now waging a campaign against the massive electoral fraud organised by the traditional parties and the electoral authorities, who are trying to say he finished in last place.
The origins and experience of the Causa Radical are interesting from several points of view. It is one of the organisations of the Latin
American left that, without abandoning its revolutionary principles, is building a political party that seeks to carry out its activities with society's disposessed — and not only in their name —and has posted some good results.
In the following interview, the general secretary of Causa Radical,
Pablo Medina, provides a general overview of the organisation. The interview was conducted by Emir Sader and originally appeared in the
April-May 1993 issue of the Latin American journal América Libre.
INTERVIEW
HAT are the
W origins of
Causa Radical?
Its origins are in the end of the
1960s, when a series of national and international factors coincided. On the national level, there was the fourth
Congress of the Communist Party of
Venezuela (PCV), where a balance sheet of the armed struggle was made. It should be recalled that at the beginning of the
1960s a process of armed struggle unfurled, which ended in a complete fiasco. It was necessary to analyse this, but the discussion on the armed struggle led to another one on the political instrument, the party. It wasn't the armed struggle as such that had to be discussed, but the political actors and the political subject —
32 in our case, the PCV - that had demonstrated their inability to lead the struggle, both in the legal sphere and in the armed sphere. The discussion was centred on the structure of the party and the programme; we participated in this discussion.
To begin with, there were three currents in the party: the right-wing, linked to Moscow, led by legendary figures such as Jesus Faria and Gustavo Machado; a centrist current, led by the general secretary of the party at the time, Pompeyo Marquez, who is now a leading member of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), and whose proposal at the time was to arrive at the Congress united and leave it united; and there was a current led by Teodoro Petkoff, which mainly argued not for the renewal of the PCV but for a break from it, hoping for a qualitative
Petkoff decided to remain in the PCV; but we, who had been with him, left. However, we were hardly more than 10 people, the best known of whom was Alfredo Maneiro, who until the break had been a member of the Central Committee of the PCV and a guerrilla commander.
By the end of the 1970s, there was the rise of what was then known as "Maneirismo", which, ironically, many had identified as the agnostic current. Afterwards, we adopted the name Causa R, with the "R" printed backwards, to say that the country was the wrong way around. When it came to registering for the elections, we called the group Causa Radical.
But coming back to the time of our birth, in January 1971, there was pressure from the Soviets to expel Petkoff from the PCV. The MAS was then born as a result of pressure from the right of the PCV and not through its own initiative. First it was called the Venezuelan Communist Force and then Movement Toward Socialism.
We were at the founding congress of the MAS, simply to state our position -which included the conviction that the MAS was going to reproduce the vices and errors of the PCV in its own ranks.
Internationally, our emergence onto the scene was related to the situation at the time - the Cultural Revolution in China, May 68 in France, the invasion of Czechoslovakia - which decisively influenced changes in the Venezuelan left.
Was the group already called
Causa R?
No, in the beginning we thought about organising a movement that would be called Venezuela 83. In that year, Venezuela took back all the oil enterprises that had been in American hands; it was also the bicentary of Bolivar's birth. The idea was to organise a mass movement that would lead to the building of a political organisation. The original 12 spread out to do work at the University of Caracas and in the
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VENEZUELA
International Viewpoint #252 January 1994 slums. I went to be a worker in Guyana, with the idea that the vanguard had to be born from the people, from the working people. It cannot be born from a fixed and pre-determined structure; in Venezuela, all parties are born from a previous party as a result of divisions. A new party is born, it organises a congress, this congress formulates a programme and names a leadership; the policies are drawn up, and the people are called upon to have confidence in the party and vote for it.
We believe that things have to be done in the reverse order. Not to begin with a fixed structure, but to call on the people for the building of this organisation — not only to build a political leadership but also, along with the people, to develop the programme and policies. Causa R is the consequence of that work. Through time, this approach proved to be feasible though very difficult - since we were confronted with very entrenched political structures, such as AD and COPEI, and a trade union structure with deep roots, with armed gangs, in the State and with work inspectors.
But the most important thing for us was developing our own political proposals. Over time, we never brandished the call for socialism in Venezuela. Firstly, because the MAS had taken this task on itself. Second. because it didn't seem a viable option; and in Venezuela, alongside the armed struggle there developed very strong anti-communist sentiments in the media, and the masses were affected by this.
This does not mean that the masses in Venezuela are reactionary. They have always sought change and this change has always been associated with democracy. Our challenge was to take over the issue of democracy from the right-wing, because democracy is not a reactionary issue but one for working people.
We began our struggle to take this banner out of the hands of the AD and COPEL in the trade union sphere. We proposed universal suffrage and a secret ballot for the election of executive committee of the trade union centre. We called for respect for trade union elections, for daily information sessions for workers on contract negotiations, and for financial accountability and
All this saw us displace the AD and the COPEL in the trade unions. We began a new trade unionism. AD is now synonymous with trade union dictatorship and corruption. Over the last few years, we have displaced them in the major trade unions, and we have taken on the political banner of radical democracy, the transformation of the State and service to workers and the
How did it happen that you won the elections for the Caracas city
This was the result of a long-term process. Since we were few, we decided not to spread ourselves out throughout the country, but rather to concentrate our forces in a few areas. We created the theory of the four legs. The popular leg would be developed in Caracas, in the parish of
Catia; and we thought that this could be an example for the rest of the popular movement in Venezuela. We created Pro Catia Causa R and organised a lot of popular activities: sporting activities, protest movements. We built a very interesting movement. The Constitution of the Republic says that legislation can be proposed to the Congress if backed by 20,000 signatures. In 1976, we collected 20,000 signatures for the modification of the municipal law in Caracas and for the right to recall municipal councillors. This generated a very interesting people's movement in Caracas, as an example of democratisation of life in
We also set up the movement of the Casa del Agua Mansa for intellectuals. In one year we managed to stir up intellectual activity. We called on this sector to make a commitment, declaring that there would be no change without the intellectuals, alongside the working people. Intellectuals act as a beacon to point out the problems in the country, using their ability to see beyond the viewpoint of the rest of socie-
But the majority of intellectuals in Venezuela sold out in the 1970s. During the armed struggle, many intellectuals were heavily committed; but in the 1970s the oil boom neutralised and bought most of them out. Workers and the people stayed on without the support of the intel-
The other leg was in the university. We established a movement and a publication called PRAG, which was very important in the Central University of Venezuela and served as a model for the rest of the
But when this movement retreated at the end of the 1970s, Causa R also retreated. We are linked to the movements; when the movements disappear, Causa R is greatly weakened.
The next foot was in the working class, and this all began with the publication El Matancero. Founded in 1972, this publication has now printed more than 500 issues. Though it was quite a modest effort to begin with, it was converted into a substitute for the trade union. It was a kind of voice for the workers. For several years it was a clandestine publication — there was a repressive situation on the trade union front, and the trade union dictators were trying to find us and get us dismissed. On
15 February 1972 I began to work at
SIDOR, in the field of electric ovens, a very difficult department. Already at the end of the first year, we had brought together an initial group. We succeeded in forcing the holding of a trade union election; we got someone elected. From that point, we were able to organise the workers, elect departmental delegates and democratise the life of the unions and the life of the workers.
In seven years we completely won over the union, that is in 1979. From that year until 1981 we created a model of what a trade union should be — with writing courses so the workers could put together publications, courses in industrial safety, cooking classes, and so forth. The life of the trade union was democratised; assemblies were held at the factory gates and in the union offices. Publications were printed, and there was a lot of debate. This type of trade union life had an impact in the country, above all in the Guyana region.
After 1981, AD-COPEI intervened in this trade union for seven years. They set up a dictatorship, because they had to kill the trade union and that whole radical experiment. 3,000 workers were fired during those years; the entire leadership team was sacked, as were all the delegates. There were a few deaths and others were detained — all with the objective of beheading the social vanguard. Nevertheless, after seven years there were new elections; in spite of the fact that the ADCOPEI had 3,000 of their members in the factory, we swept the elections. We gave them a real drubbing. The work carried out in this trade union later served as a reference, and won over other trade unions -leading to the creation of a new trade unionism, which was distinct, democratic, popular and revolutionary.
In 1989, there were muncipal and gubernatorial elections. In 1988 there had been presidential elections, in which we ran Andres Velazquez as the candidate of the working people of Venezuela. Broadly speaking, in Venezuela out of ten million voters, six million are workers.
We had no money. We would show up at a factory with a megaphone and Andres would speak. We got 120,000 votes and three parliamentary deputies. We concentrated our efforts in the state of Bolívar, with the idea of winning there. We came third but it was a step forward. And one year later, in the gubernatorial elections, we won in Bolivar - with
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International Viewpoint #252 January 1994 ahaJo
V Andres Velazquez.
We wanted this government to be a model for the country. Indeed, it was a reference point for many in the area of democracy, for efficiency and honesty. We had to continuously mobilise a lot of people, because we had only two deputies. It was a difficult struggle and the whole country was watching closely. In the end, the Bolivar government came through with flying colours.
In this period, there was a debate in Causa R; in the following gubernatorial and municipal elections we had to win in other important regions, to give us a real national profile. By majority decision, we decided to concentrate on the state of Carabobo; there are many workers there, it is in the centre of the country, and Causa R has a solid structure there.
But the idea didn't catch on; it didn't acquire a mass dimension. So we had to take a step backwards; and we saw that two of our three deputies had been elected in Miranda and Caracas, which are linked and form one and the same metropolitan area. So we decided to concentrate our efforts there.
With great anticipation, we began promoting the leadership of Aristobulo Isturiz, who had been president of the teachers' trade union. In 1987, we were with Andres Velazquez, and spoke with Aristobulo to get him to align himself with Causa R. 34
FUERO
We launched a plan to democratise the city, a plan of democratic struggle. We decided that, since Causa R was small, we would become a propaganda and agitation team, and divide up into brigades. This gave rise to a real force, that rose in the social and economic malaise and the political crisis.
As a result, the victory in Caracas was no surprise. We had foreseen it months beforehand. We realised that the outgoing mayor was Black - like Aristobulo -but he was AD-COPEI, so the people voted against Perez.
In Caracas, we launched the struggle against the Perez package of economic measures. Given the combative population, and the context of major political events, this helped us a lot, and added to the credibility that Causa R already enjoyed
Winning Caracas was always a central objective. In the last century, Bolivar always tried to take Caracas from the interior. All the movements of the last century - independence, the federal war in 1860, armed movements - always converged on Caracas. But never had there been a movement such as that of 6 December 1992, which was born from the people itself.
In 1958, when Perez Jimenez fell, there was an agreement between all the political parties, the Church and the army to descend into the streets. But never has there been a change like last year, when the people surged into the streets on their own initiative.
Last year there were some rather serious events in the country.
There was the military rebellion in February, another one in
November, and municipal elections in December.
There were three coups: two military and one civilian.
How do you characterise these attempted military coups?
The Armed Forces in Venezuela (FFAA) are nationalist in character. They are educated in the ideas of Bolivar, in the defense of national sovereignty. Unlike other Latin American countries, these FFAA are popular in nature. Nearly 100% of officers are people with popular origins - sons of workers, from poor families. They have direct contact with the problems of the workers.
Haven't Venezuela's armed forces gone through a process of indoctrination, with the ideology of national security in the period of the guerrilla war?
This was the case in 1960s, with the impact of the Cuban revolution and the armed struggle in Venezuela. Clearly, there were confrontations with the army. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that the armed struggle in the mountains was preceded by events in the military - in 196061, forces from the navy in Carupano and Puerto Cabello were looking for a change. And whenever there were confrontations with the army, it showed itself to be very vulnerable to popular ideas — to ideas for democratic change, for a change in the interests of the Venezuelan people.
The February 4 coup attempt was related to the tremendous corruption that had developed. Ministers of Defense had been detained for corruption. In this period, the Movimiento Bolivariano was born, and they carried out the February 4 attempted coup.
There was a very significant event at that time. Aristide was removed in Haiti. President Carlos Andres Perez planned to send a sizeable section of the armed forces there, including the Bolivarianos. They feared that they were going to be killed. This information has never been revealed in Venezuela.
Near the end of 1991, there was a debate in Venezuela concerning the San
International Viewpoint #252 January 1994
Pedro Alejandrino map that Perez had negotiated and signed with the Colombian government. There were unclear agreements concerning integration of territory lying between the two countries. In his previous government, Perez gave up the eastern slope of the Ocas Mountains, which contain open air coal mines; these are now being explored by multinational companies. If it went to the Colombian people, that would be alright; but everything was for the multinationals and the Colombian oligarchies.
This greatly disturbed sections of the armed forces. And this debate around the agreements with Colombia was the final detonator of the February 4 activities.
This Movement has a programme; it planned to establish a civilian-military government, to detain the president of the republic and political leaders and place them before the courts, and organise elections. Nobody claimed to know the names of the civilians in question.
There was sympathy for the Movement. Perez has not been able to solve the problems raised by them. He set up a consultative council composed of well-known figures in Venezuela. The council presented him with a list of proposed measures, which he completely ignored. The whole exercise had just been a manoeuvre to gain time.
The government closed off all channels of negotiation and agreement. In Venezuela, the idea of a referendum on revoking his mandate was very popular; and the president would have had the right to defend himself.
We promoted the idea of the referendum, in the belief that it would stabilise the country somewhat and give the political decision to the people. We did a trial referendum. 160,000 voted in Caracas and about 600,000 in the whole country. There weren't more because it was a working day, and we didn't have the resources to organise more widespread voting. Two to three million Venezuelans could have voted.
90 percent of the votes were against Perez. A few days later in parliament, AD and COPEI denounced the referendum and thereby unmasked themselves. They proved that they feared the people, that they feared democracy and that they weren't really democrats.
Did Causa R establish direct ties with the Bolivariano Movement?
In prison. I went there directly to speak with them, with Hugo Chavez, a few days after they were detained. They were still incommunicado. I was the first to speak with them, to ask about the reasons for their coup attempt.
Perez said that they were going to kill him, and opened up a debate on February 4 itself — an historic debate that was broadcast on national television. A very well-known AD senator declared, "Death to the architects of the coup!"
Caldera made a big speech, saying he was not convinced that they wanted to kill the president. This speech quickly made him a prime suspect of the inquiry. Aristobulo spoke after him, giving a speech that made a tremendous impact in the country.
This changed the situation in the country. It is strange that while Perez was able to score a military victory, on the same day he suffered a political defeat. And this is why the political instability continued.
Perez engaged in his old tactics of manoeuvre. He called on the COPEI to join the cabinet, in the search for stability. COPEI and its general secretary Eduardo Fernandez had to resign three months
The MAS supported the suspension of constitutional guarantees on 4 February; they were to enter the government with four ministers, including Pompeyo Marquez. They were all ready to go, but there was a big debate in the MAS and they had to make a retreat. They realised that supporting the government was not going to pay any dividends.
What is the situation in the run up to the December 1993 elections?
AD is very worn out. We say that it is in its death agony. It has nothing to offer Venezuela, in political and economic terms. It certainly is not the party of change, although at one time it was, in the mid-1940s. It is a very corrupt party, tired out and bureaucratised. Its leaders have their bank accounts abroad, and have houses abroad, too; they are ready to leave the country.
On 4 February and 27 November, many of them sought asylum in foreign embassies for a few nights. In the 3 December 1992 elections, AD won the gubernatorial elections in three small states. Afterwards, through force they got three more; now, through fraud in the courts, they are getting two more.
In those states there are big mobilisations in support of the genuine governor, with drums and saucepans. 40 to 50,000 people join in these actions. And, nevertheless, the Supreme Court is ignoring the election results. Even with all this, AD does not have any candidates and has no platform for the coming elections.
If the elections take place - and this is not guaranteed - the future of the country is very uncertain. COPEI is divided. On one hand, Caldera — who is for all intents and purposes the founder of this organisation — has practically split away and aligned himself with the MAS, which, having previously opposed him, is now throwing its support behind him. Caldera has evolved. It seems that the MAS has not. COPEI is not going to support Caldera.
In some states in the east, and in Caracas and Mirindas, Causa R is ahead with Andres Velazquez. The tendency is for Caldera's support to drop and for there to be a social, political and ideological confrontation - because, whoever the COPEI candidate is, they have said they will privatise basic industry and open up the country to international banks.
For the first time, they are not hiding ideology. And we will openly be with the workers and the people. There is going to be a very interesting confrontation, and it is not excluded that we will emerge victorious, that there will be a people's victory.
This feeling of possible victory can already be felt in the streets. And this is generating political instability - for which AD is preparing itself. They have armed gangs, mercenaries. There are police groups with lists of people to be assassinated; even the attorney general of the Republic has said as much.
It appears that I myself am on the top of their list. This is all designed to generate a climate of terror and fear, to muzzle the opposition and thereby prepare a fraud.
Causa R considers itself a political party of the social movements. How does this work in practice?
Causa R is a new political organisation with neither the style nor the organisational conceptions of parties in Venezuela. We define it as a free revolutionary party of working people. "Free" because in the party people have real freedom. "Revolutionary" because we want a change, a transformation of structures in Venezuela. And "of working people" because we believe that the working class is the most advanced class — not only factory workers, but working people in the broad sense. They have an ideal of justice and a democratic ideal, more advanced than those of other social classes. *
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