Inside the PLO
Introduction
Walid Salem is already known to our readers. In our November 1993 issue we published an interview with this militant Palestinian from the occupied West Bank, imprisoned several times for his involvement in the leadership of the Intifada and accused of
International Viewpoint #253 February 1994 institutions without Arafat, along democratic lines. It was the only organisation to insist on the need for the Intifada to have a national and Islamic leadership.
Saika (a nationalist current) made a third proposal. It called for a CL which belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Unfortunately the conditions in which the interview was carried out and transcribed resulted in his words being cut short and a little misrepresented. We therefore suggested that he put forward his point of view in a new contribution.
The article which we publish below contains important information on the debates within the opposition to the Washington Accords. It also exposes the views of the left of the PLO, which we have already had occasion to criticise, notably on the subject of the kind of alliance there should be with the Islamic fundamentalists and how the Rabin-
Arafat Accords should be approached (see International Viewpoint, no. 252, January
WALID SALEM - 24 January 1994
T
HE course of the discussions between the ten groups which make up the
Palestinian opposition* shows that these organisations have not yet been able to organise anything more than simple co-ordination between themselves, despite the efforts of democratic elements.
It is worth examining closely the events of the last three meetings of "the ten" - which can be divided into democratic, nationalist and Islamic tendencies — which took place in December 1993 and January this year. At these meetings the future and tactics of their alliance were central topics.
Discussion
The meeting on 15 December was devoted to a discussion of what the joint political programme should be, and ended with the public release of what was decided:
• The Gaza-Jericho Accords should be defeated;
• The Palestine Liberation Organisation's (PLO) institutions should be rebuilt, along with loyalty to its National
Charter;
• The elections to be held by the self-government administration should be boycotted;
• Its political and administrative institutions should also be boycotted;
• The struggle for the right of return for Palestinians, and for self-determination and full national independence should be re-affirmed.
An "Alliance of Palestinian Forces", comprised of the ten, was declared on the basis of the new programme, which also defined tasks on the pan-Arab and international levels. However, no clear strategy was advanced in respect of building a new leadership of the Intifada (uprising) in the territories occupied since 1967 — a significant drawback to the programme as a whole.
The 30 December meeting was devoted to the question of organisation. In the previous meeting Hamas had proposed a Central Leadership (CL) of forty members, in which forty percent would be Hamas members, forty percent would be from other organisations, and twenty percent would be independents. It had further proposed that there should be an Executive Committee (EC), comprised of a member from each of the ten and five independents chosen by the CL.
Hamas now proposed that half of the CL should be comprised of independents, which it would have the right to choose, while the other half should be comprised of two members from each of the ten. The EC would still be comprised of one member from each of the ten but the five independents would be chosen by consensus of the ten, rather than by the CL.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) proposed a CL of twenty members (two from each of the ten) and an Executive of ten members (one from each). It also proposed that a national conference be organised to lay the basis for the reconstitution of PLO would comprise three members from each of the ten, and a number of independents (to be determined collectively) and an EC comprised of equal numbers of representatives from each of the ten and independents.
The Hamas proposals were rejected by the nine other organisations, which requested that they be withdrawn. Hamas then requested a delay of one week, and the meeting was adjourned.
The 5 January meeting was devoted to reaching an agreement with Hamas on organisation. At the beginning, the Islamic movement conditionally accepted the political programme (including that part relating to the PLO Charter) provided that forty percent of places were allotted to Hamas.
### Represntation
The formula eventually agreed was that of equal representation for all the organisations in the leadership. However, there was no longer agreement on that part of the political programme relating to the rebuilding of the PLO and its National Charter.
After a long discussion, the meeting adopted a resolution to the ettect that firstly, the Alliance should be based upon equal representation, with the CL being comprised of two representatives and the EC of one representaive from each of the ten, and, secondly, the political programme decided on 15 December should be transformed into a list of "political tasks".
Although the part relating to the rebuilding of the PLO and its Charter was retained, no specific details were agreed concerning the timescale and framework within which the Palestinian leadership should be rebuilt.
The result of the meetings is the logical conclusion of the positions held by and conflict between the three major tendencies which make up the ten. * See International Viewpoint, no. 250, November 1993
31
----- pull-quotes on this page -----
PALEstiNe
International Viewpoint #253 February 1994
What is the current position of the democratic, nationalist and Islamic tendencies?
The democratic tendency is essentially made up of the PFLP and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), together with two small organisations: the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) and the Front for Popular Struggle (FPS). Its approach may be summarised thus:
1. The ten must direct themselves towards forming a national Islamic Front, as a provisional framework in which to rebuild the PLO without Arafat and the supporters of the Gaza-Jericho Accords. A rebuilt PLO would unite the opponents of the Accords, (including Arafat Fatah opponents), and would attempt to draw in independent figures from the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the Central Council and members of the PLO Executive Committee, in particular those who have resigned or been suspended from it.
2. However, care should be taken that the building of a national, democratic and Islamic front does not become a goal in itself. It should only be a transitional front for the rebuilding of the PLO institutions, which should be taken up by all opponents of the Gaza-Jericho Accords, independent of their Marxist, nationalist or Islamic ideological projects. PLO membership at this stage of the national liberation struggle should represent political and practical support for a national, not ideological program32 me. Of course, democratic forces must preserve their specific character, and also carry out the democratic struggle for women's liberation. In this way they will have sufficient weight in the new PLO to prevent domination by Hamas, oppose reactionary features of religious ideology and defend the rights of the working class, which should become the dominant social force in the national struggle.
The idea is certainly not to build an alliance between Marxists and Hamas which will grant hegemony to Hamas and provide a leftwing cover for its growth, but to rebuild the PLO without Arafat, with all those forces which continue to support the national programme - the democratic, nationalist and Islamic tendencies. The last tendency currently plays an important role in the national struggle and cannot be excluded, unless, as it appears to be considering, it changes its current position and participates in the elections of the self-government administration - which change would constitute a clear break with the aim of rebuilding the PLO.
3. The tendency has proposed democratic mechanisms for the formation of a transitional front and the rebuilding of the PLO. These would involve the masses through popular assemblies which would elect delegates to a broad national conference, which in turn would elect the leadership of the PLO. Hopefully this would prevent leaders of the new structures being chosen only by the top.
4. Finally, the tendency emphases that the struggle against the Gaza-Jericho Accords cannot be waged only on the basis of strategic slogans. Slogans must be translated into concrete action and a firm political programme which addresses the issues of the right to return, self-determination, and the creation of an independent Palestinian State with international credibility.
For its part, the nationalist tendency is represented primarily by Fatah-Intifada (a dissident Fatah group led by Abu Mussa), the Popular Front General Command (PF-GC), Saika, and the Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party. The first two organisations have taken the following positions;
1. It is unnecessary to form a national, democratic and Islamic front. It would be better to convene immediately a meeting of the PNC, to elect a new leadership of the PLO. According to the democratic tendency, this proposal is premature and makes it impossible to try and convince independents and opponents within Fatah that they should participate in the rebuilding of the PLO.
2. The tendency is rather unsupportive of the idea of involving the masses in the rebuilding of the PLO and in elections of its leadership, preferring that only the ten choose the members of a broad national conference, each organisation sending representatives according to predetermined quotas.
3. The tendency supports the strategic objective of an independent Palestine, but rejects both the idea of seeking international legitimacy and a transitional formula for an independent Palestinian State, wanting the liberation of all Palestine rather than simply an independent state.
The Islamic tendency is composed of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and takes the following stance:
1. In the political arena it is similar to the nationalist tendency in that it also rejects a quest for international legitimacy and a transitional formula.
2. From the beginning the tendency has approved the idea of a national Islamic front (as opposed to a national, democratic, Islamic front). It has also supported the idea of forming an Islamic national leadership of the Intifada — no doubt because it believes it has the support of the masses and so can do so alone.
3. Although following the meeting on 15 December the two organisations agreed to work within the PLO and rebuild its institutions, and also agreed to recognise the Charter (on condition that
International Viewpoint #253 February 1994 it be amended to include the project of a future Islamic State in Palestine), this was not through conviction (although they claimed this but rather due to the fact that the PLO is recognised on a panArab and international level. Further, gaining leadership of the PLO is not their strategic objective. Both organisations have always stated openly that their aim is to build a replacement organisation.
4. The tendency agrees with the idea of broad national conferences and popular assemblies, but only on condition that these are propagandist bodies with no democratic role, that is, without mass participation in the election of the leaderships.
5. A minority current in Hamas is in favour of participating in the self-government administration elections, if they involve election to a legislature. This position shows that they have not understood the liquidationist nature of the Gaza-Jericho Accords in relation to the Palestinian struggle. If this current should strengthen, leading to a shift in the Hamas position, the tendency could end up participating in the liquidation of the struggle.
### Alliance
It should be stated that Islamic Jihad does not support the position of Hamas, particularly with regard to organisation of the Alliance, and is also firmly opposed to the self-government administration elections.
The attitude of Hamas towards programme and organisation in the meetings on 15 December and 5 January led to the formation of an alliance rather than a front (and so a reduced platform) and to adopt "political tasks", not a substantive programme. Nor was a timescale agreed for the rebuilding of the PLO Arafat thus continues to appear as its legitimate leader.
Moreover, there remains a lack of clarity in respect of establishing a national leadership of the Intifada. If no leadership is set up the activities of the ten in the Occupied Territories will become dispersed between Hamas, the PFLP and DFLP, with further isolated activity by Islamic Jihad. None of the other groups has any real existence in the Territories.
There is no reason, however, for pessimism.
Firstly, the meetings have reduced a concrete result — an alliance around agreed political tasks — a positive achievement which has already produced results in daily activity.
Secondly, we intend to continue the struggle, in particular for the rebuilding of the PLO's institutions in such a way as to remove Arafat's claim to legitimacy, which he uses to obtain support for the Gaza-Jericho Accords, and also for the setting up of a national Islamic leadership for the Intifada, based on the four organisations with a presence in the Occupied Territories. This clandestine leadership will have a public leadership comprised of democratically elected organisations and individuals, involving the broadest possible mass participation.
The PLO has its basis in the Palestinian National Charter, the national programme (adopted in 1974), the political and moral identity of the Palestinian people, its institutions and the people who work within the framework of these.
By signing the Gaza-Jericho Accords, Arafat abandoned the Charter, the programme and the political and moral identity of the PLO. Accordingly the PLO presently does not exist in its old form. The different currents must remain loyal to the above and rebuild the PLO's institutions with new people, to remove Arafat's appearance of formal legitimacy.
The democratic tendency sees the PLO as a project for Palestinian liberation which is the property of all the Palestinian people — not just of Arafat. The tendency contributed to the building of the PLO and to it becoming the symbol of the political and moral identity of the Palestinian people. This is why it believes that the PLO must continue -unburdened of all those who, under Arafat's guidance, have abandoned the programme and the Charter.
The nationalist tendency shares this conception of the PLO, although differing on the transitional programme. Accordingly, eight of the ten are in favour of maintaining the PLO and rebuilding its institutions — thereby isolating Hamas and Islamic Jihad and increasing the pressure on them to rally to this position.
It is extremely important that Hamas takes part in the rebuilding of the PLO for two reasons: Firstly, if Hamas remains in the ten this weakens the current within it which wants to participate in the self-government administration elections. Secondly, it will be easier to prevent Hamas from posing as an alternative to the PLO or attempting to eliminate it outright if it is involved in the rebuilding.
The discussion on the tactics of each of the three oppositionist tendencies remains open. However, the important point is that we are working for our revolutionary project. Whatever our successes or errors, we must act decisively and with confidence. *
33
Tuzla: "A workers' town"
OUR correspondent, who was a driver with the first International
Workers' Aid convoy last year, and plans to return to Bosnia in the near future, has sent us the following report. It was originally submitted to the British political magazine New Statesman and Society which declined to publish it. In our March issue a major article from Catherine Sammary
International Viewpoint #253 February 1994 sel stocks for essential services. Much of the trade reaching Tuzla previously had come from the Serbs via a bunch of renegade HVO who had been chased out by the BH army after the massacre by Croat fanatics of twenty-five Muslim will continue our regular coverage and analysis of the war in Bosnia. MICK WOODS* — London, 14 January 1994
W
HEN our convoy of trucks reached Tuzla last November we were one of the first convoys to get through for seven months; since the Croatian Defence Organisation (HVO) had begun their blockade of the route from Split to Central Bosnia in April 1993.
The HVO are only one part of the blockade of Tuzla. The town has been surrounded on three sides by Bosnian Serb forces since May 1992 and is constantly in range of heavy artillery. Together, this mis-alliance is trying to starve the city into submission and, perhaps more importantly, isolate it from the Europe of which it is so much a part.
### Ideals
Tuzla is the embodiment of the old multi-ethnic Bosnia and the ideals of the old Titoist Yugoslavia. Here Muslim, Croat and Serb lived and continue to live, work and fight side by side. This area had the highest number of people describing themselves as Yugoslavs; the product of mixed marriages or political conviction. When we visited the 760 megawatt power station TE Tuzla, a Serb worker told us he stayed in Tuzla "because it is a workers' town". The most popular picture in factories, offices and homes remains that of Marshall Tito, architect of federal Yugoslavia.
Tuzla benefited from the years of Titoism and grew five-fold in that period to its present 150 thousand inhabitants. It had one of the highest standards of living in the relatively backward Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH), a life its inhabitants remember fondly. Its main industries were mining; there are five deep and two surface coal mines. These supplied the electricity industry for much of Bosnia and Croatia. There are also salt 34 mines, a massive chemical complex to the west of the town and assorted light industries.
The war has devastated the prosperity of the town. Pits are barely working due to a lack of fuel and explosives. The power station works at five percent of its capacity. It is not certain whether there will be sufficient fuel for the town's communal heating system this winter. Many workers are in the army and most others are working short-time or not at all. Cash wages have fallen with the BH dinar and are now worth between three and five deutschmarks (DM) a month. The Bosnian dinar is no longer a currency, but is a war bond worth about 80 thousand to the DM and is most often encountered as small change.
In any war or disaster a small section of the population will arise to exploit the misery of their fellow citizens. In Tuzla we were told that maybe five percent are working in or living off the black-market. Opposite the town hall you can buy Serbian cigarettes for 7DM a packet, flour for 10DM a kilo, and coffee for between 70 and 90DM a kilo. Diesel is 25DM a litre. Most people are either spending their savings or slowly starving.
### Nouveau riches
On the other hand you can see the well dressed nouveau riches eating in the Tuzla Hotel or one of the few remaining restaurants — places where a meal costs six months' salary.
The challenge of controlling this trade seems to be beyond the civil and military authorities and one is forced to ask questions: Who runs it? Who benefits? And why is there not greater effort to suppress it? It was not easy to get answers to any of these questions.
The local authority control some diecivilians at Stupni Do. It is inconceivable that the 70 thousand refugees in the town do not sell some of the items from their food parcels. We were told even more bizarre tales of the BH army buying ammunition from the Serbs only to shoot it back at them. The black-market is at present the most visible sign of market forces at work.
The army has grown since May 1992 when the Tuzla militia and police drove the Yugoslavian National Army (JNA) out of the town with heavy losses. The effect of the United Nations arms embargo has crippled the BH army against their better armed enemies. Soldiers have to walk perhaps twenty-five kilometres to the front where they are issued with six bullets for normal purposes. They are not allowed to fire unless sure of their target or their own lives are in danger. They stay at the front for six days without adequate food and then they walk back.
The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) they face has tanks, artillery, machine guns, mortars and plenty of ammunition. However, the morale of the BH army is magnificent. On the day before we planned to leave Tuzla we were invited to dinner by the miners' union. While we were eating there was chanting and singing outside in the hotel entrance. We went out and saw maybe two-hundred fully armed soldiers celebrating. When we asked what they were celebrating we were told it was their being sent to the front!
Whoever you talk to in the town, from the Mayor to miners and soldiers, expresses a desire for peace but also a determination to fight to maintain their multi-ethnic Bosnian identity. At the last election in Tuzla the anti-nationalist parties won overwhelmingly. The same cannot be said of the area surrounding it,
* Mick Woods is a supporter of the British Fourth Internationalist paper, Socialist Outlook. Jenny Mees, a member of the Belgian section of the Fourth International, the Socialist Workers' Party (POS/SAP), was also on the convoy which reached Tuzla.
----- pull-quotes on this page -----
BOSNIA
International Viewpoint #253 February 1994 which is dominated by Itzebegovich's Muslim Democratic Party.
There is a tension within Bosnia-Herzegovina between the two poles of multi-ethnicity and Muslim nationalism. The Presidency seems to move between the two but can be seen, at this time, to be moving towards the latter and away from the Sarajevo declaration.! This reflects many factors: the isolation of BH by both its enemies and the international community; the efforts of the UN to broker a carve-up of BH on ethnic lines: and the real effects of ethnic cleansing on the national psyche (the base of the nationalists in Tuzla is amongst refugees). The arms which have arrived have been from the Muslim world and this has strengthened the hand of the
Tuzla is the other pole. The towns' Mayor, Selim Beslegic, is the best known spokesperson for the old BH. The 2nd Corps of the BH army, based in Tuzla, has mixed units; for example, the 3rd Mechanised Brigade, made up of Muslims, Croats and Serbs. No ethnic cleansing has taken place of Serbs in this area, although many have moved voluntarily to places like Bijeljina. The only other comparable area is Sarajevo but the effects of the Presidency's shifting position seems to be undermining this.
Tuzla now stands like an island in a sea of nationalist madness, its population slowly starving and freezing in the Bosnian winter. To get a convoy to Tuzla you have to drive over four-hundred kilometres of some of the worst roads and tracks in Europe, and through three battle lines. Tuzla's refugees receive only forty-eight percent of the food needed to keep them alive. Why is this happening?
### Airport
Tuzla is an industrialised city with an airport and is two hours drive from Croatia on a perfectly good road. Why does the UN not open the airport and the northern route through Orajse, or the route through Banja Luka and Doboj and carry out its mandate to take humanitarian aid to the people of Central Bosnia?
The simplest answer is that the UN are prepared to use aid and starvation as an instrument with which to force the Bosnian people to accept the Vance/Owen or Owen/Stoltenberg plans, or whatever is being cooked-up in Geneva at the time. This may sound cynical. It is not nearly so cynical as the games which are being played with the lives of my friends in Tuzla; or the threats of David Owen to suspend aid if Bosnia does not accept his solution to the war. The West may not be pro-Serbian or pro-Croat, but they are certainly pro-order, and the "strong" regimes being built by Milosevic and Tudjman are seen as safer for stability than the beleaguered Bosnians.
### Shoe-string
At another level the UN is one of the most flatulent, useless bureaucracies in the world. They hate anyone who comes in on a shoe-string and shows up their inadequacy and inactivity. Thousands of these people are sitting in offices in Zagreb, and Split drawing £30 thousand-plus salaries telling people they are powerless to help and trying to control the whole shooting match. If you doubt this read the outburst of the UNHCR chief in Mostar against Sally Becker for having the cheek to come on to their patch and evacuate injured people.? On the day before we reached Tuzla we were told categorically that it was impossible to proceed further and the only thing to do was to unload in to the local UNHCR warehouse at Zenica.
This is not to deride the genuine efforts of many of the UN staff and soldiers who helped us and showed great friendliness and hospitality on the road but to describe the rotten edifice of the
The International Workers' Aid convoy in which I drove had support from trade unionists, socialists, Muslims and many other people in our home countries. We came from England, Ireland, Australia, Belgium and Sweden. We gave our aid to the trade unions, the very same unions which have assisted others in struggle, for example, during the British miners' strike of 1984/85. The people of Tuzla were delighted to see such international support and treated us accordingly. They begged us to tell the world about their situation and specifically to tell our trade union movements. They rely on our solidarity to fight the blockade they face so that their small nation may live in peace and
There is much we can do: we can start campaigning for the opening of Tuzla airport; we can start asking why the northern route cannot be opened for aid; we can demand our governments drop their hypocritical arms embargo and allow the Bosnian people to defend themselves against aggression; and we can go back there with more aid.
At the end of last year, at a meeting in Copenhagen, International Workers' Aid decided to raise 60 thousand deutschmarks to buy three four-wheel-drive trucks to develop its operation. I can't wait to get back. *
1. The Sarajevo declaration was published in 1992 by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, emphasising the multi-ethnic nature of the society they wished to detend.
2. Sally Becker, a Briton, while working independently from any of the various medical agencies, has managed to evacuate wounded on more than one occasion.
Student appeal from
Tuzla
"Greetings,
We address you from Tuzla, the centre of north-eastern Bosnia, and the most important mining area of our country.
Soon, two whole years will have passed since the war began in this area.
The war has affected all of us but our faculty, Mining & Geology, still functions. Professors and students still work hard and learn so that in the future their acquired knowledge will aid the industrial development of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Our town and country is under a blockade from all sides, so we are in no position to make contact with the outside world
For these reasons we are appealing for your co-operation.
We have no new books and little access to the necessary literature and journals. Our financial situation is so bad we need whatever help you can give.
Thank you."
Our address is:
Students' Association
Mining-Geological Faculty/Tuzla
University
Bratstva i jedinstva
75 000 Tuzla phone: (075) 238 552 or 239 492
Video out soon!
A video made by members of the
International Workers' Aid convoy, and edited by British film-maker Anne
Marie Sweeney, is soon to be released
This will be a resource no solidarity campaign can be without.
Watch this space.
35